With the northern flank of the Indian advance so secured, 2 Madras and 1/5 GR were pulled out the next day – leaving only 3 RAJ RIF to hold the enclave – for deployment in other sectors where battles were raging. With the typically confused scenario most military operations create, the two units were moved about from one location to another for almost a fortnight, often under shelling and air attacks, until they found themselves together once again on 21 September, poised to attack Khemkaran, where we had suffered reverses in the face of a major offensive by the enemy. It proved to be a disastrous mission, wherein the battalion started taking casualties from intense enemy shelling3 even as it was establishing a firm base. Despite heavy odds the attack went in at 1400 hours on 22 September, only to make very slow progress against the fierce resistance the enemy put up. The next morning Pakistanis intensified their air strikes and artillery fire to a saturation point; and with its forward position no more tenable, the battalion was pulled back some 800 metres. The ceasefire was declared that afternoon; and the unit remained facing Khemkaran till relieved on 29 September. 2 Madras lost 27 lives in all, including those of 3 officers in its two major engagements of the war, at Dera Baba Nanak and Khemkaran.
The capture of the place was part of 6 Division’s mission to secure a bridgehead for the breakout of 1 Armoured Division later.
3 Madras, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel BK Bhattacharya, and 4 Madras, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel HL Mehta, were inducted into the operations together, along with 9 Kumaon (the three units forming 69 Mountain Brigade of 6 Infantry Division under 1 Corps), on 7 September for the capture of Maharajke in the Sialkot Sector. A fairly big-sized village some two and a half miles across the international border and 13 miles from Sialkot, it became tactically significant because of being the site of a major crossroads on the drive to Sialkot. The capture of the place was part of 6 Division’s mission to secure a bridgehead for the breakout of 1 Armoured Division later.
The brigade attack, well-supported by artillery and synchronized with flanking attacks by other formations, went in at 2300 hours with 3 Madras and 9 Kumaon going for the right half of the objective in the first phase, so as to block the roads to Pagowal-Badiana and Sialkot. Deadly fighting ensued with the enemy machine gunners playing havoc; but the assault proved unstoppable4, and the objective was overrun by 0130 hours. The losses of the Madras battalion amounted to 20 in all, 3 killed and 17 wounded.
The phase-2 of the attack, for the left half of the objective – to block the roads to Charwa and Zafarwal – by 4 Madras, launched at 0200 hours on 8 September, turned out to be a far bitter contest, against a rather dogged defence by the men of Pakistan’s famed Frontier Force Regiment. With the initial two-company-up assault flagging, the CO was forced to commit the reserve companies as well. In the end it was a trench-by-trench bloody hand-to-hand fighting; but the Madrassis had taken the objective by 0530 hours. The amount of casualties was considerable on both sides. 16 dead bodies of the Frontier Force men and the Mujahideen were counted on the objective after the battle; the number of Madrassis killed weren’t much lesser – 11 in all, which included their Commanding Officer. The wounded numbered 34.
Trench after trench was cleared by men closing in and lobbing grenades, often led by young officers.
It was the 4th Battalion’s – ‘Wallajahbadis’ as they proudly call themselves, being the descendant unit of the old Wallajabad Light Infantry – hour of glory. Trench after trench was cleared by men closing in and lobbing grenades, often led by young officers. The Adjutant of the unit, Lieutenant Ramesh Kumar, was wounded in such a sortie. Two JCOs, Subedars, CA Madhavan Nambiar and PM Gregory, leading a handful of men charged two enemy posts from the rear. They both were to be awarded the Vir Chakras later. The CO of the battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Harbans Lal Mehta, who personally led an outflanking attack by a reserve company, was mortally wounded. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously.
After the Battle of Maharajke, 3 Madras was engaged in clearing some of the villages in the vicinity until 13 September, when it was assigned, along with a company of 4 Madras and two squadrons of 62 Cavalry, to form the vanguard of the brigade advance to Pagowal. The enemy was contacted within two hours of the commencement of the advance at 0400 hours, and a position cleared and occupied north of Pagowal without much of a hassle. But the enemy kept the stakes high with constant shelling, and counterattacked with tanks and infantry in the afternoon. It was repulsed with the powerful support of own artillery. After holding on to the position for three days the battalion captured Pagowal itself on the 17th and cleared three more outlying villages during the next four days until the 23rd when the ceasefire was declared. The operations after Maharajke had cost the battalion 23 casualties, 4 killed and 19 wounded.
