Indian Defence Review

Development and Economic Sustenance

Despite billions of dollars being poured into Afghanistan since 2001, it remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Nevertheless, there is a sea of improvement on almost all parameters of human development compared to the dark period of the Taliban. Seven million children are in schools, with nearly 30%–40% of them being girls. Health facilities, roads, bridges, power lines, dams, telecommunication services, industries, construction, almost every field of activity have seen remarkable improvement.

But there has also been a downside to the development process, not the least of which is the resurgence in the narcotics economy. Equally bad is the impression that much of the boom has resulted in Afghanistan developing into a “war economy.” Over the last decade, there has been far too much reliance on international donors to fund the business of the Afghan government and little effort to develop indigenous sources of revenue. The overdependence on foreign sources for funds has skewed development priorities. Making the situation worse is the fact that much of international assistance has been poorly conceived and implemented and lack of robust monitoring has led to massive leakages and misappropriation of funds by both local and foreign contractors and consultants.

The withdrawal of the foreign forces will almost certainly have a major impact on the Afghan economy. Even if the Taliban and the uncertain security situation are wished away for a moment, the big question of how the Afghan government will meet its expenses and obligations if and when the foreign funding starts to drop remains unanswered. Things are, however, not as bleak as they appear at first sight. No doubt the Afghan state will need external funding for both security and nonsecurity activities for at least a further decade after 2015. But with tax revenues rising and the prospect of increased revenue from mineral exploitation and revenues from transit charges on possible gas pipelines, Afghanistan might be able to reduce its dependence on external aid sharply after 2020. In order to make Afghanistan self-sustaining after 2014, it should be allowed to become an economic bridge between south Asia and central Asia and beyond through multimodal corridors and allied infrastructure projects. This would not only generate enormous transit revenues for Afghanistan but would also facilitate investments in Afghanistan, at the same time giving an enormous fillip to its trade, commerce and economic activity.

Strategic Partnership Agreement between the U.S. and Afghanistan

The strategic partnership agreement signed by Kabul and Washington marks a new phase in the political evolution of the northwestern subcontinent amidst the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan.

The agreement is meant to demonstrate the long-term U.S. commitment to the security and stability of Afghanistan. Sceptics in the region and in Washington, however, will wonder how long the current American policy might survive amidst the uncertainties in Washington and Kabul. One proposition, though, appears definitive. Contrary to the popular assumption in the subcontinent, the U.S. military role in Afghanistan is not coming to an end in 2014. What stops in 2014 is the direct participation of American troops in Kabul’s war against the Taliban and its associates with sanctuaries in Pakistan. The indications now are that the U.S. will retain a significant military presence in Afghanistan after 2014 to help Kabul defend itself against its adversaries. The size of this American presence, the legal basis for it and its full range of the military missions are being negotiated between Kabul and Washington. On his part, U.S. president Barack Obama is signalling that America will not abandon Afghanistan the way it did in the late 1980s when the Soviet occupation came to an end. Obama also wants to protect American interests in the region. These include preventing the al-Qaeda from regaining a home in Afghanistan after U.S. withdrawal and disrupting its current networks in Pakistan.

Thanks to the withdrawal of most American forces currently in Afghanistan (about 90,000), the new U.S. commitment to Kabul will involve only a small fraction of the current expenditure, in blood and treasure. Therefore, in theory at least, the new American commitments should be politically sustainable in Washington, where the appetite for a prolonged war in Afghanistan has begun to evaporate.

View from Pindi

Besides the credibility of the Western promises, the big question is about Pakistan’s attitude towards a long-term U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Until now, the principal patron of the Afghan insurgency, the Pakistan army had bet that Kabul might be a pushover after the U.S. forces stopped fighting in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The Pakistan army’s recalibration of its Afghan strategy will depend on how robust the U.S. strategy appears in Rawalpindi. A rapidly deteriorating economic condition and the unfinished threat from the Pakistani Taliban might, optimists hope, compel Rawalpindi to be more cooperative with the United States. The pessimists will insist that Rawalpindi has invested far too much in the Afghan insurgency to be able to pull back and support a genuine reconciliation in Kabul.

Role of External Powers Other Than the U.S.

