The period of China’s ultimatum expired without any serious incident, but the Chinese troops who had moved in large numbers to the Chumbi Valley, and right upto the Sikkim-Tibet border, did not withdraw and continued to remain entrenched in those areas. On the plea that it had to “heighten its vigilance and strengthen its defences,” China directed its troops to move to all the strategic passes along the Sikkim-Tibet border and to make defences and military structures there. At Nathu La and Jelep La the Chinese even constructed low stone walls and started manning the positions with machine guns and mortars. The construction of a motorable road from Yatung to Nathu La and Jelep La was also simultaneously taken up.
After consolidating their position the Chinese troops adopted a very provocative posture and started intruding into the Sikkimese territory through most of the important passes such as Dongchui La, Nathu La, Yak La, Sebu La, Sese La, Bamcho La and Kongra La. In the next three months, there were at least eleven intrusions and six incidents of unprovoked firing.1
There was no major territorial dispute along the Sikkim sector of the border. China chose the Sikkim sector for those numerous intrusions and attacks and to accuse India of building the so-called military structures in the Tibetan territory across that area only to gain time and make up for its “relative strategic inferiority” in that area. Under such conditions of “relative strategic inferiority,” Chairman Mao had advised, the method to be used was to take the initiative at many places simultaneously, depriving the enemy of any initiative and, thus, plunging him into inferiority and passivity. When the initiative was retained, it resulted in a series of local successes. “These local successes,” Mao assured, “would add up to strategic superiority and initiative for us, and strategic inferiority and passivity for the enemy.”2
How long was this technique to be used? Mao laid down at another place that this was to be continued till the Red Army had created conditions favourable to it and unfavourable to the enemy. According to him, at least two of the following conditions should be secured, before the situation could be considered favourable:–
- All the main forces of the Red Army are concentrated.
- The enemy’s weak spots have been discovered.
- The enemy has been reduced to a tired and demoralized state.
- The enemy has been induced to make mistakes.
- The population actively supports the Red Army.
- The terrain is favourable for operations.3
The Sikkim-Tibet border was one sector where the Indian troops had occupied many dominating hill features before the Chinese were able to do so. A motorable road, connecting Nathu La, the most strategic pass, had already been completed in 1958 and a road upto the base of Jelep La had also been completed. The Indian troops had made their defences long ago and were well entrenched, while the Chinese troops had only started moving up since their ultimatum in September, 1965. Between October and December 1965, while small detachments of Chinese troops were committing border violations and keeping the Indian Army deployed in Sikkim tied down, the main body was busy constructing the Yatung-Chumbithang-Nathu La road and rushing construction material to the border passes for the construction of accommodation and defences so that the troops could stay there throughout the winter. By October, 1965, a good motorable road was completed upto Chumbithang and by December, 1965 Chinese trucks started coming right upto the border pass of Nathu La. During the next six months there was hectic construction activity at Nathu La and Jelep La, the two most important passes along the Sikkim-Tibet border. A number of living barracks, shell proof bunkers, communication trenches, gun positions and defences were rapidly constructed, and by the middle of 1966, the Chinese troops were well entrenched at these passes.
On July 3, 1966 the Chinese put up six powerful loudspeakers facing the Indian troops at Nathu La and started a virulent and provocative propaganda warfare against the Indian troops stationed there. Similar loudspeakers were also installed at Jelep La on August 31, 1967, and Cho La on February 10, 1968. A new chapter in hostile Chinese activity was thus opened.
Sun Wu Tzu, a Chinese military scientist, who wrote a treatise of war in the Fifth Century BC had stressed the necessity of subduing the enemy’s capacity to fight by driving a wedge between the sovereign and his ministers, superiors and inferiors, and commanders and their subordinates, so that they were demoralized and their will to resist was completely broken. Tb misguide the enemy, Sun Wu Tzu had advocated the use of beacons and drums in night fighting and a large number of banners and flags in day fighting; to demoralize the enemy he had suggested the spreading of tales of treachery of enemy’s leaders and superiority of own troops; to produce a feeling of defeatism, all should be made mutually suspicious so that they drifted apart; to cause frustration one should create national disunity and a belief that the existing Government was not devoted to the cause and good of the people; and to ensure victory, he had emphasized the use of deception such as feigning incapability and disorder while actually preparing to attack.4
The purpose of this type of psychological warfare was to achieve political victory or to prepare ground for success in a future military engagement. In this, the forces receded to the background and their place was taken by a psychological attack on enemy troops so as to influence their beliefs, values, attitudes and pattern of behaviour. The outcome of this could be dramatic in creating mental instability and moral disintegration, resulting in frustration, unrest, a feeling of helplessness and ultimately softening of resistance. Once that had been achieved, the situation could be exploited by convincing the target that there was no advantage in continuing the struggle and to make it to accept the terms which were intended to be imposed.
