On 9 December, Sagat Singh had secured the waterline of the Meghna in the general area of Ashuganj and was poised for an advance to Dacca. All the approaches to Dacca lay across the Meghna, which was about 4,000 yards wide in this area. A 2,950 feet long bridge crossed it at Ashuganj, but two of its spans had been destroyed by the retiring Pakistanis. Engineer resources of the magnitude required to span the river obstacle were not immediately available, and were not likely to be so early enough to keep up the momentum of the advance. 57 Mountain Division, established on the waterline, was ordered to push across the river by all means locally available and build up sufficient strength on the other bank to be able to move ahead to Dacca.
On the night of 9/10 December, the helicopter force in the theatre, numbering some 14 MI-4s in all, were brought into service, and for the next 36 hours an air bridge was established, flying some 110 sorties. The Ml-4 has a limited load capacity and can carry hardly a section of infantry with full loads at a time. 311 Mountain Brigade Group was the first formation to be lifted. One landed in the Raipura area. It secured Methi Kanda railway station by the evening of 9 December. 19 Punjab crossed the river and worked its way along to dominate the Pakistani pocket still holding out at Bhairab Bazar. 4 Guards advanced simultaneously to Narsingdi and secured it on 11 December.
The buildup across the Meghna was proceeding almost in a vacuum, but its rate was painfully slow. The main reason for the slow progress was lack of transport.
With Narsingdi in Sagat Singh’s hand, the Bhairab-Bazaar-pocket contained and his north flank fully secured, the stage was set to break out towards Dacca, especially when no resistance was encountered anywhere. The buildup across the Meghna was proceeding almost in a vacuum, but its rate was painfully slow. The main reason for the slow progress was lack of transport. The capacity of Ml-4 helicopters and country boats was limited, and the river gap formidably large, and this added to the turnround timings. Even PT-76 amphibian tanks, which could be used to ferry troops and equipment, had to be towed across by country craft as they got overheated after an hour’s operation. The fast current and the Meghna’s width would take anything up to three hours to negotiate. By 11 December, Headquarters 311 Mountain Brigade, with four infantry battalions, one troop of PT-76 tanks, one mountain artillery regiment less one battery, one battery of 120-mm mortars, four medium guns and only two Kraz tractors, had crossed. When the units organised themselves, they were pushed to make contact with the Pakistani opposition. At times, troops were leapfrogged by helicopters along the line of advance to achieve speed.
Broadly, 311 Mountain Brigade advanced along the Narsingdi-Demra axis. Having secured Narsingdi on 11 December, it contacted Demra on 14 December and found it held by about a company strength supported by a couple of tanks. 2 Bangladesh Battalion crossed the Satlakhya river in the north and secured Rupganj the same day. Another battalion also crossed in the general area of Puligaon on the night of 13/14 December. 71 Mountain Brigade Group, advancing along the Narsingdi-Pubail-Tungi axis, secured Pubail on 14 December and contacted the Tungi defences the same evening. At this stage, further advance by 57 Mountain Division was halted on the orders of the Army Commander to avoid a clash with 101 Communication Zone Area troops advancing from the north and reportedly already in contact with the Dacca fortress defences.
Wishing to give hot pursuit to the withdrawing Pakistani garrisons, Nagra decided to use Klers brigade with the new grouping.
As adequate river craft could not be mustered, 301 Mountain Brigade was ordered to concentrate after the capture of Chandpurat Daudkandi for an advance on Narayanganj by helicopter and with whatever river craft could be found there. Brigade headquarters and two battalions without supporting arms and heavier weapons were lifted by helicopter from Daudkandi to Baidya Bazaar on the night of 14/15 December. The remainder of the group moved by river and road. This brigade reached the eastern bank of the Satlakhya only on 15 December, but before they could cross the ceasefire had become effective.
Crossing the Meghna and advancing to the Satlakhya by 57 Mountain Division under Gen Gonsalves was a great feat of logistics and movement achieved with rare ingenuity and enterprise. Heli-lift operations of such magnitude, using an aging fleet of MI-4 helicopters, was tried out for the first time in India although not visualised in the operational plans. Credit for this must go to Sagat, and to Gonsalves, for its bold and enterprising execution.
