Homeland Security

IPKF's Performance in Sri Lanka
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
Issue Book Except: Assignment Jaffna | Date : 08 Apr , 2011

The Long War

Used as we are to wars of a fortnight or three weeks, the Cl Ops against the LTTE in Sri Lanka, which went on for nearly two and a half years, proved indeed tough – and to many, too much. Careerists suffered a great deal. Calculations of many went awry and many were ‘found out’ if not found wanting. Large numbers felt uncomfortable, dissipated, disheartened. Some were dispirited, on the verge of tears. The contagion spread to the families of not only officers but jawans also. One common question most earnestly asked was:. ‘When will our husbands return?’ People, village elders, old veterans, friends back home asked: ‘What are you doing in Sri Lanka’? We quietly asked ourselves: ‘What are we achieving?’

Click to buy: Assignment Jaffna

Communication facilities fortunately, in Op PAWAN were indeed well engineered and quite a few could talk to their families at various locations from where formations had moved. This carried some to the other extreme. Talking every day to the families became a ash ion. Eyebrows would be raised if this was not done. And families would gather at central places where telephone facilities existed and talk to their husbands. If he did not call twice or thrice a week, the wife would be in tears. Some wives specialised in finding out details of not only their husbands activities but also those of their superiors: Where they went, what they did, when, in what manner etc! Notes would then be exchanged. Other wives then would feel offended that their husbands did not tell them enough. This is a peculiarity common to most of our officers’ and soldiers’ families across the board.

If he did not call twice or thrice a week, the wife would be in tears.

In my long tenure of nearly three and a half years In Nagaland as a Sector Commander, I had been witness to a far higher degree of this tragi-comic practice. Loose talk would be rampant; security rendered weak; and the soldier would start being influenced, biased or affected unduly. During my spots of short leave I thought it appropriate to talk to all the families in their respective family welfare centres. I told them what the war was about, what exactly their husbands were doing, how everyone who went Into war was not going to die, unless destiny willed specifically (in which case one could die by falling down in the bathroom too, why on the battle field?) and how well their husbands were doing In adversity, which after all was war and would remain so. One could not expect the good life all the time! It had to be death, wounds, hardship, blood, sweat and Interminable toil.

That was a soldier’s life, the soldier’s lot and the lot of his family. I frankly told them that their ‘men’ would not be in a hurry to come back; that they had a job to do; that the thought of their return depended on when the job would be successfully concluded; and that we would come back with honour and fame and success. Would not the wives wish that their husbands returned as brave, honoured soldiers with heads high and chests out? How would the husbands be devoted to their dangerous job and pickup courage if the wives pestered them about their return and expected them to speak on the telephone ever so frequently? At the end of such sessions I would invite questions – any question so that I could give an authoritative reply and squash rumours and loose talk.

It was indeed heart-warming to see the response of tile same family, the same Army wife, who could not hide the fact that she was indeed brave and was determined to be even more so, in her own quiet fashion. Most of them were ignorant and unaware of what was happening on the Island; nobody seemed to have told them what the whole thing was about. Almost all wives of the Commanding Officers and Brigadiers said so. No senior Generals and their wives from higher HQ seemed concerned or thought it fit to speak to the families and explain why their husbands had been away so long.

In the final stages the gunner had to coordinate with the Naval Guns, Air Defence Guns, Armed Helicopter, Mechanised Columns, Infantry rear parties. Air Force, various commanders at different echelons and reserves.

For them it was enough to be photographed with patients in hospitals or while giving sewing machines and solar cookers to the war widows. But what about the large number of families of men who were alive; yearning, tense, apprehensive, shuddering and nervous? Somehow our ideas of a human approach to a soldier’s life, welfare of his family and developing that dynamic of belonging among them are skewed, even absent. We do not go to the root of it, to the practical aspects, relevance and reality. We could have done with much more robustness, professional approach, a greater businesslike attitude and vigorous pursuit of the job on hand on a firm war footing than our predilection for taking shelter under peacetime practices. We fought this war with a peacetime outlook.

This war was fought by the Infantry. It also demonstrated its concomitant overuse. Engineers came very close to Infantry in most of the Infantryman’s domain, a credit I admit to with great admiration. The Sappers were remarkable indeed in almost every sphere, including many of the Infantry’s. The Artillery, though little in quantity, did a good job with the resources they had. It was more a rule that the guns deployed in troops and not conventionally in batteries. That increased the pressure on and demand for larger number of gun position officers and observation post officers. The gunner in great demand was the Artillery Air OP (Army Aviation) since most of the shoots were in the jungle, along the sea coast and lagoon marshes. In the final stages the gunner had to coordinate with the Naval Guns, Air Defence Guns, Armed Helicopter, Mechanised Columns, Infantry rear parties. Air Force, various commanders at different echelons and reserves. It was a unique experiment actually structured, deployed and employed on the ground for the first in the’ Indian Armed Forces combat history.

