Homeland Security

IPKF's Performance in Sri Lanka
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Issue Book Except: Assignment Jaffna | Date : 08 Apr , 2011

What the young subaltern lacked in knowledge and experience he more than made up in his enthusiasm, keenness, guts and getting into the act promptly.

What we lacked in many an instance was what I should specifically emphasise – inspiring leadership. If the leader, particularly formation commander, did not inspire his command then that body of troops would be at half its effectiveness. For instance, if he visited a post, and the men did not talk warmly, inquisitively and fondly about that visit for the next week or ten days and if they did not perceive a challenge left behind by the commander and did not feel a spontaneous desire to meet it, in thinking hard to solve it and bracing to present an innovative novelty to the commander on his next visit, then it is better that this type of commander did not visit that post! His visit otherwise would only amount to eating the post’s ration and mumbling inanities about fighting spirit, welfare, etc, leaving the post heaving a sigh of relief at the disappearance of a pest.

Many formation commanders failed to inspire. Not many of them roughed it out with troops on patrols, ambushes, staying over in their posts at night, on road opening and raid or heli-Ianding missions. It is not that they were not brave enough, but that they were far too concerned about tying themselves to their HQ, its comforts and communications. This was a highly biased managerial form of leadership than heroic. Inspiring leadership emanates from heroic aspects. Heli-hopping in this regard, caused maximum damage to inspiring leadership. The GOC or the Brigade Commander would land by helicopter in a post or on a helipad which had to be secured, then breeze past a few bodies lying in muck and mud, beam a flashy smile to affect unconcern for danger, have a hurried chat with the local leader, blurt out directions or orders, sip a cup of tea or coconut juice, showing no concern to the jawan who laboured under those circumstances to prepare and offer it and before you could blink an eye, would be off in his chopper. What Inspiration could his men in the post or on the spot draw?

It is not that such visits by commanders are fruitless or undesirable, or even avoidable. But a good balance between such communication or ‘control’ visits and inspiring visits has to be struck. Many formation commanders slogged, took pains, worked very hard Indeed; but they simply failed to inspire. The contribution of their formations fell below expectation, their performance remained insipid. Men and subordinates should look forward to the visit of their senior commanders and feel the impact of their visit, a degree of enthusiasm, a cause to think, and act rightly within the ambit layed down.

This is particularly necessary in counter-insurgency war, because it is long-drawn, laborious, sapping, tricky, taxing, uncertain and flexible to a much higher degree than conventional war. Without an equally high level of camaraderie, concern for and Involvement with the men and sincere and effective exercise of a heroic pattern of leadership, there can be no inspiring leadership. It needs a very large number of ‘good’ officers than ‘successful’ officers. The former deliver, the latter only contribute. But unfortunately the Army’s peace-time ethos and attitude produces more successful officers than good ones.

We had three types of officers. One category was that which thought acted, moved about, was bold and got down to business fastest, even in a totally alien, confusing, unknown environment. The second one consisted of those who had brains and moved about as best as they could, but lacked boldness and ability to inspire. The third category consisted of those who simply slogged when prodded. Many complained about their troops not being trained, orders not being clearly given and so on.

Click to buy: Assignment Jaffna

They could do nothing else. Their units suffered. A businesslike attitude – read professionalism – was lacking in most of the last category. I n all the categories there was it tendency to ignore the factor of tension, which is far more serious in highly active counter-insurgency war as in Sri Lanka, than in conventional war. In counter-insurgency, personal dangers are far more, stakes far higher, constraints many and issues very delicate. It is a very tightly controlled war, where aims play more importantly than objectives and where (as a result) there is a great deal of manoeuvring in the war effort at the jawans’ end in the manner of an accordion – press/release, that is to say apply/release pressure in a fine-tuned orchestration.

The Brig had to be told to make use of his professionally critical faculties in evaluating the LTTE and not illogical awe.

Tensions therefore naturally increase and need to be controlled, smoothed, calmed. This needs to be done in a conscious, deliberate manner, which was not the case in Sri Lanka. Senior officers paid less attention to the role of Officers’ Messes, Langars [field kitchen] and rest camps in this regard. All these are institutions created or brought about for the purpose of not only feeding and resting, but also senior officers making a conscious effort to ease the tension of their subordinates and men.

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