Indian Defence Review

The Saudi–British Nexus: “Saudi Arabia has always relied heavily on Pakistan in shaping its policy towards Afghanistan. During the jihad of the 1980s, Saudi funds and expertise were channelled to the mujahidin almost exclusively through the ISI. During the Taliban regime, Saudi Arabia was one of only three states (with Pakistan and the UAE) to establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban government of Mullah Omar.”50

Also read: Salvaging America’s Botched Strategic Foray into Asia – I

In 2007, Saudi Arabia began to adjust its orientation once the Taliban began to threaten the internal security of Pakistan. It is also notable that Saudi Arabia paid greater respect to President Karzai during his last visit and Saudi Arabia made an unprecedented pledge at the Paris Conference in 2008. The Saudi royal family remains highly ambiguous in its posture towards Afghanistan today. The Taliban are still held in high esteem and are regarded as legitimate successors to the mujahidin of the 1980s: their Deobandi views are closer to those of Saudi Arabia’s Wahabis. This is particularly so in relation to the more conventional Sufi-influenced approach to Islam historically prevalent in Afghanistan.51

The Saudi royal family remains highly ambiguous in its posture towards Afghanistan today. The Taliban are still held in high esteem and are regarded as legitimate successors to the mujahidin”¦

The Saudi interest in backing the British plan in Afghanistan lies in pushing Wahabism throughout the Islamic countries and to become the leader of the Sunni world. On 6 June 2007, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) aired a sensational story, revealing that the British arms manufacturer BAE Systems had paid more than $2 billion in bribes to Saudi Arabia’s national security chief and long-time ambassador in Washington, Prince Bandar bin-Sultan. The al-Yamamah arms contract was a nearly $80 billion 22-year-long deal between BAE Systems and the Saudi government, in which British-made fighter jets and support services were provided to the Saudi kingdom beginning in 1985.

The al-Yamamah deal was structured as a barter arrangement in which Saudi Arabia agreed to provide Britain with one tanker of oil per day for the entire life of the al-Yamamah contracts. An oil tanker holds approximately 600,000 barrels of oil. BAE Systems began “official” delivery of the Tornado and Hawk planes to Saudi Arabia in 1989. BAE Systems now has approximately 5,000 employees inside Saudi Arabia servicing the contract.

According to sources familiar with the inner workings of al-Yamamah, much of the Saudi oil was sold on the international spot market at market value through British Petroleum (BP) and Royal Dutch Shell.

Using BP’s average annual cost of a barrel of Saudi crude oil, an economist concluded that the total value of the oil sales, based on the value of the dollar at the time of delivery, was $125 billion. In current U.S. dollar terms, that total soars to $160 billion. The extra cash of more than $100 billion, a slush fund, thus generated over 23 years was used to fund various movements, many of which were targeted against sovereign nation states.

Once London came to the conclusion that Washington, both in Afghanistan and inside the United States, is losing the war and its staying power is subsiding by the hour, it called for an international conference”¦

Anthony Loyd of the Times of London in an article, “Terror link alleged as Saudi millions flow into Afghanistan war zone,” reported on 31 May 2010, pointed out that according to members of the Afghan financial intelligence unit, FinTraca, the funds, totalling more than £920 million, enter from Pakistan, where they are converted into rupees or dollars, the favoured currency for terrorist operations. The £920 million, or 5 billion Saudi riyals, monitored by FinTraca since 2006, has accelerated, peaking this year. Most of it entered Afghanistan through the Pakistani tribal area, in particular North Waziristan, which is infamous as al-Qaeda’s heartland.52

Mohammed Mustafa Massoudi, the director general of FinTraca in Kabul, said that the Saudi riyals were moved from Waziristan to Peshawar, capital of the NWFP, where Pakistani nationals were used to exchange the cash for local currency or dollars.

Exactly what happens to this cash is unclear, given the murky nature of the transactions and the absence of controls on money leaving or entering Afghanistan. The riyals, in the hands of Pakistani money changers, are recycled back into regular cash channels, also through Afghanistan, Loyd wrote.