6 and 7 Madras were deployed to contain the Pakistani infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir, mainly on the Rajauri-Punch Sector. Although ceasefire had been declared by the time 6 Madras arrived, it took part in a subsequent attack on Balnoi in Punch. 7 Madras had been hunting the infiltrators from early August itself and held vital pickets in Punch during the operations. The battalion continued to be deployed in the area for another three years. The casualties of 6 Madras were 1 killed and 1 wounded, and that of 7 Madras were, 6 killed, 16 wounded and 1 missing. 8 Madras, though mobilized, could not see action since the ceasefire had come into effect by the time it concentrated in Punjab. Lance Havildar Kannappan of 7 Madras was awarded a Sena Medal for exceptional bravery.
9 Madras, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel BK Satyan, forming part of 65 Infantry Brigade under 7 Infantry Division, was part of the 11 Corps thrust aimed at Lahore. As part of the advance guard, the battalion captured the village of Barka Kalan, a vantage point, prior to the armour-supported assault of 10 September on Barki, around which the Pak defences of Ichhogil Canal Bund were built. The Ichhogil Canal5 being a strategically significant barrier for its nearness to Lahore (12 miles), the Pakistanis put up a stout defence. Having had to abandon their positions in disarray under the tank assault, they blew up the bridge; but before the Indian troops had consolidated their hold, managed to reoccupy a part of the Bund in strength. With the deadline fixed for the ceasefire on 23 September, the battalion (short of one company) – which has so far been holding the firm base for the attack by the other two battalions of the brigade, 4 Sikh and 16 Punjab – stormed the Bund during the night 22nd-23rd and dislodged the enemy in a do-or-die fight.
The enemy was virtually routed, with a number of them jumping into the canal to escape the fury of the assault, while many of the rest were bodily lifted and thrown in, if not shot down or bayoneted.
The Battle of Ichhogil Bund was by far the fiercest engagement the Madras Regiment fought in the war of ’65. It was a tricky mission wherein the unit had to assault in waves, one company at a time from the flank, and clear the enemy entrenched along the Bund with colossal fire support from their comrades on the far bank barely 150 feet across. Nevertheless, in an amazing feat of arms, the battalion, endowed with an abundance of fresh youngsters and equally vigorous young leadership, made short work of it with a lightning charge that bordered on recklessness, supported eminently by our own guns and tanks which kept up a steady fire across the canal through out the engagement, effectively neutralizing the enemy fire from the far bank. The enemy was virtually routed, with a number of them jumping into the canal to escape the fury of the assault, while many of the rest were bodily lifted and thrown in, if not shot down or bayoneted. It was all over in 2 hours and 30 minutes from the word go at 0030 hours on the 23rd. By 0300 hours the objective had been overrun. The enemy casualties were heavy, 48 dead and an estimated 80 washed away in the canal. 11 were taken prisoner, including one officer. An enormous amount of arms and ammunition including 2 RCL guns were also captured. Own casualties were considerably heavy too – 49 killed including one JCO and 65 wounded including one officer.