Communications within the Island and between it and Madras, Delhi and Pune were indeed another remarkable feature of Op PAWAN the Signals had a tricky and difficult job and rose to it manfully. Some highly ingenious structuring, engineering and routing was done. Mechanised forces – the tanks and the mechanised infantry – somehow held back. Terrain and the nature and scale of operations did not enable their classical employment. And that is the aspect their commanders harped upon, saying that there was no scope for their classical use. How can you have massed mechanised forces operating in a Cl Ops environment against armed civilians moving about in small groups in jungle and built-up areas? Mechanised troops perforce had to undertake dismounted action far more frequently, using their armoured fighting vehicles as fire platforms, communication points and in open areas as roving platforms.

Editor’s Pick

Wherever there were bolder, inquisitive and innovative minds and command encouragement, they improvised tactics, evolved operating methods and took on tasks; even suggested, ‘them to their formation commander. But such leaders were few. Largely they preferred to remain idle, stagnant, wishing for a classical role which would not come their way. The Services too did a conspicuously good job, particularly in adjusting to the hostile environment and an invisible enemy all around. They provided their own protection, shared combat patrol duties. ambushes, road opening, small-scale searches, etc. It was pleasantly reassuring to see an ASC or AOC vehicle with an LMG mounted on it and manned by their personnel, speeding up and down.

A few statistics would be relevant at this stage. In the two and a half years In Sri Lanka more than a hundred infantry units went through operational experience as a result of normal turn over. Of the ten GOCs of the four divisions which operated in Sri Lanka, only one was an Artillery officer, the rest being infantrymen. Of the more than 40 Brigs who went through operations as Brigade Commanders and Deputy GOCs of divisions, only one was from the Armoured Corps and one from the Engineers (both were deputy GOCs), while the rest were Infantrymen. The Armand Corps Brig stayed a few months and went off on a long course. In my 14 months as GOC in Jaffna. I saw three Deputy GOCs!

In HQ IPKF at Madras. Which at long last was sanctioned an organisation in April ’88, out of the eight Brigs who went through the war period, only one was from the Engineers (looking after the discipline and welfare branch), the others being from the Infantry. The post of its Chief-of-Staff (number two in the force, next to GOC IPKF), although sanctioned in the organisation, was kept vacant for over nine months, at the height of the war, for reasons best known to the powers that be! And when one was finally posted in late February ’89, it was Maj Gen who had already commanded a division in Sri Lanka for 14 months. Myself. Similarly, a few Brigs and Cols also who had done their bit in Sri Lanka, were posted to the IPKF HQ.

Click to buy: Assignment Jaffna

The tendency appeared to be to circulate officers internally in the IPKF itself and not give an exposure to other peace-time stalwarts. One wonders why. It was common talk that senior officers were not willing to be shoved into such a cesspool where they would be exposed. I must also hasten to add, in the same breath, that a number of Majs and Cols and a couple of senior officers did volunteer to serve In Sri Lanka, some of them placed in low medical category. Nobody noticed them, except troops and those of us who endeavoured to put our nose down on the ground. They too were not bothered about being noticed; and seemed to have been satisfied with what they saw as their duty, perhaps. God bless them!

 What is all this then if it is not a peacetime attitude and dispensation? Who is to do the fighting?

Among the casualties suffered (both dead and wounded) in Sri Lanka, the share of officers was 20 percent, JCOs 12 percent and jawans 8 percent. JCO casualties signify that they did well Young officers and jawans proved to be the mainstay, the two main pillars of the Army. These commodities, time and again, bailed out their unit and formation commanders’ tactical poverty. Jawans were stolid, steady, phlegmatic, enduring, capable of taking enormous beating and, over time, giving it back in equal measure; but lacked guile and cunning. The Infantry’s rigidity, conservatism, wariness, long time require for its preparation, all proved to be asets, as these very attributes helped it to remain steady, firm, determined to stay put, and fight till the very last.

Many Lt Col CO’s in Op PAWAN did not make the grade for to next higher rank of Col who also do the same job as the Lt Cols. In our Army we have Lt Cols as well as Cols commanding units thanks to the confusion and devaluation created by cadre reviews. There were several Lt Cols who commanded their units in Sri Lanka for periods varying from one to two and half years. All of them commanded, satisfactorily and successfully.