In the situation which existed along the Sikkim Tibet border where the troops faced each other at a distance of less than 100 yards at many places, the Chinese technique for psychological warfare was the same as the Communists generally used for brainwashing and indoctrination. In this technique, certain strong emotions such as fear, anger, anxiety, frustration and dissatisfaction were excited and the emotional stress so aroused was intensified and prolonged. Under those conditions the soldiers often became emotional and generally irritable. Since there were many monotonous jobs to do some of them even became desperately bored. Though thoughts kept crowding into their minds, they suffered from mental fatigue and started imagining situations that would never occur. The first effect of this attack on the minds was to increase suggestibility and impair judgment. Gradually the brain was wiped, at least temporarily, of some of the recently implanted ideas and beliefs, making it possible for another pattern of behaviour to be substituted for them. When there were numerous such emotional and psychological stresses, and they were intensified and prolonged, they could create a chaotic effect on the functioning of the brain. There was then what the Communists call, “an awakening” of the thinking process. The victims of this psychological attack started doubting whether they were really correct. There was conflict of loyalties. They felt miserable, exploited and let down.
Fatigue, tension and uncertainty played a very important role in this process. When the troops were deployed in remote areas, when they had busy schedules without sufficient time for relaxation and reflection, and when they were absent from their homes for long intervals, their ties with the former environment were weakened and that further facilitated the break-up of the old behaviour pattern. An effective psychological warfare under those conditions resulted in, what the Chinese call, “tail-cutting,” tails being their ties with the old values.
The Chinese broadcasts at Nathu La, Jelep La and Cho La were based on the above Communist theory of indoctrination. Initially, the main theme of the broadcasts was the appeasement of Indian troops. Only five years ago, China had attacked India and badly defeated the Indian Army. That betrayal was the main cause of the bitterness of Indian troops against China. To pacify the Indian troops, the Chinese broadcasts repeatedly talked of the 3,000 year old friendship between the Indian and Chinese people. They adopted the technique of differentiating between the Indian people and the so-called “reactionary” Indian Government and pleaded that it was the Indian Government, inspired by American imperialists, that had launched attacks on China again and again. For example, on August 25, 1959, Chinese troops had opened fire on the Indian outpost at Longju, killing one Indian security guard and wounding some others. The next day, a strong Chinese detachment had completely over-run the post and occupied the area. Commenting on that incident, the broadcasts claimed that Longju was a part of the Chinese territory and that the Indian Government had launched an attack in order to occupy it. Similarly, in 1962, Chinese troops had crossed the Thagla ridge, in the Kameng Frontier Division, and launched a massive attack all along the Sino-Indian border, but the broadcasts alleged that the attack was made by the “Indian reactionaries” and China fought the battle only in self-defence.
As evidence of their good intentions, Chinese broadcasts quoted their voluntary withdrawal not only from Indian territory but also to the positions, 20 kilometers behind the ‘line of actual control’. Some of the broadcasts even alleged that it had been decided that both the Governments would move their forces 20 kilometers behind the ‘Line of actual control’ but the Indian side was violating that agreement by sending troops right upto the border. On several occasions, the broadcasts declared, “the Communist Government of China will, forever, remain like the river Tsongpo which will always flow towards Brahmaputra, and no matter how the reactionary Government of India behaved, the love of the Chinese people for the Indian people will remain unchanged.” Another broadcast described how China had sent food supplies to India at times of shortages in 1951 and 1952. Many other broadcasts elaborated how the Chinese Government had made tireless efforts to reduce tension on the border and was keen to settle the border dispute with India peacefully, but the “reactionary” Indian Government was bent upon committing armed aggression against China and creating tension on the border in order to seek rewards from the “imperialists” and the “modern revisionists.” “The 1962 war,” the broadcast claimed, “when China simply fought in self-defence, was also the outcome of similar policies pursued by the Government of India and its behaving like a puppet in their hands.”
