Indian Defence Review

26/11. The terrorists held sway and centrestage for four days as they basked in an electronic media blitzkreig. Another day, another time, this time in Poonch, the terrorists took on the might of the Indian Army and severely dented its image.

If Mumbai, the concrete jungle had no parallels for its sheer planning, novelty, precision and brutality of attacks, Poonch, the jungle terrain, the scene of another stand off too has no parallels in terms of longevity and boldness. If in Mumbai, the elite NSG commandos took time in neutralising the terrorists to avoid collateral damage and civilian casualties, the Poonch ‘citadel’ is purported to have been affected by the terrain and weather conditions! Be as it may, the terrorists are giving the security forces a run for their money and surely gaining at the altar of oxygen of publicity — the prime objective of all terror attacks.

In the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, the attention of the Indian media was quickly drawn to the raging gun battle in Poonch when on the New Year’s day, news trickled in of the Army’s engagement with a group of terrorists inside Bhati Dhar forest in Mendhar where it suffered two casualties.

In the recent past, the Army has shown a cautious approach to such situations like the Chinore hostage crisis in Jammu in August 2008, where operations were rightly deliberate to prevent colateral damage and to avoid hostage deaths, although at the end of the day long siege some hostages were killed by the three ‘fidayeen’ terrorists and in Mumbai the terrorists had inflicted casualties in the hundreds even before the NSG was sent in. To still have persisted with the siege only provided added mileage to the terrorists and their creed worldwide.

Civilian casualty and urban area imperatives notwithstanding, the Army in the case of the recently concluded marathon operation in Poonch was left quite out-flanked with no ‘colateral damage, civilian casualties’ cliches to offer. After all the handful of militants were holed up in a remote forest hideout with no civilian habitat in the firing line! So it hurriedly offered the ‘avoiding own casualty’ line and harked on the difficuties caused by fog, undulating terrain, rocks, etc. And, at the end of it all, the terrorists had once again slipped away! For the fourth largest Army in the world, and the victors of several wars, and veterans of counter-insurgency operations all over since its inception, to be suddenly so held at bay by a handful of militants in a small locality in Jammu and Kashmir, and perhaps in one of the most densely militarised zones in the world, is a matter of concern.

Background

The terrain — pine forests with natural caves, etc will definitely impinge on flushing out operations, but allowing these constraints to so retard the operations for more than eight days is not something one has come to expect from the battle hardened Indian Army. After all it has operated in even thicker and much tougher jungles in the Northeast. In Jammu and Kashmir, the visibility in the forests pine is much better than sun in the tropical jungles of the Northeast. There is even lesser undergrowth.

Critically the, Mendhar has been a traditional militant hot bed since 1995-96, due to its close proximity to the LoC. The linear pattern of Army deployment, forested mountain slopes and ravines of the Surankot bowl provide an easy access routes to Doda in the east and the valley of Kashmir in the north. Undulating terrain and many forested spurs opening into POK, the unfavourable delineation of the LoC facilitated infiltration, and lack of surface links and security force deployment in the hinterland provided safe havens to the militants. Post Kargil, the erstwhile transient types were joined by a large number of foreign militants and some of the major massacres of minority commmunity and attacks on security forces took place in the Rajouri and Poonch districts. This led to the creation of Counter-Insurgency Force ‘Romeo’ for the hinterland, and by 2006 the situation was brought largely under control, and the Army claimed to have restored ‘near normalcy’ in the region. This period coincided with the ceasefire along the LoC and the construction of the fence to effectively check infiltration. The field commanders now decided to shift focus on the LoC the emphasis being on ‘preventing infiltartion at all costs’.

True, infiltartion and levels of violence in the hinterland has reduced considerably, but the terror forces are adept at quick change in tactics and improvisations, in contrast to our more orthodox and deliberate tactics.

Sequence of Events Leading to Bhati Dhar Stand Off

If, even after breaking the back of militancy and depleted militant strength in J&K, militants have managed to carve hideouts just behind the two tiers of Army deployment, something has definitely gone awry somewhere.

In the closing months of 2008, in a short radius of about 10 kilometres between Krishna Ghati and Mendhar, a group of militants had managed to escape the Army dragnet on at least three occasions, starting on September 27, 2008 when three LeT militants escaped from a house in Chhajla village near Mendhar when a joint party of 39 RR and 7 Kumaon swooped upon them. Then, on polling day in Poonch (November 17) ,5 Assam lost one jawan and two sustained injuries when militants fired upon a search party in Beri Rakh forest not too far away from the site of the previous encounter in Chhajla. This group was once again surrounded on November 20 by 7 Kumaon where miraculously they again managed to give the SF a slip! On October 14, 2008 two LeT militants were killed slightly northwards in Sangiot in Kalaban by 38 RR. A few war like stores were recovered from Jugal Top and Tain in October and November.

