Indian Defence Review

UAV Employment

Another technological highpoint was the extensive use of UAVs (Unmanned Arial Vehicles). The UAVs flew some 1350 sorties overall and accumulated over 20,000 flying hours. The Israel Air Craft Industries Mhatz I (Heron) made its combat debut in this war. This is likely to replace the Searcher Mk I and II.24 The older ‘Searcher” UAVs were also fully exploited in this war for gaining real time intelligence. The Israeli Army also made extensive use of its first tactical UAV called the Skylark. This has a range of 10 kms and was closely incorporated into battalion level operations. It performed more than 500 reconnaissance missions (120 of which were for specific closed loop operations).25

Networking

Barbera Opall writes in the Defence News (9 Oct, 06 issue) that this war showcased the IDFs capability to very quickly integrate and employ its networked force. It was the first time that all the information from all service branches was carried on the same infrastructure. During the war, this infrastructure was broad based by deploying an additional 250 transmission relay points for end users.26 However, the problem came with the extension of the network inside Lebanon. Due to the very high degree of the anti-tank threat, the Jeep/Humvee based communication links could not be deployed, as getting soft skinned vehicles into the battle area proved far too risky.27 This underlines the need to base communication links on A vehicle platforms for rapid deployment forward in offensive operations.

The Israelis used a secured, three tired communication network. This included:

Aerostat-based Communications

Since the soft skinned vehicle based communication links could not keep pace with the advance, the IDF used a novel solution. It used a tethered Aerostat equipped with 60 kg of sensitive communications gear to enable forces North of the border to use the encrypted Mountain Rose cellular system. This is a novel solution and deserves a detailed look.28

The Hezbollah Network

Barbara Opall has also drawn attention to the very sophisticated Hezbollah Communication Network. Hezbollah’s two regional units and most of its functional units were supported by a well fortified terrestrial communication network (fiber optic cable) supported by satellite telephones and broadcast facilities to link with its command level HQ in Southern Beirut and its intelligence HQ North-west of Baal Bek.29 There were a huge amount of built in redundancies especially in symbolically significant sites like the al Manar TV Station. It was back in action precisely two minutes after it was bombed to rubble by the IAF. The Hezbollah net was even more resilient in the South where its Nasr unit was organised into more than 150 combat grids, or so called “Kill boxes”.

These contained foliage concealed rocket launchers buried some five meters underground. Each underground silo contained as many as 10 launchers which were hydraulically winched up to the surface and activated with automated timing devices.30 Hezbollah’s well-equipped, networked force was capable of commanding its combat units, weeks into the high intensity fighting. Only towards the end of the 33 day war did the cumulative pounding by Israeli Air Power and tens of thousands of artillery shells and tank rounds began to erode Hezbollah’s hardened underground command network. Even then, the Hezbollah maintained enough residual capability to continue fierce engagements on the ground while directing an average of 130 rockets per day at Israeli cities. The Hezbollah had clearly prepared for this war in detail.31