It was a night of unfettered heroism, layered with glorious acts and poignant scenes. There were the two jawans of the lead platoon, Narayanan and Bhaskaran, who volunteered to silence a machinegun and crawled forward in the darkness. The gun was silenced in 20 minutes, but in the heat of the battle no one noticed their absence. They were found after the battle, sprawled dead in front of the pillbox wherein the weapon had been located. A similar pair, Sepoys Mallappan and Ramachandran, was found dead, frozen in sitting posture manning their machinegun, one handling the weapon, the other belt feeding. Then there was Major Dharam Pal, leading his men in the assault undaunted by a splinter lodged in his leg. There was the sight of the CO, Colonel Sathyan, cheering his men on, walking up and down the Bund fully exposed to the enemy, gifted with a charming existence; as the night reverberated with the Madrassi Battle Cry, “Veer Madrassi Adi Kollu, Adi Kollu”, a no-nonsense phrase, to the point, and deadly – “Brave Madrassi Strike and Kill, Strike and Kill.” (The 9th Madrassis call themselves the “Terrors” – indeed that’s what the Pakistanis would have found them to be that night.) And giving it all a sombre touch was the medical inspection room truck plying up and down non-stop, picking up the casualties, with the popular Medical NCO, ‘Rasam’ Thankappan, at the wheel. For 9 Madras, a unit which traces its origin to the Travancore State Forces, it was quite an Onam, the traditional harvest festival of Kerala that the men of the whole Madras Regiment celebrate with zest in the month of September every year.
Since the Pakistanis did not open a front in the east, 16 Madras, deployed on the East Pakistan border, saw no action. 17 Madras went into action during the night 19-20 September, forming a firm base at Dali in Pakistani territory for the advance of 85 Infantry brigade towards Khinsor. However they had to withdraw late in the evening on 21 September following an enemy attack heavily supported by air and artillery. Subsequently after the ceasefire, they captured Kinra and Point 413 in Skarbu area, both within Pakistan, during September-October. The total casualties the battalion suffered were 3 killed, 15 wounded and 59 taken prisoner.
The Madras Regiment won the Battle Honours, KALIDHAR 1965 and MAHARAJKE 1965, and the Theatre Honours, JAMMU AND KASHMIR 1965 and PUNJAB 1965, for the participation of its battalions in the operations.
The Madras Engineers had two of its field companies taking part in the 11 Corps offensive towards Lahore; 10 and 63. Major PP Srivastava’s 63 Field Company, which formed part of 29 Infantry Brigade, was the first unit to be engaged. The Company found itself in the thick of action at Dera Baba Nanak as soon as the enclave had been captured by our troops – which included 2 Madras – and the initial counter-attacks beaten back. By the early hours of 7 September, the Company was called upon to demolish a span of the Ravi Bridge and mine the approach on its home side to prevent further forays by the enemy. The mines and explosives were late in arriving, and it was broad daylight by the time the work could be taken up. Nevertheless, a team led by Second Lieutenant N Chandrasekharan Nair got down to the nightmare of a job, laying mines right under the direct small arms and tank fire and artillery shelling.
And adding insult to injury, the young Indian Sapper officer, Nair, in an act of daredevilry, crossed over the ‘demolished’ bridge all alone, captured an enemy jeep and drove it back.
The enemy himself meanwhile contributed to the effort by demolishing a span of the bridge; except that it turned out to be a shoddy piece of sapper craft – the bridge still remained usable. And adding insult to injury, the young Indian Sapper officer, Nair, in an act of daredevilry, crossed over the ‘demolished’ bridge all alone, captured an enemy jeep and drove it back. The officer was later decorated with Vir Chakra.
Major MM Mathew’s 10 Field Company – the second unit deployed for the 11 Corps offensive – with 67 Infantry Brigade in Fazilka and Firozepur area couldn’t see much of action except for mine laying and braving constant shelling, since no enemy threat materialized in that sector.
The 1 Corps offensive towards Sialkot saw 8 companies of the Madras Sappers in action; 13, 14 and 65 Field Companies and 684 Field Park Company with the 1 Armoured Divisional Engineers at the Samba Sector, and 9, 36 and 39 Field Companies and 372 Field Park Company with the 26 Infantry Divisional Engineers at the Suchetgarh Sector.
When 1 Armoured Division launched its two-pronged offensive on 8 September, Major RC Mehta’s 14 Assault Field Company advanced with the tanks of 1 Armoured Brigade headed for Phillora, and Major Gur Dayal’s 65 Assault Field Company joined 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade on its way to Pagowal. On 11 September Phillora witnessed the biggest tank battle fought anywhere in the world till then after World War II, which was to turn the place into a graveyard of Pakistani Patton Tanks. Before the battle, in the brigade’s advance to Phillora and later as it struck out towards Chawinda, the Sappers kept at it tirelessly developing the tracks for the division to advance, constantly harassed by the enemy air force and artillery. At least 4 Sappers were killed in strafing and shelling. Pagowal fell on 13 September, and Alhar Railway Station and the areas south to it were taken on the 15th. The operations ended before Chawinda could be taken. 13 Field Company joined the track building effort towards the end.
