Indian Defence Review

Started in 1600 as a company with shareholders to peacefully and profitably develop trade with the Asian continent, the East India Company was no longer a trading concern by the beginning of the nineteenth century, but rather the military arm of the British Empire and “the authorised ruler of the vast Indian subcontinent and various other possessions.”

Click to buy: Tibet: The Lost Frontier

Younghusband described the manner in which British officers of the Company worked for nearly three centuries to expand their empire:

“…We who have dealt with Asiatics can appreciate so well [the following tactic] taking the opportunity, striking while the iron is hot, not letting the chance go by, knowing our mind, knowing what we want, and acting decisively when the exact occasion arises.”1

It was Warren Hastings who first saw the importance for British trade of securing some sort of friendship with Tibet.

Though recognizing the wrong action of the Bhutanese king, the Panchen Lama pleaded with Hastings for clemency ““ it was the first letter from a Tibetan Lama to a British officer.

The Company had opened trading posts in Madras and Calcutta and later started penetrating China, taking tea, silk, porcelains or cottons back to England on the return voyage. An ever-expanding Empire!

Regarding Tibet and the Himalayan states, Hastings bided his time until the right opportunity came to advance his pawn and ‘strike while the iron was hot’.

It came in 1772, when the Bhutanese attacked Cooch Behar2 and took its King prisoner. There was no hesitation in Hastings’ mind. He retaliated against the Bhutanese, defeating them. At that point, the opportunity to enter into contact with Tibet emerged. One hundred and thirty years later, Younghusband thus described Hastings’ actions:

“It was a forward policy, and combined in a noteworthy manner alertness and deliberation, rapidity and persistency, assertiveness and receptivity. He sought to secure his borders by at once striking when danger threatened, but also by taking infinite pains over long periods of time to promote ordinary neighbourly intercourse with those on the other side. Both qualities are necessary.”

The opportunity to enter into contact with Tibet came in the form of a letter from the Panchen Lama who was the guru of the ruler of Bhutan. Though recognizing the wrong action of the Bhutanese king, the Panchen Lama pleaded with Hastings for clemency – it was the first letter from a Tibetan Lama to a British officer.

“¦refer the matter to the Regent and the Kashag in Lhasa who opposed the idea as it would have upset the fragile balance with the Chinese authorities.

The Tashilhunpo monastery was much less isolated than Lhasa. India’s ‘proximity’ would be used by British officers in their ‘forward policy’ till the middle of the twentieth century. The Chinese Amban in Lhasa and the presence of many Chinese monks in the great monasteries around Lhasa were other factors which contributed to the isolation of the Tibetan capital.

Hastings laid the letter of the Panchen Lama before the Board of the Company in Calcutta and informed them that he proposed a general treaty of amity and commerce between Bengal and Tibet. For the purpose, George Bogle, a twenty-eight year old officer was chosen by the Viceroy to be the first British Agent at the Court of the Panchen Lama. He left the same year for Shigatse to negotiate with the Lama.3

Bogle’s discussions with the Tashi Lama,4 revolved around a possible alliance between Tibet and British India, “so that the influence of the latter might be used to restrain the Gurkhas of Nepal from attacking Tibet.”5

The Tashi Lama was quite open to the arguments of Bogle, but he had to refer the matter to the Regent and the Kashag in Lhasa who opposed the idea as it would have upset the fragile balance with the Chinese authorities. The Regent diplomatically wrote that he needed to get a clearance from Peking which, for obvious reasons, never came.

The entry of a new player in the game was not well received by the old players. The Nepalese were not keen to see an alliance between Tibet and India with their kingdom suddenly sandwiched between two powerful neighbours

The entry of a new player in the game was not well received by the old players. The Nepalese were not keen to see an alliance between Tibet and India with their kingdom suddenly sandwiched between two powerful neighbours. The Gurkha King took the matter to the Tashi Lama, assuring him that Tibetans had nothing to fear from the Nepalese6 and that he would keep a friendly attitude towards the Tashi Lhunpo. He also warned that if Bogle was thinking of war, the Nepalese were well prepared and Kathmandu, like Lhasa, wanted to keep the British out of their territory.

The Nepalese king concluded his letter requesting the Tibetan Lama “to have no connection with the Firingies (English) or Moguls and not to allow them into the country, but to follow the ancient custom (to keep the foreigners out).”7

Bogle had many friendly discussions with the Panchen Lama but he finally had to leave the Land of Snows. He later learned that his appeal to the Lhasa Government to receive him, had been rejected. However, before he left Shigatse, Bogle met with many traders from Kashmir and Tibet who told him how keen they were to start business with British India.

The influence of the Manchus’ representatives in Lhasa forced Tibet to remain a closed country; this situation was to continue until the beginning of the twentieth century.