Though, it is not certain whether these militants belonged to the same group holed up in Bhati Dhar, it should have been clear that something was wrong and the militants were having back-up nearby, where they were recoiling after giving the Army a slip on several occasions. So, it may well be possible, that this time too in Bhati Dhar the bulk of the militants broke the Army cordon in the first two days itself, pouncing heavily on one part of it, leaving behind a couple of them to hold the Army back. They are then believed to have disguised as nomad bakkervals and melted away.

Even after sending in its Special Forces and maintaining a cordon for nine days, the militants managed to flee shows that after the encounter on the first day, the Army never had close contact with them and were not even certain on the number of militants holed up there. This is also reinforced by the fact that it took them a while to retrieve the body of the JCO as the volume of militant fire was probably very prohibitive and forced the Army back. A similar thing had happened in Beri Rakh forest on Nov 17.

Discovery of large quantities of ration and ammunition and their ability to fortify natural caves with CGI sheets points to a longer presence which is also borne out by their staying power and presence of some top commanders of LeT and JeM. There were also erstwhile Army bunkers in the area constructed during the pre-ceasefire days for safety against enemy shelling which may have been used by the militants.

And now, the interrogation of four villagers including a retired police inspector from Bhati Dhar and nearby villages has revealed that several militants past and present may have been using Bhati Dhar forest as a base for almost five years where they had modified nearly 30 caves for their hideout. Some villagers who frequented the forest with ration and other logistics are now missing.

The militants could not have remained so well entrenched in Bhati Dhar without local support. It shows a complete lack of area domination by the local units of the Army as otherwise to and fro movement of militants and their supplies should have been noticed and or interdicted. There appears to be a deliberate effort on part of the local commanders not to report militant activity less they get adversely sucked into it. Also, there were several ceasefire violations and infiltration attempts in Rajouri-Poonch especially in September and October, some of which were successful. Perhaps the militants were making a dash for the sanctuary in Bhati Dhar. A large number of mobile phones and communication equipment have been found in the hideout which eventually led the security forces there. How were transmissions not detected earlier?

The Operational Approach

The terrain and other constraints notwithstanding, the Army’s ‘slow and steady’, ‘wear them out approach’, is causing them more fatique, strung out as they are in a cordon for so long. Not going in for the final push is prolonging the engagement and playing into the militant’s hand. It is giving them a halo which will be an elixir for other militants waiting across the LoC. Such a long and prolonged engagement affects the morale of the troops. After 26/11 when there was so much war hysteria, the Bhati Dhar episode is not good for national confidence. It brings back the scare of terror and the threat posed by it.

With militants now changing tactic and infiltrating literally from behind their backs, i.e. via Nepal and Bangladesh, the Army also needs to partially go back to some of its traditional methods like long range patrols and area domination which have become less frequent these days. In fact, to ‘terrorise’ the ‘terrorists’, more aggressive methods such as pounding them with artillery/mortar fire and use of helicopter gunships in uninhabited areas should be resorted to.

The lessons from Hill Kaka should be learnt. After all, from fortified hideouts there, several fidayeen attacks in J&K and the rest of the country were launched. With satellite phones the foreign terrorists had commuicated all over the world and a photograph of a militant posing in front of Red Fort in Delhi was found.

The group in Bhati Dhar being on the loose is an ominous sign, as they may well be on their way to carry out a sensational strike in the near future. Another such well trained group of six LeT terrorists who had trained with the Mumbai hit group is believed to be holed up somewhere in the mountains of North Kashmir, therefore it is imperative for the Security Forces to be on guard and deny them such staging areas as Bhati Dhar inside our territory. As already pointed out in my other article, snow warfare and commando training being imparted by the Pak Army’s elite Special Services Group(SSG) to select cadres will allow them to infiltrate and hold out in snow bound areas in the winters. The focus now is less on numbers and more on small but determined ‘crack’ groups which can launch swift and spectacular strikes and bring back focus on the Kashmir issue.

Importantly, it is good sense to avoid own casualties but going into battle with that fixed mindest is detrimental for operational efficiency, for, it needlessly imposes restraint and caution leading to a situation such as this. By such long drawn action against the Indian Army the terrorists become a role model for future terrorist actions and budding ‘jehadis’ who are motivated by showing video recording of such stand-offs. These even create awe among their sympathisers and the locals residing in strife-torn states such as J&K. In the valley region, this is reflective in the high attendance in funeral processions of local mlitants who are seen as ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘martyrs’ to the so-called ‘cause’.

The present day modern Indian Army can take a leaf out of its earlier engagements with many a mujahideen and insurgent group-from J&K, Northeast to Sri Lanka in the era of the Self- Loading Rifle and in the absence of bullet-proof jackets and state-of-the-art surveillance equipment, intelligence gathering apparatus, etc.

At stake is the invincibility of the Indian Army, a stake too high for the LeT’s dream of carving an ‘Islamic Caliphate’ and planting its flag on the Red Fort. It can only be prevented by the redoubtable Indian Army.