Indian Defence Review

Nuclear weapons are the most destructive form of manmade weaponry that has the ability to wipe-out the entire human generation followed by the untold amount of damage in a way no weaponry is designed to do so. Keeping this in mind, nuclear weapons are one of the most vulnerable weapons especially when I say Non-State Actors (NSAs) who wish to use to cause destruction or even threaten do so.

The US State Department’s 2010 series of Country Reports stated two specific ways by which Non State Actors could acquire this technology, one being the, “independent of state programs” while other being “the sophisticated knowledge and resources of a state”. The focus of my article is on the consequences of acquiring, methodology and tactics used to obtain a nuclear weapon or technology, (by obtaining either the fissile material needed to produce nuclear weapons or the knowledge needed to produce nuclear weapons (or both) from a state).

Today, we shall focus on two different case studies of countries with known nuclear capabilities which have been mentioned, talked, discussed and debated quite frequently when it comes to Non- State Actors acquiring nuclear weapons – Russia and Pakistan. Both the nations have suffered from political turmoil especially in the past two or three decades (Russia’s case, right after the disintegration of USSR and decades of political instability, insurgency, militancy and militaristic regime changes ) which has brought concerns over the security of nuclear stockpiles in each country.

Issues like this are quite crucial, as when you try to resolve it through multilateral approach problems increases as compared to bilateral approach which has its own specific issues. One such issue is the political opposition, where a nations claim that nuclear weapon stockpiles are safe from within. Both Russia and Pakistan have refuted the concerns of securing nuclear weapons from the ‘Western’ governments, continuously stressing that they are safe and denying any possibility of “interventions”.

Another issue arises if we talk about securing our nuclear weapons stockpiles against possible incursions by NSAs. Hence supporting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by Weapons States (NWSs) as stated in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) becomes the only viable solution. Nation states designating each other “non proliferation” and then striking the weaker nations out using nuclear technology is again ‘lesser of two evils’. Designating the Non Proliferation Treaty undesirable, a new debate of what is ‘desirable’ for power nations with respect to nuclear safety, is heating the international arena.

As a result, debate over what should be done to prevent nuclear weapons (or the knowledge necessary to construct them) from falling into ‘the wrong hands’ is getting mixed with ideals of non proliferation, safety, security and those of the UN Charter towards preserving the sovereign rights of all member states and those of the NNPT in calling for an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons as a result the real “risk” sidelined.

Russia and Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability at a Glance

The one thing that differ the two nations is the presence of nuclear of warheads each country has its disposal. Russia has one of the largest nuclear arsenals than any other member nations of the UN, with an estimation of strategic nuclear warheads to be approximately 1500, along with 1,000 non deployable nuclear war heads and roughly 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads.

Speaking of Pakistan, the Pakistani nuclear arsenal is very less as compared to the former, may be due to their handling capacity and government’s opacity towards the technology. As per ACA Pakistan has ‘100 to 120’nuclear war heads.

We know much about the deployment methods of Russian warheads as opposed to Pakistan. Russia’s capacity of nuclear deployment is over 498 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and Strategic bombers, there is quite less information as to how Pakistan will deploy its nuclear weapons.

Brief Introduction – Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Capability

Russia is quite different from Pakistan when we talk about nuclear programmes, as anyone with a basic knowledge of nuclear history would go back in time. The then USSR (until it collapsed in 1991) became the second UN member nation to have full nuclear capability in 1949. Almost 50 years later Russia tested the Fusion Bomb (widely known as the Hydrogen Bomb or ‘H-bomb’) in 1995, at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan.

Amid the Cold war, USSR signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (the predecessor to the NNPT) in 1963 along with other nuclear capable nations of that time, excluding France, who opted out of the agreement.

Since its evolution to nuclear platform, the most significant changes came during the multilateral NNPT as well as the bilateral SALT and START agreements with the USA (which is still effective today) as well as the breakup of the USSR. Although before the dissimilation of USSR, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were sites for deployable nuclear warheads, however after 1991 these warheads were transferred to Russia, resulting in these nations signing onto the NNPT as non nuclear Weapons States.

