Military & Aerospace

Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Part-7 : Major Lessons Learnt
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Issue Vol 22.1 Jan - Mar 2007 | Date : 26 Apr , 2007

Hybrid Wars

The US Marine Corps has drawn attention to this as a new generation of hybrid war where non state actors like the Hezbollah make extensive and innovative use of high technology, like third generation Anti-tank Guided Missiles, Tactical Ballastic Missiles and unguided Rockets, Anti Ship Guided Missiles and very sophisticated and survivable communications. The Hezbollah made very methodical and detailed preparation for this war and have given an excellent account of themselves at the tactical level. In the subcontinent, we can anticipate that terrorist groups will employ increasingly more sophisticated technologies in the years to come.

Employing Anti-Tank Guided Missiles in Anti -Personal Roles

A major lesson has been the effective use of Anti-tank Missiles in an anti personal role in urban and semi – urban built up terrain. US and other Western Countries are now using Thermo- baric war heads on their ATGM for employment in Anti-Personal or Bunker bursting roles. We should examine and emulate this trend. 50 out of the Israeli 119 casualties were due to Hezbollah Anti-tank missiles. One such missile shot down an Israeli Helicopter.

Escalation Dominance

One of the major constraints of Israel was to avoid escalation to a level, where Syria would be forced to intervene. A major psychological degrade were the memories of the almost two decades long earlier intervention in Lebanon which had become Israel’s Vietnam (or quagmire). At each step of the escalation ladder the Israeli political leadership felt constrained by the historic memories of the earlier quagmire and the concern over not unduly alarming the Syrians. Perhaps it was these concerns that led to a serious dilution of the initial contingency plans drawn up well before the war. In any case the political and military overcaution displayed was somewhat uncharacteristic and not in tune with the “Sparta image” assiduously cultivated by Israel (in view of its lack of strategic depth). However, it did succeed in preventing an escalation of this conflict to regional levels. An air alone option does seem to have escalation dominance spin offs which must be weighed against the synergistic impact of a high tempo – Air – Land campaign which masses effects by compressing the time dimension.

Integrating the Special Forces

While centralising or integrating the logistics element proved to be some what of a disaster, this war clearly highlighted the need to create an Integrated Special Forces Command (being called the Deep Command by the Israelis). This seeks to integrate the three wings of the Israeli Special Forces:

  • Sayeret Matkal of the Israeli Intelligence (AMAN)
  • Shaldag of the Israeli Air Force
  • Shayetet 13 Commandoes of the Israeli Navy

All these units operated deep inside Lebanon. However, their operations exposed difficulties in the units ability to operate jointly and coordinate operations due to different communications systems being used.

Special Forces Command (Deep Command)

To overcome these difficulties, the IDF have decided to establish a Special Forces Command – (dubbed Deep Forces Command) which will be responsible for commanding and coordinating all operations beyond Territorial Command Theatres. Headed by Brigadier General Tal Russo, a Veteran Special Forces Officer, it will become the IDFs eighth HQ authorised to operate Forces (to include the IAF, IN, AMAN and the Northern, Central, Southern and Home Front Commands). The Deep Command has been established with potential conflicts in distant theatres (like Iran) in mind. Previously the IAF exclusively was responsible for preparing for a potential conflict with Iran but now the Deep Command will be responsible for the ground battle aspects of such a conflict.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Maj Gen GD Bakshi, (Retd)

is a war Veteran and Strategic Analyst.

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