India gained independence in 1947, and Israel followed within several months – in May 1948. But official diplomatic relations between the two countries were established only in January 1992. During the 44 years which passed between their achievement of independence and the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries, India’s behaviour toward Israel was characterized by reservation, unfriendliness, and even hostility.
Following extensive efforts, in 1950 India agreed to grant Israel diplomatic recognition. Although this was full and de jure recognition, India refused to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and did not agree to exchange diplomatic representations with it.
During the 44 years which passed between their (India and Israel) achievement of independence and the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries, Indias behaviour toward Israel was characterized by reservation, unfriendliness, and even hostility.
India’s first prime minister – Jawaharlal Nehru, who also headed the Congress Party which had led India’s struggle against the British for independence – was hostile to Zionism and greatly supported the Arab national movement for many years even before India’s independence, because of his emotional attitude toward the Arab states, coupled with his country’s perceived economic interests.1 This policy continued throughout his years of tenure as prime minister of the independent Republic of India.
In 1951 minor progress was made when India allowed Israel to appoint a local Jewish resident as honorary consul in Bombay (Mumbai) and, in 1953, Israel was permitted to open a consulate in Bombay. But India refrained from establishing a representation of any kind in Israel. Various Israeli personages visited India from time to time and met with Nehru and other political figures, but India’s stubborn refusal to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel remained systematically and consistently in effect.
In 1964 Nehru passed away. From then on, and especially after the Six-Day War in June 1967(Arab-Israel war), India’s behaviour toward Israel became considerably more negative, particularly during the tenure of his daughter, Indira Gandhi, as prime minister. For many long years there was no dialogue or significant diplomatic contact of any kind between the two countries.
The Diplomatic Climate Changes
The international situation changed at the end of the ’80s and the beginning of the ’90s. First, there was the collapse of the Soviet Union, India’s veteran ally and arms supplier, which was a blow to India. Secondly, there was the Gulf War in 1991, which exposed severe weaknesses and splits within the Arab world. Thirdly, the period saw the negotiations being conduced between Israel and the P.L.O. with the participation and under the auspices of many countries, and India wanted to be included among them to enhance its national prestige. However, the most significant change in this context occurred within India itself: Narasimha Rao was elected prime minister.
India took its first positive step in December 1991, when it voted in favor of the annulment of UN Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism.
Despite his membership in the Congress Party, Rao fundamentally changed the policy of his predecessors and cancelled the ostensibly socialist economic practices which had been in effect during the regimes of Nehru, his daughter Indira Gandhi and his grandson Rajiv Gandhi. Rao introduced a policy of promoting a liberal and open economy, in an effort to free India from its economic distress and the terrible poverty and deprivation from which a substantial percentage of its population suffered. To this end he required the support of the United States of America in particular, and Western investments in general. He had therefore to improve India’s relations with the United States, which had become the world’s only super power.2
In addition, a number of other factors came into play: the end of the “Cold War” greatly diminished the political and ideological importance of the “non-aligned” world; the lower oil prices of the early ‘90s reduced India’s dependence on oil from the Arab countries; and the pro-Pakistani bias of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) with regard to the conflict over Kashmir prompted India to reassess its Middle East policy.
At the same time, Israel made it clear that any Indian participation in the Middle East peace process, including the Madrid Conference on the Middle East , which was scheduled for the end of 1991, was dependent on the normalization of relations between the two countries. And the rise of Islamic radicalism, as well as the upsurge of terror, worsened the state of local and regional security in India, where this was perceived as a shared concern with Israel and maybe also as an opportunity to consider potential security cooperation with her.
India took its first positive step in December 1991, when it voted in favor of the annulment of UN Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism. Ironically, it was at this very same time that a tragic incident occurred which prompted Israel to establish contact and initiate a dialogue with India.
Israeli Backpackers Attacked in Srinagar
On Thursday, June 27, 1991, Muslim terrorists attacked a group of Israeli backpackers in Srinagar, the capital of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in northern India. Though unarmed, the Israelis grappled with their assailants and, in the course of their struggle, Erez Cahana, who had led the Israeli resistance to the attackers and fought bravely, was murdered. Three other Israelis were wounded and a fifth – Ya’ir Yitzhaki – disappeared. After a while it became clear that he had hidden for several hours and, when he emerged to quench his thirst, he was captured by members of the Muslim group that had attacked him and his companions.