Brief Introduction – Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Capability

On the contrary to Russia’s fast evolution, Pakistan’s approach with nuclear technology came quite late, though it can be said that Russia’s approach for nuclear weapons were more based on rivalry with the other “superpower” of the Cold War, the USA, Pakistan’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons was similarly the result that surrounded a controversial relationship with another country developing nuclear weapons, India. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in a declaration of 1965 said, “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.”

Angered by India’s nuclear testing in 1974, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, under the leadership of Munir Ahmad Khan, worked throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s to develop the advance technological capacity, necessary to produce nuclear weapons. Pakistan conducted its first successful nuclear tests on May 28th, 1998. These tests were response to their archrival India, with then (and current) Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stating that the tests were conducted

“In the interest of national self- defence… to deter aggression, whether nuclear or conventional”

Islamabad, having an India centric approach, was eager. In a Nuclear Threat assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads, A senior IAEA inspector wrote “Because of India’s conventional military superiority, Pakistan maintains the ability to quickly escalate to the use of nuclear weapons in case of a conventional Indian military attack”

Russia, Pakistan, and the NNPT

The approach of nuclear technology of Pakistan and Russia were similar, however their stance towards the NNPT was quite contrary. Under the terms of the treaty, Russia was one of the signatories of the treaty which was signed in 1968. This treaty is also recognised as a “Nuclear Weapons State” (NWS), with signatories being “allowed” to maintain nuclear arsenal followed by some strict restrictions.

Pakistan was a non non- signatory of the NNPT and it didn’t ratify the treaty. Pakistan, a creature of old habit criticised IAEA for not taking the treaty to India first, and openly announced “that it will only give up nuclear weapons if India gives up its own nuclear arsenal”. India is, likely for the same reasons, also a non signatory of the NNPT.

This is why we know a lot about Russia’s nuclear programmes, as a sovereign nation Russia can disclose a reasonable amount of information regarding its nuclear arsenal but it has recognised itself as “allowed to speak”, under some terms of international law, which the same is not applicable for Pakistan.

This tendency of Pakistan has attracted more criticism and concern to over its nuclear program. As a matter of fact Russia is numerous agreements focused on the reduction in size of its nuclear arsenal (such as the NNPT and the aforementioned START agreement), the same cannot be said of Pakistan.

Russia’s Security Entanglement

Considering the active threat from Non State Actors also mentioned under some clauses of NNPT, it is quite logical that, due to the large amount of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and the very, very large country size, it is vulnerable for an attack from any NSA.

Graham Allison once wrote “If a nuclear terrorist attack occurs, Russia will be the most likely source of the weapon or material—not because the Russian government would intentionally sell or lose weapons or materials, but simply because Russia’s twelve-time-zone expanse contains more nuclear weapons and materials than any other country in the world, much of it vulnerable to theft or sabotage”

If I talk about threat in particular, Russia is prone to an attack by Chechen rebels. Allison correctly stated:

“To date, the only confirmed case of attempted nuclear terrorism occurred in Russia on November 23, 1995, when Chechen separatists put a crude bomb containing 70 pounds of a mixture of cesium-137 and dynamite in Moscow’s Ismailovsky Park”

Although the Rebels once tried to, fell quite short and “instead informed a national television station”, the incident still serves today an evidence of vulnerable Russia and its nuclear arsenal.

Many security experts still support the fact that Russia, no matter how powerful, is vulnerable from NSA’s. In a Harvard Political Review article entitled “Nukes for Non-State Actors”, for instance, Amy Beeson and Lynn Yi single out Russia, along with Pakistan as one of “two key states” which “experts hone in on” because of its “its quantities of “loose nukes” and unsecured nuclear material as well as its history of corruption and attempted nuclear theft”. One story of Russian business buying nuclear weapons technology shocked the global world.