13 Rajputana Rifles, one of Klers battalions, was to stay back at Jamalpur to look after crossing arrangements and provide a firm base. Siddiqis Freedom Fighters, already operating in the Madhupur forest in the Tangail area, had created havoc along the routes of Pakistani withdrawal.
Because the crossing units lacked basic transport, Gonsalves used anything which moved on wheels, from a cycle rickshaw to a bullock cart, to carry his troops and equipment. Brig Jangi Bawa, his artillery commander, did even better by mounting his guns on railway flats and firing them from these mobile platforms which were propelled by ever-willing local civilian labourers. He later managed to infiltrate some heavy mortars and medium guns across the Satlakhya and the Balu to shell Dacca from the night of 13/14 December onwards.
Despite Gonsalves’ best efforts, he was not able to create a balanced force to tackle prepared defences based on built-up fortifications and manned by spirited troops. He was woefully short of suitable types of tanks and anti-tank weaponry. A couple of Pakistani tanks were noticed in the defences at Demra and this made his troops cautious. Thus the position was not taken till it surrendered on its own after the ceasefire. Artillery support for even a deliberate battalion attack was short, and there was speculation what the outcome might have been if Niazi had the resources to make a stand at Dacca, a natural fortress covered by the formidable river obstacles of the Budhi Ganga in the west and the Satlakhya and Balu in the east. Sagat’s build-up for assaulting Dacca would have taken some days, and by that time Niazi might have received outside political or military help as the Pakistani leaders promised. His mistake lay in not making proper preparations to man the Dacca defences.
The fall of Jamalpur and Mymensingh in the northern sector acted as a spur to the plans for the advance on Dacca. Nagra issued orders for their execution on 11 December. He calculated that his advance was likely to be opposed by a battalion group or set fighting delaying actions at Madhupur, Tangail, Kalaikar and at Jaydebpur based on the Turag river. His advance was to be carried out broadly in three phases with two brigade groups, each brigade leapfrogging alternately. 95 Mountain Brigade Group, now comprising I Maratha Light Infantry, 6 Sikh Light Infantry and 2 Para Battalion after a drop in the general area of Tangail, and all available artillery under Kler, were to capture Tangail in the first phase.
It would have been preferable to use a fresh unit, 167 Infantry Brigade, which had by then become available, but it would have taken the formation much time to cross the Brahmaputra because river craft and ferry arrangements were lacking. Wishing to give hot pursuit to the withdrawing Pakistani garrisons, Nagra decided to use Kler’s brigade with the new grouping. In the next phase Brig Irani, in command of 167 Infantry Brigade Group, was to advance from Tangail and capture Jaydebpur. Finally, depending on the prevailing situation, the entire force under Nagra, including Sant Singh’s group, was to invest Dacca. 13 Rajputana Rifles, one of Kler’s battalions, was to stay back at Jamalpur to look after crossing arrangements and provide a firm base. Siddiqi’s Freedom Fighters, already operating in the Madhupur forest in the Tangail area, had created havoc along the routes of Pakistani withdrawal. They had destroyed some 18 bridges and mined the bypasses. This force was asked to intensify the disruption of the Pakistani withdrawal by laying ambushes on their lines of retreat.
The Siddigi group harassed their movements throughout with an extensive network of ambushes and mines. This forced some Pakistani troops to disperse in the 11 Madhupur forest and the countryside.
2 Para Battalion was paradropped about 1600 hours on 11 December in Tangail withthe aim of capturing the bridge over the Johajang at Poongli and interrupting and destroying the Pakistani troops retreating from Jamalpur and Mymensingh, and in the process facilitating the advance of the main Indian force towards Dacca. The drop and para action of this battalion has been described in great detail elsewhere in this narrative while discussing the airborne Indian forces. Suffice to say that in the context of the advance to Dac-.a 2 Para Battalion achieved its objective of capturing the Poongli bridge and the ferry site by 2000 hours the same day, and ambushed a Pakistani mortar battery convoy about midnight. But it transpired later that the main column of the Mymensingh and Jamalpur garrisons had passed through before the para roadblock became effective.