After the charge had been fired, the demolition group was confronted by the strange sight of some 20 Pakistani soldiers and a JCO emerging from the smoke and debris with their arms thrown up in surrender. They had mistaken the demolition for gunfire.
In the Suchetgarh Sector, the advance elements of 26 Infantry Division had reached within striking distance of Sialkot when ceasefire was declared. 39 Company was engaged to move the bridging equipment forward, which made it a favoured target of the enemy air force for strafing.
The Sappers’ war wasn’t without its lighter moments either. In 26 Divisional Sector 36 Field Company was carrying out the demolition of a low wall for clearer field of fire. After the charge had been fired, the demolition group was confronted by the strange sight of some 20 Pakistani soldiers and a JCO emerging from the smoke and debris with their arms thrown up in surrender. They had mistaken the demolition for gunfire. The young officer in charge of the Sappers promptly disarmed them and marched them off to captivity.
A large number of other Madras Engineer units were also rushed to the western sector from elsewhere, anticipating a long haul, but the conflict ended before they could go operational. The MEG won the Theatre Honours, JAMMU AND KASHMIR 1965, and PUNJAB 1965.
Click to Buy
The 1965 operations also saw the South Indian cavalry regiment, the 16th Light Cavalry (commonly referred as 16 Cavalry), in action in a significant role. Equipped with Centurion Tanks, the regiment formed the vanguard of advance of I Armoured Division towards Sialkot, up to Gadgor in Pakistan. In a major tank battle fought at Gadgor on 8 September, and a subsequent engagement at Alhar Railway Station, they destroyed 16 Patton Tanks of the enemy, against a loss of 6 tanks of their own. 2 officers, 1 JCO and 14 Other Ranks of the unit were killed in these actions; and a number of officers, JCOs and Other Ranks were wounded.
The Regiment won the Theatre Honour, PUNJAB 1965. The gallantry awards won by its officers and men comprised 1 Vir Chakra, 1 Sena Medal, 8 Mention-in-Dispatches and 3 Commendation Cards from the Chief of Army Staff.
Please wait...
MOST INSPIRING ACCOUNT – ATHOUSAND SALUTES TO THE AUTHOR
Had India threatened Multan, Bahawalpur, Karachi axis by at least 2 thrusts, would India have had better leverages and effectively cut the north south link of Pakistan leaving a deep psychological scar which would have been difficult to heal
Great deeds of valour need to be recounted for the new generation in this fiftieth year after they were performed. I request the author to recall the major battles of 1965 in September this year in news paper columns.
I think were not at gain, we lost some parts of Kutch to Pakistan, I think we also lost a brve,honest to the core & straight forward Primeminister as a result of this war.
The Rock of Gibralter or Tarik’s Rock was named after a Moorish General Jabel – El – Tarik who conquered Spain.He burnt the boats on landing & told his troops that it was ( Fateh ) victory or death.The Moors ruled Spain for over 800 years.
10 Field Company and 63 Field Company of Madras Engineers were part of 6 Engineer Regiment and my father, then Lieutenant Col M.L. Sharma was the Commanding Officer of the Regiment to which Major P.P. Srivastava and 2Lieutenant N.Chandrasekharan Nair belonged. The 6 Engineer Regiment was raised by my father, barely 2-3 months prior. The raising was yet to be fully completed when it was launched into the 1965 War under my father’s command. Their unit has the distinction of the only Vir Chakra awarded to the Engineers during the 1965 War.
War does not solve any problems unless it is unleashed upon. Pakstan fought several wars with muslim India (177 million muslims) and none with China. Now it is at war with itself and with in. Its economy is in shambles and not bigger than Singapore. India too has suffered a lot due to these wars. In the modern context fighting a war is ridiculous.
The paper should be named as “The Glorious Madrad Regiment During Indo-Pak 1965 War”