A question mark is naturally placed over this aspect of their nuclear diplomacy when the Kargil crisis is taken note of. It would be perhaps pertinent to view Indo-Pak relations by focusing on the nature of their message and who it targets.
Should it be assumed that Indo-Pak relations moved from the stage of conflict/no-conflict to that of improving their ties because of their nuclear proliferation? In this context, Indo-Pak relations undeniably fit into the theory of “classic deterrence.” The crucial impact of their nuclear policy has been twofold—one, the prevention of Indo-Pak confrontation and two, improvement in Indo-Pak ties. Had nuclear deterrence not laid the foundation, prospects of India and Pakistan moving towards better relations may not have prevailed. It may be noted, despite Indo-Pak tension being severe over the Kargil war in 1999 and Mumbai terror strikes in November 2008), they did not reach the stage of any open conflict. The two countries continued exchanging the nuclear list on the first of each calendar year. They exchanged lists of their nuclear installations for the nineteenth consecutive time this year too, on 1 January, through diplomatic channels simultaneously at New Delhi and Islamabad. Amid this backdrop, Indo-Pak nuclear diplomacy, resting on their bilateral understanding of nuclear deterrence, defies fears raised earlier about their nuclear-status leading to MAD in South Asia.
To a considerable extent, nuclear diplomacy’s role in the cessation of Indo-Pak open conflicts has contributed to opening avenues for increasing cordiality as well as reducing tension at other levels. Even though the track record of India and Pakistan cannot be hailed as positive in implementing confidence-building measures (CBMs), at least they have not abandoned the path.3 Undeniably, there have been phases when there has been a pause in their holding bilateral talks on CBMs.4 Nevertheless, despite being marked by tension, there is no denying that around two decades of pursuing CBMs has brought Indo-Pak ties to a level that seemed like a mirage earlier. The words “confidence-building measures” are in themselves suggestive of India and Pakistan having agreed that not war but dialogue was the appropriate diplomatic option for improving their relations at various levels.
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Compare this with the period when at multilateral gatherings, leaders of the two countries seemed reluctant even to greet each other. In the present period, they take out time to exchange warm smiles, shake hands and meet on the sidelines of multilateral gatherings. Even though these meetings may be viewed as nothing else but a show of cosmetic diplomacy, their significance cannot be ignored. They are at least suggestive of their trying to convince the world that India and Pakistan are holding talks and, thus, there should be no fear that they are moving towards any war. In this context, the Lahore Declaration inked shortly after India and Pakistan went nuclear bears greater relevance in light of their attempts to dismiss fears and apprehensions voiced about the negative aftermath of their respective nuclear policies. The ironic alacrity with which Indian and Pakistani leaders displayed “warmth” towards each other soon after going nuclear was their diplomatic message to the rest of the world. It aimed at dispelling noise made then about Indo-Pak nuclear policies leading the region towards a nuclear war or MAD.
The Indo-Pak nuclear diplomacy was again put to test when the Indian Parliament was attacked by terrorists in December 2001. India held Pakistani terrorists as responsible for the attack.
A question mark is naturally placed over this aspect of their nuclear diplomacy when the Kargil crisis is taken note of. It would be perhaps pertinent to view Indo-Pak relations by focusing on the nature of their message and who it targets.
The Lahore Declaration and CBMs should not be viewed simply as major strides taken by India and Pakistan in their bilateral relations. They should more significantly be regarded as diplomatic necessity of the moment to convince the world that the two “nuclear” powers were moving towards normalising their relations. Where the Kargil crisis is concerned, it may be noted that India and Pakistan continue to be engaged in minor skirmishes now and then over the violation of LoC norms they are expected to respect. The Kargil crisis was a violation on a larger level of what seems to be a routine irritant in their bilateral relations. From this angle, it isn’t surprising that the Kargil crisis remained a limited conflict.
The Indo-Pak nuclear diplomacy was again put to test when the Indian Parliament was attacked by terrorists in December 2001. India held Pakistani terrorists as responsible for the attack. The two countries reached a near-war stage once again, with around a million troops assembled along the LoC. Tension clouded their ties once again when terror-strikes hit Mumbai in November 2008. Against the backdrop of the heights reached by communication revolution during the same period, it is imperative to give some importance to its role in spreading “tension” in Indo-Pak ties as well as “news” about “progress” in their moving towards “normalcy.”
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