Indian Defence Review

The Indo-Pak confrontation over Jammu and Kashmir — more importantly the Kashmir Valley — needs to be viewed seriously from a military-strategic viewpoint. There are certain essential issues that need to be addressed and clarified, which are directly related to the current insurgency in the Valley.

The obsession with the strategic importance of Jammu and Kashmir in relation to its position vis-a-vis Central Asia, Russia and China, has traditionally been exaggerated. This viewpoint was first enunciated by the British. In subsequent years, as the geo-political environment of the subcontinent changed, the diverse interpretations of nationhood and the security concerns of India and Pakistan, gave Kashmir an altogether different strategic dimension. Suffice it to say that, whereas Pakistan considers itself incomplete (as a home for the Muslims of South Asia) without the amalgamation of the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley into Pakistan, it is equally essential for the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley to remain a part of India. Besides, any further fragmentation of India (such as the secession of Kashmir) could possibly encourage secessionism, which could then lead to a break-up of the entire subcontinent. This today is the main importance of the Kashmir issue.

Events leading to the Kashmir insurgency

Although , there is a unanimity in the view that the conflict over Kashmir has its roots in the events of the partition of India in 1947, a closer evaluation of the two decades between 1971 and 1991 reveals that a series of international, regional and domestic events have all contributed towards the current insurgency in the Valley.

It is also pertinent to understand that the present-day Pakistani psyche and identity-related dilemma is relatively different from the post-1947 phenomenon. Pakistan’s approach to India and more specifically Kashmir, is fostered in the humiliation of their defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pak war — their’s is a wounded psyche seeking revenge from lndia.¹ The Shimla Accord of 1972 — though accommodative of Zulfikar Bhutto’s requests for the inclusion of clauses that then appeared to show India and Pakistan as partners towards peace — is seen today in Pakistan as humiliating as the Treaty of Versailles, which was then imposed on a defeated Germany by the victors of the First World War.

This led to a turning point in Indo-Pak relations, and no wonder, when India joined the nuclear club in 1974, Pakistan began its overt drive for an “Islamic bomb”, with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto promising to contest India over a nuclear arms race.

From 1973 onwards, the hike in oil prices enabled some of the Islamic states of the Middle East to financially support Pakistan’s strategic efforts. Alongside simultaneously by the mid-seventies, the Kashmiris in general, became thoroughly disenchanted with their lot and more importantly, by those who continued to amass wealth in the Valley, under the semi-autonomous privileged status of J&K that accrued from Article 370 of the Indian Constitution Thus, a movement began to gather momentum amongst the Kashmiris, who now desired a socialist-pattern-equality-based Islamic state. An offshoot of this desire led to a renewed emphasis on “Madrasa” (Islamic school) education in the Valley, for which the funding came both from those supporting the spread of pan-lslamization in the region, as well as from many affluent local Kashmiris keen to appease the local hardliners.² (General Zia, as we now know, had initiated a similar emphasis on Islamic schools in Pakistan in the 1980s, which eventually became training institutions for terrorists/ militants who headed for Afghanistan and the Kashmir Valley.)

In the 1980s Pakistan became a perceived bulwark against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, leading to a massive influx of weapons in the region ostensibly for the Afghan Mujahideen. These weapons formed “the Kalashnikov pipeline”, founded by the CIA and routed through Pakistan, with the Pakistan lSI masterminding their distribution. Accountability was virtually dispensed with, and the lSI began stockpiling a huge cache of weapons for its dangerous designs to destabilize India, as has now been confirmed.³

The 1980s also saw the rise of militancy in Punjab, and as New Delhi struggled to grapple with the strategic consequences of a Punjab in turmoil, the alienation and disenchantment of the Kashmiris continued unattended. The Madras educated generation of the Valley, were by the late 1980s, young men who saw their cause as the “Liberation” of Kashmir from Indian “occupation”. The Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) saw the 1987 elections as a chance to finally establish itself as an effective replacement for the Farooq Abdullah-led National Conference. It is here that the alleged malpractices of the 1987 elections, and New Delhi’s support for a discredited Farooq stretched the Kashmiri patience to breaking point.⁴

As hordes of Kashmiri youth, a few thousand or so, periodically crossed into Pakistan for weapons and training in 1988, New Delhi was just about beginning to come to grips with Punjab.⁵ The Soviet pullout from Afghanistan in 1988-89 made available to Pakistan’s ISI, its chief cronie Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his men, to “guide” the “misguided” Kashmiri rebels. By mid-1989, trained and armed Kashmiri rebels returned to the Valley with the king Kalashnikov in their hands.

