IAF’s performance in 1971 was a remarkable improvement on its showing in 1965, mainly because the emphasis this time in applying air power shifted from a private air war to supporting land and sea battles where decisions were at stake. Moreover, the direct participation of the force in crucial battles in-close cooperation with the Army and Navy made its contribu- 4ion more visible. Frustration of Pakistan’s Cbhamb offensive, disruption of Tikka Khan’s planned thrusts towards Bhatinda, destruction of Pakistani armour at Longenwala, and the raids on installations in Karachi port in conjuction with the Navy were notable contributions to ending the short war on favourable terms for India. The credit for this must go to Air Chief Marshal PC Lal for the overall conduct of operations and to the gallant air units which executed his plan with verve and daring.
After much debate, the Government accepted a target of 45 operational squadrons, thus making IAF the fifth largest standing air force in the world.
At the same time it is prudent to evaluate the shortfalls in the performance of the Air Force and find remedial measures for preparation in the next conflict, whenever it comes. IAF claimed that some 7,300 sorties were flown in both fronts in the 14-day war, averaging more than 500 sorties a day. Superficially, this appeared an effort of significant magnitude in the sub-continent in the era after the Second World War. But in fact it was not. Considering that India fielded some 38 frontline squadrons, this daily average works out at less than one sortie per aircraft per day although each squadron was fully subscribed for authorised aircraft and personnel. With efficient management this average could have easily been trebled without undue strain on men and machines. The Israelis are known to have averag- ed eight to ten sorties per aircraft per day in the earlier Sinai campaigns. Such optimum utilisation should be aimed at, but the mere increase in air effort will not be of much use if it is not advantageous in decision-making tactical battles.
The favoured status IAF enjoys has created the erroneous impression in the minds of those running this service that it is independent. They tend to forget that it is essentially a supporting service. It cannot win or lose a war on its own. Its contribution lies in supporting land and sea battles where the real decisive actions take place. Its support may be direct and tangible, in the form of close support for land sea actions, or indirect in terms of creating a favourable air situation or disrupting the adversary’s build-up by interdiction, and the transportation of men and material. Since gains on land and sea have to be taken over physically, the Air Force can do no more than support the agencies waging war in these spheres.
On 6 September, when full-fledged fighting began on the western front, Air Marshal Arjan Singh concentrated on destroying the PAF air bases, mounting facilities and aircraft canght on the ground and in the air. He employed mainly Hunter Canberras for the purpose.
This is unfortunately not understood at the higher levels of command. In an informal gathering after the last conflict, an Air Marshal responsible for the conduct of operations in the west made it appear as if IAF had singlehandedly won the war. When a responsible Army officer respectfully pointed out that the Air Force had played only a supporting role, which however it had played well, the Air Marshal lost his shirt. He threatened to report him to the Army Chief for actions amounting to spoiling interservice relations and warned him that in the next conflict the Air Marshal would see that whichever formation the Army officer commanded would be starved of air support.
This was a typical instance of the fact that IAF had become a highly personalized service. The Air Marshal felt that in allotting air support he was bestowing a personal favour, and this was more evident in the allocation of communication or reconnaissance helicopter sorties at all levels. This led quite unnecessarily to friction in working arrangements among the services, Although IAF is a separate service, allotment of effort, assigning priorities and their efficient application should remain a joint service decision if optimum utilisation of the effort is to be achieved.
The existing system and procedures for close air support were devised in the Second World War and basically related to handling a piston-driven, slow-speed aircraft with old-style radio and line communications functioning between units demanding support to Air Force wings executing a mission through intermediate formation headquarters. Classical close air support applies. to targets in contact with forward troops, where a groundbased forward air controller (FAC) can direct aircraft to the target under his observation.
In plain country the zone of observation does not usually extend beyond 3,000 to 4,000 yards. In such terrain supporting artillery and other ground weaponry can be brought to bear much more speedily than air support. From statistics of the 1971 war the time-lag between demand and actual execution varied from one to one and a half hours. This is operationally unacceptable, especially when dealing with mobile targets like tanks or those temporarily stationary, as within this time they would have either caused damage or moved away because of ground fire.