The British clearly identified three main obstacles to their Tibetan forward policy and an eventual alliance with Lhasa.

The first problem was the antagonism of the Himalayan countries such as Bhutan and Nepal towards the Crown. They felt culturally closer to Tibet than to the British.

The second problem was the presence of the Manchu Emperors (through their Ambans) in Lhasa. We have earlier seen the extreme weakness of the Tibetan system and their military dependence on their Chinese patron.

The third obstacle Bogle identified was the growing influence and presence of Russia in the area. One hundred and thirty years later, the same argument (or pretext?) led Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, to send Colonel Younghusband to Tibet, to establish by military means the ‘forward policy’ envisioned by Hastings.

Turner again proposed an agreement to the Tibetans and although the Tashi Lhunpo was not against trading with the British, it was refused again by the Regent in Lhasa under the Ambans influence.

The next occasion for the British to penetrate Tibet came in 1782 when a British Captain, Samuel Turner visited Shigatse. He described the relations between the Tibetans and the Chinese thus: “The influence of the Chinese overawes the Tibetans in all their proceedings, and produces a timidity and a caution in their conduct more suited to the character of subjects than allies.”

Turner again proposed an agreement to the Tibetans and although the Tashi Lhunpo was not against trading with the British, it was refused again by the Regent in Lhasa under the Amban’s influence. The ‘timidity and caution’ of the Tibetan leaders had prevailed.

For a few years the forward policy of the British Empire remained at a standstill. It was only in 1810, that Lord Minto, the Viceroy, sent a new Mission to Tibet led by Thomas Manning, a reputed scholar.

Manning stayed in Lhasa for many months but was finally recalled by the Viceroy. He seems to have been so disgusted by the attitude of the British Government which had not given him the support he felt it should have, that on his return to India in June 1812, he did not even make an official report about his journey. Manning was to be the last Englishman to enter Lhasa before the troops of Younghusband in 1904.

Again and again, British field officers would not receive London’s backing; the Foreign Office did not want to upset Chinese susceptibilities. It is true that at that time, London had plenty of other problems to deal with — in particular, the advance of Napoleon in Europe.

Managing an empire on which ‘the sun never sets’, the Crown’s objectives were to become richer, open new markets, control more strategic positions and eventually bring the Pax Britannia to the world. While the objective of the Chinese Emperors was domination, that of the British was trade and London knew that it is easier to trade with friends than with enemies.

British India and the Himalayan Kingdoms

Great Britain started tackling the problems enunciated by Bogle one by one; time was in their favour. They dealt first with Nepal.

Click to buy: Tibet: The Lost Frontier

In 1814, a British expedition with 34,000 soldiers annexed Nepal. Ten years later the British made the next move and marched into Assam. The Company’s territory now had a border with Bhutan and ultimately in 1865, the British attacked Bhutan, which became a Protectorate.

London used this delay to plan its future strategy. The collateral of this rather small dispute was a new treaty between the British and the Manchu Government regarding Sikkim and Tibet.

Next on the Viceroy’s map was the Kingdom of Sikkim. The annexation of Sikkim or at least control over it by the British was of prime strategic importance: the Chumbi valley commanded the entrance into Tibet.

For centuries the major trade route between India and Central Tibet passed through Natu-la,8 Yatung in Chumbi Valley and then onto Gyantse in Tibet. From a military point of view also, the control of Gangtok and Natu-la was most important.

All the pawns were in place. Nothing would stop the opening of a trade route between India and Tibet, once the suzerainty of Sikkim was grabbed from Lhasa by the British crown.

The ‘acquisition’ of Darjeeling was also a crucial stroke in their strategy and many English officers could already see the potential of Darjeeling as a turning point for trade and diplomatic manoeuvres in the Himalayan region. Similar views were held about Kalimpong. In Tibet, there was an increasing uneasiness over the British ‘Forward Policy’, but what could be done?

The masters of the moment were the British and they were rather benevolent masters. The Sikkimese had to accept their fate in good spirit and there were already many in the kingdom who were ready to collaborate with the Crown. Is it not better to have a benevolent master than a malevolent one?

“¦would have very serious repercussions on the political relations among India, China and Tibet during the following twenty years.

In Tibet, it was different. The Government had never dealt with a Western power and the Tibetans knew very little about modern warfare and the latest technologies used by the British army. They knew even less about diplomacy.

In 1886, an incident occurred between the British, now de facto if not de lego suzerain over Sikkim, and the Tibetans.

It started with a (well founded) rumour that the Viceroy, Randolf Churchill was planning to send a commercial mission to Shigatse without the permission of Lhasa. This created a lot of resentment in Tibet and Lhasa decided to send some 200 soldiers to the Sikkimese border to block the way of the proposed mission.