While this theme of brotherhood between the Indian and Chinese people was being repeated interminably, the Chinese behaviour towards the Indian troops was all the time very uncertain and unpredictable. Sometimes they behaved normally, but on some other occasions they became aggressive and provocative. For example, on September 11, 1967, they suddenly opened heavy fire on unarmed Indian troops who were laying a barbed wire along the boundary at Nathu La and inflicted heavy casualties. About a month later, arguments between the Indian and Chinese sentries stationed at Cho La led to another heavy attack by the Chinese troops. The climax of this unpredictability came on September 24, 1969, when the Chinese troops at Nathu La delivered an ultimatum through loudspeakers that the Indian troops stationed there must withdraw from there by noon of the next day’ otherwise the Chinese troops would open fire. The warning was repeated the next morning.5 Although the period of ultimatum passed without any incident, the uncertainty remained.
Unpredictability plays a very important part in psychological warfare. The human brain adjusts readily to what is expected, but is unable to cope with uncertain and unforeseen events. Once a phenomenon has been understood and the next move correctly anticipated, the human mind does not fear it but the occurrence of an unexpected event, particularly when the brain is already under emotional stress, produces a shock, resulting in withdrawal or even surrender. Fear and anxiety also diminish resistance capacity. When an element of fear and anxiety was infused, the troops became reluctant to act with initiative and to take risks.
One great factor which had caused a deep-seated fear of the Chinese in the hearts of Indian troops was their defeat in 1962. In their attack, China had made very extensive and careful preparations, while the Indian posts were widely spread and ill-prepared for any major offensive. The Chinese troops had came in a ‘human flood’ over a large number of Indian posts, encircled numerous positions, routed even well-entrenched strong detachments and arrested hundreds of Indian Army officers and soldiers. India had met with inevitable major reverses, and the Chinese troops had left an impression of miraculous performance. The difficult terrain and other topographical factors seemed to be no barrier to their advance. Their mobility, stamina, discipline and unified command had left Indian troops in no doubt as to their military superiority.
Even while the Chinese troops devoted long hours pleading that they were not aggressors in 1962, they did not want the Indian troops to forget China’s military performance in that war. Thus, as soon as they noticed the Indian troops improving their positions, or taking other defensive measures, the broadcasts started accusing the Indian Army of making preparations to attack China and announced: “If Indian troops had forgotten the year 1962, they were welcome to fight again.” The futility of fighting against China was often stressed in the broadcasts and a defeatist mentality was encouraged in the Indian troops by explaining to them how their ultimate defeat was inevitable if they ever dared to fight against them.
Besides this, the Chinese troops also seemed to have been given instructions to attack simultaneously small Indian patrol parties in order to create a sense of awe and terror. On September 26, 1965, a small Indian patrol party consisting of three persons, which was patrolling close to Dongchui La inside the Sikkimese territory was surrounded by a big contingent of Chinese troops and kidnapped from there. The captured Indian soldiers were made to ‘confess’ that “they were sent to intrude into the Chinese territory for reconnaissance,”6 and their so-called confessions were widely publicized by Chinese newspapers on December 12, 1965. Another small Indian patrol party was attacked by a strong contingent of about 300 Chinese soldiers near Sese La (North Sikkim), killing six Indian soldiers.7 The same tactic was used at Nathu La on September 11, 1967, and Cho La on October 1, 1967, and a number of casualties were inflicted on Indian soldiers.
The broadcasts often dealt with conditions m India and gave a highly distorted picture of the economic and political situation prevailing there. Men, otherwise willing even to sacrifice their lives in the battlefield, were often torn with frustration when they got adverse news about their families and hometowns. They started worrying about themselves and the future of their families and in the face of impending danger they felt deeply depressed and apathetic. The material used for this purpose was based on titbits picked up from Indian newspapers and quoted out of context. This was done because the propaganda could be effective only if it was based on some definite information howsoever slight and unimportant. The main theme of those broadcasts was the shortage of food in India, poverty resulting in starvation and death, hold of monopolists and capitalists in agricultural as well as industrial fields, economic instability, and the deteriorating law and order situation.