Despite his (Arjan Singh) claim at the end of the war that he had destroyed nearly half of Pakistans air fleet, he failed to achieve freedom of the Pakistani skies and was unable to prevent Pakistani raids on sensitive Indian areas up to the last day of war.
Acquisition of targets by high-speed jetcraft presents a serious problem. Jets find it difficult to pick up a stationary target and have to be directed by FAC, at times by smoke indication. This however may be difficult if artillery is in action in the area at the same time. With the ever-increasing speed of modern aircraft and improved methods of target concealment and defence it is becoming exceedingly difficult to pinpoint ground targets in the tactical area from the air.
This problem becomes more pronounced when adversaries face each other from well-camouflaged fortifications. These factors have rendered air-delivery weapons less effective and have resulted in a higher attrition rate of ground-attack aircraft. Neither the efforts of a skilled FAC, ground-based or airborne, nor highly sophisticated sensors from infra-red to the “people sniffer” introduced in Vietnam have helped overcome this difficulty, and our susceptibility to this limitation is steadily increasing.
There is a case for using comparatively slow aircraft in ground attack. These aircraft should have greater endurance and ordnance carrying capability than present-day jetfighters. They should be specially designed for this task on the lines of the A-10 developed by the USAF-for ground attack purposes. For us this would mean having a separate high-speed aircraft for defence and long-range interdiction and slower aircraft for ground attack, especially for targets close to the positions of our troops. Even armed helicopters could be used in such a role, reinforced with protective armour against small arms fire. Incidentally, introduction of helicopters in this role might well result in bringing close support to ground troops deployed in mountains within the realm of possibility.
Both in defensive and offensive operations the requirement of close air support in the tactical area pertains to opportunity targets in close contact and under observation of forward troops. These targets are invariably within the capability of ground weapons and warrant air engagement only where greater and more effective weight of fire is required. This type of engagement uses only a fraction of the total availability of close air support effort. Since short wars are sustained from forward dumps, an effective way of utilizing the-air effort would be interdiction at a short and intermediate range.Short-range interdiction visualizes the isolation of battle zones so as to disrupt movement between the administrative areas of the formation in contact and the forward troops and thus prevent the movement of reinforcements and reserves into the battle area. If effectively carried out, it should affect the war potential of the forward troops adversely within 24 hours.Similarly, isolation of battlefield at greater depth amounts to intermediate-range interdiction and should be effective within 48 to 72 hours. In the context of a short war it would be more pro- fitable to carry out short and intermediate interdiction by close air support rather than dissipate the effort in winning the air war and in long-range interdiction tasks which do not materially influence the course of the war.
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The existing procedures sub-allot the available effort in the form of a number of sorties to field formations at corps level. Inadvertently, the present system of suballotment of air effort and the tendency of formations to make demands from each sector fritters away the inherent air force flexibility of concentration and its capability of switching quickly from one target to another. This effort remains dispersed at present, though there is a definite need to concentrate on sensitive areas based on tactical priorities at the cost of squeezing dormant sectors.
In 1971, India had 45 squadrons in all of combat and transport aircraft against Pakistans 13, compared with 34 and 12 respectively in 1965.
The projected concept visualizes the air effort to be concentrated at a chosen point, and such concentration shifts from one area to another, depending on the tactical demands of the, time. Close interdiction and engagement of targets near forward troops are undertaken by armed helicopters and slowmoving, fixed-wing aircraft while faster jetplanes carry out intermediate interdiction and provide air cover to slow ground-support air- craft. The system calling for air support should enable a response within ten to 15 minutes. This would be possible as slower aircraft and helicopters would operate from advance landing strips and helipads located near the battle front.
