Ramifications of Balkanisation of The Afghan Theatre of War and Withdrawal/Consolidation of the U.S. Military
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The situation on the ground in spring 2011, which has a bearing on the future of the U.S. Af-Pak strategy, is as follows.
- The U.S.–Pak equation has deteriorated to the point where the U.S. military has decided to tackle the insurgents holed up in Northern Waziristan exclusive of Pakistan, which will constrain the latter to commence military operations against U.S.–NATO forces that invade its territory.
- Tajikistan has ceded 408 sq. km of crucial territory, giving China a viable access route into the Wakhan border, which lies directly north of Baltistan (Pakistan), where it has approximately 11,000 military troops deployed.
- Sino-Pak sensitivities to their military and nuclear weapon assets in Baltistan, which includes the construction of Barracks and digging of tunnels to cater for missile launch sites, are high.
- Beijing has invested heavily in the lucrative mineral ore deposits in Afghanistan, giving it a stake in the future of that country.
- Saudi investments in the Sunni Pashtun tribes also make it an important stakeholder in the region.
- Baloch aspirations and the contiguous nature of its location in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran are factors to be considered.
- India’s alleged involvement with the Balochis and the sensitivities of Iran’s intelligence arm—Sewak—must be considered.
- The free passage given by the U.S. military to elements of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) from FATA/NWFP to Tajikistan has destabilised the security situation in the latter state. The IMU was created by a former colonel of the Soviet Spetznatz (Special Forces).
Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in J&K is as rampant as always and is the root of current Indo-Pak antipathy, adding to the security dilemma in South Asia.
- According to recent reports, Pakistan has rapidly increased its inventory of nuclear warheads to approximately 100, far in access of the need to credibly deter India.
- Moscow continues to be concerned with anti-Russian terrorist activities in the southern states of the federation and the central Asian republics. This is aggravated by the increasing movement of drugs to the north from Afghanistan.
- Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in J&K is as rampant as always and is the root of current Indo-Pak antipathy, adding to the security dilemma in South Asia.
- The Russian Duma has recently passed a law allowing U.S. military equipment to be transported through its territory.
What is certain is that the political will, economic capabilities and insufficiency of military resources make it unlikely that the U.S. and its allies can, or will, opt for a long-drawn war to subdue the Afghans fighting against occupation by a foreign force. Therefore, this contingency can be safely ruled out.
That leaves two possible contingencies:
- Contingency I: Up sticks and pullout from Afghanistan lock, stock and barrel a la Vietnam.
- Contingency II: Balkanise Afghanistan into politically manageable ethnic divisions and effect a less demanding fighting withdrawal.
Contingency I
A number of scenarios will unfold, not the least of which would be the demolition of the superpower status and aura of the United States and the military-politico denigration of NATO, that will seriously imbalance the prevailing world order and, therefore, destabilise the global strategic environment. Besides this:
Pakistans military will mobilise its strategy to regain control over Afghanistan through its Talibanised Pashtun allies, if any. This will fuel the North”“South civil war and is likely to draw Russia, the central Asian republics and China to take sides.
- Civil war will break out in Afghanistan. This would manifest in the form of internecine tribal wars to establish their primacy in their traditionally accepted regions, fighting between the Pashtuns and the Northern Alliance to ensure their independence of each other to establish control over the whole country, and last but not the least the spill over into Pakistan, unleashing a deeply ingrained Pashtun animosity for the atrocities inflicted on the Pashtuns of FATA and the NWFP and the smouldering desire to avenge the still-existing concentration camps in Balochistan established by Pakistan.
- Pakistan’s military will mobilise its strategy to regain control over Afghanistan through its Talibanised Pashtun allies, if any. This will fuel the North–South civil war and is likely to draw Russia, the central Asian republics and China to take sides.
- A major portion of the Pakistani ISI’s terrorist assets currently being directed to J&K would be drawn into the Afghan imbroglio, temporarily reducing the pressure on J&K. Many of the militants of the central Asian republics and Southern Russian states would redeploy to their homelands, further reducing resources to continue the proxy war in J&K.