The broadcasts alleged that the Government of India had taken regular loans of foodgrains from the United States of America and was now trying to procure loans from France, Denmark, Germany and Australia. They added that the Indian Government depended so much on those loans that it had completely neglected agricultural production in India. Moreover, about 85% of agricultural land was in the hands of landlords and capitalists who formed less than 5% of the population. This resulted in ‘exploitation’ and ‘squeezing’ of the agriculturists. Due to these defective policies of the Government, the broadcasts explained, the food situation had been deteriorating day by day since after Independence. “In a country where there was enough manpower, where the land was fertile and it grew three crops in a year, who else could be blamed for the situation,” they asked. Continuing the theme, the broadcasts often resorted to emotional sensationalizm. A typical example was their broadcast of May 27, 1967. It said: “The food crisis in India was becoming serious year after year. In 1966, thousands of people died while facing starvation. Out of 15 provinces, all had been affected by drought. Fifteen crores of Indian people were dying of starvation. People were subsisting on tree leaves 9Ild roots. The situation had reached a stage where even those leaves and roots had been exhausted… An atmosphere of death was prevailing due to starvation.”
The Chinese couched their assertions in authoritative style by quoting cases of doubtful authenticity picked up from various newspapers. Sometimes they also claimed to quote from the reports issued by the Government of India and statements made by the ministers. One day they quoted an English daily paper having reported that in Madhya Pradesh, out of fifty million people, forty million faced starvation. On another occasion they quoted the Government of India as having accepted that three lakh people in Bihar were facing starvation. On a third occasion, another: paper was quoted as having said that the States of Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Madras and Rajasthan were facing famine due to drought during 1966. On a fourth occasion, a weekly paper of Assam was claimed to have said on October 25, 1966 that in that State, many people were selling their children to save them from deaths due to starvation. A weekly of Calcutta, dated December 10, 1966, was quoted as having said that in Calcutta a woman committed suicide in despair and two men sold their wives due to starvation. On a fifth occasion, a report dated May 27, 1967 issued by the Government of India was quoted as having admitted a shortage of wheat, bajra and rice and was said to have made even a more grim forecast for the next year. The same report was said to have mentioned that in Bihar, out of twenty eight million people, twenty five million faced starvation. On yet another occasion, the Food Minister of India was said to have stated on November 28, 1966 that if the food crisis continued to develop like that… it would create a feeling of revolution in the people.
The alleged economic instability of India was another favourite subject of the broadcasts. It was often asserted that the Government of India was taking more and more loans from foreign countries, and it had now to repay to different foreign countries an aggregate of eleven hundred crores, which was equal to half of the national income. The internal situation was alleged to be still worse. The broadcasts gave a one-sided picture of country’s economy, and narrated instances of strikes and lock-outs in various factories affecting production and resulting in unemployment. Comparison was often made with China. “Whereas China was advancing towards self-sufficiency, the standard of living of its people had reached the peak, labourers were being paid adequately to enable them to live happily, their children were being educated free, and excellent medical facilities were being extended to all, lakhs of people in India slept on footpaths and lived miserable lives in huts, not to talk of education and medical facilities,” said a broadcast.
The alleged political bankruptcy was yet another theme often repeated by the Chinese. Events such as the defeat of certain Congress leaders in the 1967 elections, demonstrations against the Prime Minister and other Ministers of India, strikes by the Central Government employees, teachers and students, the formation of non-Congress Governments in certain States of India etc., were often reported in alarming tones in order to give an impression that the entire political system in India was about to collapse. At times, direct statements warning the Indian troops that their hard-won freedom was in peril were also made. “The ruling party in India,” declared a broadcast, “was dancing to the tune of American imperialists, and was now under so much obligation to them that even India’s freedom was in danger.”
The Chinese broadcasts also tried to create dissatisfaction in the Indian Army by pointing out to them their difficult service conditions. They tried to drive a wedge between the Government and the armed forces and also between officers and other ranks of the Army. The troops at Nathu La and Jelep La were often asked: “How can you maintain your family with your meagre pay and allowances? How can you survive in these days of high costs and food shortages? How can you tolerate your miserable existence”? Some other broadcasts appealed to their emotions by drawing their attention to the futility of their working under difficult conditions by saying: “You are posted far away from your homes in this mountainous terrain, in this cold and inhospitable area and yet your family members are starving… while your leaders and capitalists are residing in big palaces with all comforts; Once recruited in the Army, you are treated like slaves.” Similarly, another broadcast announced that the incidence of suicides in the . Indian Army was increasing. A comparison was also drawn by claiming that whereas in the Chinese Army, officers ate, drank and worked with jawans, dressed like them, got the same pay, enjoyed the same facilities and loved the soldiers, in the Indian Army everything changed according to the rank.