High-endurance aircraft can also maintain an airborne alert. The army should not get bogged down with enormous logistic support in terms of fuel and armament loads, servicing facilities and repair organisation if air operations from two landing strips are to be carried out. There will be more disadvantages than gains.
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IAF has reached the optimum level of 45 squadrons the country can afford to sustain at least for some time to come. The aim should therefore be to increase war potential within the force level rather than seek expansion. Improvements sought should be in weaponry, delivery systems, concepts, response formulations and crisis management. The basic consideration in our concepts should be to serve the immediate requirements of a short war rather than systematically destroy the adversary’s war potential to get an edge over him in a protracted war.
The Mirage was superior in all respects including speed, sophisticated weapons system and manoeuvrability.
This focuses attention on the requirements of the immediate battle zone. Winning a favourable situation over our air space and that of the tactical area should receive priority over all other air operations. This environment would allow interdiction, both short and intermediate, and close support in the classical form to be provided without interference, and would prevent the adversary from operating against our forward troops. This situation would also enable us to use our air and heliborne strike forces with added three-dimensional involvement capability.
The prime consideration should be to sharpen the teeth of the air arm within the force level. This can be easily achieved by, firstly, shedding certain roles which rightfully belong to other services and, secondly, by discarding the obsolete inventory, which has only a marginal use in the present context. The decision to hand. over the role of maritime reconnaissance to the Navy is therefore a progressive step and should be carried forward by giving heliborne tasks to the Army.
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An Army aviation corps may be created, as in most foreign armies, for this purpose out of the nucleus of Army pilots already handling air observation post helicopters. The medium transport Packet fleet, no longer required for airborne tasks in view of its replacement by an equivalent helilift, should be discarded. The saving thus accruing in crew and ground personnel may be used to increase the teeth element.
Pakistan had a good detection system in 1965, and India strove to improve its own through skilful employment of a combination of radar and observers.
As for the future Air Force inventory, there is need, as has been stressed earlier, for a close support aircraft slow in speed but highly lethal in weaponry. Thus a low-cost and relatively unsophisticated aircraft may have to be developed for this role. In addition, the development of the existing helicopter fleet with the capability of firing cannon, rockets and air-to-ground missiles is indicated. To win the air war and for deep interdiction very sophisticated, high-speed, multipurpose aircrafts are necessary.
The MIG-21 is the standard interceptor, and has also been employed in a strike role with limited weapon loads. The improved version under production is expected to have a greater range and payload. It is likely to fill the role of multi-purpose combat aircraft and may replace the Hunter and the Gnat as and when they are phased out. An Indian advanced-strike aircraft is expected to be inducted in the 1980s, but from the experience of the Marut this may prove a futile exercise. So India should look round for a suitable replacement, especially in view of the projected acquisition of better performance aircraft of the Phantom class from the US and the Mirage-F1 and the Jaguar from Western Europe.
For long-range interdiction the Canberra will need to be re-placed by a better version of a bomber in this decade. It may be seen that by shedding some roles legitimately belonging to the other services and by a rational equipping policy IAF can increase its punch considerably. Any increase in force level as a trade off of an equivalent decrease in the other services, as advocated by some armchair strategists, is not warranted. There is however further room to increase its output efficiency by sustaining more sorties per day through good management. The trail PC Lal blazed must be pursued with vigour.
There are shortfalls in the location of forward airfields where the depth of offensive thrusts is limited by the range of fighter cover operating from them. It is therefore essential to construct new airfields closer to the border to meet the present dimensions of thrusts by both armies. But in the future, when mobility is restored on the battlefield by superior generalship and equipment and deeper thrusts are possible, it will be necessary to capture enemy airfields and rehabilitate them speedily to support our operations where possible or devise some method of laying temporary airfields quickly. Failing either, there is scope for using vertical take off aircraft of the Harrier class. IAF had better learn to look for this capability for use in the next war.
In air defence, better integration, possibly computerized, between the early warning systems and communication networks connecting AD weaponry and air bases, especially in the tactical area, is indicated, and existing gaps need to be expeditiously closed.
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