Britain’s Diplomatic Offensive

Once London came to the conclusion that Washington, both in Afghanistan and inside the United States, is losing the war and its staying power is subsiding by the hour, it called for an international conference at London. That took place on 28 January 2010 and became the cornerstone of London and Riyadh’s diplomatic policy for the post-war Afghanistan. The purpose of the London conference was to set in motion, and make Washington accept, a London–Riyadh designed policy whereby the British and Saudi interests in Afghanistan remain intact and allow them to gain basic control of that country.

The peace and reintegration strategy deemed that peace can be achieved only when fighters and commanders in the armed opposition are successfully reintegrated into their communities.

The stated aim of the London conference, however, was to agree upon a comprehensive agenda designed to put Afghanistan on a sustainable path to peace, stability and development. The peace and reintegration strategy deemed that peace can be achieved only when fighters and commanders in the armed opposition are successfully reintegrated into their communities. This strategy assumed two levels—a tactical and an operational level. The tactical approach was already underway in Helmand with NATO’s Operation Marjah. The concept behind the tactical approach is that only when the scale of insurgency is reduced sufficiently will the Afghan government be able to reintegrate the Taliban foot soldiers and local commanders in to the national mainstream. The operational level envisages a process of dialogue between the Afghan leadership and senior members of the Taliban movement. This will entail provisions of amnesty for those who disarm and disengage from international terror groups.53

The real objective of this “comprehensive agenda” was to handpick Taliban leaders who had always been close to London and Riyadh. These leaders would bring in their groups to be disarmed and take oath that they have disengaged from international groups. These Taliban leaders in essence would be “small fries.”54

An important facilitating component of the overall strategy is the delisting of some Taliban members from the UN blacklist. Negotiating terms for a peaceful resolution of a conflict is seldom easy when those with whom you are negotiating have international sanctions and bounties on them, London argued. Confidence building measures must be in place in order to facilitate the reintegration process although that by itself is not enough.

Moscow continues to be concerned with anti-Russian terrorist activities in the southern states of the federation and the central Asian republics. This is aggravated by the increasing movement of drugs to the north from Afghanistan.

The UN’s al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions committee drew up the blacklist under resolution 1267 a decade ago, when the Taliban regime was isolated for harbouring Osama bin Laden. It included former ministers, diplomats, governors and officials, as also their al-Qaeda guests. Several have been subsequently killed, but others are still at large and thought to remain influential in the insurgency. Those on the list, including Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, have their assets frozen and are banned from international travel. Removal would require a request from the Afghan government followed by a vote from the five permanent members of the Security Council. Kai Eide, former UN envoy to Afghanistan, reiterated this perception back in January, contending that while he was not calling for the removal of Mullah Omar or his most senior lieutenants from the blacklist, “if you want relevant results you have to talk to relevant people with authority.”55

Another important element of this “comprehensive agenda” is to handout a sum of US$140 million over the next five years to facilitate the reintegration process. The sum was agreed upon although many have described this as a “buyout” of London–Riyadh’s Taliban leaders as a fallout of the “unwinnable” war. The logic behind the “buyout” is the belief that a majority of the Taliban, or the so-called $10 fighters, are more moderate than the top strata of the insurgency and thus open to negotiations. In other words, London and Riyadh will oversee the buying out of their Taliban leaders, identifying them as “moderates,” and use the international money to achieve that end.

Ramifications of Balkanisation of The Afghan Theatre of War and Withdrawal/Consolidation of the U.S. Military

The situation on the ground in spring 2011, which has a bearing on the future of the U.S. Af-Pak strategy, is as follows.

Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in J&K is as rampant as always and is the root of current Indo-Pak antipathy, adding to the security dilemma in South Asia.

What is certain is that the political will, economic capabilities and insufficiency of military resources make it unlikely that the U.S. and its allies can, or will, opt for a long-drawn war to subdue the Afghans fighting against occupation by a foreign force. Therefore, this contingency can be safely ruled out.

That leaves two possible contingencies:

Contingency I

A number of scenarios will unfold, not the least of which would be the demolition of the superpower status and aura of the United States and the military-politico denigration of NATO, that will seriously imbalance the prevailing world order and, therefore, destabilise the global strategic environment. Besides this:

Pakistans military will mobilise its strategy to regain control over Afghanistan through its Talibanised Pashtun allies, if any. This will fuel the North”“South civil war and is likely to draw Russia, the central Asian republics and China to take sides.

