Indian Defence Review

The reverses of October and November 1962 were a traumatic experience for India, particularly its Army. The country’s anguish was heightened by the fact that it had been led to believe that the Army was strong enough to meet any challenge. Looking back at the campaign, we find that, except for the odd skirmish, actual fighting between the Chinese and Indian forces occurred only on 13 days. Estimates of Chinese casualties are not available; they in turn inflicted a total of 9,743 casualties: 1,423 killed, 3,078 wounded, 1,655 missing, believed killed, and 3,587 prisoners.l The Chinese repatriated the prisoners in time and returned most of the captured equipment.

Considering that about 24,000 officers and men were committed in the two theatres, the casualties worked out to over 40 per cent, quite a high figure. Those who had known the old Indian Army were surprised at its performance in NEFA. However, the reader who has followed the story thus far would have no difficulty in arriving at the causes of the debacle:

1. The professional soldier after 1947 got increasingly isolated from the process of decision-making on defence matters. The situation had deteriorated to such an extent that written orders to the COAS for evicting the Chinese from the border were handed over to him signed by a mere joint secretary in the Ministry of Defence.
2. Both in protocol and in terms of promotions civil servants had improved their position considerably since 1947. The Army, for one reason or another, had been given step-motherly treatment in these spheres. Consequently, there was a feeling amongst Army officers of being denigrated which led to lack of elan amongst them and to lowering of morale.

There was no correlation of the countrys foreign policy with its defence capability. The Army was ordered to assert the countrys claims without first ensuring that in the event of China asserting her counter-claims, it would have the capacity for adequate riposte.

1. An officer who lacked the essential background and training, was first elevated to the post of Chief of the General Staff at Army Headquarters merely on account of his political connection and then given command of a corps to fight the Chinese in NEFA. Because of political patronage, Lieutenant General Kaul had become a law unto himself and ignored his military superiors.
2. The Government based its assessment of the intentions of a foreign power on the personal whims and beliefs of certain individuals instead of acting on the advice of successive Army Chiefs.
3. There was no correlation of the country’s foreign policy with its defence capability. The Army was ordered to assert the country’s claims without first ensuring that in the event of China asserting her counter-claims, it would have the capacity for adequate riposte. When Lieutenant General Daulet Singh recommended that the ‘forward policy’ be suspended in Ladakh till the Army had acquircd this capability, he was told to carry on regardless of such considerations.
4. There was political interference in the tactical handling of the situation, for example the insistence on holding the indefensible positions on the Namka Chu and the post at Tsangle.
5. There was abject failure of higher command in the field in NEFA. Troops were continuously being reshuffied, no one was taking any decision in time, and when one was forthcoming it was entirely out of tune with the realities of the ground situation. Sound tactical decisions were replaced by gross interference at the sub-unit level.

We have earlier mentioned how, after the fall of Towang, Defence Minister Krishna Menon had to resign. On 19 November, Thapar put in his resignation on returning from a visit to 4 Corps. He drove straight from the airport that night to Nehru’s residence, and told him that in view of the reverses he was prepared to resign. The next day he was informed that the Prime Minister had decided to make use of his offer.2Lieutenant General J.N. Chaudhuri, then serving as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Command, was chosen to succeed Thapar. He was the next senior but had earlier received his retirement orders on completion of tenure as lieutenant general. A cavalry officer who had seen action during the Second World War in Ethiopia and the Western Desen, ‘Muchu’ Chaudhuri had been an instructor at the Quetta Staff College and had later commanded 16 Light Cavalry. He fought at the battle of Meiktila in Burma. Later, as Brigadier-in-Charge Administration at Headquarters Malaya Command, he had seen many countries in the region.

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When Pandit Nehru paid a visit to Singapore in March 1946, Chaudhuri had been assigned the task of receiving and conducting him around. As the General Officer Commanding 1 Armoured Division, he had conducted the police action in Hyderabad and had later served as the Military Governor of the state. In 1961, as the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Command, Chaudhuri had removed the last vestiges of colonial rule from India by taking Goa, Daman and Diu from the Portuguese in a swift operation.

The Chinese having announced a cease-fire that day, the question of use of the Air Force no longer arose.

On being called to Delhi to officiate as COAS, Chaudhuri met Khera, the Cabinet Secretary, before seeing the Prime Minister. He told Khera that he would take over on three conditions. He should be given the rank of general straightaway, Kaul should go, and he should be permitted to use the Air Force if necessary.3

It is not known whether these ‘conditions’ were conveyed to the Prime Minister. However, Chaudhuri was appointed COAS in the rank of general on 20 November. The Chinese having announced a cease-fire that day, the question of use of the Air Force no longer arose. Kaul was to retire voluntarily. Chaudhuri’s first orders to the field commanders were that they should take up positions where they believed they could make a stand and then retreat no more.

There is no doubt that the year 1962 saw the Indian Army at its nadir. But that year can also be called its Great Divide. The shock of defeat aroused a powerful reaction, a resolve that never again should such humiliation befall the country.

Kaul came under severe criticism after the reverses in NEFA. Speaking of it in his memoirs, he says: “My critics chanted in chorus a hymn of hate against me and labelled me as the prime architect of the NEFA debacle”.4 He decided that the only course for him was to resign, though he had earlier advised Thapar against taking such a step when the latter had broached the subject to him on 18 November. A few days after the cease-fire, General Paul Adams of the United States Army and General Sir Richard Hull, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, paid a visit to 4 Corps. They were accompanied by Lieutenant General Sen. After Kaul had briefed his visitors on the situation in NEFA, he took Sen aside and gave him his resignation.5

Though Nehru had accepted Thapar’s resignation, he wanted Kaul to continue and tried to persuade him to withdraw his resignation. But Kaul declined to change his mind. In his memoirs, Kaul relates how he went to meet the new Army Chief on 4 December and how Chaudhuri offered to ‘rehabilitate’ him in the Army if he did not press his request for retirement. But the offer did not appeal to Kaul and he stuck to his decision.6 Thus ended the career of one who was only months earlier being considered a possible successor to Nehru himself. Major General A.S. Pathania also sent in his papers and left the Army in July 1963.