The wounded Israelis were taken by Indian soldiers to the military hospital in Srinagar, where they were hospitalized. The Indian army also arranged for the transfer of the corpse of the murdered Israeli to Israel, in coordination with the Israeli consulate in Bombay.
Reuven Merhav, Dir Gen ““ Foreign Ministry added a directive that I was not to shy away from diplomatic talks if such were to materialize, since there had been no diplomatic contacts between the two countries for many years.
At that time I served as deputy director general of Israel’s foreign ministry and head of its Asia, Africa and Oceania Department. On June 28 Reuven Merhav, director general of the foreign ministry, ordered me to travel to India to arrange for the transfer of the wounded to Israel and to take whatever action was possible to free the Israeli who had been abducted. In a general sense, he added a directive that I was not to shy away from diplomatic talks if such were to materialize, since there had been no diplomatic contacts between the two countries for many years.
Concurrently, Merhav initiated several preliminary measures: he ordered Giora Becher, our consul in Bombay, to notify the Indian foreign ministry of my scheduled arrival and to request that I be granted an entrance permit. He also contacted Dr. Gabrielle Menegatti, the Italian ambassador in New Delhi, who he had befriended when they served together as consuls general in Hong Kong years earlier, and asked him to extend any possible assistance to me, as we had no Israeli representation whatsoever in New Delhi from which I could operate or which could assist me.
By coincidence, at that time Menashe Zipori, another foreign ministry official, was also in India. Merhav ordered him to fly to Srinagar, so that he would be close by to help in the event that we succeeded in freeing the abducted Israeli. He was also charged with visiting the wounded. The Indian army assumed responsibility for his welfare. The Indian foreign ministry informed the Israeli consul in Bombay that “We have no objection to the arrival in New Delhi of a senior official of your government so that we can apprise him of the steps that the Government of India has taken to bring about the release of Ya’ir Yitzhaki, who appears to have been abducted.”
In the absence of direct flights between Israel and India at that time, I flew via Europe and arrived in New Delhi towards dawn on Monday, July 1. The Italian Ambassador Menegatti welcomed me at the airport and offered his assistance in any manner I might require, including the telephone and office services of his embassy. He even brought me a file of press clippings which had appeared since the incident in Srinagar. Representatives of the Indian foreign ministry also arrived and arranged my entrance permit.
The First Diplomatic Contacts
Prior to my arrival in New Delhi, the Indian foreign ministry published a press release which stipulated that India’s behaviour with regard to the incident in Kashmir was being guided solely by humanitarian considerations; that my visit was of a “consular” nature only, and that it would include no diplomatic discussions whatsoever with the foreign ministry; and that there would be no change in India’s policy toward Israel.
I arrived in New Delhi on July 2, 1991. A message awaited me from Professor M. L. Sondhi, head of the International Relations Department of Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and a loyal friend of Israel, who later on was to be of great help in fostering relations between our two countries. We met that very same day, and he explained that the changes in the recent international climate, the improvement in Israel’s international standing and even the incident in Kashmir, which stimulated a wave of support for Israel in India, all converged to create favourable conditions for bringing about a positive change in India’s attitude toward Israel. It was his opinion, therefore, that my visit was a welcome opportunity to conduct meetings.
Kao agreed that the time had come to bring about a change in the nature of our relationship, but explained why he did not believe this to be possible within the foreseeable future.
Sondhi emphasized that for years he had been working locally to gain support for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, and that he had been doing so as an Indian patriot and as one who believed that this would best serve India’s national interests. In his opinion India and Israel should become allies and help each other, despite the huge difference in their size and the size of their populations, because both countries faced similar dangers. I responded that I would be happy to participate in any meeting that was arranged for me, on the sole condition that such meeting was to take place with someone with whom a discussion would be of consequence and significance.
Curiously enough, as soon as we set eyes on each other, Sondhi and I realized that we already knew each other. Many years earlier, at the beginning of the ’60s, Professor Sondhi had visited Israel as a guest of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. As a young and junior official in the Asian Department of the ministry at that time, I was assigned to accompany him on his tour and to schedule meetings for him. Among others, Sondhi met with Israel’s prime minister, David Ben Gurion, who gave him an autographed copy of his autobiography. On the day after my arrival in New Delhi I visited with Professor Sondhi and his wife in their home, and they proudly showed me the volume.