After the surrender of Jamalpur in the early hours of the morning of 11 December and the discovery that Mymensingh had been evacuated about the same time, it was imperative that the advance should be resumed expeditiously if the garrison withdrawing from Mymensingh was to be trapped. The routes of retreat from Mymensingh joined the main road from Jamalpur at Madhupur and Tangail, a distance of approximately 30 and 50 miles respectively. It may be safely assumed that sufficient motor transport was available to Qadir to enable his garrison at Mymensingh to pass through Tangail before the para battalion’s block became effective.
Click to buy
The mortar battery column which was trapped was perhaps a straggler which took too long to get away. Inthe event, Kler’s brigade group did not get going till 0300 hours on 12 December, 21 hours after Qadir’s likely start from Mymensingh, and the para roadblock at Poongli became effective at 2000 hours on 11 December, thus giving a clear 14 hours for the Withdrawing Pakistanis to get away, but not without some interference. The Siddigi group harassed their movements throughout with an extensive network of ambushes and mines. This forced some Pakistani troops to disperse in the 11 Madhupur forest and the countryside. Some of these parties were captured when travelling on foot along the Mymensingh-Dacca railway line and elsewhere. But, on the whole, Qadir was successful in extricating the bulk of his Mymensingh garrison intact.It has already been brought out that Kler’s brigade had moved on manpack basis. After the capture Jamalpur, it had to be replenished. Sufficient transport was recovered and some buses and other civilian vehicles mustered on 11 December. One battery of 66 Mountain Regiment was ferried across, and rations and ammunition were replenished by airdrop. 1 Maratha Light Infantry Group was made ready to resume the advance at 0300 hours on 12 December. This would therefore explain the timelag of 21 hours.If Nagra had planned to trap the withdrawing Pakistanis he should have foreseen such delays and advanced the paradrop accordingly.
If Nagra had planned to trap the withdrawing Pakistanis he should have foreseen such delays and advanced the paradrop accordingly.
Kler’s brigade had moved some 64 miles in one day with inadequate transport facilities, and without any mobile Screen, ahead of his advance. The credit for conceiving the idea of fitting jeeps with machine guns goes to Gurbux Singh. Since Kler’s brigade had no spare jeeps, he had requisitioned those of all officers commanding units in his area and had them fitted with 30 Brownings. These vehicles were driven by their permanent drivers belonging to se rvice units. One such jeep, driven by another rank of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, was shot up at the Mirpur bridge while carrying a party of 2 para. The driver was also killed. Jeeps modifide to carry machine guns came in very handy at this stage of operations.
After reaching Tangail, Nagra discovered to his great dismay that he could not sustain the advance administratively any more, for some time at least. The prospects of a buildup across the batallion Brahmaputra were not very bright. Kler and his leading of 1 Maratha. Light Infantry had set off from Jamalpur with all the vehicles he could muster, including eight civilian trucks, and his artillery regiment, but had no petrol to proceed farther. Despite the best efforts of Siddiqi, no more than ten additional could be found in the area, and they were equally short of fuel. Man of the 6 Sikh Light Infantry, the followup battalion, hadridden in cycle rickshaws up to Madhupur and were later picked up the the third Maratha’s transport sent from Tangail. 13 Guards, battalion, was also similarly ferried forward and reached Tangail in the early hours of 13 December. 2 Para Battalion collected itself and joined the brigade by the last light on 13 December.
Qadir was so harassed by Freedom Fighters in this area that he decided to clear out of it in good time.
The remainder of 167 Infantry Brigade had by there crossed the Brahmaputra, but was in no position to join battle without itsi fghting transport. Since all the administrative units and services the ralious and still had their installations north of the river, ammunition of the force were replenished with what had been captured at Jamalpur. But this did not prove satisfactory, and the replenishment of Kler’s brigade was therefore carried out by a airdrop. While looking for a suitable dropping zone, Kler’s every etc. staff captain discovered a disused landing strip near Tangail. With the assistance of Siddiqi’s men, he commissioned it within a matter of hours. In the afternoon of 13 December, welcome transport aircraft started landing the much-wanted supplies, including petrol.
