Indian Defence Review

Shakti Shaft at Pokharan

The proclaimed benefits of the Indo-US nuclear deal are unexceptionable. Firstly, we would become eligible to receive nuclear fuel from the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This would enable us to build and operate nuclear power plants. The power plants are – it is stated – required to meet the shortfall in electricity production and also provide our rapidly growing demand for energy.

Secondly, the deal would also enable us to access nuclear processing technology. The spillover benefits of such technology would be considerable.

Thirdly, we would gain entry – maybe somewhat informally – into the exclusive club of nations possessing nuclear weapons. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, is the prospect of placing our strategic relationship with the world’s sole superpower on a higher plane.

Notwithstanding the obvious advantages of the deal, there is considerable opposition to it. The Nation would be faltering if the arguments against the deal were not listened to or were not critically examined. Brushing aside issues merely on the grounds that the person making the observation is commenting on matters outside his or her field of expertise would reflect a clear lack of maturity and more importantly – may lead to compromises on matters affecting national interests.

After over a year’s debate within the US, the Hyde Bill has been passed. Consequently, we must accept and recognise that the Indo-US nuclear deal would be governed by this law. It cannot be wished away. Therefore, we have to be very careful when we enter the domain of what is “ binding” and what is not binding in the Bill. We must also not forget that if the US is genuine about a long-term strategic relationship with us then it should be in its interest to assist us in our force acquisition plans and not to somehow sabotage it.

Fundamentally, what is at stake? At stake is the future of our nuclear weapons programme and thus the matter of our strategic autonomy and the sovereign right to seek to build such strategic autonomy. If all the arguments against the deal were to be objectively examined it would be apparent that the concerns revolve around the basic issue of our strategic nuclear weapons capability. Is the de!sired capability being compromised? To answer this question there must be clarity on what ought to be the desired capability. This is the nub of the matter.

Now if we go back to the Hyde Bill and to the contents of the Indo-US nuclear deal, all the issues that appear objectionable to the critics are those that directly or indirectly impact on our future nuclear weapons capability.  So we must first address the core issue. What should our nuclear weapons arsenal look like in the future – say 20 to 25 years from now?

Most global watchers currently tend to concur with the prediction made by a reputed consulting firm that by 2025 to 2030 India would emerge as the third largest economy in the world. The US would be retaining its position of being the largest economy and China would be close to catching up. In India itself this conviction is taking firm root within and outside the government. That is why we often hear of the prediction that if our mismanaged states like UP, Uttaranchal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Bengal, Orissa , Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh  got their act together and stepped up their growth rates to say 6%, the country then would be witnessing an annual increase in our GDP of about 14 to 15 %. And if that happens we would be competing with China for the second place.

The other vital consideration that we must factor into all our planning is that in the next two decades or so we would also be the most populous nation in the world. And this population would be relatively young and not be averse to migration. So our diaspora can be expected to expand and spread.

What does this economic ascent imply? It implies global interests and responsibilities. It also implies a greater leadership role – internationally. And much as we may wish to preach – non-violence, peace, cooperation and friendship amongst nations, we have to be pragmatic about the real world. That implies the capacity to protect our interests and not be vulnerable to coercion and threats of use of force that may lead to compromising on issues that affect us. As a matter of fact where necessary we must be capable of using force or its threat to advance our interests. This force- must, progressively be built-up in tandem with our economic growth. The principle is simple: our force projection capability must move in synch with our enlarging economic sphere of influence.

After Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear weapons have become the ultimate in the dialectics of military muscle. Conventional military forces are worthwhile only against adversaries who do not have nuclear weapons. To belong to the big league a nation needs both conventional and nuclear forces.

Ever since the Chinese exploded their first nuclear device we have been engaged in developing our indigenous nuclear weapons capability. Eventually the tests in 1998 established our resolve to emerge on the global stage as a nuclear weapons power. Accompanying the resolve was a degree of diffidence, totally uncalled for. The self-imposed moratorium on further testing reflects this diffidence. Why we did it- is something that requires deep introspection. Some claim that it was intended to soften global reaction and to reduce the stiffness of the inevitable sanctions. In retrospect it would be apparent that the declarations of a self-imposed freeze on further testing was hardly of any benefit. We gained nothing from it. More likely we lost a little. In that we encouraged the ‘nuclear haves’ to believe that we could perhaps be persuaded to stop further development of nuclear weapons or altogether give them up. The insertion of quite a few clauses in the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement stem from such a belief.

