Indian Defence Review

INS Chakra

In September 1954, the remarkable US naval officer, Admiral Hyman Rickover, succeeded in commissioning the first nuclear propelled submarine Nautilus which could run deep for months and circumvent the globe thus creating a ‘true submarine’ which radically changed war at sea. With the concurrent development of ballistic missiles with a nuclear warhead, the atomic submarine became the main strategic deterrent by possessing a second strike capability. The Soviet admiral, Sergei Gorshkov, deliberately opted for designing and building nearly 700 submarines armed with ballistic missiles as also with anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons with a view to confronting the US carrier forces.

Nuclear propulsion in India was first mooted in 1967 when a naval officer and a BARC scientist prepared a feasibility report. A more detailed report was prepared in 1971 as the Committee of Secretaries felt that R&D on nuclear propulsion technology was inescapable if India was not to be left too far behind by the end of the century, when atomic energy would be a major source for both propulsion and energy requirements. A small nucleus of engineers were located in BARC as early as 1978. Thereafter, the logical development was to induct a nuclear-propelled submarine into the Indian Navy particularly as both the superpowers had commenced a frenetic race for building bigger and more silent nuclear submarines for their global aim of ‘sea denial’ as also to provide the ‘second strike deterrent’ from the bowels of the seas.

It was in this context that the former president, R. Venkataraman, stated in his book My Presidential Years that on September 14, Admiral Roy, Vice Chief of the Eastern Naval Command conveyed to me the pleasant news that the Government had finally decided to take the first nuclear propelled submarine from the Soviet Union on lease, as purchase would entail acceptance of NPT conditions.

The idea of acquiring a nuclear-propelled submarine was floated by me as Defence Minister and after months of bargaining the Soviets agreed. A training programme was arranged for Indian sailors. I had visited the trainees in Leningrad and Riga. I was also happy that the lease amount charged by the Soviet Union was fairly reasonable. The nuclear propelled submarine had the advantage of remaining under water which was not possible for the conventional submarines. It was also proposed at that time that a second nuclear propelled submarine would be built in India. The Atomic Energy were confident of producing an atomic power pack for the submarine.7

This offer of the Soviet authorities as stated by the former President of India for a ‘nuclear-powered submarine fleet’ for the Indian Navy was made by Marshal Ogarkov during his visit to India in April 1981. The Soviets offered to arrange a two years’ training programme for Indian naval personnel, lease one nuclear submarine for 5 years for practical training and to render technical assistance for creating maintenance facilities in India for nuclear-powered submarines. He added that the sale as also assistance for designing and constructing nuclear-powered submarines could be taken up later.

This offer was reiterated by the Defence Minister, Marshal Ustinov. As an interesting postscript, the Soviet Marshal along with Admiral of the Fleet, Sergei Gorshkov came all the way to Vishakapatnam where the nuclear base facilities were being constructed and suggested to me that these modem facilities could also be utilized by Soviet submarines. It was tactfully explained that India had a Parliamentary system of Government and the provision of bases for foreign ships had been turned down time and again even after the aftermath of the Chinese attack in 1962 when Western assistance had been sought.

The gist of this conversation was immediately relayed to the Defence Minister (Mr Venkataraman) in Delhi as Marshal Ustinov was scheduled to call on him. However, the Marshal did not raise this question in Delhi but gave all support for inducting nuclear-powered submarines (with conventional weapons) into the Indian Navy.

Mrs Gandhi, who was holding the portfolio of Defence Minister, conveyed this exciting offer to the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral R. L. Pereira. The CNS surprisingly rejected the offer in a strongly worded note as he felt it was only a ploy to scuttle the German offer of HDW submarines which were near finalization. Admiral Pereira added that India could not afford nuclear submarines. He felt that it would neither strengthen the Navy’s submarine arm nor add muscle to India’s maritime forces.