For all the real and imaginary troubles faced by the Indian troops, the Government of India was constantly criticized by the broadcasts. It was alleged that the Indian Government knew the futility of deploying troops under those difficult conditions, but it had to do so to please the American imperialists in order to get more financial assistance. It was further explained to the troops that since the Indian Government was unmindful of their sufferings, the troops should not imperil their lives in vain for the ‘reactionary’ Government.
The way out, the Chinese broadcasts explained to the Indian troops, was in the armed rebellion against the Indian Government. “Eighty crores of Indian people must have their salvation,” announced one of the broadcasts at Nathu La. “For successful struggle, follow the invincible weapon of Mao Tsetung,” said another broadcast. It continued: “Mao Tse-tung has said that for the Indian people the armed rebellion was the best path to achieve salvation… Government of India was a blood sucking organization… An armed struggle is the only course to finish it.”
Some of the broadcasts gave even more specific guidance about the nature of revolution which people were supposed to organize. “Farmers should fight shoulder to shoulder against their useless Government and they will be victorious… capture big towns with the help of big villages… Follow strictly the teachings of Mao Tse-tung, Marxists and Leninists… Fight against the Government with courage.”
Sometimes the broadcasts tried to draw a parallel between India and the situation in China under the KMT regime in order to explain how, acting on Mao’s advice, China could liberate itself. They exhorted Indian troops to follow the same example and asserted, “We are confident that whatever obstructions in their struggle, the Indian people will ultimately be victorious in their struggle against the Government.”
While the Chinese propaganda was usually direct and categorical, the broadcasts also resorted to the tactics of indirect incitement. For example, they made such statements: “the students, farmers and labourers have started opposing… the Government, and their agitation is gaining momentum,” “Indian people have now been enlightened and will rest only after overthrowing the reactionary Government,” “Indian people are not afraid of anybody in their struggle against the Government and they have bravely faced the reactionary Army and Police.” “The Government of India may try hundreds of times, but the struggle of the people will not cease and the people will certainly oppose the Government,” “Some day the Indian people will surely gain liberation after ending the reactionary Government rule and no one will be able to stop the people’s revolution,” “Mao Tsetung has faith in the revolution of the whole world and supports their agitation,” Translated into imperative, those broadcasts meant that all classes of Indian people including students, farmers and labourers should oppose the Indian Government and should rest only after overthrowing the Government. In their struggle they should face even the Army and the Police and should not be afraid of anybody. Even if the Government of India tried to pacify them by meeting their demands, they should not stop opposing the Government. If they followed this advice, they would surely be able to end the Government’s rule and achieve liberation one day. The Chinese promised to support them in their agitation.
Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung were constantly quoted as the most powerful and surest means of achieving ‘salvation’. The assertions made were: “The thoughts of Mao were spreading in the world just like sun rays,” “The whole world loves Mao Tse-tung and his thoughts enthusiastically,” “The ideology of Mao Tse-tung is the strongest weapon for defeating imperialism and reactionaries,” “Every word of Mao Tse-tung was the gospel truth,” “Mao’s thoughts would bury the capitalists, modern revisionists and reactionaries of various countries in their graves,” “The thoughts of Mao pertained to the time when the society was advancing towards development,” “The study of Mao’s thoughts and application of his ideology could liberate the people of the world.”
Almost all Chinese troops posted along the Sikkim-Tibet border carried with them the ‘Red Books’ containing the “Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung.” They not only studied them during spare hours but also waved them at the Indian troops and tried to convey that the solutions to all their problems were contained in them. In December, 1966, large portraits of Mao Tse-tung, were also erected, facing the Indian troops at Nathu La and Jelep La.
