Indian Defence Review

Nuclear weapons are the most destructive form of manmade weaponry that has the ability to wipe-out the entire human generation followed by the untold amount of damage in a way no weaponry is designed to do so. Keeping this in mind, nuclear weapons are one of the most vulnerable weapons especially when I say Non-State Actors (NSAs) who wish to use to cause destruction or even threaten do so.

The US State Department’s 2010 series of Country Reports stated two specific ways by which Non State Actors could acquire this technology, one being the, “independent of state programs” while other being “the sophisticated knowledge and resources of a state”. The focus of my article is on the consequences of acquiring, methodology and tactics used to obtain a nuclear weapon or technology, (by obtaining either the fissile material needed to produce nuclear weapons or the knowledge needed to produce nuclear weapons (or both) from a state).

Today, we shall focus on two different case studies of countries with known nuclear capabilities which have been mentioned, talked, discussed and debated quite frequently when it comes to Non- State Actors acquiring nuclear weapons – Russia and Pakistan. Both the nations have suffered from political turmoil especially in the past two or three decades (Russia’s case, right after the disintegration of USSR and decades of political instability, insurgency, militancy and militaristic regime changes ) which has brought concerns over the security of nuclear stockpiles in each country.

Issues like this are quite crucial, as when you try to resolve it through multilateral approach problems increases as compared to bilateral approach which has its own specific issues. One such issue is the political opposition, where a nations claim that nuclear weapon stockpiles are safe from within. Both Russia and Pakistan have refuted the concerns of securing nuclear weapons from the ‘Western’ governments, continuously stressing that they are safe and denying any possibility of “interventions”.

Another issue arises if we talk about securing our nuclear weapons stockpiles against possible incursions by NSAs. Hence supporting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by Weapons States (NWSs) as stated in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) becomes the only viable solution. Nation states designating each other “non proliferation” and then striking the weaker nations out using nuclear technology is again ‘lesser of two evils’. Designating the Non Proliferation Treaty undesirable, a new debate of what is ‘desirable’ for power nations with respect to nuclear safety, is heating the international arena.

As a result, debate over what should be done to prevent nuclear weapons (or the knowledge necessary to construct them) from falling into ‘the wrong hands’ is getting mixed with ideals of non proliferation, safety, security and those of the UN Charter towards preserving the sovereign rights of all member states and those of the NNPT in calling for an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons as a result the real “risk” sidelined.

Russia and Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability at a Glance

The one thing that differ the two nations is the presence of nuclear of warheads each country has its disposal. Russia has one of the largest nuclear arsenals than any other member nations of the UN, with an estimation of strategic nuclear warheads to be approximately 1500, along with 1,000 non deployable nuclear war heads and roughly 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads.

Speaking of Pakistan, the Pakistani nuclear arsenal is very less as compared to the former, may be due to their handling capacity and government’s opacity towards the technology. As per ACA Pakistan has ‘100 to 120’nuclear war heads.

We know much about the deployment methods of Russian warheads as opposed to Pakistan. Russia’s capacity of nuclear deployment is over 498 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and Strategic bombers, there is quite less information as to how Pakistan will deploy its nuclear weapons.

Brief Introduction – Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Capability

Russia is quite different from Pakistan when we talk about nuclear programmes, as anyone with a basic knowledge of nuclear history would go back in time. The then USSR (until it collapsed in 1991) became the second UN member nation to have full nuclear capability in 1949. Almost 50 years later Russia tested the Fusion Bomb (widely known as the Hydrogen Bomb or ‘H-bomb’) in 1995, at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan.

Amid the Cold war, USSR signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (the predecessor to the NNPT) in 1963 along with other nuclear capable nations of that time, excluding France, who opted out of the agreement.

Since its evolution to nuclear platform, the most significant changes came during the multilateral NNPT as well as the bilateral SALT and START agreements with the USA (which is still effective today) as well as the breakup of the USSR. Although before the dissimilation of USSR, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were sites for deployable nuclear warheads, however after 1991 these warheads were transferred to Russia, resulting in these nations signing onto the NNPT as non nuclear Weapons States.

Brief Introduction – Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Capability

On the contrary to Russia’s fast evolution, Pakistan’s approach with nuclear technology came quite late, though it can be said that Russia’s approach for nuclear weapons were more based on rivalry with the other “superpower” of the Cold War, the USA, Pakistan’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons was similarly the result that surrounded a controversial relationship with another country developing nuclear weapons, India. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in a declaration of 1965 said, “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.”

