Pakistan had dubbed the attacks on Indian territory in Jammu & Kashmir a holy war, a Jehad by Muslims against the infidels. That an Indian Muslim led the defenders of Naoshera was thus a matter of significance.
The enemy held strong positions North and South of the route to Jhangar. It also had several hideouts within the valley. Kalwant Singh began by clearing the valley; thereafter, the two brigades attacked and captured enemy strongholds on the approaches to Jhangar. The enemy fought stubbornly before giving up some of these and Indian casualties were considerable, though the enemy suffered more heavily on most occasions. By 8 March, the enemy had been cleared from the environs of Naoshera and the two brigades were ready for the thrust against Jhangar.
Kalwant Singh’s final plan for Operation ‘Vijay’ was that both brigades should advance simultaneously on parallel axes —19 Brigade along the hills on the right of the Naoshera-Jhangar road, and 50 (Para) Brigade on the left of that road ( see Fig. 3.4). At this time, infantry battalions were not allotted to brigades permanently and were regrouped, as required, from one formation to another. Thus, for this operation,50 (Para) Brigade was to consist of 3 (Para) Maratha Light Infantry, 3 (Para) Rajput, 1 Patiala and one company of 3/1 Punjab; 19 Brigade was to have 1 Rajput (less a company), 4 Dogra and 1 Kumaon. While the two brigades advanced along the hills on both sides of the Naoshera-Jhangar road, an armoured column, consisting of 7 Light Cavalry (less a squadron), a squadron from the Central India Horse and a company from 1 Rajput, was to advance along the road. Artillery support for the operation consisted of two mountain batteries (5 and 7), 30 Field Battery, a troop of 45 Field Battery and a troop of 37 Anti-Tank Battery. About a platoon of Mahar machinegunners was also given to each brigade.
The recapture of Jhangar was of special significance to Usman and 50 (Para) Brigade. In a special order of the day, he made a stirring appeal to the men under his command to ‘retrieve the honour of our arms’. But, when all was ready, rain intervened and unseasonal downpours made the road to Jammu unusable and the track to Jhangar a quagmire.
Indian troops entered Rajauri on the evening of 12 April. The sight that greeted them in and around the town was so gruesome that it killed all jubilation. The enemy had carried out a massacre of non-Muslims and put a torch to all that could be burnt down before making his getaway.
The weather cleared by 14 March and, although the Jhangar track was still slushy and unfit for vehicular traffic, Kalwant Singh ordered the advance to commence. Field artillery could not move and, on the second day out, 50 (Para) Brigade was held up at the Pir Thil Nakka feature after its leading battalion (3 [Para] Maratha LI) had suffered 18 casualties, induding two officers killed. The feature could be taken only on 17 March after field guns had been brought up and, together with the Air Force, they softened up the position. After taking this feature, the brigade reached Susiloti Dhar that day without further opposition.
On the right, 1 Kumaon took Point 3327 and 1 Rajput captured Tangni Dhar on the first day. The next day the Rajputs, with assistance from the Dogras took Darhal Fort. A double thrust by the Dogras and the Kumaonis cleared the Gaikot forest on 17 March. On the following day, the two brigades made a pincer move against Jhangar. But the enemy had meanwhile pulled out, and the commanding heights around Jhangar were taken without opposition. The village itself was entered by the armour and a company of 1 Rajput at 1400 hours.
Leaving Jhangar in the care of 50 (Para) Brigade, 19 Brigade returned to Naoshera after a few days. Cariappa soon had another mission for it—the liberation of Rajauri. Non-Muslims escaping from there had brought reports of inhuman atrocities.
The town of Rajauri lay 48 kilometres North of Naoshera on the old Mughal route to Kashmir. The fair weather road linking the two followed the Tawi River and passed through thickly wooded hills. Many of the hilltops had well-defended ‘sangars’. Halfway to Rajauri was Chingas, an enemy base from which it had been launching its operations against Naoshera.
On the first day of the advance, an enemy mortar bomb had landed in the midst of a sapper platoon. Among the casualties was Second Lieutenant Rama Raghoba Rane. Though bleeding heavily he refused to be evacuated.
Kalwant Singh’s plan for the attack on Rajauri provided for diversionary operations by 50 (Para) Brigade and 80 Brigade. While 19 Brigade advanced to Rajauri, these two formations would keep the enemy engaged with limited offensives of their own. The opening move of 19 Brigade was made on 8 April with an attack on the Barwali Ridge by 4 Dogra. This hill, 11 kilometres from Naoshera, was held by enemy troops in uniform, who were equipped with automatics and 3-inch mortars. The Dogras’ attack was supported by artillery and tanks of the Central India Horse, and their flanks were secured by 2 Jat and 2 Rajputana Rifles. The enemy made a spirited stand and it was only after a hard-fought action that Barwali was taken. Thereafter, the advance was conducted on a broad front, the infantry moving along the line of hills on either side of the road, while armour moved along the road. The Kumaonis entered Chingas on the morning of 11 April after taking a feature that overlooked the village.
It had been expected that the enemy would fight hard for Chingas. That it was taken without much trouble was largely due to the dedication shown by the Engineers of 37 Assault Field Company. To enable the tanks to advance, they worked under enemy fire for long hours to clear the road-blocks and mines from their path. On the first day of the advance, an enemy mortar bomb had landed in the midst of a sapper platoon. Among the casualties was Second Lieutenant Rama Raghoba Rane. Though bleeding heavily he refused to be evacuated. On 10 April, this officer ‘achieved an almost impossible task when he cleared, single-handed, a formiable road-block of five big pine trees surrounded by mines and covered by machine-gun fire’. For his ‘grim determination and tireless diligence’ in the face of the enemy, Rane received the PVC.
| Also read: |
Indian troops entered Rajauri on the evening of 12 April. The sight that greeted them in and around the town was so gruesome that it killed all jubilation. The enemy had carried out a massacre of non-Muslims and put a torch to all that could be burnt down before making his getaway. Three gaping pits full of corpses were found near the town. The enemy reacted to the success at Rajauri with attacks on Jhangar and Naoshera. Even at Rajauri, 19 Brigade had to mount several small missions to reduce enemy strongholds in the countryside. At Thanna Mandi, North of Rajauri, a local chief, Ali Bahadur by name, proved particularly troublesome and a column with armour had to be sent out to clear the place.
These operations in the South-West liberated hundreds of square kilometres of Indian territory. In the North, too much had been happening. At Uri, the enemy became very aggressive after the successful ambush of Sen’s column on the morning of 21 November 1947. When he hurried back to his Headquarters, he found that large numbers of Pathan tribesmen were collecting in the vicinity of Uri. The enemy was preparing to retake this wayside town where three roads met – the road to Punch, the one to Srinagar, and the road to Domel. Between 22 November and 9 December, the enemy put in no less than 16 attacks on Uri. It speaks well of the garrison that each one of these attacks was repulsed.
Please wait...