China would be constrained to protect its economic interests in Afghanistan by whatever means it finds suitable. The question is, would Beijing deploy the military to Afghanistan?

Contingency II

This contingency is predicated on setting into motion a process that will lead to the integration of the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and, by default, Pakistan as one ethnic entity, and the formation of a Pashtunistan. This would be separated from the more advanced Northern areas inhabited by the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Nuris and Krygzes that comprised the Northern Alliance, thus creating a second independent state. As Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, now working with the USAF-funded RAND Corporation, says, “De facto partition is clearly not the best outcome one can imagine for the United States in Afghanistan. But it is now the best outcome that Washington can achieve consistent with vital national interests and U.S. domestic politics.”

While the objective may be to fragment Afghanistan into two ethnically manageable states—as was done with Kosovo being carved out of Serbia—the consequences cannot be contained within the borders of Afghanistan. It would per se spill over into Pakistan, where the British had carved out a segment of the Pashtuns that had traditionally been part of Afghanistan. This would result in further fragmentation of Pakistan.

Pakistan will react violently. Though Pakistan is not a failed state, it is a “failed economy.” The economic straits its in makes it highly dependent on Western beneficence to avoid a total economic collapse. Nevertheless, it will fight to maintain its territorial integrity.

Pashtuns that had traditionally been part of Afghanistan. This would result in further fragmentation of Pakistan.

In the run-up to the Lisbon talks, November 2010, Britain gained sufficient leverage in Washington to sell the idea of Balkinisation in a mirror image of its experience and strategy evolved by Lord Curzon. This strategy is based on the acceptance of the intractability of Pashtun tribes, deeply influenced by Wahabism, and support from Saudi Arabia and the rejection by the northern tribes to be ruled by the Pashtuns. The concept revolves around Mackinder’s theory of the “heartland” that would reward the U.S. with the capacity to retain a military presence in the central Asian states in compensation for the “blood and treasure” invested in the region over the last decade.

In this eventuality, most of the consequences enumerated earlier under Contingency I would manifest themselves in Contingency II also. However, to negotiate and set up this strategy, a considerable amount of time would be required and the redeployment of troops and logistics would be necessitated.

The primary focus of the U.S. coalition would have to shift from military operations to creating a meaningful economy and infrastructure in both the northern and southern portions of Afghanistan.

Finally, one cannot but be concerned with the opium economy from which the Western alliance benefits and the concerns of Beijing that can be expected to strongly defend the economic inroads into the economic benefits it has acquired in Afghanistan. That is a matter for analysis by those in the government who have full access to both these occurrences in Afghanistan.

A Hypothetical Methodology to Operationalise Contingency

“¦one cannot but be concerned with the opium economy from which the Western alliance benefits and the concerns of Beijing that can be expected to strongly defend the economic inroads into the economic benefits it has acquired in Afghanistan.

How the U.S. deals with the Balochis is any one’s guess as this involves reconfiguring the Afghan–Pakistan–Iran triangle. It is safe to assume that they would be excluded from Pashtunistan in the long run.

Conclusion

The U.S. is on the cusp of the run-up to the presidential elections due in 2012. That generates unusual political pressures that constrain the decision-making process of the incumbent in Washington. The rough edges affecting domestic and economic policies gain precedence over ongoing foreign policy schemes.

Washington would be forced to downsize its arrangements with Pakistan, which is hosting the American nemesis””al-Qaeda””and using massive air power to secure the southern parts of the negotiated Pashtunistan.