All countries in the region barring one want peace and stability in an independent and sovereign Afghanistan. Russia is most concerned about drug trafficking from Afghanistan besides fears of a Taliban-like ideology gaining ground in the region with spill-over effects in southern Russia. It is cooperating with NATO in logistics in Afghanistan but has concerns about some undercurrents of U.S. truck with Islamists. It has concerns about the implications of a long-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan as part of America’s Greater Central Asian Policy.

Iran is suffering the most from the drug-trafficking problem. The extremist Sunni ideology of the Taliban is anathema to the Shias of Iran. For Iran, the continued presence of the United States in Afghanistan with a beefed-up military base close to its border is a threat to its security. For the time being, Iran finds the situation manageable from its point of view, with some vested interest in the Taliban insurgency to exact costs from the United States. But Iran is ready to discuss hedging strategies if the Taliban looks like being in power once again in Kabul.

The central Asian states are deeply opposed to the Taliban ideology and would not support its return to power.

China, as usual, is an enigma. It is concerned about the Uighur insurgency and its linkages with extremists in Pakistan. It is well entrenched in central Asia and has plans to invest in Afghanistan’s natural resources. Its geopolitical strategy seems to be to integrate central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially the northern areas, into its circle of political and economic influence, countering potentially the U.S. presence and the Russian influence.

The only country with disruptive intentions in Afghanistan is Pakistan. It is surprising that the Western countries are willing to accept Pakistan’s claim that Afghanistan should either have curtailed sovereignty or that the government in Kabul must be friendly to Islamabad. The West must fundamentally change its approach as the most powerful external actor in Afghanistan. It should not make a failing state its principal partner in finding short-term solutions in Afghanistan.

Unlike Pakistan, India has no notion of strategic depth in Afghanistan. India’s benign influence in Afghanistan, using essentially a soft power approach through development of infrastructure projects, aimed at stabilising Afghanistan has earned her international accolades. India has indicated that it will be expanding its own efforts to support Afghanistan in its national development strategy, covering social, economic, security, state-building and many other sectors. The recent strategic partnership agreement between India and Afghanistan is a step in the right direction and, therefore, a positive development. Despite being the largest donor in civilian assistance outside the NATO, it has refrained from getting militarily involved in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The drawdown by the ISAF after a surge in the recent years in Afghanistan has created apprehensions about security and stability in Afghanistan after 2014. Political and economic compulsions are dictating the discourse of the ensuing disengagement and transition process in Afghanistan. Though much progress has been made in social, security and economic sectors in Afghanistan, these gains remain “fragile and reversible.”

The international community, in conjunction with the United States, has contributed to building Afghan capabilities in a significant way, but much remains to be done. Political, ethnic and tribal divisions among Afghans have militated against bringing peace, stability and security to Afghanistan. Poor governance, weak administrative structures, poor enforcement of law, narcotics trafficking, weak economy and a still-growing ANSF add to the apprehensions of stakeholders about the viability of Afghan state after 2014. The final phase of the drawdown would also be coinciding with crucial presidential elections, smooth and secure conduct of which needs to be ensured.

Reconciliation and integration of the Taliban elements into the mainstream has taken a beating after the assassination of Rabbani. However, a political solution is the only alternative within the political process that is Afghan led and that respects the constitution, women’s rights and disarming of militants. There would be continuing need for a strong ANA and ANP to maintain a benign security environment so that development programmes can be executed in a peaceful and stable environment. ANA would need the United States’ and NATO’s intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and other military assets for many years to come. An international military/security commission to oversee the development of the ANSF would be able to address issues of developing the ANSF more realistically. Terrorist safe havens need to be wiped out, and stronger international instrumentalities are needed to enforce compliance by the countries that violate international norms. Further, there is a need to evolve meaningful mechanisms to curb the spread of small arms, explosives and movement of funds.

Similarly, an international mechanism to oversee development and efforts to improve the economy, including capacity building, could be thought of.  Moreover, regional countries also need to do the burden sharing for bringing the Afghan state on an even keel. Linking central Asia and south Asia through multimodal corridors is expected to promote trade and commerce and generate revenue for Afghanistan in a considerable measure. Shaping the future of Afghanistan will not be an easy task, and the forthcoming Bonn Conference throws up an opportunity to do the same.