Indian Defence Review

Many surmises were made at the time on the reasons for China’s sudden invasion and the equally sudden pull-out. A year after the event, the Chinese themselves stated that their aim had been ‘to thoroughly rout the Indian reactionaries and to shatter their plan of altering the border status quo by armed force and to create conditions for a negotiated settlement’.This was stated in an article in The Peking Review of 8 November 1963.

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The words ‘altering the border status quo by armed force’ were apparently a reference to India’s ‘forward policy’ in Ladakh. Put in simple terms, the Chinese aim was to bring down the existing Indian Government (its leaders were reactionaries in Chinese eyes on account of their commitment to democracy) and in the conditions that would obtain after a Chinese victory, secure a settlement that suited China.

Chinese successes did not bring down the Indian Government. On the other hand, the whole country placed itself behind Nehru. A patriotic surge swept over the country and people came forward in their thousands to serve in the armed forces.

In the event, China failed to secure her political aim. Chinese successes did not bring down the Indian Government. On the other hand, the whole country placed itself behind Nehru. A patriotic surge swept over the country and people came forward in their thousands to serve in the armed forces.

Even though public clamour for rejecting the cease-fire was great, the Chinese once again made a virtue out of a necessity. They had to withdraw from Kameng before they were enclosed by deep winter on the wrong side of Bum La. Kameng and Lohit were linked politically, so they made a point to vacate both. In Ladakh there was no such compulsion, so they held on to their captured territory. Moreover, they had not brought up any armour and not much in the shape of mechanized transport. It was, in fact, impossible for them to bring mechanized forces across several hundred kilometres of mountainous terrain.

Till their unilateral cease-fire, the Chinese had come up against a small segment of the Indian Army – only about 24,000 out of 400,000. Indian reinforcements had begun to arrive and counter-attacks were sure to follow. The Chinese knew that with their overstretched lines of communication and without adequate transport for logistics, they would not be able to withstand these. There was also the possibility of outside intervention on India’s behalf. Thus, the Chinese decision to withdraw was not a magnanimous gesture on their part, as it was made out to be at the time.

The Indian Government accepted the cease-fire and the Army observed it strictly. The orders to troops were not to fire unless fired upon. The Chinese announcement of cease-fire was accompanied by a statement of how they would carry out their withdrawal; it also contained an invitation for negotiations. They specified that the withdrawal of their troops would commence on 1 December and that they would withdraw to positions 20 kilometres behind the Line of Actual Control which existed between India and China on 7 November 1959.

The countrys anguish was heightened by the fact that it had been led to believe that the Army was strong enough to meet any challenge.

They expected that India would do the same, i.e. keep her armed forces 20 kilometres away from the Line of Actual Control as it was on 7 November 1959. An identical proposal for a withdrawal had been made by the Chinese Premier in a letter to Prime Minister Nehru of that date. The Indian Government now made it clear that before there could be any discussions, the Chinese must withdraw to positions they held before 8 September 1962, i.e. the date on which their troops had invested the Assam Rifles’ post at Che Dong.

In their cease-fire declaration, however, the Chinese had stated that their withdrawal was not conditional and regardless of the fact that a common ground could not be found for negotiations, they commenced their pull-out on schedule.

The reverses of October and November 1962 were a traumatic experience for India, particularly its Army. The country’s anguish was heightened by the fact that it had been led to believe that the Army was strong enough to meet any challenge. Looking back at the campaign, we find that, except for the odd skirmish, actual fighting between the Chinese and Indian forces occurred only on 13 days. Estimates of Chinese casualties are not available; they in turn inflicted a total of 9,743 casualties: 1,423 killed, 3,078 wounded, 1,655 missing, believed killed, and 3,587 prisoners.l The Chinese repatriated the prisoners in time and returned most of the captured equipment.

Considering that about 24,000 officers and men were committed in the two theatres, the casualties worked out to over 40 per cent, quite a high figure. Those who had known the old Indian Army were surprised at its performance in NEFA. However, the reader who has followed the story thus far would have no difficulty in arriving at the causes of the debacle:

1. The professional soldier after 1947 got increasingly isolated from the process of decision-making on defence matters. The situation had deteriorated to such an extent that written orders to the COAS for evicting the Chinese from the border were handed over to him signed by a mere joint secretary in the Ministry of Defence.
2. Both in protocol and in terms of promotions civil servants had improved their position considerably since 1947. The Army, for one reason or another, had been given step-motherly treatment in these spheres. Consequently, there was a feeling amongst Army officers of being denigrated which led to lack of elan amongst them and to lowering of morale.