Some were decorated for bravery. And yet, many did not make it to the next rank, while their compatriots sitting in peace stations and peacetime jobs got promoted. Rely on our system to rub salt in the wound – these superseded Lt Cols continued to be retained in their command appointments in war, while the system did not find it fair or prudent to replace them with peace-timers who had made the grade. One simply fails to understand the logic, the rationale, the state of concern and interest!

Should not war performance erase or take precedence over peace-time luke-warmth of the past? No, in our Army it does not happen.

How would the superseded Lt Col feel and continue to do his job? How better is he to prove himself, even after successful command in war? What faith is he supposed to retain in the system? What would the men think of their superseded CO? In short, what does the Army really require? It is indeed difficult to see how a Lt Col, who commanded successfully in war, is unfit to do the same job in the next, higher rank! The Military Secretary’s branch trots out gibberish about such Lt Cols having a few luke-warm confidential reports earlier on in their careers. Does this apology hold water? Should not war performance erase or take precedence over peace-time luke-warmth of the past? No, in our Army it does not happen. That is proof enough of its being a peace-time Army.

Further proof of this was provided by the visible reluctance of officers, particularly at middle and senior levels, to be posted to Sri Lanka or to report as ordered. Many were the cancellations, postponements and down gradation of medical category that decides fitness or otherwise of the person’s employability and the desirability of his being so employed. We brought it to the notice of senior officers, including the Army Chief, more than once. But nothing happened. Few wanted to go to Sri Lanka and get stuck in the quagmire there.

There would be bright chances of being found out. Add to this the attitude of rear logistic detachments, which changed their key personnel every three months. They attempted to provide such back-up on temporary duty basis for the entire 30 months of Op PAWAN. What is all this then if it is not a peacetime attitude and dispensation? Who is to do the fighting?

Command and Control Structure

We had a very peculiar, off-beat command and control structure, which had intimate concerns, cooperation and interaction with the sister Services – the Navy and Air Force – Ministries of Defence, External Affairs, Information and Broadcasting and Home, Intelligence agencies, the Indian High Commission In Colombo, the Press, a few State Government agencies of Tamil Nadu, the Indian Red Cross and others. The IPKF, with its HQ at Madras and the operations had to be very closely orchestrated and handled directly from Delhi, where a core group of relevant representatives oversaw and controlled the whole show.

Editor’s Pick

The Directing HQ was the Army HQ, where all planning and coordination were done. The Force HQ at Madras, though conventionally placed under HQ Southern Command, had to deal directly on most of the operational and intelligence matters with the Army HQ. Southern Command was responsible for providing logistic support, dealing with discipline and welfare matters and writing confidential reports. Technically, the Southern Army Commander was the Overall Force Commander COFC) but the policy, planning and execution were dealt with by GOC IPKF, Lt Gen Kalkat (who was also Deputy OFC) directly in accordance with the directions of Army HQ.

This was the repository of all dissonance in the command structure. As it is, there is always a certain amount of animus between subordinate and superior HQ, which in this case was exacerbated by this peculiar arrangement. Personality clashes not only hampered optimisation of effort and result but also indirectly affected welfare of troops adversely, despite varying efforts by all senior actors to ‘make the system work.’

Command personality clashes leave little scope for the staff and subordinates to effect smoothness in functioning and maximisation of efficiency. Tension rules the roost. One has to donate a good deal of blood for internal combustion. HQ OFC wanted to push HQ IPKF out into Sri Lanka whenever things hotted up, so that the former could control more effectively from Madras. For HQ IPKF, there was no magic wand which could be waved to make it move in and out at the drop of a hat. In fact its attempts, in the initial months, to locate itself in Jaffna or Trincomalee had been turned down by the Army HQ.

One can only hope that a future recasting of such an organisation and its command and control structure will be less conducive to personality friction and dissonance.

Splitting the IPKF HQ between Madras and the Island frequently and for indefinite periods was unacceptable to GOC IPKF, because the staff authorised in the HQ was at a low scale. There were problems of communications, staff processing, examination of problems, coordination with the Air Force and the Navy Nevertheless the sword always hung on our heads.

More often than not we in the HQ IPKF let it hang! There was nothing we could do. The Command HQ staff thought HQ IPKF had no time for it. HQ IPKF thought that the Command HQ was interfering unduly. The next door ATNK & K Area HQ thought that HQ IPKF was bullying them or making excessive demands. We thought the Area HQ was not responding adequately. The Navy had its own plans, pattern and conception. The Air Force usually saw things faster and more clearly and responded quicker, but occasionally put their foot down even on minor matters. The OFC and Deputy OFC had their own views and conceptions. The former wanted to be heard, counted, listened to, but he did not assert himself. The latter had the direct responsibility and often asserted himself with a certain amount of brusqueness. Thus, it was left to the staff and subordinates to muck their way through to make things work.

