Indian Defence Review

The real reason was that in anticipation of a pre-emptive attack IAF had dispersed its aircraft among rear bases outside the range of the Pakistani F-84 and F-104. It took some time to collect and group them before launching a counter-offensive. The first raid on the Pakistani air bases took place about 2300 hours on 3 December. The Indian Canberras struck at the air bases at Chander, Sargodha, Mianwali, Rafiqui, Murid and Risalwala. Early next day about 200 sorties were flown by Hunters and SU-7s against these bases and the radar installations at Sakesar and Badin. Later in the day Hunters penetrated as deep as Kohat, Peshawar and Chaklala. These attacks continued on 5 December as well with renewed vigour.

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Raids by Hunters and SU-7s flying low were invariably escorted by MIG-21s at a higher level. This not only facilitated swooping on the Pakistani interceptors from positions ofadvant- age but was also a line of sight for the VHF relay link between low-flying raiders and their control stations at forward bases. Coded Sparrow, these MIG-21 standing patrols were later declared Russian-manned TU-20 AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft by Pakistani evaluators. Nothing was farther from the truth.

The two-day onslaught on the Pakistani air bases was meant to cause crushing attrition by destroying aircraft on the ground and damaging runways, radar and attendant maintenance facilities to cripple the airworthiness of PAF. The ordnance used varied from 400-pound blockbusters to anti-tyre steel tripods. Some of these bombs were supposed to penetrate deep into concrete before exploding, thus causing irretrievable damage to runways. The Indian press published claims of 30-odd Pakistani aircraft destroyed in the counteroffensive, out of which five or six transports were destroyed at Chaklala and one at Mianwali. In addition, fuel dumps at Karachi and Attock were destroyed. The vital radar centre at Sakesar was damaged and remained unserviceable throughout the war, thus creating a gap in the early warning system which India exploited in subsequent air operations.

Pakistan claimed the destruction of three Canberras and 17 other aircraft in air combat and by ground fire from the anti- aircraft guns of the heavily defended Pakistani air bases. Irrespective of claims and counterclaims, it may be said that IAF found this type of counteroffensive costlier in attrition, and the results achieved were certainly not commensurate with the effort involved. PAF interceptors operated in home air space with a slight edge over raiding Indian aircraft. But this offensive was of immense value indirectly to the conduct of the war in that PAF got so involved in defensive operations that it was unable to support the Pakistani Navy when it was under attack both from sea and air in and around Karachi. It also saw the total disruption of Pakistan 18 Division’s offensive in the Rajasthan Desert by a couple of Hunters operating in Pakistani skies without fear of interference.

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Lal soon grasped the futility of pursuing the counteroffensive and switched over to the strategy of interdiction, embracing the destruction of lines of communication and industrial targets affecting the immediate land battle. These targets were systematically tackled all along the front. In the north a detachment of four Vampire trainers, besides bombing Skardu airfield, disrupted narrow valley roads leading to Kargil, Tithwal, Lipa, Uri and Poonch in addition to destroying dumps providing logistic support to these fronts. The railway system connecting Karachi- Lahore-Rawalpindi was ceaselessly pounded in the Sialkot and Lahore sectors to prevent any significant military movement. Railway sidings and marshalling yards housing what looked like oil tankers and installations were rocketed and straffed.

In the later stages of the war no train could ply on this route unless covered by continuous air patrols. Burning trains, damaged locomotives and marshalling yards in shambles were a common sight. The strike on the Attock oil refinery, resulting in a “beautiful blaze,” combined with destruction of the oil instal- lations at Keamari and elsewhere on the west coast, almost dried up the oil backing of the Pakistani Army. But the most significant contribution of IAF in this regard was frustrating. Tikka Khan’s offensive in the Ganganagar sector with Pakistan Strike Force South, comprising 1 Armoured Division and an infantry division.Fearful of the deployment of such a thrust line towards Bhatinda, Manekshaw had asked for surveillance of the area opposite. On such a mission four Mysteres operating from Nal and Sirsa forward airfields to take photographs were destroyed by anti-aircraft fire from innocent-looking sand dunes. Taking a tip from this Pakistani reaction, IAF flew about 300 missions against expected launching areas for the offensive in Pakpattan,. Fort Abbas, Haveli, Mandi Sadiq Ganj and Bahawalnagar. According to some defecting Bengali officers from 1 Armoured Division, IAF destroyed the divisional petrol dump at Chistian Mandi, the power house in Bahawalpur, 27 tanks loaded on a train, five guns and 13 vehicles. This damage in itself could not amount to very much, but what was significant was the damage to bridges and other crossings over the Sutlej and the canals. south of it.The entire resources of Indian Airlines were employed along with the IAF transport fleet to fly formations from the plains of Punjab and elsewhere to Tezpur, Gauhati and Dibrugarh to reinforce NEFA, and to Bagdogra for induction in Sikkim.
This retarded the force’s buildup for the offensive for 48 hours or so, by which time developments in the Rajasthan sector forced the Pakistan higher command to split 33 Infantry Division and divert two brigades north and south towards 1 Corps and 18 Infantry Division respectively. This depletion of the infantry component of the strike force nullified Tikka,. Khan’s offensive for good. The offensive, scheduled to start on. 7 December or so, was postponed because of the slow buildup and was later scuttled because Pakistan’s higher command panicked. IAF undoubtedly helped in frustrating Pakistan’s counteroffensive, which might have altered the course of the war-in the west.

