The first meeting Professor Sondhi arranged for me was with Ram Nath Kao, who had headed the Indian Secret Service for many years. Following his retirement he was appointed special security advisor to the prime minister and considered to be a person of great influence. Sondhi drove me to this meeting in his car. When we arrived at Kao’s home, he told me that he thought it best that I hold this meeting on my own and that he would wait for me in his car. I was greatly surprised, for our relationship had been very open from the outset. I had updated him on all developments, including those relating to the abduction in Kashmir, and had asked for his guidance and advice. I would like to add that Sondhi’s wife, Madhuri Santanam Sondhi, was also most helpful. She, too, guided and advised me with her deep insight and wisdom.
In any case I entered Kao’s house, and we began our discussion. I presented to him our position in support of a normalization of relations and explained how this would be of benefit to both countries. I proposed an evaluation of India’s policy toward Israel, as other countries had done. I pointed out that I had no intention of requesting a meeting with representatives of the diplomatic branch, because of the traditionally hostile policy of the Indian foreign ministry and because Israel was not about to apply formally for the establishment of a diplomatic representation in India. After so many years of such applications by Israel having been rejected, the initiative would now have to be Indian.
Kao agreed that the time had come to bring about a change in the nature of our relationship, but explained why he did not believe this to be possible within the foreseeable future. At his suggestion, Professor Sondhi arranged a meeting for me with Naresh Chandra, a very senior secretary to the Government of India. My meeting with Chandra took place at his home, two days later. It was his opinion that the unstable political and economic situation which prevailed at that time in India following the elections would make a change in the nature of the relationship impossible. His most ambitious suggestion was to consider the transfer of the Israeli consulate from Bombay to New Delhi, and that, too, not in the near future.
Several articles appeared in the Indian press calling upon the government to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and pointing out the benefits that India would reap from this.
Nonetheless, these meetings did have an impact. Later on, Professor Sondhi told me that Secretary Chandra had reported on our meeting to the prime minister, the foreign minister, the defense minister, the minister of finance and the foreign secretary , who had participated during that very week in some convention in the Maldive Islands. All of them, he reported, agreed in principle that India’s relations with Israel must be upgraded, but they all believed that the government was too weak, since it was in a minority and that it would not be a good idea for it to “rock the boat.”
On the other hand, India was at the time trying to secure a loan of 2-5 billion dollars from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and they feared that the “Jewish Lobby” in the United States would prevent the granting of such a loan because of India’s negative attitude toward Israel.
Sondhi suggested that Israel try to solicit American pressure on India in this context. He even hinted that he was in this way actually conveying a surreptitious message from the minister of finance, who was more interested than others in improving Indian-Israeli relations and thus neutralizing potential opposition to the loan in the United States. In Sondhi’s opinion, this was an opportunity not to be forfeited, and we had to act immediately to enlist the help of our American friends. At that time several articles appeared in the Indian press calling upon the government to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and pointing out the benefits that India would reap from this.4
From a number of people, including Indian journalists with whom I met, I heard that, apart from the reasons presented traditionally for abstaining from improving relations with Israel – such as concern for the possible reaction of India’s Muslim minority or of the Arab countries; the continuing influence of Nehru’s legacy and that of his followers in opposition to Zionism and the State of Israel and the reluctance to deviate from his traditional foreign policy; and the fear that Pakistan would take advantage of any strengthening of India’s relations with Israel to reinforce its anti-Indian propaganda efforts – the conservative nature of the professional staff of the Indian foreign ministry was a significant impediment. Their pro-Arab and anti-Israel tendencies are predominantly decisive in shaping their policies, not to mention the fact that the political echelon was weak and essentially unable to impose its views on the professional staff, which remained entrenched in its traditional attitudes.
All in all, my impression upon the conclusion of my visit to India was that a certain degree of discomfort was felt there toward Israel. The leaders of India were aware of the improvement in Israel’s relations with various countries, particularly China, and even the press had to a considerable degree improved its attitude and had been dealing incessantly with the issue of India’s relations with Israel ever since the incident in Srinagar.
Continued : The normalization of relations between India and Israel: II
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