The Prime Minister was perplexed. with such a reaction as she had already approved the order for buying two HDW1500 submarines and constructing two more in Mazagon Docks, Bombay. The Prime Minister then consulted Dr Raja Ramanna, the distinguished nuclear scientist who had been shunted out of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) at Bombay by the then Prime Minister, Mr Morarji Desai. Fortunately at this juncture, he was ensconced in the Defence Ministry as Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister as also Director General, Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO) and Secretary to Government for Defence Research. He felt that unless the Indian Navy enthusiastically agreed to make available resources, manpower and facilities, it would be imprudent to respond to the Soviet offer which had come out of the blue!

At this juncture it will be of interest to tarry and peep into some unusual links which now affected the choice of the Indian Navy going nuclear. Dr Ramanna and Admiral Roy had both graduated with honours from the University of Madras in 1945 and voyaged to UK in troop ships Raja Ramanna to do his Ph.D. in nuclear physics at King’s College, London and Mihir Roy to RN College, at Eaton Hall as Darthmouth, like King’s College, had been bombed.

In London, Raja Ramanna, K. N. Raj (distinguished economist and later Vice Chancellor, Delhi University), Tissa Wijaratne (later Foreign Secretary, Sri Lanka), and Mihir Roy (during his sojourns from sea) found ‘suitable digs’ in South Kensington. Ramanna and Roy spent many of their holidays in Europe trying to stretch Sir Stafford Cripps’ annual foreign allowance of 40 pound sterling by sleeping in cattle trucks and traveling much the same away through war-ravaged Europe.8 Qn returning to India, Ramanna continued his; work in the garages of the Yacht Club’ which was adjacent to the Navar, Dockyard. Hence, they spent connival evenings in the hospitable environment of naval ships which were ‘prohibition free’ in parched Bombay! On one occasion In 1974, when Captain Roy, who was by now commanding the aircraft carrier Vikrant, was eulogizing on the need to go nuclear, Dr Ramanna remained silent (which was quite unusual!). It was soon thereafter that he telephoned me and told him to read the next day’s newspapers as he had successfully demonstrated a nuclear underground explosion at Pokhran. This was possibly the best-kept secret in leaky democratic India!

Such was the background for Dr Ramanna enquiring of Mihir Roy (who was now the C-in-C of Eastern Naval Command and hence the Submarine-Operating Authority) as to his opinion for acquiring nuclear propulsion. A few days later, Admiral Pereira also arrived at Vishakapatnam for the Commanders’ Conference and commenced proceedings by stating that on no account should the Indian Navy support the proposal for acquiring a nuclear submarine as there was no necessity nor resources nor manpower to induct this large and expensive underwater platform into the Indian Navy.

He add8d that Dr Raja Ramanna had been nominated to lead a delegation to Moscow to discuss the Soviet offer for nuclear submarines and that Vice Admiral Roy had been specifically nominated to accompany him. On being asked his view, Admiral Roy stated that acquiring new technology and going nuclear could not be scuttled by pre-determined unilateral decisions without analysing the pros and cons. It was necessary to have an open mind as the Navy would never forgive them for any hasty and undigested decisions. He was strongly supported by his Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral Kewal Krishan Nayyar (later Vice Admiral).

The CNS left in a huff and his hitherto cordial relations with Admiral Roy were thereafter frosty until this fine gentleman, now deceased, retired three months later. In some way this misunderstanding impinged on the choice of CNS’s successor which would be from among the three C-in-Cs present at this meeting.

Ramanna-Gorshkov parleys

A delegation led by Dr Ramanna along with Vice Admiral Roy and including Rear Admiral Biloo Chaudhry, Director of Marine Engineering thereafter visited USSR in July 1981 and again in April 1982. Dr Ramanna, Vice Admiral Roy and Dr Dastidar of BARC were ‘jetted’ to Murmansk to walk around a comparatively old Victor class attack submarine. It is interesting to Ilote that this was perhaps the first visit by representatives of a non-Warsaw Pact country to the Northern fleet at Murmansk.

