Indian Defence Review

Duration of Future Conflict

Proactive Scenario

The latest doctrine favors proactive operations that could be launched in a zero warning scenario. The aims are to under cut the external balancing that would be resorted to by Pakistan in face of an Indian attack and reduce the mobilization time differentials. The time window for international pressure to impact on Indian calculus would be very short. Therefore, in the envisaged short war, early gains and seizing the initiative would be telling on the subsequent result and duration of conflict. It is also required to break the crust of the defenses so as to meaningfully penetrate to operational depth. This is easier done when the defences are unoccupied or in early stages of preparation.

The proactive scenario has also been influenced by the nuclear backdrop. The strength that can be brought to bear on elaborate mobilization, such as of fully geared strike corps, cannot be applied in face of nuclear deterrence. The space for conventional operations below the nuclear threshold can accommodate only limited operations to punish the enemy. Such limited order punishment can be administered with the offensive content readily available with the pivot corps and precludes need for mobilization preceding war. That own mobilization is underway would act as deterrent to escalation by Pakistan since it spells future force employment of superior strength, i.e. escalation dominance. The estimate is that in a window of opportunity of a week to a fortnight, the military would require to compel a change in Pakistani policy of sponsorship of terror in India.

A Short War?

Military History. Close parallels to current doctrine exist in the case of the start of both the World Wars. In both cases the expectation of the aggressor was that early mobilization, surprise and swiftness would enable a paralyzing psychological blow to the enemy. The Schlieffen Plan of 1914 was to advance through the Low Countries in a rapid outflanking move to culminate at Paris so as to end the war by Christmas. An early exit of France from the conflict was required so that German focus could shift to a slower mobilizing Russia in the East. In the event psychological weakness of the military commander, General Moltke (The Younger) led to a weakening of the right flank that proved fatal to the plan. A subsequent excellent opening gambit to the East also did not push Russia out of the reckoning, relying as it did on its proverbial depth in manpower and territory. In the Second World War the operational level excellence of the Blitzkrieg did not have the desired strategic level dividend.

Likewise at the outset of the war in the Pacific, the Japanese commander Yamashita was under no illusions that should the war last longer than six months, it would not be possible for the Japanese to sustain. Therefore the lightening strike at Pearl Harbor, which in retrospect only served to rile the US into waging a total war. In these cases the side relying on faster mobilization schedules and seizing the initiative at the outset was unable to clinch the issue as per its desire. The clearest example is the most recent. Rumsfeld was neglectful of the advice of his Generals on this score leading to an embarrassment of the President prematurely declaring an end to the war on an aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln under a banner reading ‘Mission Accomplished’.

Assessing Proactive Operations. The lesson of historical parallels is that strategic determinism of any kind is strategic imbecility. Therefore even if the scenario were to unfold as envisaged by planners, it is prudent to cater for the contingencies that could arise.

• International Pressures. The warning issued to its citizens to vacate by the US in wake of the Kaluchak incident in May–Jun 02 may provide the warning against believing that the international community may be over eager to see the end of the conflict. Foreign pressures could not only recede, but both states would be less sensitive to these, busy as they would be instead in selling respective points of view and with the conduct of the war. Foreign pressures would only reckon only in the first pause, and not necessarily in order to end the conflict. External powers would be interested in seeing a favorable strategic outcome in line with their self interest, not necessarily an Indian advantage. Arms dealing would be a priority most certainly of the lesser great powers as France and UK. The UN would likely castigate the proactive power as an aggressor, being the first off the blocks. In order that the opprobrium is worth the initiative, greater impetus to continue to achieve the aims set at the outset may result. The reactive state would likely prefer the war to continue, even if on the receiving end, so as to make international censure more stringent for the aggressor state. Therefore the expectation of a short war, on which is predicated proactive doctrine is based, is questionable.
• Political Fallout. The Limited War doctrine is not alive to the manner in which war clouds precipitate on populations. The pressure of war hysteria on reactive governments or the state on the defensive would be to heighten and prolong the war effort. Political opportunism would ensure that rationality is eclipsed. The military would gain as a political actor, and within the military, those elements that pander to the national mood, such as the German Hindenberg–Ludendorf duo of the Great War, would gain ground. Extremist political forces of both sides will be in tacit concert to prolong the war and gain political advantage. There is thus more to war making than military minds and simplistic military oriented approaches can comprehend. The political effect would be such as to force an unintended metamorphosis in the war. The changed nature of the war would imply a loss of the control necessary to keep it limited along any of the dimensions of Limited War – space, time, resources and weapons employed.

Contending with Long Duration Conflict

Given nuclear dangers, prospective damage to the economy, associated opportunity costs and uncertain outcomes, there is considerable force of logic behind keeping conflict limited in time. Preparations therefore are rightly geared towards keeping conflict duration short through operationalisation of the proactive doctrine. However, in case of impact of conflict duration enhancers, the measures and psychological adjustments required need apriori reflection.

A manner of doing so would be to also arrange war-games at the operational and strategic levels beginning with the Strike Corps having reached culminating point in vicinity of objectives. Here the Redland thinking cap would require to be applied with a formal Redland team taking non-programmed decisions. This would reveal the options with the enemy, including one of an Iraq style resistance. With the knowledge that there is no option with India but to revert to the border over time, there is ample opportunity for non-conventional threats and threat of nuclear use by the enemy.

Since war aims are likely to be limited, India may choose to retract in the belief of having achieved these. In such a circumstance, information war strategies would require to be implemented so as not to attract the criticism that attended Israeli withdrawal from Shiite areas of Lebanon after their Jul 2006 offensive.

Long duration conflict has certain advantages. It could have a cathartic effect, besides bringing about a substantial result. This may not be possible in short wars that can only release emotions of the crisis while stoking historical animosities. An expanded time horizon may reduce the nuclear danger in making the nuclear decision-making less crisis sensitive. In case of India’s extraordinary qualities of mass, a long duration war would not be adverse to it since it would enable it to harness its greater potential. It would reduce the premium on preparedness that requires a ‘mass’ Army with modern ready to use weaponry, both conspiring to drive up the defense budget.

This not only creates the threat of war from a threatened neighborhood, but also an internal threat from the trade off with development. Time is also not at a premium as completion of operations in mountain theatres, particularly in breaking the initial crust that has developed Maginot like over half a century, may take time. This would shift the focus from the high population density plains theatre to the disputed territory. Thus the otherwise avoidable eventuality of a long war should not be taken necessarily as averse to Indian interests.

Conclusion

Reflections on the future are in any case a fraught exercise. Reflecting on war is equally difficult in light of war being in the realm of uncertainty. Theory and history can act as guides. Since war is a political act, being politics by other means, political sensitivity is desirable in such considerations. By these yardsticks, reflection on conflicts of the future, envisaged as proactive operations in a nuclear setting, render unstable some popularly held assumptions. Reappraising some doctrinal aspects would help usher in fresh thinking. In doing this here the assumption of a short duration war has been examined.

In summation, the nature and direction of future conflicts cannot be predicted with any accuracy. Since both long and short duration conflicts have their merits, to privilege short duration conflict as the desired and most likely one of the future may well turn out as preparation for the wrong war. Therefore, thinking requires to be done on how long duration war is to be avoided. Lack of attention to this aspect would result in bringing it about.

Therefore, the aim here would have been met to have initiated the debate as to how to avoid long duration conflict given that circumstances spelt out here may conspire with the enemy to bring this about.