Although negotiations were conducted with Britain on the purchase of Bloodhound SAMs, the final choice fell on the Russian V-75 SAM system. A few of these were acquired and installed around vulnerable points before the 1965 conflict but their meagre number and lack of proper integration with other weaponry left wide gaps in the air umbrella. The mainstay of low-level defence was the anti-aircraft L-60 Bofor gun of the Second World War. It depended on visual engagement by day and sought to trap flying aircraft in an extensive barrage at night. Manually operated, it had difficulty in tracking supersonic aircraft, especially at low altitudes. Although many claims, like that of Subedar Kunju, were made of downing Pakistan Sabres the hits must have been scored more by accident than design. At best the weaponry India possessed in this field could only act as a deterrent.
Chinese policies in the Himalayas, the growing menace of insurgency and civil wars in Southeast Asia, and even more the acquisition of supersonic Starfighters by Pakistan, sent India in frantic search for similar aircraft for IAF.
Having learnt a lesson, India set about overhauling its air defence organisation. To replace the outdated L-60, some L-70s were procured and arrangements made for its indigenous production. The L-70 was radar-controlled and could track aircraft effectively both by day and night. The replacement programme was well underway, and by the start of the 1971 conflict the bulk of the sensitive areas had the protection of the new gun against low-level attack. On the whole, a workable integration had been achieved between the detection system, the Air Force SAMs and air defence guns both in the tactical and strategic zones.
On the other hand, the Pakistani Air Force which took to the skies in 1971 was totally different from that of 1965. It could field a total of 250 frontline aircraft, and these were organised into about eleven and a half squadrons comprising F-86 Sabres, a few F-104 Starfighters received under US military aid, some Chinese MIG-19s, Mirages, B-56 bombers and T-33 jet trainers. One squadron was deployed in East Pakistan and the remainder in the western wing. After September 1965 the US had stopped the supply of spares, and as a result Pakistan had to keep its fleet of American-built aircraft in the air by obtaining spares from third countries. In this regard Iran, Jordan and Turkey proved of great help, to the extent that they even loaned fully assembled aircraft to tide over Pakistan’s difficulties in war.
This polygon collection of weapons systems, representing technologies of both the East and the West, had its attendant logistic problems, especially the sluggish flow of spares. The worst affliction however was the defection of some personnel of Fast Pakistan origin early in April 1971 which led to grounding the remaining airmen from that province. It embraced about 25 pilots and, worse still, 25 per cent of the ground technicians. This seriously affected the serviceability of aircraft and the war potential of PAF.
Even more serious was the crisis in leadership of the force. Air Marshal Nur Khan, who had painstakingly raised it to new heights of efficiency in 1965, was finding it difficult to get along with the power-intoxicated Yahya Khan. Nur Khan was eased out of office with the bait of governorship of a province to make room for a more pliable air chief. Air Marshal Abdul Rahim Khan, who succeeded him, lacked the daring and foresight of his predecessor and did not inspire confidence among the younger pilots. All this and much more air intelligence gathered through defectors was used very effectively by IAF as the drama unfolded.It appears from the PAF deployment in East Pakistan that they had already given up the struggle before war came to Bangladesh. Apart from army aviation flights of MI-4 helicopters Abdul Rahim Khan had some 16 F-86 Sabres operating from two airfields in Dacca. Although East Pakistan had a network of civilian and military airfields covering the entire province, none of the other airfields was activated, and this deprived the operating air force of the inherent flexibility of dispersal and forward fighting at the very outset.
Click to buy: India’s wars since independence
The observer group, which had been earlier deployed on the periphery of the border for early warning, had to be withdrawn in view of the activities of the Mukti Bahini. It was impossible for isolated parties like this group to sustain themselves in hostile surroundings. The mainstay of early warning having been eliminated, the low-looking radar at Dacca was also dismantled and moved to West Pakistan to cover higher-priority gaps.
IAFs growth was so haphazard that by October 1962 it possessed an extraordinary mix of aircraft, some 30-odd types of British, American, Canadian, French, Russian and Indian manufacture, with their attendant problems, especially of logistics.
The lone Sabre squadron was not only blind but had no place to go to in case it was hunted down in its lair, and was facing far superior Indian air strength operating from all directions. The fatigue of sustained counterinsurgency operations from April 1971 and the feeling of isolation and prospects of an unequal fight was having its effect both on men and machines. IAF had some six to eight squadrons of Hunters, MIG-21s and Gnats pitted against the Pakistani loner.
The first skirmish between the two forces took place in the East on 22 November,1 when Sabres attacking the Indian positions opposite Boyra, in the Jessore sector, were intercepted by Gnats at a low level. In the ensuing dogfight two Sabres were shot down, and maybe a third, with the possible loss of one Gnat Pakistan claimed. On the outbreak of open war in the eastern theatre, the first offensive raid was carried out by MIG-21s against Tejgaon and Kurmitola air bases near Dacca. In ceaseless attacks for the next two days, both by day and night, these airfields were rendered non-operational by heavy cratering of the runways and complete disruption of maintenance facilities.
