Military & Aerospace

Maritime Rapid Reaction Force
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Issue Vol 21.4 Oct-Dec2006 | Date : 26 Aug , 2011

Addressing the combined conference of Indian Military Commanders on October 26, 1999 Former Defence Minister George Fernandes had noted that the Indian Armed Forces should set up a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) that would be “able to reach any corner if a threat arises”. He qualified this need to add that such a force would have to be a “tri-service” one.

The Global War on terrorism has levied new demands on maritime forces emphasising the need for fleet to confidently meet the challenges of an uncertain world on short notice.

KC Pant, Former Deputy Chairman, India’s Planning Commission, has also expressed similar views. He noted, “Over the years, the Indian Navy has developed into a multi-dimensional force with lethal weaponry and sensors, and enhanced reach…. Three elements appear to be at the core of the Indian Navy’s doctrine – the development of rapid reaction maneuverability, along with the concentration of firepower, and land-attack capability to influence the war on land.”

Before engaging in the exercise of highlighting the need for a dedicated Maritime Rapid Reaction Force (MRRF) for the Indian Navy, it will be useful to examine the concept of a Rapid Reaction Force. It is generally acknowledged that states must build capabilities to respond quickly to international crises as also to contain conflicts to avoid the “spillover” effect and to prevent the escalation of human casualties.

In the maritime domain, naval forces are required to respond to a wide spectrum of crisis ranging from classical naval operations in convention and nuclear environment to countering low-level threats from asymmetric actors such as terrorists and pirates and also respond to natural disasters like the recent Indian Ocean tsunami. The above spectrum of threats and responses demand judicious force mix and more importantly a capability of immediate reaction to deter/ counter the enemy or act in response to a natural emergency.

It is generally acknowledged that states must build capabilities to respond quickly to international crises as also to contain conflicts to avoid the “spillover” effect and to prevent the escalation of human casualties. Currently, MRRF capability is limited to the US and a few western navies like the French and the British.

Currently, MRRF capability is limited to the US and a few western navies like the French and the British. A majority of other navies acknowledge the fact that the existing force structure is unable to meet the demands of rapid reaction to threats/emergencies in distant waters.

As far as the Indian Navy is concerned, it has a limited capability to respond to various maritime crises. In the past, Indian Navy has responded to several maritime crisis and emergencies and these merit discussion. In November 1988, two Colombo-based dissident businessmen from the Maldives, along with about 80 Tamil mercenaries belonging to the left-wing People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), attempted to overthrow the Gayoom regime. They quickly overpowered the Maldivian militia using rockets and machine guns and attacked the President’s residence. The President sought urgent assistance from New Delhi over the phone. The island was secured within 30 minutes after the arrival of forces. Fighter aircraft of the Indian Air Force were also deployed to the island in a show of force and helicopters landed commandos to the outlying island to search for any mercenaries. Shortly afterwards, a vessel was seen fleeing Male with mercenaries and hostages including Maldives Minister of Education. An Indian Navy maritime reconnaissance aircraft detected the ship and Indian Navy vessels later captured the ship.

In another crisis, the Indian Navy participated in Operation Pawan in pursuance of a request made by the Sri Lankan government to counter the LTTE. The Indian Navy was required to undertake maritime operations in the waters around Sri Lanka and particularly Palk Bay, north of Sri Lanka. Palk Bay was frequently used by the LTTE for carrying out strikes against the Sri Lankan naval forces and to keep the arms supply lines open at sea.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Dr Vijay Sakhuja

Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi.

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