Indian Defence Review

A classical response option for a country faced with an externally inspired Low Intensity Conflict (that can drag on for decades) is to conventionalise the conflict. In so doing, its strategic objective is to impose such heavy and deterrent costs on the perpetrators /external sponsors of the Low Intensity Conflict that they are forced to call it off or scale it down drastically. To that extent (from the purely military stand point) the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in Jul-Aug 2006 can be examined as a Case Study of conventionalising a Low Intensity Conflict.

It would, therefore, be highly instructive to analyse this campaign in great detail for lessons suitable to our context. The first and foremost issue is one of a cost-benefit analysis. Has this military escalation by Israel served to deter further continuation of Low Intensity Conflict by the Hezbollah? That is the core issue for analysis. Martin Van Creveld, writing in the Royal United Services Journal (Oct 2006 issue) seems to suggest that despite the initial outcry and criticism in Israel itself (as well as abroad) this campaign has (so far) been remarkably successful in imposing peace on the Hezbollah.1

The Hezbollah was taken by surprise by the strength, ferocity and violence of the Israeli reaction. In 33 days of intense combat, Israel reacted violently to the capture of two of its soldiers by the following energetic counter measures:

Martin Van Crevald makes a telling point. “Bluster as he may, Nasrullah (leader of the Hezbollah) has good reason to think twice before engaging in another adventure of the same kind”. 3He adds, “Nasrullah said that while Hezbollah is rebuilding its strength it is in no hurry to pit strength against Israel.” 4 Meanwhile the cease-fire has now held for over five months. In such a struggle, avers Martin, the side with the strongest will wins.5

The cumulative stunning impact of the colossal throw weight of the ordinance and the shock of massed air, artillery and ground assault may not have generated awe. However, it certainly seems to have succeeded in imposing peace and quiet on that low intensity conflict battlefield. To that extent, the cost benefit analysis may well centre on how long this peace with the Hezbollah will endure. This article, therefore, will steer clear of any value judgments and focus entirely on the military aspects of this conflict. The key area of analysis would be:

It is noteworthy that for a long time Israel had been wargaming precisely such a scenario where the Hezbollah would seek to capture some of its soldiers (as hostages to swap for thousands of their detainees in Israeli prisons). Alon Ben David (writing in the 23 Aug, 06 issue of the Janes Defense Weekly) had noted that one such wargame was conducted in Jun 2006 (just a month before actual operations). In this a three phase, high tempo response had been worked out as under:

However, once the actual provocation came in the form of a Hezbollah ambush of an Israeli patrol on 12 Jul 06, the Israeli response seemed to be hamstrung by an uncharacteristic political over caution and unfolded in a staggered and incremental manner. Thus the Air Offensive continued for two weeks. Tremendous initial success was gained in neutralising a large number of Hezbollah long range rockets and known/suspected command and control nodes. However, thereafter the air offensive petered out due to lack of identifiable/engageable targets.

The ground offensive came in driblets. Initially raids were launched by the Special Forces. When these failed to subdue the rain of short range Katyusha Rockets, two Israeli brigades were launched. The Hezbollah was able to focus all its resources against these thrusts and they became mired in hard fighting. As almost a hundred Katyusha rockets a day continued to rain down on the Israeli cities, the long awaited major ground offensive of some seven brigades (three divisions) was launched on the 29th day of the war, just four days before the cease-fire came. Was it a case of too little too late?”

The end state that would become the basis of conflict termination had somehow gotten fixated on stopping the Hezbollah’s rain of 100 to 200 Katyusha rockets per day. These are small tube launchers, very easy to hide and difficult to locate from the air. Yet used against civilian targets, their psychological impact was tremendous. One million Israelis were forced to live in shelters and a further 250,000 migrated to Southern Israel. Some 53 Israeli civilians were killed, while thousands more were wounded.7

There was an outcry in Israel at the inability of the armed forces to stop this rain of free rockets. Halfway through the war, the Israeli Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, sacked his commander of the ground forces General Udi Adam. Adam in turn accused the Govt and Dan Halutz of holding him back and not allowing the offensive to proceed in a high tempo and synergistic manner as had been worked out in the contingency plans.8 Former Army Generals accused Dan Halutz (an Israeli Air Force Officer) of putting too much reliance on air power alone and not letting the ground offensive unfold as per plans. They complained that there were far too many Air Force officers in his joint/unified command.