Could this friction have been avoided or minimised by a proper ordering of a command and control structure? An assertive OFC-cum-Army Commander and a GOC IPKF sans bouts of siege mentality, both under the aegis of a clearly perceived hierarchical directive-cum-executive channel at the Army HQ could have done better. Even then, they would have required considerable patience, skill, tact and will to make the system work. The job of the IPKF was not a routine one like any other HO of a Corps. Its functioning had to be fine-tuned with political-diplomatic developments on a daily basis. Even so, under the circumstances and with scarce resources the system somehow worked; it might have creaked, tottered and dawdled, but it worked, and delivered. One can only hope that a future recasting of such an organisation and its command and control structure will be less conducive to personality friction and dissonance.

Discipline and Morale

In the Initial stages of the war,  October-December ’87, there were complaints and reports of rape, looting and wanton destruction indulged in by the IPKF. When a soldier is pushed and led into a blind alley-like the situation in Jaffna, where it suddenly changed from the so well tom-tommed peace-keeping and bonhomie into a full fledged battlefield – he feels terribly insecure and starts seeing an enemy all over. In an insurgency sparked and sustained by an opponent who is dressed in civilian clothes but shoots and blows him up unseen, suspicion alone takes a vicious turn.

Click to buy: Assignment Jaffna

When he sees his comrades being killed by innocent looking civilians, blending again into the civilian population, he gets into a rage and anger against the uncertainty, the unseen. At that point his pent-up tension, welling feeling of helplessness and burning desire to explode into a release of Counter-violence are in frantic search of a tangible object he can master – an object which is weak and helpless itself? What better object than a frightened, weak, cowering woman; an unguarded, wide open shop; an unresisting, defenceless house and its feeble occupants whose shelter the unseen deceitful opponent had obtained (by whatever means)? It is madness, the animal in him, that rules momentarily. He is wild – but just for a brief spell.

In an insurgency sparked and sustained by an opponent who is dressed in civilian clothes but shoots and blows him up unseen, suspicion alone takes a vicious turn.

If he can get hold of himself, or if somebody controls him in that moment of crisis of cathartic explosion, he might in all probability get over his baser instincts. Where this does not happen then the explosion manifests in counter-assault, rape, loot, wanton destruction; seeking release from tension, fear, rage. Education, motivation, communication and company are good antidotes. Most culprits realise their bestiality within minutes of the act and repent, weeping like children. I saw a JCO with 27 years service breaking down like this.

It was under these circumstances of total uncertainty, initial disorientation, sudden violence, inability to communicate (language and surroundings were totally different) and lack of effective control, company and education that excesses were committed by a few. But the command and leadership chain rapidly gathered their brood once again within the warmth of their moral influence and disciplinary binding. Enquiries were instituted and disciplinary action taken against the defaulters. Warped minds had to be weeded out. But there were not very many. After February-March ’88, the incidence rates dropped almost to zero.

We had a few desertions in the Island. In Jaffna they could be counted on one palm. In one case a boy fell in love with a girl and decided to abscond, little realising that he had a herculean task escaping, unless of course the LTTE absorbed him. The LTTE found this first class material for their propaganda mill. The boy had no chance, as the people brought him back. In another case, an interpreter was influenced by one of the detents who was an important Jaffna leader. The boy, apart from interpreting was also tasked to be on guard duty on the prisoner at night. This went on for many days.

We had a few desertions in the Island.

One fine morning, the boy and the militant jumped the cell and disappeared. Months later, when some of the Indian fishermen apprehended by the Sri Lankan Navy and handed over to us at Karainagar, were being sent back to Madras in our passenger ship from Kankesanthurai, one of the JCOs going on leave in the same ship recognised this jawan. He was apprehended and questioned. He confessed that he was enticed by the LTTE prisoner with tall, tempting promises and deserted.

Realising the gravity of the crime he decided to get back to Tamil Nadu in one of the fishing boats, but was apprehended by the Sri Lankans, who handed him over to us after keeping him for a month, thinking that he was an Indian fisherman. We kept him and other such fishermen in a small building near one of our posts till our Government finished formalities and the Tamil Nadu Police indicated a date for taking them over. We carried out no specific identification parade of these fishermen since it lay outside our jurisdiction. The deserter was happy to hide his identity as long as he could. He was later tried in accordance with the Army Act.

There were a few attempts to commit suicide and inflict self” injury. There were a couple of attempted murders too. Most of them related to unhappy circumstances at home: marital, parental, financial and so on. Frayed temper was another detonator, but the cause was high tension and anxiety. These were, all said and done, minor in scale, a natural fallout of war. By and large our officers and jawans displayed noticeable robustness and good discipline. Where it did not come up to the same high standard was in matters of money, although it related mostly to personal purchases and spending.