PAF did not usually interfere with these interdiction missions. The reasons for this are many and have been enumerated earlier. The Pakistanis generally got to know of the raids, only after the intruders had gone across the border. Moreover, the shorter range of interdiction did not allow PAF enough reaction time for interception, especially when operating from rear areas in depth. Another reason Mugeem gives in defence of the operational pilots is that Pakistan’s Air Chief had so centralized control that for mounting a single mission permission had to be obtained from the Chief himself. This cramped the style of the local commanders and hampered flexibility in the use of air power. As a result IAF had complete freedom of the skies in the forward Pakistan communication zone, while PAF continued to dominate its own air bases, and neither side later interfered with each other’s spheres, to the great advantage of India.

Before Pakistan could redress its shortfalls in strategy and deployment the fortunes of war had been made and unmade. The losses suffered by the Pakistani Navy in the way of shipping and tanks by 18 Infantry Division at Longenwala were directly attributed to PAF inability to intervene because of faulty and timid handling. Nevertheless, PAF did attempt close interdiction on the western front. It went for the ammunition dumps at Akhnur and Ferozepur, but without much effect. The halfhearted attempts at Bhatinda, Gurdaspur, Mukerian and Barmer railway stations caused some damage, but more to civilian traffic. An ammunition train was however destroyed at Mukerian.

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On the other hand, IAF was very much in evidence in direct support of land operations, and its significant contribution to some of them needs to be highlighted. When the Poonch sector was under heavy attack and its fate was for a while in the balance, IAF was asked to attack the Pakistani gun areas and rear administrative installations. As these were outside the range of fighters, Canberras and modified AN-12s were mustered to execute the task. Night bombing of the Kahuta area, south of Haji Pir Pass, was carried out on a large scale.

“¦IAF had no serious training in tactical support of land battles in the rugged and mountainous terrain of NEFA and Sikkim.

According to prisoners who were interrogated as well as authentic reports from a defector, our carpet bombing generated a great deal of noise without causing much damage to the Pakistani organisations. The guns had been deployed close to the ceasefire line on the reverse slopes of high hills, and the logistic dumps were well protected by the hills. As a result, bombing did not materially alter the course of the battle, but all the same it was heartening to see the Air Force come to the aid of the Army in rugged hilly terrain, and with a big bang.

The Indian Army was caught unawares by the Pakistani offensive in the Chhamb sector. Pressing home the advantage of surprise achieved, the Pakistanis captured Chhamb town on 6 December. The next day they secured the line of Manawar Wali Tawi, and efforts were afoot to pursue the withdrawing 10 Infantry Division across the river. PAF, despite its preoccupation with Indian air attacks on its bases, was providing intimate support to the advancing troops with an average 30 to 40 sorties a day. In this period IAF was conspicuous by its absence.

“¦primarily oriented to meet the Chinese threat, the exercise indirectly brought out the weaknesses against Pakistan as well.

The army was told that it had been diverted to achieve freedom of operation in the tactical area by knocking out Pakistan’s forward airfields in accordance with the overall plans of the Air Force. Till then the ground support effort could only be marginal and the Army should be content with this. Army Headquarters protested and got the Air Force employment reversed at the instance of Manekshaw. Lal ordered all efforts to be concentrated in the Chhamb sector to help the Army recover its positions. On the night of 7 December Pakistan had established a bridgehead across the Manawar Wali Tawi and managed to induct some armour into it.

On the morning of 8 December IAF joined the battle, flying 200 sorties. With Hunters, SU-7s and Canberras it struck with rockets by day and bombs at night at Pakistani tanks, guns, vehicles and troop concentrations. These attacks were kept up on the same scale for two days, claiming the destruction of 60 tanks and 20 guns. The success of the Army counter-attack on the night of 9 December was attributed mainly to the destruction caused by the air attack across the river in the Pakistani rear areas. The Pakistani decision to withdraw from east of the river, as indicated in Muqeem’s book, was due to the accidential death of the general in command and the pressing need to divert troops from this sector elsewhere.

Whatever the reason, this amply demonstrated the inherent flexibility of the Air Force and its ability to concentrate efforts wherever required in a tactical area and set the pattern for its future use. Similarly, in the Hussainiwala and Fazilka sectors the Air Force helped prevent Pakistan from taking advantage of local setbacks. The question is not what was achieved, which is indeed creditable, but how the Indian advance to Rahim Yar Khan was planned on the support of a meagre force of four Hunters stationed at Jaisalmer, out of which two were unserviceable. What would have happened if the Pakistani Air Force, operating from the nearby airfield at Jacohabad, had decided to support the armoured thrust on a large scale. The fate of the battle in reverse was made possible more by bankruptcy of joint planning at the level of the Pakistani higher command than good planning on the part of IAF.Operating from Uttarlai in the Thar Desert, Maruts supported 11 Infantry Division’s advance towards Nayachor. The border post Ghazi on the way to Khokhrapar was attacked with rockets which softened the way for the advancing troops to the extent that it was taken without a fight. The advancing columns reached the outer Nayachor defences over the trackless desert virtually without opposition. Since the construction of vehicle tracks had not caught up with the advancing troops the help of the Air Force was sought to drop drinking water, food and ammunition. IAF refused, saying that at that range Maruts could not provide adequate escort for unarmed transports. Even at night it did not take a chance, fearful of Pakistani inter- ference. Nor could it stop daily forays by Pakistani aircraft on trains transporting much-needed water and other supplies. The Maruts found it hard to operate without MIG-21 cover although in the later stages of the war they did claim one F-86 over Nayachor.

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The air operations in support of the naval action in and around Karachi were well executed both in terms of synchronisation and effectiveness of strikes, and unqualified success was thus achieved against the Pakistan Navy. For this IAF deserves all credit.In the sphere of trar sport support a battalion group was paradropped at Tangail in Bangladesh, and an infantry brigade group was later flown out from Bagdogra to reinforce the Fazilka sector. This was in addition to routine maintenance of the posts in Ladakh and NEFA facing the Chinese.