- China would be constrained to protect its economic interests in Afghanistan by whatever means it finds suitable. The question is, would Beijing deploy the military to Afghanistan?
- Indian assets in Afghanistan would be dangerously compromised. These include units of the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), the five consulates currently operating in Afghanistan, approximately five battalions of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) on security assignments, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) assets assisting in maintaining communications, two military medical missions (MAPs/MHs) and, of course, the Indian embassy in Kabul.
- Pakistani and Chinese nuclear assets, that had been withdrawn to Baltitistan in Northern Chitral when the U.S. coerced Musharraf to join the “war on terror,” would be compromised. This would include a rather large Chinese military contingent (regiment size equivalent of a brigade as we understand it) and technicians that maintain and secure the nuclear assets of Chinese origin. This would draw a military response from both countries that would further complicate the Afghanistan situation.
China would be constrained to protect its economic interests in Afghanistan by whatever means it finds suitable. The question is, would Beijing deploy the military to Afghanistan?
- In the event the Pashtuns ally with their brethren in Balochistan, the IPL project will be compromised, thereby further degrading Pakistan’s economy and energy strategy.
- The repercussions on the Chinese-funded port of Gwadar (also a critical component of China’s “string of pearls” strategy) in the Pashtun-dominated Balochistan need to be analysed as this could generate a reaction from Beijing.
- Finally, the wrath of the Pashtuns against their persecutors in Karachi would automatically integrate into the larger Afghan civil war and its spillover into Pakistan. Tayyab Ali Shah draws attention to this problem in his piece “Karachi Emerges as Pakistan’s New Tinderbox of Violence and Extremism.” The withdrawal of U.S. Special Forces from this port town would leave grounds for major ethnic upheavals and has to be factored into the overall scenario of a U.S. withdrawal.
Contingency II
This contingency is predicated on setting into motion a process that will lead to the integration of the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and, by default, Pakistan as one ethnic entity, and the formation of a Pashtunistan. This would be separated from the more advanced Northern areas inhabited by the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Nuris and Krygzes that comprised the Northern Alliance, thus creating a second independent state. As Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, now working with the USAF-funded RAND Corporation, says, “De facto partition is clearly not the best outcome one can imagine for the United States in Afghanistan. But it is now the best outcome that Washington can achieve consistent with vital national interests and U.S. domestic politics.”
While the objective may be to fragment Afghanistan into two ethnically manageable states—as was done with Kosovo being carved out of Serbia—the consequences cannot be contained within the borders of Afghanistan. It would per se spill over into Pakistan, where the British had carved out a segment of the Pashtuns that had traditionally been part of Afghanistan. This would result in further fragmentation of Pakistan.
Pakistan will react violently. Though Pakistan is not a failed state, it is a “failed economy.” The economic straits its in makes it highly dependent on Western beneficence to avoid a total economic collapse. Nevertheless, it will fight to maintain its territorial integrity.
Pashtuns that had traditionally been part of Afghanistan. This would result in further fragmentation of Pakistan.
In the run-up to the Lisbon talks, November 2010, Britain gained sufficient leverage in Washington to sell the idea of Balkinisation in a mirror image of its experience and strategy evolved by Lord Curzon. This strategy is based on the acceptance of the intractability of Pashtun tribes, deeply influenced by Wahabism, and support from Saudi Arabia and the rejection by the northern tribes to be ruled by the Pashtuns. The concept revolves around Mackinder’s theory of the “heartland” that would reward the U.S. with the capacity to retain a military presence in the central Asian states in compensation for the “blood and treasure” invested in the region over the last decade.
In this eventuality, most of the consequences enumerated earlier under Contingency I would manifest themselves in Contingency II also. However, to negotiate and set up this strategy, a considerable amount of time would be required and the redeployment of troops and logistics would be necessitated.
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