Editor’s Pick

Some individuals indulged in silly attempts of bringing lung is, cycle tubes and the like from India and selling them in Sri Lanka. On a larger scale were the attempts to smuggle goods -mostly electronic – from Sri Lanka to India. We-requested the Customs to establish their detachments at the airfield and port at Madras to check smuggling and give customs clearance to our jawans. That reined in much of this unlawful traffic. But then that also gave scope to certain rackets where various agencies at the checking point(s), including the Army’s colluded and struck varying bargains, blackmailed and deceived the jawans returning from Sri Lanka.

In Sri Lanka our Government had allowed a percentage of our pay to be drawn in Sri Lankan currency. These accumulations enabled the jawans to buy goods but they would be charged custom duty on return to India. We-requested the Government to give the IPKF soldier concessions in this tegard, since he was being paid in Sri Lankan currency. Finally, we requested the Government to treat us as Indian citizens and apply baggage rules to us.

That required passports, said the Customs. We asked the Government to give us those many thousands of passports. There was some softening. We were brought under the baggage rules as Indian citizens, at long last, towards the later half of’1989. It took us nearly two years to get this resolved so that we could be fair to the officers and men in regard to discipline, smarting under that odious allegation – ‘smuggling’.

Morale remained adequately high. In counter insurgency, there are no spectacular successes; but even the loss of a couple of soldiers and weapons in an ambush can have a telling effect on men. Consequently, small catches and weapon counts start appearing as big achievements. Operating in such an environment is laborious, trying, nagging, gnawing. Twenty days of alert, efficient patrolling can be cancelled out overnight by an ambush the next day.

 Madras had a certain disdain for and gave an uncomfortable feellng of the IPKF soldiers.

Morale manifests itself in two states: defensive and offensive. Security of posts, not being ambushed, successful road and convoy protection, keeping the area of responsibility free of militant Incidents, may reflect defensive morale. But it may not reflect a state of high morale where soldiers ‘go’ for the militant, searching for him In the jungle, In his hide-out, In his lair, seeking him, getting at his throat by guile, initiative, manoeuvre and will to seek and destroy. This may be termed offensive morale. In our case, the state of offensive morale was not as high as the state of defensive morale. This is exemplified in losing contact with militants, lacking vlgour in pursuit, lifting cordons or releasing pressure prematurely, reluctance to penetrate the jungle boldly, opening fire at long ranges and tardiness towards bold experimentation.

The other aspect of morale as we noticed was that it operated at two levels, Internal and external. Internally, the intrinsic regimental traditions, spirit and pride held firm. Where these were yet to take firm root, as in some recently raised units, the officer leadership provided the prop and the fibre. Where both these were suspect or sub-standard there was trouble; low morale.

In one case a battalion failed to contribute, even to move and became an useless mass.~ another case a battalion disintegrated, leaving their dead and wounded and trudged back In driblets over the next two or three days. By and large, in fact, In most units, morale remained fairly high because of the Internal functional structure, the regimental system and leadership. Externally, it suffered at the hands of such Influences as the politics of people like Gopalaswamy, Nedumaran and others; the attitude of the Tamil Nadu Government’ towards the IPKF vis-a-vis the LTTE which was pointedly lionlsed and towards the IPKF’s Intelligence reports on the LTTE’s presence and activities in Tamil Nadu which were largely Ignored; and the pronouncements of eminent people like Justice Krishna Iyer, AP Venkateshwaran and others on IPKF operations in Sri Lanka.

Large posters of Prabhakaran and Mahatlya appeared along the Marina Beach, starting from right In front of the Legislative Assembly building. LTTE posters and their cadres’ participation in the Tamil Nadu election campaign were a factor in the 1988 Assembly Elections. Madras had a certain disdain for and gave an uncomfortable feellng of the IPKF soldiers. Jawans therefore would ask us: ‘Saheb, have we done something wrong?’ Be that as it may, the Internal fibres of morale held firm and sustained soldiers, their units – and the Army – in Op PAWAN despite the unhelpful, harmful external features.

What we at the ground level acutely felt was the lack of response or necessary promptness at all higher levels to our problems of discipline, welfare and morale. Customs clearance and application of baggage rules, as mentioned earlier, had to wait for nearly two years to be resolved, that too when we at the lower end repeatedly made a noise, even taunted and used harsh words at our superior HQs. This problem could have been easily visualised and resolved; there were precedents of Gaza, Congo, Lebanon and Korea.