Several hours after arriving in New Delhi, I went to the foreign ministry for my first visit with A. P. Gupta, director of the Consular Branch. He handed me a copy of the Indian foreign ministry’s press release which condemned the attack on the Israeli tourists in Srinagar and determined that it was an attack on India itself and on its tourist industry. The release further determined that such terror was aimed to harm not only Israelis, since it had already, previously, victimized European tourists. Gupta emphasized that the behaviour of the Indian government with regard to the attack was guided only by humanitarian considerations, and that the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries would be of no consequence. (Nevertheless, he was the only foreign ministry official with whom I was permitted to meet during my stay.) Gupta also informed me that the Indian security forces were continuing their house-to-house search for the abducted Israeli tourist, Ya’ir Yitzhaki, in Srinagar.
“¦ the Government of India would not negotiate with the terrorist organizations and rejected the claim published in the Pakistani press that the Israeli tourists in Srinagar were commando fighters and agents of the Israeli Mossad Secret Service tourists and come to prepare an attack on Pakistans nuclear installations”¦
I thanked Gupta for all that had been done up to that point, and told him that the main purpose of my visit was to bring Yitzhaki back home as quickly as possible. I asked that the Indian security forces to be careful not to take any step that might endanger the life of the abductee. I also sought to clarify another important point with him. Among the press clippings the Italian ambassador had given me, I found an announcement that had been published by the Muslim Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front (J.K.L.F.) to the effect that Yitzhaki was in its hands and that he would be handed over to representatives of the United Nations.
I wanted to know how this transfer was to be carried out. Gupta replied that there were U.N. observers in Srinagar, but that this was a complex diplomatic issue which he would prefer to discuss at our next meeting scheduled for that afternoon, in which representatives of the interior ministry would participate. I understood that India was not happy with the U.N. presence in Kashmir.
At noon I visited the Swedish ambassador. He told me that two Swedish engineers had been abducted in Kashmir by another Muslim terrorist group some three months earlier, on March 31, and that they had not yet been released. He briefed me on the various Muslim terrorist groups which were fighting against the Indian government in Kashmir, pointing out the degree of radicalism of each group and the nature of its relations with Pakistan. I was pleased to hear from him that the “Liberation Front” which held Yitzhaki was considered to be a relatively moderate group.
And, indeed, it transpired that the group’s leader, Amanullah Khan, had issued a public statement from his place of exile in Pakistan calling upon the members of his organization to release Yitzhaki, since the holding of foreign hostages might result in the loss of international support for his “Liberation Front.” The Swedish ambassador told me about his governments efforts, which had failed to bring about the release of the Swedish abductees. My impression was that they had been doing very little.
In the afternoon I returned to the office of Gupta, director of the Consular Branch, where I found two men who were introduced to me as interior ministry officials. I understood quickly enough that they were members of the Indian secret service. Their portrayal as officials of the interior ministry was apparently to serve as camouflage. They told me that Yitzhaki was being held in an ancient quarter of Srinagar, which was populated by Muslims who supported the various underground separatist movements.
The two gentlemen facing me claimed to have had ways to contact those terrorist organizations and had in fact already suggested to them that they transfer Yitzhaki to the representative of the Israeli foreign ministry who was already on site. My interlocutors were convinced that the United Nations would not send a representative to take him. They were also certain that the goal of the terrorist organizations was to receive as much media coverage as possible.
I responded that it must be clear that Israel would not relax its efforts or ease its pressure in every possible venue and manner until the abductee was released. I emphasized that I saw two reasonable alternatives: the first – that the abductee be transferred to the U.N. observers in Srinagar or to the senior U.N. official in New Delhi; and, the second – that he be handed over either to Zipori or myself. I asked that these alternatives be conveyed to the abductors. We agreed to meet again the following morning.
India was at the time trying to secure a loan of 2-5 billion dollars from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and they feared that the “Jewish Lobby” in the United States would prevent the granting of such a loan because of Indias negative attitude toward Israel.
The meeting in the foreign ministry was reported in the Indian media The spokesman of the Indian foreign ministry took the trouble to point out that diplomatic relations were not discussed, and that India’s relations with Israel would remain unchanged. He added that the Government of India would not negotiate with the terrorist organizations and rejected the claim published in the Pakistani press that the Israeli tourists in Srinagar were commando fighters and agents of the Israeli Mossad Secret Service who had disguised themselves as tourists and come to prepare an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear installations together with their Indian counterparts.3
The description of my remaining meetings with Gupta, the head of the Consular Branch, and the indirect negotiations I conducted with his help with that of the two “representatives of the interior ministry” with the J.K.L.F. terrorist organisation are not really relevant to this article. Suffice it to say that the abductee was freed following four days of coordinated and intensive diplomatic efforts conducted simultaneously in New Delhi and Washington, as well as at the U.N. headquarters in New York and Geneva. This is also the place to publicly condemn the behaviour of the U.N. observers in Srinagar, headed by Major Victorson of Sweden, for the obstacles they created. Let us return to Professor M. L. Sondhi and his activities.