There was no correlation of the countrys foreign policy with its defence capability. The Army was ordered to assert the countrys claims without first ensuring that in the event of China asserting her counter-claims, it would have the capacity for adequate riposte.

1. An officer who lacked the essential background and training, was first elevated to the post of Chief of the General Staff at Army Headquarters merely on account of his political connection and then given command of a corps to fight the Chinese in NEFA. Because of political patronage, Lieutenant General Kaul had become a law unto himself and ignored his military superiors.
2. The Government based its assessment of the intentions of a foreign power on the personal whims and beliefs of certain individuals instead of acting on the advice of successive Army Chiefs.
3. There was no correlation of the country’s foreign policy with its defence capability. The Army was ordered to assert the country’s claims without first ensuring that in the event of China asserting her counter-claims, it would have the capacity for adequate riposte. When Lieutenant General Daulet Singh recommended that the ‘forward policy’ be suspended in Ladakh till the Army had acquircd this capability, he was told to carry on regardless of such considerations.
4. There was political interference in the tactical handling of the situation, for example the insistence on holding the indefensible positions on the Namka Chu and the post at Tsangle.
5. There was abject failure of higher command in the field in NEFA. Troops were continuously being reshuffied, no one was taking any decision in time, and when one was forthcoming it was entirely out of tune with the realities of the ground situation. Sound tactical decisions were replaced by gross interference at the sub-unit level.

We have earlier mentioned how, after the fall of Towang, Defence Minister Krishna Menon had to resign. On 19 November, Thapar put in his resignation on returning from a visit to 4 Corps. He drove straight from the airport that night to Nehru’s residence, and told him that in view of the reverses he was prepared to resign. The next day he was informed that the Prime Minister had decided to make use of his offer.2Lieutenant General J.N. Chaudhuri, then serving as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Command, was chosen to succeed Thapar. He was the next senior but had earlier received his retirement orders on completion of tenure as lieutenant general. A cavalry officer who had seen action during the Second World War in Ethiopia and the Western Desen, ‘Muchu’ Chaudhuri had been an instructor at the Quetta Staff College and had later commanded 16 Light Cavalry. He fought at the battle of Meiktila in Burma. Later, as Brigadier-in-Charge Administration at Headquarters Malaya Command, he had seen many countries in the region.

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When Pandit Nehru paid a visit to Singapore in March 1946, Chaudhuri had been assigned the task of receiving and conducting him around. As the General Officer Commanding 1 Armoured Division, he had conducted the police action in Hyderabad and had later served as the Military Governor of the state. In 1961, as the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Command, Chaudhuri had removed the last vestiges of colonial rule from India by taking Goa, Daman and Diu from the Portuguese in a swift operation.

The Chinese having announced a cease-fire that day, the question of use of the Air Force no longer arose.

On being called to Delhi to officiate as COAS, Chaudhuri met Khera, the Cabinet Secretary, before seeing the Prime Minister. He told Khera that he would take over on three conditions. He should be given the rank of general straightaway, Kaul should go, and he should be permitted to use the Air Force if necessary.3

It is not known whether these ‘conditions’ were conveyed to the Prime Minister. However, Chaudhuri was appointed COAS in the rank of general on 20 November. The Chinese having announced a cease-fire that day, the question of use of the Air Force no longer arose. Kaul was to retire voluntarily. Chaudhuri’s first orders to the field commanders were that they should take up positions where they believed they could make a stand and then retreat no more.

There is no doubt that the year 1962 saw the Indian Army at its nadir. But that year can also be called its Great Divide. The shock of defeat aroused a powerful reaction, a resolve that never again should such humiliation befall the country.