In passing, Admiral Roy informed his Soviet hosts that he had earlier gone ashore at Kola Inlet (port of Murmansk) when minesweeping in RN ships operating from Sidesfiord in Northern Iceland at the end of the Second World War. The Soviet C-in-C Admiral Chernavin (a nuclear submariner and later to be Gorshkov’s successor) hosted a reception in the Town Hall of Murmansk where the art of grilling Artic Sturgeon in liquors was demonstrated with finesse!

On return to Moscow, the Indian delegation emphasized the need for a better and less noisy nuclear submarine as otherwise it would unnecessarily attract the attention of the more modern NATO submarines operating in the soft underbelly of the Indian Ocean.

On 14 April 1982, Dr Ramanna and Admiral Gorshkov signed an ‘inter-governmental agreement of consent in principle’ embodying the initial offer for training, leasing and assistance in constructing base and operational facilities in India. Admiral Gorshkov mentioned in passing that the submarine would not come under [AEA safeguards as it was not a weapon but only a propulsion system. Soon after, Mr Venkataraman became the Defence Minister and Dr Arunachalam relieved Dr Ramanna who was appointed Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Admiral Roy led several delegations to finalize and sign the working protocols. [n December 1983, Mr Belousev. Minister of Ship-Building, visited India with over a dozen specialists and confirmed India’s industrial expertise and competence in this area. This was the background for the comments of the former president that ‘he felt proud on the fulfilment of one of my pet projects’.

Rajiv Gandhi welcomes INS Chakra

On completion of his four-year tenure as C-in-C, Vice Admiral Roy was reappointed to the Ministry of Defence as a Secretary to Government to negotiate various agreements as also to finalize the costs for training and the lease terms for the nuclear submarine.

Two submarine crews were carefully selected after the necessary psychological aptitude tests where the rejection rate was much lower than that experienced in Soviet and Western nuclear submarine forces. On completion of the escape refresher course at Vishakapatnam the crews departed for Vladivostok via Tashkent and Khabarovsk and arrived at the Training Centre at Kirova on 1 October 1983 for a 30-month course which was later reduced to two years. The Indian ambassador, Professor Nurul Hasan. visited the Indian personnel in July 1985.

The final part of the training included attacking single surface ships and submarines as also shadowing and attacking large formations including convoys and aircraft carriers. A Charlie I Class. SSGN nuclear submarine was positioned at Ulis Bay as part ohhe sea training programme. The graduation ceremony in April 1986 was attended by Vice Admiral Sedernov. C-in-C of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. the minister G. Ranganathan and Commodore V. Jerath of the Indian Embassy. Moscow. The only Indian casualty was a voung lieutenant who was pierced by Cupid’s arrow. He resigned from the Navy to settle in the Soviet Union with his young Russian bride.

The agreement between the two countries for the lease of a Soviet nuclear submarine for an initial period of 3 years was thereafter concluded. Captain R. N. Ganesh (who later commanded the aircraft carrier Vikrant and is presently a Rear Admiral, commanding the Western surface fleet) along with Commanders R. K. Sharma (executive officer), B. R. Raju (nuclear engineering) and P.K. Sharma (electrical engineering) along with one complete Indian crew returned back to Ulis Bay in September 1987.

The Soviet authorities were of the opinion that the crew would require a six-month refresher period prior to the leased nuclear submarine departing for India. Captain Ganesh, an experienced submariner, reiterated that the already workedup crew, who had again completed their escape training in India, would not require more than 30 days’ refresher training, followed by 10 days for storing and 5 days for acceptance trials. They would therefore be ready for sea inspections by the Soviet divisional commander prior to sailing for India by end October 1988.