Click to buy: Assignment Jaffna

Even after we projected our difficulty, there was that typical ‘babu’s’ response – put up a statement of case. Then there were the rear area functions like transit camps at Madras, despatch and receipt of personnel, rations and stores across the sea to and from the Island, arranging shipping, trains, aircraft and so on. Although there were small units or detachments nominated to undertake these functions, at Madras the major contribution of manpower and some command responsibilities still devolved on field formations fully stretched in active operations in Sri Lanka. No amount of our entreating with the higher HQ at Pune and Delhi helped us persuade them for benevolence. Formations had to look backwards across the sea’ for logistic support organisation in the rear area.

What we at the ground level acutely felt was the lack of response or necessary promptness at all higher levels to our problems of discipline, welfare and morale.

HQ IPKF was given no resources or financial powers to help the field formations in this respect; it rested with the Command HQ. These arrangements violated the basic principles of administration.

Another instance related to the status of Madras being peace station or field area for the specifically raised organisation of HQ IPKF. Since nothing was spelt out, those posted to HQ IPKF moved as for peace station, brought families, applied for government accommodation, hired houses and claimed reimbursement. JCOs and jawans did the same and claimed enhanced allowances for a class ‘A’ city that Madras is.’ Some were given accommodation, many others were not. Some were permitted rent reimbursement, others were not. Representations against this unfair dispensation were not even replied to.

Even statutory complaints remained unanswered for over a year. The Government, the bureaucracy and the system can be terribly callous. In the meanwhile, after more than a year of the raising of HQ IPKF, its status was declared as field area with retrospective effect. That made things worse for most of those who were already affected. When we cried ourselves hoarse, again the same posturing from higher HQ was forthcoming – forward a statement of case. It took nearly a year thereafter to resolve this very simple case, which was well within Command HQ powers to resolve. The tardiness, an almost open punch below the belt, was indeed very hurtful to honest, simple, disciplined, devoted officers, JCOs and jawans.

It must go to the credit of the higher HQ that they were not as tardy and ‘peace-timely’, if one can so use the word, in obtaining extention of leave concessions, death and disability benefits, etc. That was all fine, but what about the benefits to and welfare of the 90 per cent who could not die? Why this callousness in helping them with their discipline and morale? Don’t the higher and the highest HQ have a responsibility towards contributing to the discipline, morale and welfare of troops?

It must go to the credit of the higher HQ that they were not as tardy and “˜peace-timely, if one can so use the word, in obtaining extention of leave concessions, death and disability benefits, etc.

Operations are ordered, discipline is demanded, morale is measured every time, but welfare is only accorded lip service, grudgingly attended to! The Army and its system have a strange comprehension of welfare of troops. The soldiers were shoved into operations overnight, build-up for battle was achieved within days, organisational structures of sorts were contrived within weeks, but measures for helping the soldier maintain his discipline and morale and to care for his welfare took not merely months, but years.

Leadership at JCOs and NCOs levels showed improvement and in several units reached remarkably high standards. But it took a long time and hard knocks to achieve it. Wherever unit and formation commanders specifically devoted their energy, time and attention to nurturing excellence in their subordinates, things improved rapidly. It is a painstaking affair, a hobby-horse if you will, because the Infantry takes longer to prepare, particularly since our training and control systems have smothered individual thinking and acting. The rank and file interminably await orders and guidance at each and every step.

‘Initiative’ is a word used only in lectures, talks and harangues, seldom seen executed or encouraged, because of the peace-time attitude in war and the petrifying malaise of a ‘no mistake’ syndrome which has affected the very vitals of the Army. In war the only rescuing factor is to do, to act, to take the first step (initiative). Action and initiative may prove wrong on occasions, but their chances of success and maintaining cohesion too are far brighter than inaction, awaiting orders or delay in doing a right thing.

Editor’s Pick

Young officers were fairly prompt in doing, acting and doing things right. They did not wait for doing right things; and therefore largely succeeded. What the young subaltern lacked in knowledge and experience he more than made up in his enthusiasm, keenness, guts and getting into the act promptly. God bless him. He proved to be the cutting edge, while steadiness, ballast and momentum were provided by his enduring, stolid, phlegmatic, gritty follower, the jawan. Many unit and formation commanders waited for doing right things and were bypassed by events and opponents.

One of the first things I did was to declare and demand that my subordinates and their subordinates in turn, should be two steps ahead of their superiors in their (subordinates’) spheres. Section and platoon commanders must be experts in sitting and employing their weapons and be the last word in minor tactics. How dare a Brigade or Divisional Commander point out faults in these fields? It would be sacrilege if it were to happen. That, we in 54 Infantry Division said, should be the spirit and practice as well.