Angered by India’s nuclear testing in 1974, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, under the leadership of Munir Ahmad Khan, worked throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s to develop the advance technological capacity, necessary to produce nuclear weapons. Pakistan conducted its first successful nuclear tests on May 28th, 1998. These tests were response to their archrival India, with then (and current) Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stating that the tests were conducted

“In the interest of national self- defence… to deter aggression, whether nuclear or conventional”

Islamabad, having an India centric approach, was eager. In a Nuclear Threat assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads, A senior IAEA inspector wrote “Because of India’s conventional military superiority, Pakistan maintains the ability to quickly escalate to the use of nuclear weapons in case of a conventional Indian military attack”

Russia, Pakistan, and the NNPT

The approach of nuclear technology of Pakistan and Russia were similar, however their stance towards the NNPT was quite contrary. Under the terms of the treaty, Russia was one of the signatories of the treaty which was signed in 1968. This treaty is also recognised as a “Nuclear Weapons State” (NWS), with signatories being “allowed” to maintain nuclear arsenal followed by some strict restrictions.

Pakistan was a non non- signatory of the NNPT and it didn’t ratify the treaty. Pakistan, a creature of old habit criticised IAEA for not taking the treaty to India first, and openly announced “that it will only give up nuclear weapons if India gives up its own nuclear arsenal”. India is, likely for the same reasons, also a non signatory of the NNPT.

This is why we know a lot about Russia’s nuclear programmes, as a sovereign nation Russia can disclose a reasonable amount of information regarding its nuclear arsenal but it has recognised itself as “allowed to speak”, under some terms of international law, which the same is not applicable for Pakistan.

This tendency of Pakistan has attracted more criticism and concern to over its nuclear program. As a matter of fact Russia is numerous agreements focused on the reduction in size of its nuclear arsenal (such as the NNPT and the aforementioned START agreement), the same cannot be said of Pakistan.

Russia’s Security Entanglement

Considering the active threat from Non State Actors also mentioned under some clauses of NNPT, it is quite logical that, due to the large amount of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and the very, very large country size, it is vulnerable for an attack from any NSA.

Graham Allison once wrote “If a nuclear terrorist attack occurs, Russia will be the most likely source of the weapon or material—not because the Russian government would intentionally sell or lose weapons or materials, but simply because Russia’s twelve-time-zone expanse contains more nuclear weapons and materials than any other country in the world, much of it vulnerable to theft or sabotage”

If I talk about threat in particular, Russia is prone to an attack by Chechen rebels. Allison correctly stated:

“To date, the only confirmed case of attempted nuclear terrorism occurred in Russia on November 23, 1995, when Chechen separatists put a crude bomb containing 70 pounds of a mixture of cesium-137 and dynamite in Moscow’s Ismailovsky Park”

Although the Rebels once tried to, fell quite short and “instead informed a national television station”, the incident still serves today an evidence of vulnerable Russia and its nuclear arsenal.

Many security experts still support the fact that Russia, no matter how powerful, is vulnerable from NSA’s. In a Harvard Political Review article entitled “Nukes for Non-State Actors”, for instance, Amy Beeson and Lynn Yi single out Russia, along with Pakistan as one of “two key states” which “experts hone in on” because of its “its quantities of “loose nukes” and unsecured nuclear material as well as its history of corruption and attempted nuclear theft”. One story of Russian business buying nuclear weapons technology shocked the global world.

Frederik Dahl during the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Hague, reported that “Russia, China and 16 other countries shunned a separate initiative of the United States, the Netherlands and South Korea at the summit to incorporate U.N. nuclear agency security guidelines into national rules”.

An anonymous security analyst wrote that “American experts have described more vividly potential nuclear terrorist attacks on U.S. soil than have Russians, at least in the writings and conversations that are publicly accessible”.

So, from the above few evidences, four conclusions can be made on Russia’s nuclear Security situation.

• No Russian nuclear experts have agreed to an imminent threat or vulnerable state towards an attack from active NSA’s. However experts outside the region have showed immense concern towards the issue.
• If there is a security threat, then it is entirely due to the immense of the region followed by its large nuclear arsenals, but also due to institutional corruption
• Threats to Russia’s nuclear arsenal are likely to come from groups operating inside of Russia (other than Chechen rebels) and are likely to affect Russia first and foremost
• The Russian government does not seem to take the threats seriously as compared to other sovereign states and Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) do.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Entanglement

As mentioned previously the other “nuclear power” that has ruled out any security threat to its nuclear arsenal is Pakistan.

There are three factors that make Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal vulnerable –

• Increased terrorist activities in Pakistan
• Political instability
• The growing size of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal

The first factor (and some second) is the most notable concern that international agencies, global nations have expressed from time to time. The attack on Minhas Air Force Base (known to have nuclear arsenal storage facility) was one “significant concern” and a question on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

A threat assessment report from the CSIS desk stated that “several Pakistani nuclear facilities, including the Khushab facility and the Gadwal uranium enrichment plant, are in proximity to areas under attack from the Taliban”

A threat assessment report by independent analyst Salik and Luongo stated that “Pakistani air bases cover a large area protected by barbed wire fences, which are not too difficult for an organized and determined attacker to breach. The aircraft parked on the runway are soft targets that can be observed from a distance and hit with relatively unsophisticated weapons”.

