Indian Defence Review

Army Post at Siachen

 Pakistan’s Aims and Plans – II

It appears that Pakistan’s ‘Plan-X’ was prepared after a widely read fortnightly of New Delhi reporting on Exercise Brass Tacks gave brief comments on certain offensive plans for Northern Kashmir (POK) conceived during this exercise. The details of planning, if authentic, amounted to an astounding breach of security as sensitive material of this kind could not have become available to a news magazine in the normal course. True or false, this news item caused alarm bells to ring rather shrilly in the highest echelons of Pakistan’s defence planners. It seems, soon after the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) was asked to produce comprehensive plans to counter such a threat.

The periodic eruption of violent anti-Indian sentiments had now become a permanent feature in the Kashmir Valley.

After prolonged deliberations, JCSC submitted a plan which would pre-empt any Indian offensive in Northern Kashmir and in addition make her recoil from the Saltoro Crest Line and Siachen Glacier. This operation was codenamed ‘Plan-X’. The aim of this operation was to seize and hold logistics support bases vital for maintenance of troops deployed on the Saltoro Crest Line, Siachen and Southern Glaciers, by a surprise attack with a view to:

The main features of ‘Plan-X’ made available to India by an Intelligence Agency of a third country appeared to be:

• To achieve surprise ‘Plan-X’ was to be see executed in deep winter, preferably at a time when flights between Thoise and the rest of India are unable to operate and Ka Khardungla is blocked.
• Capture of forward positions of Partapur Co garrison astride axis Siari-Tortuk and De logistics support bases for Southern Glaciers by infiltration across the LC.
• Hell-landing/drop of specially equipped and trained troops east of Partapur-Thoise and Siachen Base Camp; with the task of capturing Thoise Airfield complex and Siachen Base Camp simultaneously.
• Interdiction of Khardungla by SSG after blowing up sections of road and important w culverts on either side of the pass.
• Actual concentration of troops and simulation of major attacks at an appropriate time in Dras, Kargil, Gurez, Tangdhar and Punch Sectors with a view to tying down Indian reserve formations.

• Raids and destruction of staging camps and gun positions located on the Siachen Glacier. Exert maximum pressure on Indian posts located on the crest line from both sides of the LC. Capture Sia La on the crest line in the northern Glacier area, if possible.
• Step up guerrilla and terrorist activity, raid airfields and radar facilities in the valley on given code words.
• Activate major disturbances and widespread rioting in all major towns of Kashmir Valley and Jammu Division.
• All forces to be prepared and trained to operate for a period of eight days without re-supply or land link-up.
• Plans for exfiltration of troops in unfavourable circumstances will be prepared but divulged only to a selected few.

Review of the Situation by the Defence Cabinet Committee, Pakistan

‘Plan-X’ had to remain only on paper, it seemed, due to various compulsions of the Mghanistan situation and later due to General Zia’s sudden demise. An overall review of the Kashmir situation in general and Siachen in particular was undertaken by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) and the Defence Council after Ms Benazir Bhutto came to power. In the analysis of options, one fact stood out clearly, that Pakistan was in no position to opt for a military solution of the Kashmir issue; even a limited military action in Siachen may not be feasible at present. Any military operation, however limited in scope, may open multiple options for India to gain a tactical victory in a sector of its own choosing. If pressed hard, India may even t widen the conflict with serious repercussions for Pakistan.

A radio station calling itself Voice of Islamic Republic of Kashmir came on the air off and on from 15 August onwards. It exhorted the people of the valley to overthrow the Government and establish an Islamic order.

The political leadership appeared to be n totally against any military adventure in Kashmir. However, they were persuaded to W’ turn a Nelson’s eye to the ongoing covert operations in Kashmir. A summary of major conclusions drawn during various deliberations was as follows:

A note of dissent

It appears that during various discussions, certain ‘Generals’ were not in favour of postponement of ‘Plan-X’. Their main argument was that India was bound to help the present Afghan regime militarily and must be taught a lesson in Siachen in such a situation. These Generals may not have their way immediately but it cannot be assumed that they will not have their way in the future.

General situation in J&K – The Next Twelve Months

The periodic eruption of violent anti-Indian sentiments had now become a permanent feature in the Kashmir Valley. The political leadership continued to be ambivalent, in spite of mounting evidence that Jammu & Kashmir was slowly drifting towards a total political and administrative collapse due to a ‘low-intensity conflict’ situation. If the Government had any action plan or had learnt any lessons from the havoc wrought by mob violence and ever-increasing terrorist activities, it was not much in evidence. As usual, complete bandhs were observed in all major towns in the valley on Republic Day and Independence Day. Violent incidents further marred these occasions. On Pakistan’s Independence Day on 14 August, a large number of Pakistani flags appeared on many public buildings and no one seemed to be in a hurry to pull them down. Local police appeared to be a demoralized force as it had to face the wrath of the people without let-up. A state of stupor seemed to have overtaken the whole Government machinery. The Secretariat had become a cauldron of intrigue and the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service were divided on Kashmiri and non-Kashmiri lines.

Towards the end of September, there were mob attacks on civil trucks carrying military stores, when they were passing through some crowded areas of Srinagar and Sopore.

Terrorist activities continued unabated in the’ valley and caches of sophisticated weapons and explosives were discovered quite by chance in Bodh Bungus, Kanil and Gangabal areas. This indicated that large stocks of arms and ammunition were being built up in selected areas over a period of time. The tourist season opened with bomb and grenade attacks on tourist facilities, buses and shopping centres, in tourist resorts. Indian tourists were the main targets of attack. As only minor injuries were caused by these attacks the aim seemed to be to scare away the indigenous variety of tourists. Soon, however, shikarawaLas and petty shopkeepers were incited to block the roads in Srinagar and Pahalgam. The agitationists asked for subsidies and accused the Government of diverting tourist traffic to Patni Top and Batot, outside the valley, in order to punish the poor Kashmiri.