Kaul came under severe criticism after the reverses in NEFA. Speaking of it in his memoirs, he says: “My critics chanted in chorus a hymn of hate against me and labelled me as the prime architect of the NEFA debacle”.4 He decided that the only course for him was to resign, though he had earlier advised Thapar against taking such a step when the latter had broached the subject to him on 18 November. A few days after the cease-fire, General Paul Adams of the United States Army and General Sir Richard Hull, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, paid a visit to 4 Corps. They were accompanied by Lieutenant General Sen. After Kaul had briefed his visitors on the situation in NEFA, he took Sen aside and gave him his resignation.5

Though Nehru had accepted Thapar’s resignation, he wanted Kaul to continue and tried to persuade him to withdraw his resignation. But Kaul declined to change his mind. In his memoirs, Kaul relates how he went to meet the new Army Chief on 4 December and how Chaudhuri offered to ‘rehabilitate’ him in the Army if he did not press his request for retirement. But the offer did not appeal to Kaul and he stuck to his decision.6 Thus ended the career of one who was only months earlier being considered a possible successor to Nehru himself. Major General A.S. Pathania also sent in his papers and left the Army in July 1963.

Lieutenant General Manekshaw succeeded Kaul in the command of 4 Corps. It fell to him to reorganize and refurbish the defences of NEFA. He went round the various units and spoke to officers and men to raise their morale and to listen to their complaints, so that corrective action could be taken.

Manekshaw’s assessment was that NEFA could have been defended. He said, “The only reason for failure was that morale was low, absolutely low. There was no higher direction – from Delhi, or from the Army or corps commanders. . . . The troops were demoralized because of their commanders”.

It was decided to put into effect a plan for the expansion, re-equipment and reorganization of the Army. Its strength was to be doubled in a phased programme over the next few years.

Regarding Lieutenant General Sen’s part, this is what Manekshaw had to say. When I took over, I asked General Sen, . . . “Bogey, why didn’t you come as Army Commander, sack the Corps Commander and take over yourself ?” His reply was: “It is all very well for you to say this, Sam; but do you know what his stature was then? He never talked to me; he would just pick up the phone and talk to the Prime Minister. He never even consulted the COAS. I would have got no support from anyone. Krishna Menon and Bijjy Kaul were running the armed forces of the country”. Even so, I told him that had I been in office, I would have said: “Sorry, out you go! I am taking over”. They could have sacked me. At least there would have been no disgrace for the country’.

There is no doubt that the year 1962 saw the Indian Army at its nadir. But that year can also be called its Great Divide. The shock of defeat aroused a powerful reaction, a resolve that never again should such humiliation befall the country. A new spirit, a new leadership and support from the Government brought into being a new Army.   .

It was decided to put into effect a plan for the expansion, re-equipment and reorganization of the Army. Its strength was to be doubled in a phased programme over the next few years. Six new divisions were to be raised; two of them would be standard infantry divisions and the remainder were to be specially equipped and trained for mountain warfare. Some of the existing infantry divisions were also to be switched over to mountain role. The fire-power of infantry units was improved. The 7.62-mm self-loading rifle was introduced and mountain divisions were given preference for the issue of this weapon. Then came the 81-mm mortar and other improved equipment.

Some of the existing infantry divisions were also to be switched over to mountain role. The fire-power of infantry units was improved.

Y.B. Chavan took over as Defence Minister on 21 November. As was to be expected, an enquiry was ordered into the NEFA reverses. The enquiry committee was headed by Lieutenant General T.B. Henderson Brookes and it had Major General (later Lieutenant General) P.S. Bhagat as member. The committee’s terms of reference restricted the enquiry to the military aspect of the operations; even in this field, it was not to concern itself with individual responsibility for the defeat. Certain restrictions were also placed as to the people who could be questioned.

The committee sent in its report in the middle of 1963. Despite its restricted terms of reference, it reviewed comprehensively the operations in Ladakh as well as NEFA, covering the developments and events prior to the hostilities and also the plans, posture and strength of the Army in the theatres of operations. For reasons of security, the report was not published but in a statement made before Parliament, the Defence Minister summarized the recommendations of the report. These emphasized:

1. The need for more realistic battle training, especially in mountain warfare.
2. The urgency of eliminating shortages of equipment.
3. The need for curbing the tendency among senior commanders to interfere in the tactical handling of troops at lower levels.
4. The requirement of preparing troops adequately before committing them to a theatre of operations.
5. The requirement of better communications (surface and signals).
6. The need for a better intelligence set-up.

It was also given out that while the performance of junior officers was ‘fair’, at higher levels of command there had been lapses. The need for improvement in the work and procedures of the General Staff at all levels was also stressed.

Continued…: The Chinese Invasion: The Reckoning & After – II