Indian Defence Review

Ten years after the Pokhran (POK-2) series of tests in May 1998, it is useful to examine the progress on the diplomatic front and see what is needed further.

The recently concluded India-US nuclear deal was preceded by interactions with all major powers — economic and nuclear countries in the neighborhood. It is comforting to note that while the western global economies are in recession, the Indian economy is still growing, albeit at a lower 5-7 percent rate. Overall economic strength and financial ratings of India today is in a much better situation than pre-May 1998 levels. The domestic political scene is fractious as ever and elections are to be held soon.

Due to ideological ties and possible command of such movements by surrogates or regulars on leave, the state players might not feel they are violating their sovereign commitments of non-transfer of WMD.

The strategic weapons and policy impact of India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement (IUCNA) split the Indian strategic thinkers and stakeholders in a highly divisive debate. The quality of debate and horse trading in Indian parliament raised the rhetoric and obfuscated and confused the Indian people, the defence forces, and the scientific establishment. It is now an opportune moment to examine India’s deterrent posture and assess the path forward and actions necessary to safeguard, preserve and expand Indian interests.

Immediately after the POK-2 round of tests, India declared the following elements of its policy — No First Use1 (NFU) and non-use against non-weapon states which constitute negative assurances to non- NWS. An additional element was credible minimum deterrent posture to assure the world that the Indian position was not open-ended and India had no intention of seeking parity or indulging in an arms race in and outside Asia. While India remains committed to its nuclear No-First-Use policy that does not mean India will not have a first-strike capability.2

It is important to examine the role of nuclear weapons in an Indian thought. The primary role is to deter other nuclear weapons. Hence this role exists as long as other states possess these weapons. They are not to deter war and the Indian leadership has acknowledged this. They only deter escalation.

Elements of A Credible Deterrent

Nuclear Doctrine

The first element is to have a clear doctrine stating the conditions under which the Indian State would resort to nuclear weapons. It has to keep in mind the commitment to No First Use and the negative assurances to non-weapon states. This doctrine has to address all threats — state and non-state actors.

There is no real basis for distinguishing between tactical and strategic weapons. All nuclear weapons are strategic and the decision to use them is a political step on the escalation ladder. The real distinction is between low and high yield devices.

The declared position of the GOI on NFU etc., takes care of state players. However, as regular warfare is a deterred, there is a possibility of proxy wars through non-state actors both within and without India. Due to ideological ties and possible command of such movements by surrogates or regulars on leave, the state players might not feel they are violating their sovereign commitments of non-transfer of WMD. Under such conditions the doctrine has to treat the sponsors as proxy aggressors and deal accordingly.

In addition it has to take into account the fact that the Revolution in Military affairs (RMA) makes it possible to subject the state to severe degradation with conventional attacks. The NFU pledge could lull an attacker to resort to massive conventional attack without fear of retaliation. Thus the NFU clause has to have a rider that it would not apply when facing a severe defeat. An alternate clause would be that use of force not in accordance with international law or the UN charter would negate the NFU. These take care of aggressions and unlawful use of force.

The possibility exists of some powers using fourth generation nuclear weapons, which are not accompanied by nuclear chain reactions. These could be what are termed as micro-nukes and could be used against high value targets. To counter such use, the use of weapons based on fission or fusion or using nuclear materials or by products should be considered as First Use and invite retaliation.

Command and Control

A clear chain of command and control of strategic forces has to be put in place. Logically, the Prime Minster would be the ultimate decision-maker. There is no place for incompetence here. In case of incapacity of the PM, the line of succession has to be clearly documented by an act of Parliament. Separate travel arrangements for those on the list have to be implemented. The Warrant of Precedence is a hangover from colonial times and is good for protocol purposes only and should be revised to suit modern realities.

The other aspects that need addressing are discussed below.

Detection

First and foremost is the authentication of the first strike — whether it really is nuclear, where it came from and who is responsible.

Missile launch detection by a constellation of space borne optical/IR sensors is a highly effective method to locate the launch point and source of the nuclear missile.

The first requires highly mobile units spread across the nation that can quickly sample the air to determine if a nuclear attack has occurred by using on-board equipment to analyze fallout residue. Analysis of the atomic signature of fissile nuclear material used in the attack will narrow down the nationality/pedigree of nuclear weapon.

An attack by challenger nation-state will very likely involve ballistic missile or air-cruising vehicle. Missile launch detection by a constellation of space borne optical/IR sensors is a highly effective method to locate the launch point and source of the nuclear missile. A complement of 3-4 satellites in geo-synchronous orbits and 4-5 more satellites in medium earth orbit can reliably locate missile launch from land or sea, which can also feed Indian ABM sensor network.

These satellites of between 900-1,200 kg mass can serve other military functions (E.g., communication and ELINT). India has proven capability to build and launch such satellites.3 Ground based surveillance radars that are part of ABM networks along the perimeter of Indian borders can also locate the launch location and determine the type of hostile missile. Submarine launched missiles also leave a tell-tale acoustic signature during launch, and a global array of hydrophones will increase reliability in determining the source of nuclear attack. Detection and identification of small and/or low flying cruise missile or aircraft require interlocking grid of bi-static radars and conventional mono-static radars. Bi-static radars are strategic assets and not commercially available — thus it warrants urgent indigenous development.

Communication

The communication system has to be augmented. Press reports indicate two transponders on the INSAT series could be used for secure communications. These have to be expanded and eventually a dedicated satellite system with redundancies has to be put in place. All feasible measures to avoid accidental/unauthorized launches have to be in place.

Intelligence

Another step needed is to setup an early warning system based on satellite sensors for timely detection of hostile moves. The Cartosat-I and II satellites with 2.5m and 1m resolution respectively could provide a basis for this setup. Again tradeoffs between roles and missions have to be made. For instance, the remote sensing role requires a sun-synchronous orbit. In the misty winters of the sub-continent this may not be adequate due to cloud cover. Hence suitable orbits have to be selected in conjunction with the planners and end users. In addition radar based imaging satellites (similar to ISRO’s RISAT) have to be deployed.4

Dedicated Strike Force and Command

A dedicated strike force and chain of command has to be established to provide a convincing way of enforcing the doctrine. A separate strategic force commander should be appointed, reporting to the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) along with all other service chiefs.

The strike force should be a joint one with the Indian Army units, the IAF and IN for the missile and aircraft based systems. Currently, the force is based on land-based mobile missiles and aircraft. Eventually the bulk of the deterrent has to move to a submarine platform for survivability. In the interim it can be based on surface assets — missiles and aircrafts. The idea is to raise the cost of first strike to an aggressor and enable the Armed Forces to deploy its assets to match the situation.

The actual weapons themselves have to be made by DRDO with inputs from BARC. There has to be a joint certifying agency for stockpile issues.

Nuclear Arsenal

In summary there are three broad types of nuclear warheads:-

The POK-II tests demonstrated Indian mastery of fission and boosted fission nuclear weapons. Thermonuclear experiment (Shakti-1) based credible warhead however requires confirmatory test.

Fission warhead : This is the earliest type of nuclear warhead in which all the yield comes from nuclear fission. This type of warhead is militarily useful for low yield application to take out enemy command and control via precision strike. With only 5 to 15 percent efficiency of the fissile fuel these types of warheads require large fissile material stockpile. Indian mastery of this type of weapon was evident from accurate control of the yield of 3 sub-kiloton test shots on the far lower end of the yield curve at par with established nuclear powers.

Boosted Fission warhead : Also known as Fusion Boosted Fission (FBF) warhead. This type of warhead uses small amount of Tritium and Deuterium (isotopes of Hydrogen) to increase fission efficiency, converting up to about 45 percent of the fissile material into explosive energy, thus reducing fissile material requirement. Such warheads require lesser chemical explosives thus are lighter, as well as are more robust and lend themselves to better arming and safety mechanism. The POK-II test in 1998 demonstrated Indian mastery of this type of weapon in the form of primary stage of the Shakti-1 test shot.

Thermo-nuclear (TN) warhead : Also known as a multi-stage nuclear warhead. The first stage of a TN device consists of a Fission or FBF nuclear explosive whose energy in the form of soft X-rays is used to ablate a heavy pusher material to compress and ignite the second stage consisting of Deuterium (in the form of Lithium Deuteride) to undergo nuclear fusion. Nuclear fusion generates highly energetic neutrons that in turn cause fission in the surrounding third stage fissile material. The third stage fissile material can be ordinary natural-Uranium or some other kind of enriched fissile material. Such weapons give very high yield. Most of the yield is generated by the third stage. TN warhead have far higher yield per unit mass of warhead, as well as consume smaller quantity of enriched fissile material. This type of light weight warhead can be delivered over greater range even by a small missile.

The POK-II tests demonstrated Indian mastery of fission and boosted fission nuclear weapons. Thermonuclear experiment (Shakti-1) based credible warhead however requires confirmatory test. Submarine compatible TN warhead also requires testing a TN design that uses only enriched Uranium or super-grade Plutonium.

Warhead

There is no real basis for distinguishing between tactical and strategic weapons. All nuclear weapons are strategic and the decision to use them is a political step on the escalation ladder. The real distinction is between low and high yield devices.

Public information and trade estimates indicate following types of Indian RV warheads:

1. Mk-4: For light weight 17Kt Fusion Boosted Fission (FBF) warhead5. Mass6: ~180 Kg7.
2. Mk-5: For 50Kt FBF or 200Kt Thermo Nuclear (TN) warhead8. Mass: ~340 Kg
3. Mk-6: For 150Kt FBF warhead9. Mass: ~550 Kg.

If India wants to accede to the CTBT it must conclude following tests10 in the next nuclear test series:

1. 5 to 7 tests involving FBF’s and TN’s warheads of 150 Kt and 300-500 Kt ranges respectively.
2. 5 to 7 sub-Kt tests, to significantly improve the database for future ICF11 simulations.

Pending the verification of thermonuclear warhead the high-yield Boosted Fission warhead sets the upper limit of Indian warheads, thus Indian missile range is often quoted for 1,000 Kg payload.

“India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement” has for all practical purposes capped Indian ability to field test and proof high yield nuclear weapons till some time in future (about 20 years) when Indian three stage nuclear fuel cycle based on Thorium fuel matures into mainstream power production, thus eliminating Indian dependence on imported nuclear fuel from NSG countries or if there is a breakout in global nuclear test monitorium.

An alternative to field nuclear test for India is to test and validate the nuclear warheads by building two or more National Ignition Test Facilities (NITF). Incidentally, NIFT is also required for stewardship of Indian Nuclear weapon.

Nuclear Stewardship and National Ignition Test Facilities

It is clear that nuclear weapons will continue to exist in world for the foreseeable future. In the absence of underground testing, the reliability, safety, and effectiveness of the remaining stockpile can be assured only through advanced computational capabilities and above-ground experimental facilities.

Indian Nuclear Stewardship program will involve:

India requires two NITF facilities one for classified weapons programs and other for scientific research in civil domain to unambiguously demonstrate Indian facilities and competence in high energy physics to develop and test fusion weapons. This will make credible Indian high yield FBF and TN weapons that are otherwise not field-tested, thereby significantly increasing Indian deterrence which at the same time reduces total number of weapons required for credible deterrence. The NITF will cost the government about Rs.6,000 crore (US$ 1.3 billion).