Strikes by lower Government employees and truck drivers came next. This created major problems for the Government as strikers frequently blocked the main highways and brought life in the vclley to a standstill. These strikes seemed extremely well organized and they started and stopped suddenly, as if on a signal. Another disturbing feature was the total passivity of the police duringbandhs and strikes, which almost amounted to connivance.

A radio station calling itself Voice of Islamic Republic of Kashmir’ came on the air off and on from 15 August onwards. It exhorted the people of the valley to overthrow the Government and establish an Islamic order.

In this crisis situation, there seemed to be a further falling apart of the Centre and State leadership, resulting in the lack of a well-coordinated plan or strategy to meet the situation.In the first incident of its kind, a truck carrying three CRPF jawans and a Sub-Inspector was fired upon with automatic weapons. The truck suffered major damage but the men escaped with minor injuries. Immediately afterwards, baseless reports of atrocities purported to be committed by BSF and CRPF were circulated through leaflets and posters. Some similar reports appeared in the vernacular press also.

A powerful time bomb with a sophisticated fIring device was discovered at the Srinagar Airport Luggage Lounge. It was disarmed by an IAF expert squad which was luckily near at hand. A similar device was found in a room of the Press Information Bureau on the Residency Road in Srinagar. A number of noted journalists were present when the bomb, which was to explode soon, was found and disarmed. These discoveries pointed towards an increasing sophistication of means but the lack of expertise of the “saboteurs” was also apparent.

Towards the end of September, there were mob attacks on civil trucks carrying military stores, when they were passing through some crowded areas of Srinagar and Sopore. Military convoys were fired upon in remote areas of Kupwara district. In Bandipore area, grenades were lobbed on an ammunition dump. Gradually Paramilitary forces and some reserve Army formations were getting tied down with the ever-increasing static guard duties at vulnerable points and important bridges and culverts on the highways. The Army now started providing armed escorts to convoys, and guards at .rear depots and formation Headquarters were strengthened. This affected the fighting strength of combat arms on the posts. Normal maintenance and advance stocking schedules could not be kept due to various constraints and non-availability of civilian vehicles. Army convoys from base depots to Srinagar and to Ladakh were often delayed for more than twenty-four hours due to disturbances in the crowded areas, en route to Zojila. Plans for alternative routes to avoid these bottlenecks existed on paper for many years, but had remained unexecuted.

In a dangerous escalation of terrorist activities, the airfields at Avantipur and Badgam were subjected to commando-type attacks in which a couple of IAF transport aircraft and one IA Boeing were damaged.

It was obvious from a graduated escalation of insurgency that Phase 2 of Op Topac as visualized by the late General Zia-ul-Haq was taking concrete shape. In this crisis situation, there seemed to be a further falling apart of the Centre and State leadership, resulting in the lack of a well-coordinated plan or strategy to meet the situation.

Parleys on Siachen at the Secretary level made headway but Pakistan insisted on the status quo existing prior to 1984. The sequence of major incidents recorded in Jammu & Kashmir indicated a definite pattern leading towards the objective of destabilizing the Jammu & Kashmir Government and facilitating the passage of insurgency with the ultimate aim of creating an “Afghan-like situation”.

Details of Major Incidents in J&K

Kashmir Valley

Major fires broke out in J&K Road Transport Corporation (JKRTC) and Army Petrol Depot near Srinagar almost simultaneously. It seemed a hand:-held model, MZ-A17 Flame-Thrower, firedfrom a hill overlooking this depot, was used to start the fire. Even though the fire was brought under control within a few hours by an efficient Army fire-fighting organization, a large quantity of fuel was lost. It was also noted that the approach to this depot was through a crowded area, and as such fire-fighting vehicles and personnel had to force their way through a one-way, narrow and crowded street. This spot was obviously no longer suitable for a large FOL Depot.

The fire in JKRTC depot caused much greater damage and created panic in the town. It was evident that no serious attempt was made to fight this fire. A report suggested that the passage of fire brigade vehicles was obstructed en route by a violent mob.

Simultaneous attacks were made on Avantipur and Badgam airfields in which one AN-32, one Cheetah helicopter and one Boeing 737 were rendered unfit for flying due to major damage. It was apparent that small teams of specially trained terrorists had mounted rocket attacks on the aircraft parked on the tarmac. In the ensuing confusion, the terrorists made good their escape. A new variety of specially trained commando teams were obviously operating in the valley.

The staff of Radio Kashmir was held at pistol-point by a couple of intruders during the broadcast of the programme ‘Wadi ki Awaz’. An attempt was made to force the broadcasters to say ‘Radio Islamic Republic of Kashmir apse mukhatib hai’ (This is Radio Islamic Republic of Kashmir). This attempt, however, did not succeed and the intruders fled in a jeep after throwing two petrol bombs on soine transmission facilities. Significantly, no one either made an attempt to catch the culprits or offered any resistance. The armed guard at the gate remained oblivious of this incident, or so it was said.

Some reports suggested that some youths dressed in blue shalwar suits were collecting taxes in the name of Islamic Republic of Kashmir.

Power stations and transmission towers were being regularly damaged in Baramulla district, Gund and Bandipur. In most cases high explosives were used. .

One tube of Banihal Tunnel was blocked for more than twenty-four hours when a truck blew up half-way. It seemed the driver of the truck had stopped the vehicle and walked away on the pretext that it was defective. Two vehicles behind this truck were badly damaged and the drivers/cleaners sustained serious injuries.