Having come so far on the road to becoming a nuclear weapons power it would be unwise to not stay resolved and committed to building a nuclear weapons capability that is in consonance with our growing stature in the comity of nations. Underestimating requirements or limiting capability in order to appear nice and reasonable or in anticipation of some obscure rewards would be reflective of naiveté and little else.

In a conceptual framework what should our nuclear weapons capability be? As a first step we should aim at creating a nuclear force that is sufficiently potent to deter other nuclear weapon powers from attempting to coerce or threaten us. This is achieved by having the capacity to retaliate (in response to a first strike by the adversary) and inflict unacceptable damage on such states in the event of a conflict. The more important element of this capability is that all other nuclear weapon states are aware of this capability and recognise our determination to use it if the need arises.

Now we know that nuclear weapons capability is not just nuclear bombs. It has other equally important components. Versatile delivery systems that can be land, space or sea-based. Delivery systems that guarantee mission accomplishment. This would obviously imply considerable redundancy besides the requirement to conceal their locations with the utmost care and also provide protection. The next requirement is of missiles that can be launched from land, air, sea and submarines. These must have- reach (short range to inter continental), be able to carry appropriate warhead weights, possess very high levels of accuracy, and must be very reliable. The acquisition of MIRV (multiple independently target able re-entry vehicles) technology and other such advanced delivery systems should now be the focus of our R&D.

The two other important components of a nuclear force are surveillance and C4 I systems. Technologies that support these systems today are highly sophisticated and complex. R&D effort in these areas can be expected to be expensive and also require the nurturing of very talented specialists.

We now revert to the core issue of the debate over the nuclear deal. All the objectionable clauses in the deal pertain to two concerns. Firstly, is the attempt to limit our production of fissile material for warheads and secondly, is the attempt to prevent us from improving the quality of our bombs. On both counts we must not compromise.

The precise assessment of what can be done with the deal – in the form that it is unfolding and, without the deal is best known to our nuclear scientists. There has been a fair degree of very informed comment and critical analysis of each line word and nuance of the proposed agreement. So we leave those issues aside and just try and assess the capability we should be seeking over the next twenty years and then leave it to the Government and the scientists to decide how best to proceed. This is precisely what the military hierarchy should be engaging itself with. As a matter of fact it should be considering how it could create in house expertise in this field so that the subject is studied and researched on a continuous basis.

It is fashionable and even logical for many theorists to argue that the size of the nuclear arsenal need not be large. The idea being that with reliable delivery systems and a very high level of security for them, a small number would be adequate to deter. Some of us apprehend that our planners may also have been persuaded by the logic of this approach and have settled for the barest minimum. Sensible but the catch is in why the existing nuclear weapon states are not buying this logic.

Despite the end of the cold war, the US and Russia continue to retain thousands of bombs. We will not go into the numbers possessed by the UK and France as they are US allies, but what about China? Why is China not settling for just a handful? If China has say x number of bombs would it be prudent for us to plan on only 10% of that? Deterrence is not about what we feel is enough. It is more about what the adversary thinks about what we have.

A pragmatic approach would be to look at acquiring parity with China. That is what we should aim for the next twenty years. This capability must be comprehensive and cover the complete spectrum of bombs, types, delivery, surveillance and C4I systems.

Concern has been frequently expressed about the quality of the bombs that we are capable of building. It is widely believed that we need to carry out more tests to build more efficient thermonuclear bombs. If we do not contemplate further testing what is our road map to improving the efficiency of our devices? This is again an issue for the National Security Establishment to address together with our scientists. The matter should be taken head on without any further prevarication.

Finally, is the deal good or bad? Clearly the deal is acceptable provided we can build the number and types of bombs we believe necessary for our security. While determining the force structure it would be prudent to over insure and not work on some kind of a minimalist approach for that may not give us the security we seek.