What the young subaltern lacked in knowledge and experience he more than made up in his enthusiasm, keenness, guts and getting into the act promptly.

What we lacked in many an instance was what I should specifically emphasise – inspiring leadership. If the leader, particularly formation commander, did not inspire his command then that body of troops would be at half its effectiveness. For instance, if he visited a post, and the men did not talk warmly, inquisitively and fondly about that visit for the next week or ten days and if they did not perceive a challenge left behind by the commander and did not feel a spontaneous desire to meet it, in thinking hard to solve it and bracing to present an innovative novelty to the commander on his next visit, then it is better that this type of commander did not visit that post! His visit otherwise would only amount to eating the post’s ration and mumbling inanities about fighting spirit, welfare, etc, leaving the post heaving a sigh of relief at the disappearance of a pest.

Many formation commanders failed to inspire. Not many of them roughed it out with troops on patrols, ambushes, staying over in their posts at night, on road opening and raid or heli-Ianding missions. It is not that they were not brave enough, but that they were far too concerned about tying themselves to their HQ, its comforts and communications. This was a highly biased managerial form of leadership than heroic. Inspiring leadership emanates from heroic aspects. Heli-hopping in this regard, caused maximum damage to inspiring leadership. The GOC or the Brigade Commander would land by helicopter in a post or on a helipad which had to be secured, then breeze past a few bodies lying in muck and mud, beam a flashy smile to affect unconcern for danger, have a hurried chat with the local leader, blurt out directions or orders, sip a cup of tea or coconut juice, showing no concern to the jawan who laboured under those circumstances to prepare and offer it and before you could blink an eye, would be off in his chopper. What Inspiration could his men in the post or on the spot draw?

It is not that such visits by commanders are fruitless or undesirable, or even avoidable. But a good balance between such communication or ‘control’ visits and inspiring visits has to be struck. Many formation commanders slogged, took pains, worked very hard Indeed; but they simply failed to inspire. The contribution of their formations fell below expectation, their performance remained insipid. Men and subordinates should look forward to the visit of their senior commanders and feel the impact of their visit, a degree of enthusiasm, a cause to think, and act rightly within the ambit layed down.

This is particularly necessary in counter-insurgency war, because it is long-drawn, laborious, sapping, tricky, taxing, uncertain and flexible to a much higher degree than conventional war. Without an equally high level of camaraderie, concern for and Involvement with the men and sincere and effective exercise of a heroic pattern of leadership, there can be no inspiring leadership. It needs a very large number of ‘good’ officers than ‘successful’ officers. The former deliver, the latter only contribute. But unfortunately the Army’s peace-time ethos and attitude produces more successful officers than good ones.

We had three types of officers. One category was that which thought acted, moved about, was bold and got down to business fastest, even in a totally alien, confusing, unknown environment. The second one consisted of those who had brains and moved about as best as they could, but lacked boldness and ability to inspire. The third category consisted of those who simply slogged when prodded. Many complained about their troops not being trained, orders not being clearly given and so on.

Click to buy: Assignment Jaffna

They could do nothing else. Their units suffered. A businesslike attitude – read professionalism – was lacking in most of the last category. I n all the categories there was it tendency to ignore the factor of tension, which is far more serious in highly active counter-insurgency war as in Sri Lanka, than in conventional war. In counter-insurgency, personal dangers are far more, stakes far higher, constraints many and issues very delicate. It is a very tightly controlled war, where aims play more importantly than objectives and where (as a result) there is a great deal of manoeuvring in the war effort at the jawans’ end in the manner of an accordion – press/release, that is to say apply/release pressure in a fine-tuned orchestration.

The Brig had to be told to make use of his professionally critical faculties in evaluating the LTTE and not illogical awe.

Tensions therefore naturally increase and need to be controlled, smoothed, calmed. This needs to be done in a conscious, deliberate manner, which was not the case in Sri Lanka. Senior officers paid less attention to the role of Officers’ Messes, Langars [field kitchen] and rest camps in this regard. All these are institutions created or brought about for the purpose of not only feeding and resting, but also senior officers making a conscious effort to ease the tension of their subordinates and men.

In this context, it is further necessary for senior commanders to increase their interaction with the rank and file and maintain frequent communication down to the rifleman to explain to him the stakes, his conduct and nature and significance of tasks; why it is necessary to tighten pressure now, release it a little, tighten again and so on. Only a constant interaction keeps him alert, informed, educated and motivated. It is a laborious process again and that much taxing on the senior commander, especially in active Cl Ops. Where this was not done there were set-backs, inefficiency and casualness. It was difficult to keep the men interested, alert and motivated in an environment of ennui, mental fatigue and constant, sapping danger in an arc of 360 degrees around them, day in and day out, for months on end.