One concern amid threat and insecurity is the opacity of Islamabad towards their nuclear programs. For instance, Hassan Abbas, a former Senior Advisor to Harvard’s Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, has written that:  “A lack of certainty about the extent and nature of earlier proliferation activity makes it difficult to assess Pakistan’s nuclear safety and control measures”

The situation in Pakistan with respect to the security of their nuclear weapons arsenal is “risky” not only in regards to what we do know, but also in the sense that we know relatively little about the nature of the country’s nuclear programme.

Comparative Analysis – Pakistan and Russia’s Issues of Nuclear Security

To begin with similarity, the clearest example is the stage of violence in the two nations, and lack of security/seriousness with respect to their nuclear arsenals. Russia’s unpreparedness was clearly seen in the recent Nuclear Summit while Gen. Majid’s remarks in 2009, made it quite clear that Pakistan is “willing” to take any chance with respect to their nuclear arsenals.

The second most important point which I saw was the national instability in the region. Both the nations have intelligence services and Russia’s FSB is one of the ruthless ones, but due to heavy political support, their movements are more “guided from the top”. In Russia political corruption is on its peak, as a result any NSA with heavy cash in their pockets could bribe a high ranking official for nuclear weapon technology (for the case of businessman) while Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) have ties “with anti India militant groups”.

Now the difference between the two nations arise when we talk about their nuclear strength, surprisingly, “we don’t have much” on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal  and this is the part which makes Pakistan’s situation more concerning, more alarming as compared to Russia’s. However getting the information on the base of intelligence reports and speculation will limit the resource and cripple the threat analysis methodologies. After all when it comes to Pakistan, it’s not a question of how, it’s a question of when. With inadequate data in hand we will never identify Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal storage areas or the threats imposed by its quantity or capacity. Hence, with respect to NSA, the threat perception doubles as there is no adequate information about its nuclear programme.

Solutions – Till now

Coming to the “resolution” of the crisis described in length, three potential solutions have been implemented –

• Bilateral responses (strict nuclear agreements between Pakistan and the US)
• Multilateral responses
• United Nations Security Resolution 1540

Bilateral Responses

The biggest example of bilateral relations is that of Pakistan and the US, where the US have spent, as of 2007, around $100 million since 9/11 on improving Pakistan’s nuclear security.

As stated clearly in the pact “a raft of equipment… from helicopters to night- vision goggles to nuclear detection equipment” is supplied to strengthen Pakistan’s efforts to secure Nuclear stockpile, under the widely criticised Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA), which is “the main supervisory and policy-making body controlling Pakistan’s nuclear weapons” which is “said to be” partially separate from the Pakistani government.

The results of these bilateral relations have been very unsuccessful in improving Pakistan’s nuclear security. However international agencies are quite positive and describes this semi failed state as the “most improved nuclear- armed state”. The then US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in an interview said “We have confidence in the Pakistani government and military’s control over its nuclear weapon”, and showed confidence in improving relations with Pakistan along with more financial assistance, “if required”.

It should also be noticed that insecurity is still an issue in Pakistan as globally Pakistan is among the worst “nuclear-armed states” with regards to nuclear security, and US officials have been confidently keeping a close eye on the situation.  Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff while giving a press conference said “clearly we are very watchful, as we should be”.

Multilateral Responses

When we talk about multilateral response, NSA’s are the first threats hence to counter it, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) which came into formation in 2006 and now has support of 85 UN member nations (including all of the NWSs recognized under the terms of the NNPT as well as both India and Pakistan) followed by four observers (the EU, the IAEA, INTERPOL and UNODC).

The Organization was formed:

“To strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism by conducting multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, policies, procedures, and interoperability of partner nations”

The GICNT is functions on 8 main “Principles” as mentioned in the initiative’s ‘Statement of Principles’, starting from “improving accounting, control, and protection of nuclear/radiological material” and “Promoting information sharing to prevent and respond to acts of nuclear terrorism”.

The United Nations Security Council – Resolutions 1540

Although no international community has a right to enforce other sovereign nation with policies and reforms but the UN Security Council (UNSC), certainly does. The UNSC Resolution 1540 was passed unanimously in 2004, is equipped to handle NSA’s and the nuclear threat they posed, I would say, this entire concern was itself a confined to a forefront clause. The Clause 2 states –

“that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engaged in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them”

To address the conflicts within NNPT, the Clause 5 states that –

“None of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”

Nonetheless, moving down, the Clause 7 encourages bilateral agreements between states in order to strengthen security mechanisms and encourages security partnerships between two or more nations with regards to nuclear weapons. The Clause 7 states –

“Invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to… States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions”