Indian Defence Review

Lloyd’s casualty figures

The tote for October 1971 was 8000 tons of shipping sunk and a further 16,000 tons damaged. In addition, pressure was mounted on transport in the inland waterways system particularly from Chittagong, and Khulna to Narayanganj and thence to the provincial capital of Dacca. The armed forces on internal security duties had to spend more time in ensuring their own safety than in carrying out search and attack patrols for ferreting out Mukti Bahini’s concentrations.

Sector Commanders tended to retain the services of the well-trained frogmen who also had the experience for handling explosives and delay charges.

The Mukti Bahini Sector Commanders, as already identified, actively assisted in updating intelligence, providing guides and locating safe hiding places for the frogmen. But the highly motlvated and well-trained underwater guerrillas tended to keep to themselves as the sine qua non for their success and safety depended on surprise, innovation and audacity where leakage of information was invariably fatal to their operation. Moreover, Sector Commanders tended to retain the services of the well-trained frogmen who also had the experience for handling explosives and delay charges. Therefore, the frogmen guarded their quota of limpet mines with a fervour, which in hindsight, was similar to the elan built up by the highly motivated Special Service Groups of today.

The Mukti Bahini land forces also improved their performance considerably after being blooded in their earlier engagements. Bombs exploded nightly in Dacca. Bridges were blown up. Railway tracks uprooted and explosives planted in defence headquarters. West Pakistan Army patrols were consistently ambushed and were in a state of seige both physically and psychologically.

With the end of the monsoons, Pakistan had augmented her forces to four divisions with well-established cantonments at Chittagong, Comilla, Dacca, Jessore and Khulna. It was almost a replica of the British cantonment pattern of command and control. Communication arteries from ports to these cantonments hence became vital targets for the Mukti Bahini. It was therefore necessary to attack the only refinery in the Eastern region which was located at Chittagong. The transportation of fuel for the increasing number of mechanized units and air links in East Pakistan thus became a major task for Pakistan.

Anguish and ecstasy

Bangladesh, however, paid a fearsome price for their resistance. Whole villages were levelled out as colle2tive punishment. Women were raped without ~ny concern of their being Muslims or Pakistani citizens although the Hindus bore the brunt of the atrocities. When I visited Dacca on 17 December 1971 carrying a message from Indira Gandhi to Begum Mujibur Rehman regarding the safety of the Sheikh, the bunkers around the airport resembled brothels with condoms and other sex items littering the military fortifications – a damning indictment of Pakistan’s military norms and that too against their own citizens. Torture and murder were the order of the day. The looting of provisions and stores by the Pakistan Army invariably had a note: ‘Send the bill to Indira Gandhi’.

The World Bank official, Peter Cargill, wrote a damaging report on Pakistan’s administrative incompetence and military brutality. The Bank stopped further economic assistance in spite of the initial efforts of Robert MacNamara to only limit the assistance. The Washington Post and the ‘deep throat’ of American conscience however cut into the efforts of President Nixon and his administration to step up assistance to Pakistan. The secret visit of Kissinger to China brokered by Pakistan was the price paid by democracy.

The armed river launch could only see the outhnes of the freighter and promptly opened fire scoring nearly 50 direct hits on the conspicuous bridge. Fortunately, no one was hurt.

Nearly ten million refugees crossed into West Bengal, Tripura, Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Mizoram. There was an unending stream of deprived citizens carrying all their worldly possessions in a bundle. They belonged to many religions and worshipped different gods but they were all united in running away from death in the figure of the Pakistan soldier who did not differentiate between a Hindu or a Muslim or a Christian or Buddhist. They were all Bengalis and hence a fit target for the genocide unleashed by the martial law authorities on 25 May 1971 – which day was observed as the beginning of the ‘Amar Bengali’ movement.

Mujibnagar became the Headquarters for the exiled Government of Bangladesh and was initially located at Theatre Road, Calcutta. 4 The Bangladesh Government in exile appointed Colonel M.A.G. Osmani, as Commander-in-Chief of the Bangladeshi armed forces on 14 August 1971 to ensure that there was some sort of coordination and control over the thousands who desired to liberate their ‘Sonar Bangia’.

The millions of refugees who entered India had to stand pitifully for hours for a handful of rations which cost India Rs 2 per head. Children suffered most from malnutrition, dysentery and cholera which affected nearly 46,000 by end September. S Life-giving milk and other protein foods were available in some of the camps but the rush for survival was so great that many children failed in their efforts to avoid hunger. A doctor remarked that the children died so quickly that they did not have time to treat them.

November Nemesis — Death-Knell of Ports and Waterways

Surface action at Chalna

The floods of East Pakistan, the breakdown of law and order and the deployment of service personnel for countering the increased hostility of the local population had their effect on the morale and discipline of officers and men of the Pakistan Navy. This was compounded by informal mobilization and the stoppage of retirement. Rear Admiral Shariff, the Flag Officer Commanding East Pakistan, gave a detailed briefing at Naval Headquarters, Karachi on 9 November 1971. He spoke of the increasing role of the Navy in East Pakistan and the urgent need for additional equipment and personnel. He concluded that although it would be a long-drawn-out and dirty campaign, the hard-core insurgents would be subdued. Thereafter, it was business as usual at Naval Headquarters until jolted by the commencement of hostilities.

The secret visit of Kissinger to China brokered by Pakistan was the price paid by democracy.

The Mukti Bahini forces had by now built up sufficient confidence and experience to take on the depleted West Pakistani forces. They sailed their two captured river launches with a mixed crew of twelve ex-naval and freshly trained frogmen to reach Akram Point which was \the entrance to Pusur river on 10/11 November 1971. The launch was armed with a captured 40/60 Bofors gun and with her low silhouette the vessel was difficult to detect in the mist covered environment. At this juncture, the British 7000-ton freighter, St. Albans, commenced entering the Pusur channel. The armed river launch could only see the outhnes of the freighter and promptly opened fire scoring nearly 50 direct hits on the conspicuous bridge. Fortunately, no one was hurt. The Captain instantly reversed course and returned to Calcutta for repairs. The British Naval Adviser at Delhi, Captain Hans-Hamilton requested assistance from the Indian Naval Ordinance personnel at Calcutta to patch up the ship which was completed with a sense of urgency.

It was also explained to the British High Commission in Delhi that the despatch of the British aircraft carrier, HMS Bulwark, and an attendant destroyer ostensibly to evacuate British citizens from East Pakistan would convey the wrong signal to the Bangladeshis as did the announcement of the despatch of the US Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal. It was also pointed out that in view of the large British investments in East Pakistan,’ any feeling that Britain was siding with the oppressors of East Pakistan would imperil their investments as there was never any doubt that ‘Bangladesh’ would be liberated.