The above time frame was maintained as Indian sailors have invariably been quick learners and dedicated to their profession as was apparent time and again when ships and air squadrons were commissioned in Britain, France, Germany and the Soviet Union. As Professor Stephen Cohen also pointed out ‘Indian officers looked to their profession first and politics found no place’. 9

A refurbished Charlie I class submarine was transferred to the Indian Navy on 1 September 1987 ,and commissioned as INS Chakra – a name derived from the’ fabled Sudarshana Chakra, an invincible weapon of destruction of Indian mythology. The submarine was thereafter ready in all respects to depart by end October 1988. However, as the ongoing historical SALT talks between the United States and the Soviet Union were underway, all other activities were suspended. INS Chakra which was strictly on lease to the Indian Navy for training purposes (unlike the US-leased submarine Ghazi which took an active part in “both Indo-Pak conflicts and was sunk in 1971) finally sailed and again in a freezing temperature of -15 degrees celsius from Vladivostok on 5 January 1988. The routing was partly dived and partly on the surface via the South China Seas and the Malacca Straits where she was escorted by an Indian frigate. She then dived in the Andaman Sea to arrive in Vishakapatnam on 2 February 1988. The submarine was constantly tracked by US and Australian Orion P3C aircraft.

The only unusual incident during the voyage was the successful appendicitis operation carried out by Surgeon Commander Bellubbi to save the life of Leading Engineering Mechanic M. Biswal. The submarine was a day’s sailing from both Subic Bay and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Hence, the Captain ordered the doctor to perform the operation and entered it in the log book as Dr Bellubbi was basically a specialist in underwater medicine who had picked up emergency appendix operations which are done in the Outdoor Patients’ Department (OPD) in Russia. The Ward Room was scrubbed and hastily converted into an operation theatre. The submarine was required to be dived for the surgery in view of the rough seas. The appendix of the patient was successfully removed and this incident merits mention as it was the first time that such an operation was carried out below the surface of the sea in the Indian Navy and that too by a physician and not a surgeon!10

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi along with the Defence Minister, K. C. Pant, the Chief of Naval Staff Admiral J. G. Nadkami and the C-in-C of the Eastern Naval Command, Vice Admiral S. C. Chopra embarked on INS Chakra off Vishakapatnam at midday on 2 February 1988 for a demonstration at sea in conformity with the Prime Minister’s vision of propelling India into the merging environment of computers, simulators and other hi-tech ingredients of a modernizing nation. INS Chakra thereafter entered harbour and berthed alongside the specially built facilities in Vishakapatnam at 1430 on 3 February 1988.

An intellsive training programme followed and the Indian crew coped with all emergencies during their long patrols. Captain S. C. Anand who had also completed the training in the USSR relieved Captain Ganesh in December 1988. INS Chakra took part in the President’s review of the Indian Navy at Bombay on 15 February 1989 which was seen by millions on television. The Indian Navy was on the cover page of the Time magazine, which described India. as an ‘awakening power’. However, Washington Post labelled India as an ‘Oriental bully’. Commander R. K. Sharma who had earlier been the executive officer relieved Captain Anand in June 1990 when the latter was also elevated to Flag rank. This marked the successful implementation of the Indo-Soviet agreement which as already stated by President Venkataraman was one of his pet projects.

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The demise of the Soviet Union coincided with the need for refuelling Chakra which was almost at the end of her lease agreement. It was then decided by the Indian authorities to honour the agreement and return the nuclear submarine. Accordingly a Soviet crew took over the vessel and the submarine departed from Vishakapatnam on 16 December 1990 and escorted by INS Savitri through the Malacca and Singapore Straits from 21 to 25 December 1990. Chakra was again photographed by patrol boats and maritime aircraft.

The return of Chakra raises may issues for developing a coherent maritime policy for the twenty-first century for both the management of deterrence and the development of nuclear propulsion by India as China had already commissioned several nuclear-propelled submarines. To those who pioneered the induction of nuclear propulsion into the Indian Navy, it seemed like a step backward both strategically as well as technologically. In hindsight India should have gone ahead with testing more peaceful underground explosions as also transfer of technology for nuclear propulsion which would have avoided the syndrome of ‘tails you win, heads we lose’!

India’s submarine arm which has completed a quarter of century service along with the Fleet Air Arm and supported by missile fits in surface, subsurface and airborne platforms which will be the aces for ‘sea control’ and trumps for ‘sea denial’ in this warm ocean linking the Pacific and the Atlantic.