In the 20 odd attacks by MIGs on this complex, three inter-cepting Sabres were shot down over Dacca. The Pakistanis claimed to have destroyed nine Indian aircraft. Whatever the count in aircraft casualties, IAF established complete mastery of the East Pakistan skies within 48 hours of war.2 Whatever remained of the Pakistani squadron was grounded, and was later destroyed on the ground by the Pakistanis themselves as part of their scorched-earth policy. Simultaneously, Chittagong airfield was raided by Hunters approaching the target over the sea in to-hi profile. The airfield was bombed, installations strafed and some ships anchored in the harbour sunk, but the gain in military terms was small because the airfield was not in use. This action however brought credit to the Indian Navy’s Seahawks operating from the aircraft carrier Vikrant.
Enjoying freedom of the skies, IAF operated with impunity, except for occasional groundfire, and supported the Army’s blitzkrieg by relentless attacks on the Pakistani fortresses and other strongpoints. In addition, it completely disrupted all movement along roads and waterways serving Pakistani forward formations. According to Niazi and his formation commanders, the movement of troops and vehicles had become impossible in daylight. The fast-advancing Indian columns received supply drops, ammunition and POL when surface means of transport could not keep up with the Indian thrust lines.Apart from this close conventional air support to the land forces, IAF made a significant contribution by certain innovative actions which altered the course of the war in Bangladesh and are therefore worth highlighting. The first was the use of 12 MI- 4 helicopters for airhopping troops, guns and equipment over the formidable river obstacle Meghna in support of the IV Corps race to Dacca. On the night of 9/10 December these helicopters lifted 1,270 men, nine guns and 40 tons of material across the river from Brahmanbaria to Raipur. On the next two days and nights they lifted the bulk of 57 Mountain Division’s leading brigade comprising 2,791 men and 3,200 kilograms of equipment and stores in the same region, thus earning the appellation Air Bridge. It proved that, given bigger helicopters, possibly fitted with armament, heliborne capability could add new dimensions to land and air warfare in the way of flexibility of employment with enhanced mobility across natural and artificial barriers.
Also read: India’s quest for Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence
The next was the raid on Government House, Dacca, where, as a signal intercept revealed, a historic cabinet meeting was to be convened to decide the course of the war. Within an hour or so of the interception of the message by Indian intelligence six MIG-21s were airborne,3 and with only a tourist map of Dacca as a guide they made such an accurate rocket attack on the meeting room that the shaken Governor scribbled his resignation in great haste. A similiar precision attack on Pakistani troops holed up on Dacca University campus for a last ditch stand followed. The quick response and the precision of the attack indicated the skill of the pilots and the power of the weaponry IAF wielded in battle, and this still remains to be fully exploited.
Bureaucratic failure to produce timely and accurate lists of spares and the strange behaviour of the Government, which spent freely on buying aircraft but displayed miserliness in providing spares, brought about a sharp decline in the serviceability curve of our frontline aircraft.
PAF started the war in the western theatre late on the afternoon of 3 December with air strikes on the Indian forward air-fields at Pathankot, Amritsar, Srinagar and Avantipur. More raids followed late at night under a full moon on airfields covering the entire Air Force complexes along the border- Amritsar, Halwara, Ambala, Pathankot, Sirsa, Jodhpur, Uttarlai, Jamnagar and Srinagar. For a pre-emptive this was a rather tame affair, for at no time did Pakistan employ more than a total force of 18 to 26 aircraft for the task, and this meant only two to four aircraft raiding a particular airfield at a time. With this much effort the main aim of the Pakistani attack seemed to be to diminish IAF capability to operate from its forward bases, thereby forcing it back to its rear fields and thus decreasing the range of penetration into Pakistani territory. The main methods of attack were 750-pound bombs on runways and strafing and rocketing radar installations.
These attacks damaged some airfields, but the damage was small. With the repair organisation set up at each airfield, IAF was able to effect repairs with modern materials like quick’ setting cement in a matter of hours. The runways were fully serviceable throughout the war. Anticipating such an attack on the part of Pakistan, the Air Force dispersed its planes among rnany airfields and kept them well protected in concrete pens. As a result not a single Indian plane was destroyed on the ground in these strikes.
IAF took four to six hours to retaliate. There was much adverse comment about this delay in reaction in the Indian press the next day. Some apologists then advanced the theory that this was meant to tire Pakistani interceptors flying patrol over their air bases and expecting instant Indian retaliation. This lame excuse did not hold water as interceptors get airborne on receiving warning of an approaching raid, and there was no question of a modern air force constantly patrolling air bases, especially in rear areas, when the reaction time was adequate to be airborne before it materialised.
Please wait...