The United States’ “War against Terror” is at precarious crossroads. The exit strategy in Iraq is wavering; the war in Afghanistan has reached a no-win situation, and public opinion at home is steadily growing in favour of disengagement of military forces; instead, Obama, against the advice of the Pentagon, has committed his overstretched military to yet another war in Libya; the U.S. economy is faltering, and unemployment is at an all-time high, at near 12 per cent; the “reset” button with Russia is under fire; the disastrous oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico has taken an unprecedented toll, threatening a debilitating economy and environment even further; Somalian terrorists have expanded their war to Uganda, drawing the U.S. with it; Israel is nixing U.S. attempts to broker a Middle East peace plan and is dragging Washington into exercising the military option to eliminate Iran’s nuclear programme; North Korea has successfully frustrated the Obama administration’s nonproliferation initiatives; the U.S.–Japan military pact for basing facilities is under strain; the enormity of the nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan, has given rise to unforeseen consequences for the U.S. security strategy in support of its allies along the Pacific Rim; and China is a major economic and strategic headache. Something has to give to reduce the pressure on Washington’s capability to manage its strategic policies.

The flailing war in Afghanistan is unpopular at home; the outlay is disproportionately excessive, imposing a prohibitive penalty on the economy; and last but not the least, the loss of American lives carries unsustainable political consequences, more so with Obama’s unfulfilled election promise to bring the troops home.

The U.S. administration has already spelt out the objective of the ongoing war in Afghanistan through a white paper, affirming that the “core goal of the US must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan”¦

The Afghan War could be the much-needed pressure-release valve, provided Washington can come up with a face-saving “exit strategy,” for the besieged administration.

An abrupt end to the unfinished war can only be brought about by a major change in course. The only option is to design the ongoing negotiations with the disparate Pashtun entities to recognise a separate homeland for them in the form of Pashtunistan, an independent state for the Northern Alliance, and meaningful corrections to the distortions in the overall U.S. strategy to shift the centre of gravity of its strategic imperatives and focus of its military policies from Europe to Asia. The sanctity and viability of these two states would have to be guaranteed, for which both would have to guarantee base facilities for U.S. and residual NATO military forces.

In doing so, Washington would be forced to downsize its arrangements with Pakistan, which is hosting the American nemesis—al-Qaeda—and using massive air power to secure the southern parts of the negotiated Pashtunistan. To insulate a disgruntled Pakistan from Iran, the coalition would perforce have to recognise the aspirations of Balochistan.

The tricky part would be managing the fallout of truncated Pakistan possessing nuclear weapons. This may have to be dealt with by putting into action the U.S. counterproliferation strategy.

All this is not a new gambit. The U.S. administration has already spelt out the objective of the ongoing war in Afghanistan through a white paper, affirming that the “core goal of the US must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan,” mentioned earlier in this paper. Obviously, the Pentagon has been working at formulating a strategy to achieve this end in conjunction with the UK, as is manifest in the research paper put out by the House of Commons Library, “The ‘AfPak policy’ and the Pashtuns” (Research Paper 10/45, 22 June 2010).56

In the event of such a policy shift by the U.S., South Asia will undergo major upheavals with serious ramifications for India. New Delhi will have to make major alterations to its strategic thinking and policies to cope with the new strategic environment—in keeping with its objective to be a major player in the region, the U.S. and its coalition notwithstanding.