And then in 1990, the Soviet Union began to break up and the media coverage of revolutionary movements in East Europe convinced the Kashmiris that their independence too was round the corner. To add to India’s misfortune, the collapse of successive weak political governments in New Delhi led politicians to focus on little else other than their own political future.⁶

When the Kashmiris finally revolted against India, things had never appeared so hopeless for India. The problem “in” Kashmir had finally become the problem “of” Kashmir, with very few, if any, having the foggiest idea as to how Kashmir could be handled.⁷ From 1990 onwards the uprising in the Valley continued to exhibit the classic symptoms of an insurgency that would last a long, long while. Insurgency is only the military component of the strategy; the political component is subversion by terrorism, and violent struggle. Kashmir is a case in point.

The military-strategic dimension

After the Indo-Pak war of 1971 and the Shimla Accord of 1972, the Line of Control (LC) which was earlier known as the cease-fire Line (CFL) became an accepted de facto extension of the Indo-Pak boundary line. This line dividing the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two parts, between India and Pakistan, proceeded north until it terminated t a map reference called NJ 9842. This point lay south of the Saltoro Ridge, overlooking the Siachen Glacier. In the mid-1980s, General Zia-ul-Haq initiated a campaign — both politico-diplomatic and military — to claim NJ 9842 and the areas beyond. Soon India responded militarily and the glacial conflict became known as the Siachen dispute. Pakistan’s intention was to occupy areas well beyond NJ 9842, so as to defy the sanctity of the LC and thus keep their claims on the entire region of Jammu and Kashmir alive.⁸

Apparently, the second phase of General Zia’s plans to lay fresh claims on Kashmir, as the glacier conflict went on endlessly, was to infiltrate armed elements into the Valley and create conditions of insurgency. The second phase gained momentum after General Zia’s sudden demise, but the design for the current turmoil in the Valley was, by many authoritative accounts, laid by him in 1987-88. Whereas the question that was being asked in India about the ongoing Siachen conflict was related to the justification of fighting a “futile” glacier war, in Pakistan there was a general dismay at the inability o their “elite” forces to dislodge Indian troops from the Saltoro Ridge (Siachen glacier) complex. Thus it was with the intention of maintaining the momentum of his grand design on Kashmir, that General Zia had planned and initiated his second phase, i.e. the anti-Indian insurgency in the Valley.⁹ Herein lies the remote, but strategically significant, linkage between the glacier conflict and the insurgency in the Valley.

A significant military issue which lies at the heart of Pakistan’s propaganda campaign on Kashmir is on the actual number of Indian troops deployed in the Valley in counter-insurgency operations. Pakistan has so often quoted the figure of some half a million (500,000) Indian soldiers deployed in the Valley (and by implication against the Kashmirsi that these figures have begun to be generally accepted internationally. And the official Indian silence in response to the Pakistani propaganda-ostensibly for purposes of military secrecy-gives further strength to Pakistan’s assertions. A recent Pakistani circular at the UN has now raised the figure of Indian troops in Kashmir to 600,000! However, a closer inspection of the real strength of India’s forces in the Valley makes the entire Pakistani propaganda look highly illogical.¹⁰

India’s army is divided into five regional field armies — north, south, east, west and central — and J&K falls under the operational area of the Northern Command which comprises of some 330,000 troops (with eight divisions and eleven brigades) the operational role of the Northern Command essentially includes the manning of the highly volatile Line of Control (which is constantly the scene of fire exchanges between Indo-Pak troops) and in turn keeps the troops deployed on the LC heavily committed. In addition, the Northern Command has the responsibility of the ongoing conflict in the Siachen region, as well as deployment on the Indo-China border in Ladakh.

Hence, the Indian army troops operating in the Valley have never quite exceeded three divisions (i.e., 35,000 troops). Added to that are some 40,000 SSF and some 5000-odd CRPF paramilitary men who are in the Valley. Besides, the current induction of some 10,000 Rashtriya Rifle troops has led to the pull-out of an equal number of regular army units (i.e., a Division). Thus, the correct figure of Indian troops in the Valley, all inclusive, is certainly not more than a 100,000. The Pakistani figure (of 600,000) would imply that half the entire Indian Army was in the Valley — a ridiculous idea indeed.¹¹

An aspect which is sometimes discussed by Indians but which receives little clarification, concerns the issue of launching Indian trans-border military raids into Pakistan to destroy or damage their training camps for terrorists and insurgents. Despite the uneasy peace that prevails between India and Pakistan, such an exercise is highly improbable for a number of reasons.¹² First, there remains an unwritten, but a much accepted sanctity of the LC. Troops on either side cannot operate across this Line unless both sides decide to go for another war. Second, most of the camps in Pakistan are located well beyond a 24-hour turnaround period. As most commando raids are planned to last up to 24 hours — inclusive of an infiltration and exfiltration — and with the possibility of airlift or heliborne induction of commandos being ruled out, such an exercise will be highly provocative, dangerous and will meet with little or no success. Third, these training camps for insurgents within Pakistan are highly mobile and have no permanence, which makes any accurate air-photography or intelligence-gathering of the status of these training camps very difficult. Commando raids are not launched on vague targets. Fourth, there are many areas on the LC itself where the Indian troops are at a disadvantage, i.e., dominated by the better tactical positions of the Pakistanis. Should such an exercise be undertaken by India, we may stand to lose ground along the LC itself. Finally, Pakistan will not stand by helplessly against such raids within its territory. Any raids of such a nature can only be undertaken if we are prepared for a full-scale war that may follow. Strategic wisdom thus suggests that this is on the whole an unlikely proposition.