Around the same time yet another irritant emerged: the Tibetans heard in 1876 that the British had signed an Agreement with the Chinese in Chefoo. Though the Government in Lhasa had not been consulted or even informed, one of the clauses concerned Tibet. The British scheme was to pass the Treaty through the back door: as they had not been able to reach Tibet from the South, they would do it through the West. They secured the permission of the Chinese to send a mission to Tibet through the mainland.

Tempers ran so high in Lhasa that the Tsongdu,9 at an emergency meeting, decided to take an oath never to allow the British to enter Tibetan territory. The National Assembly’s seal was put on the oath. It also declared that the Chinese Emperor had no power to give passports permitting foreigners to enter Tibetan territory.

The British scheme was to pass the Treaty through the back door: as they had not been able to reach Tibet from the South, they would do it through the West. They secured the permission of the Chinese to send a mission to Tibet through the mainland.

In the meantime, the Kashag was informed that the British were planning to build a guest-house on the border between Sikkim and Tibet, near the border pass of Jelap-la. Lhasa resolved to send two Representatives to find out where the border was and to set up a check-post to guard it. The border had never been properly demarcated.

Finally, in 1887, a fortified post was built by the Tibetans in Lungthur which according them, was inside their territory. Unfortunately the British did not agree with the demarcations and demanded their immediate removal.

An ultimatum was sent to the Tibetan commanders to vacate their fortifications before March 15, 1888. At the same time the British sent a formal protest10 which was forwarded to the Manchus and the Dalai Lama by the Choegyal of Sikkim.

Though not in a position to intervene, the Manchus told the British that “no marked separation existed formerly between Tibet and Sikkim” and that the Tibetans regarded the kingdom of Sikkim as an extension of their own country.

The Kashag replied to the Choegyal that there was no harm if Tibet defended its own borders. This time the British were not in a mood to discuss or even negotiate the exact position of the border.

With the pressure mounting, the British positioned more than 2,000 troops of the Sikkim Field Force. The Tibetans sent 900 men as reinforcement under two generals and a minister, Kalon Lhalu.

The British knew perfectly well that Sikkim was a protectorate of Tibet, but they were also aware that Tibet was in too weak a position to defend its rights in Sikkim. At the same time, the Chinese pretended to be overlords of Tibet.

Till the last minute the Choegyal tried to mediate, but each party was determined to show the other that they were within their rights. Unfortunately for the Tibetans, their troops were no match for the British, neither in training, equipment nor discipline. The clash which took place at Lungthur was short and the Tibetans were trounced.

The British had taken two years to throw the Tibetans out of what the latter believed was their own territory. But London used this delay to plan its future strategy. The collateral of this rather small dispute was a new treaty between the British and the Manchu Government regarding Sikkim and Tibet. This would have very serious repercussions on the political relations among India, China and Tibet during the following twenty years.11

The British knew perfectly well that Sikkim was a protectorate of Tibet, but they were also aware that Tibet was in too weak a position to defend its rights in Sikkim. At the same time, the Chinese pretended to be overlords of Tibet. The game was to ask the Chinese to restrain the Tibetans.

It was without doubt the best way to avoid hurting the Chinese feelings while dealing with them and recognizing their overlordship over Tibet. It was also the best way to avoid sending the Manchus into the arms of the Russians. Rumours were rife in Beijing that the Russians were expecting to enter into an alliance with China. The doors were left open for British diplomacy to strike.

This came in the form of a Treaty, the “Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet” signed on March 17, 1890 between Great Britain and China, behind the backs of the Tibetans and the Sikkimese.

The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet was defined as follows: “The crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluent, from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet.” The next Article was the most important one for London. China admitted through the Treaty: “…the British Government, whose Protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recognised, has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State…”

Rumours were rife in Beijing that the Russians were expecting to enter into an alliance with China. The doors were left open for British diplomacy to strike.

The formal take-over of Sikkim was complete, thanks to a few Tibetans who had crossed over a border pass they believed to be their own.

The Tibetans were deeply disturbed by the Convention on Sikkim and Tibet signed by the Chinese and the British; they regarded it as a breach of the Patron-Priest relationship.

The Treaty of 1890 along with the fact that the British (and the Chinese) had decided not to inform the Tibetans about its contents, which was of direct concern to them, was the last straw for the Tibetans. There was henceforth no alternative but to show both parties that their terms were unacceptable.

One point was clear for the Tibetans—they had lost their protector. The events which followed should be seen more in terms of the Tibetans seeking to find a new protector.

Another factor, which played a role in this complex game was the visit of Prince Henri d’Orléans to Tibet in 1888; he declared that France was ready to have diplomatic relations with Tibet. He even promised the Tibetan Government: “We, the French can save Tibet from the British threat. France and Russia have concluded an alliance and, we are now the strongest power in the world.”12

To be continued…