Maj Gen Benjamin Gantz (former Special Forces Commander) also told the media that the Israeli war against the Hezbollah was not executed as originally planned. There was a huge disconnect between planning and reality. The timings of the four phases planned had been altered and thus diluted the synergistic impact of the Air-Land Campaign.9 It became incremental and graduated and lost the planned impact of shock and awe that would have resulted from a time compression of the massed effects of air and artillery bombardments closely exploited by a massive tank assault by some 600 tanks. We planned for a bullet train, “lamented Gen Gantz, but what we got was an urban bus with several stops.”10 The units on the ground received contradictory and even changing orders.

To effect economy in the lean years preceding this war, training of the Israeli Reserve units had been slashed down badly. This severely effected their mobilisation and combat performance”.11 For years the Israeli Govt had been downsizing the defence budget as a cost cutting exercise. Lt Gen Dan Halutz had reorganised the armed forces into a Unified Command. Substantial parts of the technological and logistics directorates (TLD), Personnel Directorate and C4I Directorate were merged with the Army HQ. A new concept of ‘regional logistics’ was developed. This over centralised logistical system collapsed in the war with near disastrous impact.12

Most brigades operating inside Lebanon had to go without food, water and even ammunition. The Northern Command was slow in breaching logistic routes and the Israeli Air Force had to drop supplies. Peacetime cost cutting exercises cost Israel very dearly in actual combat. There lie some vital lessons for other militaries.

Cost Cutting Exercises can breed such disasters in war if armed forces loose touch with ground realities.

In Oct 2006, Maj Gen Yifach Ran Tal, former head of the IDF Ground Forces, called upon the Israeli Chief of Staff to accept responsibility for his failure in the war and resign. Ran Tal was sacked in turn. There was considerable outcry and witch hunting after the war and calls for the resignation of the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defence Minister Amir Peretz and Chief of Staff (Lt Gen Dan Halutz). A number of commissions of inquiry have been ordered.13 Former soldiers and political opponents tried to highlight the lack of military experience of the political hierarchy.

Despite all this criticism and controversy however, five months down the line, one hard fact is now becoming evident. The cease-fire has held. To that extent, the war definitely furthered Israeli interests:

Martin Van Creveld states that, “the Oct 1973 Yom Kippur war was also thought to be only a qualified success for Israel. A number of commissions of inquiry were ordered in its aftermath. Yet in retrospect, it is clear that this war broke the will of the most important Arab States to launch large-scale attacks on Israel”.16 This may turn out to be the most important lesson of this war too. It establishes a linear relationship between the quantum of explosives employed and the benumbing impact of these on the human will to conflict.

Hybrid Wars

The extensive use of sophisticated weaponry in such large numbers by the Hezbollah has given rise to what US Marine Crops General Matis now terms as a new genre of hybrid wars.17 Frank Hoffman (of the Marine Corps Centre for Emerging Threats and Opportunities) states that the amorphous Hezbollah, is representative of a rising threat and emerging trend that blends a political movement with decentralised cells employing adaptive tactics in ungoverned zones. These highly disciplined, well trained distributed cells can contest well trained armed forces with a mix of guerilla tactics and technology in densely packed urban centers. Future sub- conventional conflicts will now witness usage of much higher levels of technology by Non State Actors.

Anti-Tank Environment

The most significant military lesson to emerge from this war is the considerable success of the Russian Kornet E and Matis M Antitank third generation guided missiles that were fired in swarms, both against the Israeli Merkava tanks and infantry. These “missile swarm tactics” separated the Israeli tanks from the infantry and severely disrupted the synergy of the Israeli combat teams. Israel lost a total of 20 Merkava Tanks. These are amongst the most heavily armoured tanks in the world. 14 of these were lost to the Antitank missiles and six to improvised explosive belly charges.18 This war has thrown up useful tactical lessons for the organisation and conduct of anti-tank layered defences. It has also highlighted the need for devising better anti-tank protection systems to protect our tank fleets on the modern battlefield. The war, therefore, holds a host of very critical lessons for military professionals all over the world and merits a detailed analysis and scrutiny.

Conduct of the War

Having highlighted the salient distinguishing features of this conflict, and the primary lessons that have emerged, let us take a more systematic and detailed look at the conduct of this war.

Triggering Incident

The Lebanon conflict of 2006 was triggered by an incident on 12 July, 06. The Hezbollah ambushed two Israeli Humvees moving on a border patrol with their RPGs. The attack was conducted by an elite Hezbollah unit in an area unobserved by the IDF multiple surveillance system deployed on the Lebanese border. The attack was carried out under the cover of heavy artillery shelling. Eight Israeli soldiers were killed and two were kidnapped. The Israeli’s responded immediately by improvised pursuit into Lebanese territory. An Israeli Merkava Mark –II tank was destroyed and all its crew were killed by the Hezbollah using a huge belley charge. This incident triggered off the war.19