The extent of impact that this type of propaganda had on the Indian troops was difficult to assess. According to the External Affairs Minister of India, most of it could not even be understood by the Indian troops due to highly Sanskritized Hindi used in the broadcasts.8 At times, the broadcasts also made ridiculous exaggerations losing their credibility. “The cultivator in certain area of China studied the thoughts of Mao with interest,” announced one of the broadcasts, “and they raised the yield in agriculture considerably… And the residents of another area studied the powerful thoughts of Mao and the country side was developed.” Similarly, with regard to the economic and political situation in India, names of Indian newspapers with dates and places of occurrence were quoted in the broadcasts but the material was so grossly exaggerated that the audience could easily make out that it did not present an accurate and dispassionate account.
However, India could not ignore this activity altogether. When the troops heard such broadcasts they were likely to share them with their friends who suffered from common fears, anxieties, frustrations and doubts. In a tense atmosphere, most rumours, howsoever baseless, encouraged discontent, frustration and boredom and worked slowly to undermine confidence. There was a tendency to accept anything that was new unless it was contradicted by factual information. Similar loudspeakers were, therefore, installed by the Indian Army at Nathu La, Jelep La and Cho La in order to counter the Chinese broadcasts. The Indian broadcasts contradicted some of the false statements made by the Chinese and explained to the Chinese troops as to what was happening in China behind their backs. The Indian broadcasts described how their rulers were oppressing them in the name of Cultural Revolution, how the underpaid and underfed Chinese Army was being exploited by a ruthless political party, what atrocities were being committed on their families at home in remote China, how chaotic conditions, including deaths due to starvation, existed in the mainland China, how various important leaders had been disgraced and dismissed, and how China had been isolated from rest of the world, including socialist countries, due to the deceit and treachery of its leaders.
For any propaganda to be successful, it was necessary to base it on happenings inside the enemy territory, class conflicts there and recent occurrences which were of some concern to the audience. Due to regimentation, official concealment and very limited sources of information, the Indian side did not have enough material about actual happenings in the mainland of China. There was also a shortage of Chinese translators and interpreters. The Indian broadcasts were, therefore, irregular and lacked content. Very often the Indian side adopted a clumsy technique of simply making noise with their loudspeakers so that the Indian troops could not listen the Chinese propaganda broadcasts.
Unable to match them in psychological warfare, the Government of India protested to the People’s Republic of China and pointed out that their broadcasts amounted to a gross interference in India’s internal affairs. China asserted in its reply: “It is entirely within China’s sovereign right to make broadcasts on Chinese territory advocating the friendship between the Chinese and Indian people and setting forth the truth about the Sino-Indian boundary question… the Indian Government has all along been hostile to the friendship between the Chinese and the Indian people and has obstructed and sabotaged their friendly contacts,” and that “the Chinese broadcasts were conducive to friendship between the Chinese and the Indian people.” The note also declared: “That the Indian people want to make revolution is their own affair; it is the inevitable result of the reactionary domestic and foreign policies pursued by the Indian Government.”9
India sent yet another protest note, and pointed out that such “poisonous propaganda” and blatant interference in it’s internal affairs was “contrary to the concepts of peaceful co-existence, the equality of independent nations, the solidarity of Asian-African countries, and good neighbourliness among nations.”10 China kept quiet. It did not reply at all.
However, the vile and inciting Chinese propaganda continued at the strategic passes along the Sikkim-Tibet border. As Mao Tse-tung had said, political struggle was the main role of the Chinese Army. In his words, “The Chinese Red Army was an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of revolution… The Red Army fought not merely for the sake of fighting, but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, arm them and help them to establish revolutionary political power.”11 If that purpose was served, a large scale war became unnecessary. As Mao said at another place, “The contest of strength was not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale.”12 Once human power was shaken, morale lowered, and resistance weakened, conquering the enemy was no problem, for, he had already been defeated. This is what Sun Tzu meant when he wrote, “to subdue the enemy’s army without fighting was the acme of skill.”
Notes and References
For details of these intrusions, see White Paper No. XII, pp. 61-103.
Selected military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, (Peking, 1963), p. 237.
Ibid, p. 111.
Tzu, Sun, The Art of War, (London, 1963), translated by Samuel B. Griffith.
“Amrita Bazar Patrika,” Calcutta, April 27, 1969.
White Paper No. XII, p. 71.
Ibid, p. 96.
Statement of the External Affairs Minister of India in the Rajya Sabha on November 29, 1966.
White Paper No. XIII, pp. 51-52.
Ibid, pp. 56-57.
Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, op. cit, p. 52.
Ibid, p. 217.