Within the Valley, there are even more important security dilemmas that need to be addressed. While combating insurgency, which has a strong external base, any security force has to make a clear division between its “operational” (i.e., counterinsurgency) role and its “security” (i.e., law and order) role.¹³ In the case of J&K, the operational role of the army is twofold. One, it has to guard the sanctity of the LC and be deployed along the borders to ward off external threats. The other is a purely counterinsurgency role within the Valley itself. The same forces on the ground are rarely used for both these roles simultaneously, although the higher headquarters will be often involved in both these efforts together (such as HQ 15 Corps in Srinagar). The law and order situation despite the army’s presence is by and large handled by the paramilitary and the police forces of the area. This essentially involves protection of VIPs, important buildings and offices, security of the treasury and the banks, etc.

Interestingly, much as the common man and even many in the media find it convenient to club the entire lot of weapon-carrying uniformed personnel into a broad and ambiguous term “Security Forces”, there is a world of difference in the professional ethics, competence and goals of the Indian Army and the other armed police elements operating in the Valley. The army is, by and large, far more experienced and professional in handling the insurgency and is doing a remarkable job in winning the “hearts and minds” of the people. The same cannot be said for the other forces deployed in the Valley. Related to this aspect is that despite the effort to initiate a conceptually sound unified command for the “Security Forces”, the entire project lacks unity of purpose. The army and the police (paramilitary included) are constantly at odds with each other in an effort to protect their own interests. And the plethora of intelligence agencies in the Valley are a law unto themselves, who abhor any submission to the army’s command.

The modern-day battlefield (such as in Kashmir) is turning into a “war without fronts” — a nightmare for the classical strategists. For many observers, military strategy is caught between the endless prospect of fighting a protracted and an ambiguous low-intensity conflict on the one hand, and at the other end of the spectrum looms the threat of a conventional war turning nuclear. One of the major strategic lessons of the 1965 Indo-Pak war, which started once Ayub Khan had failed to destabilize the Valley through Operation Gibraltar, was that any conventional military adventure over Kashmir would not be restricted to Kashmir alone; it would eventually develop into a full-scale Indo-Pak war. This remains the guiding principle for any future Indo-Pak military confrontation over Kashmir.¹⁴ However, such a confrontation, it must be added, is on the whole unlikely.

Finally, while we are on the subject of clarifying the major strategic issues related to Kashmir, it is important to comment on a typical scenario that the Americans often repeat in the context of current Indo-Pak hostilities. It goes this way: “India’s frustration with insurgency in the Valley could encourage the Indians to undertake transborder military raids into Pakistan. The Pakistan army would then retaliate and having made certain territorial gains, would force the Indians to bargain over J&K. India’s military retaliation however will provide no decisive gains and hence the Indians would resort to using nuclear weapons to subdue Pakistan. The ensuing nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would cause a global catastrophe. Hence, the urgent need for Arms Control, Disarmament and the de-nuclearization of South Asia.”¹⁵

The scenario sounds good but it is obviously flawed. The reasons are manifold. First, the unlikelihood of India undertaking transborder crossings for reasons which have been dealt with in detail earlier. Second, both the Indian and Pakistani military leaderships are convinced that in the event of a conventional war between the two, neither side can hope to make any major territorial gains. In fact, it is India which still enjoys a relative edge over Pakistan and not vice-versa despite India’s commitments against the Chinese. Third, the military leadership on both sides is on the whole very stable and well conversant with the awesome power of nuclear weapons. Finally, nuclear weapons in fact act as a strong deterrence (for fear of Mutual Destruction) and it is a fallacy to believe that some trigger-happy General would be only too willing to press the (non-existent) red button! Hence, in sharp contrast to what analysts in Washington propagate both Indians and Pakistanis are categorical that there is no likelihood of a nuclear conflict between them.

Quite clearly, the Kashmir issue has an importance extending into several areas of strategic interest. At the heart of the traditional Indo-Pak rivalry lies the unresolved status of Kashmir, since the partition of India. And it is this rivalry that shall continue to influence the balance of military power in South Asia.

This article was first published in IDR Vol. 11 (2) Apr-Jun 1996.