The first meeting Professor Sondhi arranged for me was with Ram Nath Kao, who had headed the Indian Secret Service for many years. Following his retirement he was appointed special security advisor to the prime minister and considered to be a person of great influence. Sondhi drove me to this meeting in his car. When we arrived at Kao’s home, he told me that he thought it best that I hold this meeting on my own and that he would wait for me in his car. I was greatly surprised, for our relationship had been very open from the outset. I had updated him on all developments, including those relating to the abduction in Kashmir, and had asked for his guidance and advice. I would like to add that Sondhi’s wife, Madhuri Santanam Sondhi, was also most helpful. She, too, guided and advised me with her deep insight and wisdom.
In any case I entered Kao’s house, and we began our discussion. I presented to him our position in support of a normalization of relations and explained how this would be of benefit to both countries. I proposed an evaluation of India’s policy toward Israel, as other countries had done. I pointed out that I had no intention of requesting a meeting with representatives of the diplomatic branch, because of the traditionally hostile policy of the Indian foreign ministry and because Israel was not about to apply formally for the establishment of a diplomatic representation in India. After so many years of such applications by Israel having been rejected, the initiative would now have to be Indian.
Kao agreed that the time had come to bring about a change in the nature of our relationship, but explained why he did not believe this to be possible within the foreseeable future. At his suggestion, Professor Sondhi arranged a meeting for me with Naresh Chandra, a very senior secretary to the Government of India. My meeting with Chandra took place at his home, two days later. It was his opinion that the unstable political and economic situation which prevailed at that time in India following the elections would make a change in the nature of the relationship impossible. His most ambitious suggestion was to consider the transfer of the Israeli consulate from Bombay to New Delhi, and that, too, not in the near future.
Several articles appeared in the Indian press calling upon the government to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and pointing out the benefits that India would reap from this.
Nonetheless, these meetings did have an impact. Later on, Professor Sondhi told me that Secretary Chandra had reported on our meeting to the prime minister, the foreign minister, the defense minister, the minister of finance and the foreign secretary , who had participated during that very week in some convention in the Maldive Islands. All of them, he reported, agreed in principle that India’s relations with Israel must be upgraded, but they all believed that the government was too weak, since it was in a minority and that it would not be a good idea for it to “rock the boat.”
On the other hand, India was at the time trying to secure a loan of 2-5 billion dollars from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and they feared that the “Jewish Lobby” in the United States would prevent the granting of such a loan because of India’s negative attitude toward Israel.
Sondhi suggested that Israel try to solicit American pressure on India in this context. He even hinted that he was in this way actually conveying a surreptitious message from the minister of finance, who was more interested than others in improving Indian-Israeli relations and thus neutralizing potential opposition to the loan in the United States. In Sondhi’s opinion, this was an opportunity not to be forfeited, and we had to act immediately to enlist the help of our American friends. At that time several articles appeared in the Indian press calling upon the government to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and pointing out the benefits that India would reap from this.4
From a number of people, including Indian journalists with whom I met, I heard that, apart from the reasons presented traditionally for abstaining from improving relations with Israel – such as concern for the possible reaction of India’s Muslim minority or of the Arab countries; the continuing influence of Nehru’s legacy and that of his followers in opposition to Zionism and the State of Israel and the reluctance to deviate from his traditional foreign policy; and the fear that Pakistan would take advantage of any strengthening of India’s relations with Israel to reinforce its anti-Indian propaganda efforts – the conservative nature of the professional staff of the Indian foreign ministry was a significant impediment. Their pro-Arab and anti-Israel tendencies are predominantly decisive in shaping their policies, not to mention the fact that the political echelon was weak and essentially unable to impose its views on the professional staff, which remained entrenched in its traditional attitudes.
All in all, my impression upon the conclusion of my visit to India was that a certain degree of discomfort was felt there toward Israel. The leaders of India were aware of the improvement in Israel’s relations with various countries, particularly China, and even the press had to a considerable degree improved its attitude and had been dealing incessantly with the issue of India’s relations with Israel ever since the incident in Srinagar.
Continued : The normalization of relations between India and Israel: II
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