If Nagra had planned to trap the withdrawing Pakistanis he should have foreseen such delays and advanced the paradrop accordingly.
Kler’s brigade had moved some 64 miles in one day with inadequate transport facilities, and without any mobile Screen, ahead of his advance. The credit for conceiving the idea of fitting jeeps with machine guns goes to Gurbux Singh. Since Kler’s brigade had no spare jeeps, he had requisitioned those of all officers commanding units in his area and had them fitted with 30 Brownings. These vehicles were driven by their permanent drivers belonging to se rvice units. One such jeep, driven by another rank of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, was shot up at the Mirpur bridge while carrying a party of 2 para. The driver was also killed. Jeeps modifide to carry machine guns came in very handy at this stage of operations.
After reaching Tangail, Nagra discovered to his great dismay that he could not sustain the advance administratively any more, for some time at least. The prospects of a buildup across the batallion Brahmaputra were not very bright. Kler and his leading of 1 Maratha. Light Infantry had set off from Jamalpur with all the vehicles he could muster, including eight civilian trucks, and his artillery regiment, but had no petrol to proceed farther. Despite the best efforts of Siddiqi, no more than ten additional could be found in the area, and they were equally short of fuel. Man of the 6 Sikh Light Infantry, the followup battalion, hadridden in cycle rickshaws up to Madhupur and were later picked up the the third Maratha’s transport sent from Tangail. 13 Guards, battalion, was also similarly ferried forward and reached Tangail in the early hours of 13 December. 2 Para Battalion collected itself and joined the brigade by the last light on 13 December.
Qadir was so harassed by Freedom Fighters in this area that he decided to clear out of it in good time.
The remainder of 167 Infantry Brigade had by there crossed the Brahmaputra, but was in no position to join battle without itsi fghting transport. Since all the administrative units and services the ralious and still had their installations north of the river, ammunition of the force were replenished with what had been captured at Jamalpur. But this did not prove satisfactory, and the replenishment of Kler’s brigade was therefore carried out by a airdrop. While looking for a suitable dropping zone, Kler’s every etc. staff captain discovered a disused landing strip near Tangail. With the assistance of Siddiqi’s men, he commissioned it within a matter of hours. In the afternoon of 13 December, welcome transport aircraft started landing the much-wanted supplies, including petrol.
As 167 Mountain Brigade was unable to fetch up in time, Nagra decided to resume the advance with 95 Mountain Brigade, which had already managed to concentrate. Kler resumed the advance from Tangail with 6 Sikh Light Infantry Group at 1200 hours on 13 December. The unit was held up by a Pakistani section which had taken up position in a reinforced concrete house about 40 yards astride the road east of Mirzapur. The unit tried all the weapons it had, including the direct firing of a 76-mm Yugoslav gun, but this had no effect on the building, and the enemy kept firing on the advancing column. Boggy ground on either side of the road forbade outflanking moves.
When told of this holdup, Kler went forward and made his way to a position about 50 yards from this building where the officer commanding and his subedar major were conferring with the leading company commander to find ways of tackling the positio. The situation was explained to Kler, and he was thinking of a way out when he heard a cry of “Bole so nihal” from east and west of the house and saw a JCO leading the platoon in an assault on it.
The approaches to the river line north and south of the Pakistani defences were marshy and difficult to negotiate. Nagra realised that it would take days to tackle this position in the systematic and deliberate manner visualised in army manuals.
Covering fire was given by machine guns on the roadside, and within minutes the position was cleared, with six Pakistanis killed and two captured. 6 Sikh Light Infantry lost one JCO and one other rank. Later, when questioned, the subedar major told Kler that in his 30 years service he had never seen a brigade commander who had come so close in actual battle. He had therefore decided that instead of waiting another 30 minutes for it get dark they should go in straightway and preserve the honour of the platoon.
The advance continued in the hours of darkness, and by morning on 14 December the battalion had contacted the enemy position on the west bank of the Turag river. The opposition was estimated to be no more than a company supported by medium machine guns and some pieces of artillery sited west of the river, while east of the river the Pakistanis had about two companies with a troop of tanks, and their defence was sited in the general area of the crossroads. The approaches to the river line north and south of the Pakistani defences were marshy and difficult to negotiate. Nagra realised that it would take days to tackle this position in the systematic and deliberate manner visualised in army manuals. A way had to be found to circumvent these defences somehow.
Flying over the area, he accidentally noticed a newly constructed road running south from near Kalaikar, but he could not make out where it led. Meanwhile, an engineer patrol assessing the crossings over the river captured a Pakistani major, who on interrogation gave the information that Qadir and a few others officers were hiding close by. A patrol of 6 Sikh Light Infantry sent out for the purpose soon rounded up the Brigadier, his brigade major and eight other officers. They confirmed that the new road joined the Man ikganj-Sabhar-D acca road, and also that the remnants of the Jamalpur and Mymensingh garrisons were holding the river line and the area of the crossroads behind it.
With no suitable antitank weapons, the Indians feared a few tanks supporting the Pakistani pockets at Bussi and Jagannathganj along the Jamuna.
The air strikes on 14 December could not locate the Pakistani tanks which were causing damage to the attackers, but they destroyed a few vehicles. It was clear that the Pakistani forces in the area had organised strong and well-coordinated defences on the river line and in and around the crossroads. By the afternoon of 14 December, the followup battalion, 1 Maratha Light Infantry, had also come forward and deployed south of the Kashimpur ferry. About this time, the other two battalions, 13 Guards and 13 Rajputana Rifles, were ferried forward with all the available transport.
An effort was made to outflank the Pakistani opposition west of the river by sending one company each from the north and south of the road against it. The companies moved at 1500 hours on 14 December but crossed the river too close to the road. They drew heavy machine gun and artillery fire but held their ground. Soon a few Pakistani tanks rushed towards the companies from the crossroads and threw them across the river. The next morning two companies of 6 Sikh Light Infantry were again sent forward, but this time they carried out a wide outflanking movement and, crossing the river by country craft, established themselves west of it. The bridge along the main axis was assaulted subsequently.
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Unnerved by the outflanking movement, the Pakistani troops deployed west of the river withdrew after destroying a 150-feet span of the bridge. 6 Sikh Light Infantry captured the bridge and established itself on the eastern bank of the Turag by 1500 hours on 15 December with minimal casualties on either side. But no further progress could be made as any forward movement invited heavy machine-gun fire. With no suitable antitank weapons, the Indians feared a few tanks supporting the Pakistani pockets at Bussi and Jagannathganj along the Jamuna. These pockets were ultimately cleared by 13 Rajputana Rifles, killing some 36 and capturing 23 Pakistani troops with a few arms and ammunition in the process.
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