Our unit and formation commanders too came under the mental hypnosis of the LTTE. They would graphically explain how well entrenched the LTTE was in the midst of the people, how ungrateful people were to us, how elusive the LTTE was, how perfect it was in the midst of the people and in its actions, how effective was its grip over the public and so on – virtually admitting that it was an impossible task and all our endeavours were pointless. One formation commander was relating vividly how the LTTE cadres – including their women – fought so bravely, killed our soldiers in fierce combat and proved to be our bane in early October ’87 in the Jaffna University Campus.

It was in logistics that I think the IPKF performed admirably.

I thought he was doing a good PR job for the LTTE. There was no doubt about the proportion of exaggeration in the indirect kudos accruing to the LTTE. The Brig had to be told to make use of his professionally critical faculties in evaluating the LTTE and not illogical awe. A lot of such roughage which had been allowed to enter the cerebral recesses of some of our unit and formation commanders had to be evacuated and their thinking disabused of self-invited cant. Mentally such influence was dangerous. I too frequently fell prey to this weakness, but made conscious and equally frequent efforts to shake loose from this hypnotic state; and, I think, I largely succeeded.

One Instance stands clearly embedded in my memory. In October ’87 a group of our jawans had suffered heavy casualties in the Jaffna University Campus and most had died there. Their belongings – dress, equipment and other service impedimenta -lay tattered and strewn all over the huge playground even as late as February ’88 when I went up there on one of my visits.

I thought this was disrespectful to the brave souls and asked the escort accompanying me to pick up all those items and remove them from public gaze. To my acute horror not one of them moved to pick them up! The escort consisted of all denominations, but none dared. It became painful to see such reluctance. I spontaneously got down from my open jeep, walked to the pair of pouches, pagri and belt strewn closest to my vehicle and picked them up, brought them to the jeep and kept them in. The Brig was the next one to do so. It was only after this that the rest of the escort got down and gathered other items.

Editor’s Pick

It was one of the strangest incidents of my stay in Jaffna. The only other incident as painful as this, if what I saw was correct was the order given by an Armoured Corps officer to an infantry unit which had fought its heart out in the midst of Jaffna In October – November ’87, to march all the way to Mannar, nearly 250 km away. Then, on the day it reached there, he ordered it to march back to Vavuniya, another 100 km. For this BGS, the Infantry did not require vehicles; it was meant to march on its flat feet.

It was in logistics that I think the IPKF performed admirably. It was un untrodden ground, without a precedent to help us. We had no experience of supporting logistically a large composite force of all arms across the seas in a foreign country, which not only was hostile but also lean In resources. We had to lug everything across the sea by ship or aircraft, often both.

The Army needed an even flow of men and material to and fro, between Madras and Sri Lanka and insisted on some semblance of tactical loading. The Navy, which was charged with providing and scheduling shipping, insisted on bulk carriage and optimum utilisation of shipping. Our men were dumped frequently on cargo ships which had holds for goods but which did not permit men to breathe, eat, defecate, perspire or vomit. Our men had to do all this because of the system of certain involuntary muscles it was hell for them. Passenger ships like Akbar, Harshavardhan, etc, would close down their passenger comforts for our men.

Yet, we largely kept our tryst with destination – many termed it destiny. Poultry, vegetables and fruit flew in the aircraft every day with VIPs like senior Gens and Brigs of the IPKF. It was a great leveller of rank and hierarchy, if troops had to get their rations in time, in edible condition. We had to set up organisations out of our own resources at ports of embarkation and debarkation, at the airfields both at Madras and in Sri Lanka. We repaired the airfields, constructed temporary structures for holding huge stocks and improved ports where our ships berthed and. picked and/or discharged cargo. All the three Services – the Army, the Navy and the Air Force – representatives and staff would sit down every day till late at night and plan the transit and transport of men and material.

At lower levels, the three Services had an excellent understanding and shared knowledge and information of their senior bosses and their attempting any exercise to score a point or two over the other. This exchange would take place delightfully well in advance and mutual agreement arrived at to the over idiosyncrasies. The logistic staff under the Brigadier-in-Charge-Administration at the HQ IPKF and Colonels Q at Divisional HQ did a commendable job, quietly, efficiently and without much ado. It was a unique contribution to the history of our Army. Yet, every officer of the Q and A Branch staff at the HQ IPKF was superseded. That is our system for us.

Rate this Article
Star Rating Loader Please wait...
The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

More by the same author

Post your Comment

2000characters left

One thought on “IPKF’s Performance in Sri Lanka

More Comments Loader Loading Comments