Notes and References

1. Irfan Husain. “Endgame in Afghanistan.” Dawn (Pakistan), 19 June 2010, <http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/21-irfan-husain-endgame-in-afghanistan-960-sk-07>.
2. Nancy Youssef. “What’s US Objective in Afghanistan?” The Real News, 3 November 2009. Pentagon officials are going public with plan to set up indefinitely in the region objective. <http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=4407>.
3. House of Commons Library. “The ‘AfPak Policy’ and the Pashtuns.” Research Paper 10/45. 22 June 2010. p. 50. <http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/rp2010/RP10-045.pdf>.
4. Vijai K. Nair. Report on findings during a visit to the U.S. 25 March 2001–14 April 2002. Based on interviews with strategic analysts in and out of the administration; Rebecca Pearsey. “Center of Power Shifting World to Asia.” United Press International, 13 February 2007.
5. Ibid.
6. Jim Holt. “It’s the Oil.” London Review of Books 29, no. 20, October 2007. pp. 3–4. <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n20/jim-holt/its-the-oil>.
7. Global Security.org. “Iraq Facilities.” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/iraq-intro.htm>.
8. Julio Godoy. “US Policy on Taliban Influenced by Oil – Authors.” Asia Times, 20 November 2001.
9. George Friedman. “The Caucasus Cauldron.” Stratfor, 7 July 2010. <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100706_caucasus_cauldron>.
10. Richard Weitz. “Afghanistan in China’s Emerging Eurasian Transport Corridor.” China Brief X, no. 14, July 2010. <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36604&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=780230c2e2>.
11. David Batty. “Dutch Government Collapses After Labour Withdrawal from Coalition.” Guardian (UK), 20 February 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/20/dutch-coalition-collapse-afghanistan>.
12. Peter Cassata. “Harper Stresses Commitment to 2011 Canadian Troop Withdrawal from Afghanistan.” Atlantic Council. 8 October 2008. <http://www.acus.org/atlantic_update/harper-stresses-commitment-canadian-troop-withdrawal-afghanistan>.
13. The Frontier Post (Pakistan). “Germany to Start Withdrawal Next Year.” Reported by Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle. 10 July 2010. <http://www.thefrontierpost.com/News.aspx?ncat=an&nid=1883&ad=10-07-2010>.
14. Patrick Wintour. “Afghanistan Withdrawal Before 2015, Says David Cameron.” Guardian (UK), 26 June 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/25/british-soldiers-afghanistan-david-cameron>.
15. Agence France-Presse. “Obama Allies Demand End to Afghan War.” 2 July 2010. <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\07\02\story_2-7-2010_pg1_5>.
16. Walter Anderson, former points man for the U.S. State Department’s Intelligence Wing and now a senior adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins, Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Presentation at a seminar hosted by the Centre of Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, on “Afghanistan: Post-exit Strategies and India’s Role.”
17. Arnaud de Borchbrave. “DEBORCHGRAVE: Wearying Walk in the Quagmire.” Washington Times, 30 June 2010. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/30/wearying-walk-in-the-quagmire/>
18. General Casey. “America May Be in Iraq and Afghanistan for Another Decade.” CNN, 10 July 2010. <http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/07/10/gen-casey-america-may-be-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-for-another-decade/?fbid=T5BIX_6XBDD>.
19. Indranil Banerji, a defence and security analyst. “End Game in Kabul.” Asian Age, 10 July 2010. <http://www.asianage.com/opinion/endgame-kabul-256>.
20. Pepe Escobar. “Slouching Towards Balkanisation.” Asia Times Online, 14 November 2001. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KE22Df02.html>.
21. Robert D. Blackwill. “A De Facto Partition for Afghanistan.” Politico.com, 7 July 2010. <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=AACEE164-18FE-70B2-A8E30566E50DFB3A>.
22. Afghanistan’s Web Site. “Durand Line.” <http://www.afghanistans.com/information/history/durandline.htm>.
23. Encyclopædia Britannica, s.v. “Durand Line.” <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/174128/Durand-Line>.
24. Op cit, n. 3, p. 77.
25. Ibid., p. 11.
26. The Dawn Media Group (Pakistan). “NWFP Officially Renamed as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.”15 April 2010. <http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/07-senate-begins-voting-on-18th-amendment-ha-02>.
27. Imtiaz Gul. “Pakistan’s Dueling Drones Debate.” Foreign Policy AFPAK Channel, 2 July 1010. <http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/02/pakistans_dueling_drones_debate>.
28. Rumbold. “Pashtunistan: The Way to Save Both Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Pickled Politics, 19 September 2007. <http://www.pickledpolitics.com/archives/1384>.