As 167 Mountain Brigade was unable to fetch up in time, Nagra decided to resume the advance with 95 Mountain Brigade, which had already managed to concentrate. Kler resumed the advance from Tangail with 6 Sikh Light Infantry Group at 1200 hours on 13 December. The unit was held up by a Pakistani section which had taken up position in a reinforced concrete house about 40 yards astride the road east of Mirzapur. The unit tried all the weapons it had, including the direct firing of a 76-mm Yugoslav gun, but this had no effect on the building, and the enemy kept firing on the advancing column. Boggy ground on either side of the road forbade outflanking moves.
When told of this holdup, Kler went forward and made his way to a position about 50 yards from this building where the officer commanding and his subedar major were conferring with the leading company commander to find ways of tackling the positio. The situation was explained to Kler, and he was thinking of a way out when he heard a cry of “Bole so nihal” from east and west of the house and saw a JCO leading the platoon in an assault on it.
The approaches to the river line north and south of the Pakistani defences were marshy and difficult to negotiate. Nagra realised that it would take days to tackle this position in the systematic and deliberate manner visualised in army manuals.
Covering fire was given by machine guns on the roadside, and within minutes the position was cleared, with six Pakistanis killed and two captured. 6 Sikh Light Infantry lost one JCO and one other rank. Later, when questioned, the subedar major told Kler that in his 30 years service he had never seen a brigade commander who had come so close in actual battle. He had therefore decided that instead of waiting another 30 minutes for it get dark they should go in straightway and preserve the honour of the platoon.
The advance continued in the hours of darkness, and by morning on 14 December the battalion had contacted the enemy position on the west bank of the Turag river. The opposition was estimated to be no more than a company supported by medium machine guns and some pieces of artillery sited west of the river, while east of the river the Pakistanis had about two companies with a troop of tanks, and their defence was sited in the general area of the crossroads. The approaches to the river line north and south of the Pakistani defences were marshy and difficult to negotiate. Nagra realised that it would take days to tackle this position in the systematic and deliberate manner visualised in army manuals. A way had to be found to circumvent these defences somehow.
Flying over the area, he accidentally noticed a newly constructed road running south from near Kalaikar, but he could not make out where it led. Meanwhile, an engineer patrol assessing the crossings over the river captured a Pakistani major, who on interrogation gave the information that Qadir and a few others officers were hiding close by. A patrol of 6 Sikh Light Infantry sent out for the purpose soon rounded up the Brigadier, his brigade major and eight other officers. They confirmed that the new road joined the Man ikganj-Sabhar-D acca road, and also that the remnants of the Jamalpur and Mymensingh garrisons were holding the river line and the area of the crossroads behind it.
With no suitable antitank weapons, the Indians feared a few tanks supporting the Pakistani pockets at Bussi and Jagannathganj along the Jamuna.
The air strikes on 14 December could not locate the Pakistani tanks which were causing damage to the attackers, but they destroyed a few vehicles. It was clear that the Pakistani forces in the area had organised strong and well-coordinated defences on the river line and in and around the crossroads. By the afternoon of 14 December, the followup battalion, 1 Maratha Light Infantry, had also come forward and deployed south of the Kashimpur ferry. About this time, the other two battalions, 13 Guards and 13 Rajputana Rifles, were ferried forward with all the available transport.
An effort was made to outflank the Pakistani opposition west of the river by sending one company each from the north and south of the road against it. The companies moved at 1500 hours on 14 December but crossed the river too close to the road. They drew heavy machine gun and artillery fire but held their ground. Soon a few Pakistani tanks rushed towards the companies from the crossroads and threw them across the river. The next morning two companies of 6 Sikh Light Infantry were again sent forward, but this time they carried out a wide outflanking movement and, crossing the river by country craft, established themselves west of it. The bridge along the main axis was assaulted subsequently.
Click to buy
Unnerved by the outflanking movement, the Pakistani troops deployed west of the river withdrew after destroying a 150-feet span of the bridge. 6 Sikh Light Infantry captured the bridge and established itself on the eastern bank of the Turag by 1500 hours on 15 December with minimal casualties on either side. But no further progress could be made as any forward movement invited heavy machine-gun fire. With no suitable antitank weapons, the Indians feared a few tanks supporting the Pakistani pockets at Bussi and Jagannathganj along the Jamuna. These pockets were ultimately cleared by 13 Rajputana Rifles, killing some 36 and capturing 23 Pakistani troops with a few arms and ammunition in the process.
Please wait...