29. Michael D. Holmes. “Secessionist Jihad: the Taliban’s Struggle for Pashtunistan.” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Jul–Sep 2008. <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBS/is_3_34/ai_n45026127/>.
30. Ibid.
31. Chadwick F. Alger, Ohio State University. “Religion as Peace Tool.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1, no. 4, June 2002. pp. 94–109.
32. M. Ehsan Ahrari. “China, Pakistan, and the ‘Taliban Syndrome.’” Asian Survey 40, no. 4, Jul–Aug 2000. University of California Press. pp. 658–671. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3021187>.
33. Lawrence Osborne. “Ministry of Silly Wars: Britain in Central Asia. Source.” World Affairs Journal. <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-MayJune/full-Osborne-MJ-2010.html>.
34. Ibid.
35. Trip Atlas.com. “Pashtunistan.” <http://tripatlas.com/Pashtunistan>.
36. Ian Mills. “China’s Patience Paying Off in Central Asia.” World Politics Review. 14 July 2010. <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6035/chinas-patience-paying-off-in-central-asia>.
37. Mark Curtis. “Bin Laden, the Taliban, Zawahiri: Britain’s Done Business with Them All.” Guardian (UK), 5 July 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jul/05/bin-laden-radical-islam-collusion>.
38. Remarks by Antonio Maria Costa, executive director, UNODC, to the Diplomatic Academy, Warsaw, Poland. “Drugs: Cash Flow for Organized Crime.” 1 February 2005. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/speeches/speech_2005-02-1.html>.
39. Executive Intelligence Review News Service. “Why Did U.S. Intelligence Expel MI-6 Agents from Afghanistan?” 30 December 2007. <http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2007/12/why-did-us-intelligence-expel-mi-6.html>.
40. Nasimeh Niazi. “Afghan MP Unveils Western Forces’ Involvement in Drug Trafficking.” FARS News Agency, 19 April 2010. <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8901301473>.
41. James Kirkup. “British Muslims Fighting Alongside Taliban, Commanders Claim.” Telegraph (UK), 2 January 2009. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/4076591/British-Muslims-fighting-alongside-Taliban-commanders-claim.html>.
42. History Commons.org. “Early 1997: Leading Radical Imam Abu Hamza Begins Working with British Security Services.” <http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=aearly97damsonberry#aearly97damsonberry>.
43. See O’Neill and Daniel McGrory. The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque. HarperCollins, 2006. pp. 89–93. Also see “Early 1997: Leading Radical Imam Abu Hamza Begins Working with British Security Services.” History Commons.org. <http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=aearly97damsonberry#aearly97damsonberry>.
44. Ibid.
45. Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh. “Global Jihad: The 21st Century’s Global Phenomenon.” <http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=410>.
46. PBS Online News Hour. “Pakistan Convicts Four Men in Pearl Murder.” 15 July 2002. <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/pearl_07-15-02.html>.
47. Paul Lewis. “Inside the Islamic Group Accused by MI5 and FBI.” Guardian (UK), 19 August 2006. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/aug/19/religion.terrorism>.
48. Nicola Smith. “British Islamists Plot Against Pakistan.” Sunday Times (UK), 4 July 2006. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6638483.ece>.
49. Christina Lamb, reporting from Kabul. “Karzai Bids for Peace in Furore with London.” Sunday Times (UK), 11 February 2007. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article1364771.ece>
50. Talatbek Masadykov (UNAMA), Antonio Giustozzi (Crisis States Research Centre) and James Michael Page (UNAMA). “Negotiating with the Taliban: Toward a Solution for the Afghan Conflict.” Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2. January 2010. p. 16. <http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP66.2.pdf>.
51. Ibid.
52. Anthony Lyod, reporting from Kabul. “Terror Link Alleged as Saudi Millions Flow into Afghanistan War Zone.” Sunday Times (UK). 31 May 2010. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7140745.ece>.
53. Paul Reynolds. “Aims of the London Conference on Afghanistan.” BBC News, 28 January 2010. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8480368.stm>.
54. History Commons. “April 26, 2009: Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal and Brent Scowcroft Advise Obama Administration to Ally with Jalaluddin Haqqani, Negotiate with Taliban.” http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=KabulTalksInsurgentsMecca08#KabulTalksInsurgentsMecca08. And History Commons. “Between 24 and 27 September 2008: Afghan Government Officials Reportedly Meet with Hekmatyar and Taliban Representatives Under Saudi Auspices in Mecca.” <http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=TurkiUSshouldAllyWithHaqqani09#TurkiUSshouldAllyWithHaqqani09>.
55. Mariam Safi. “Reconcilition & Reintigration [sic] in Afghanistan.” South Asia Defence & Strategic Review, 6 June 2010. <http://www.defstrat.com/exec/frmArticleDetails.aspx?DID=247>.
56. House of Commons Library, Op cit.