Ironically, though India and Pakistan still entertain differences over Kashmir and several other issues, prospects of their being engaged in an open and full-fledged conflict over the same may be now regarded as nonexistent. The link between their nuclear drives, deterrence pact and their heading towards better ties stands out. Equally significant is the role played by communication revolution, people-to-people interaction and the diplomatic maturity displayed by both countries, particularly in times of crisis. It cannot be missed that their nuclear diplomacy has faced strong tests, including the Kargil crisis and Mumbai strikes. The anti-Pak and anti-India rhetoric has lost the frenzy that it held earlier for politicians in both countries. While nuclear diplomacy has helped India and Pakistan to stay away from the battlefield, communication revolution, together with global and regional developments, has led to a major change in the attitude of people from both countries towards each other. There was a phase when Indo-Pak cricket matches had the agitated crowds turn the pitch almost into a battlefield. The commercialisation of this game now has Pakistani cricketers playing for Indian teams. Tennis has taken a lead against cricket, with an Indo-Pak team playing in the U.S. Open finals.
The anti-Pak and anti-India rhetoric has lost the frenzy that it held earlier for politicians in both countries. The nuclear diplomacy has helped India and Pakistan to stay away from the battlefield, communication revolution”¦
The Indo-Pak nuclear diplomacy has undeniably defied apprehensions held about their heading towards ‘Mutually Armed Destruction’ (MAD). A communication revolution has prompted leaders from both countries to display through the media that they are engaged in dialogue and not war to resolve their differences!
Still known as “permanent enemies” in international circles, though diplomatically India and Pakistan have come a long way from being at war or near war with each other, their relations have not yet reached the stage of being friendly. This demands an analysis of their relations from two angles. What has led their ties to reach the no-war stage, and why have they still not moved further from this stage to being viewed as friendly neighbours?
History stands witness to the partition of India and the end of British colonialism, leading to the formation of Pakistan as well as independence of the countries in 1947. Though more than six decades have passed, India and Pakistan still remain a long way from resolving differences over certain problems, including Kashmir, which may be viewed as a legacy of their partition.
“¦despite terrorism leading to diplomatic tension between India and Pakistan, it has had limited impact on bilateral relations promoted through people-to-people interaction.
Prospects of India and Pakistan reaching any mutually acceptable agreement over Kashmir remain as dim today as they were earlier. Nevertheless, the notable change in their approach towards the issue cannot be ignored. The same issue that once brought them to the battlefield now at least has them discuss it over the table, even though numerous rounds of talks have only led them to say that the Kashmir problem remains “unresolved.” Nevertheless, despite Kashmir and other problems remaining “irritants” in their diplomatic relations, they have slowly but definitely started steps to ease tension over the same. Where Kashmir is concerned, no less significant is the implementation of their agreement to open the controversial Line of Control (LoC) at a few points for facilitating trade and travel. They began the bus service in 2005, across the LoC between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, capital cities of Jammu & Kashmir and Pakistani Kashmir, respectively.
The Poonch-Rawalkot bus service began in 2008. Undeniably, India and Pakistan are still nowhere near reaching any agreement on Kashmir, but at least they have backtracked from going to war over the same. This in itself needs to be hailed as a major diplomatic step taken by both India and Pakistan.
There is definitely no doubt that the anti-Pak and anti-India approach entertained by certain groups of people on both sides has not yet been erased totally. It would perhaps be presuming too much, equivalent to chasing a mirage, to expect this attitude to ever disappear completely. Nevertheless, what stands out is that the anti-Pak and anti-India frenzy, earlier played upon with full fervour by politicians during their respective election campaigns, has now lost its old electoral appeal for the leaders as well as the people. This implies that India and Pakistan have not simply diplomatically moved away from the war phase but, more importantly, people on both sides are no longer in favour of taking to the battlefield.
There was a phase when cricket matches between India and Pakistan excited certain sections in India to express their anger against the same by damaging property where they were being held, shouting anti-Pak slogans and so forth.
Undeniably, the turn in Indo-Pak ties cannot be delinked from developments in the subcontinent as well as on the global stage. Normalcy in their bilateral ties marked by India and Pakistan at least refraining from being engaged in war bears diplomatic importance not just for the two countries but major powers closely involved in regional developments. It is no more the phase of Cold War, the period when India’s diplomatic ties with the then Soviet Union held greater importance than with the United States. The end of the Cold War period, the break up of the Soviet Union, the emergence of China as a great power, the United States’ remaining the only superpower and the Afghanistan crisis, among others, may be viewed as significant developments that have had a strong influence on Indo-Pak ties.
Nuclear proliferation pursued by both India and Pakistan, defying apprehensions voiced about the risk of it leading to MAD, has its own importance, globally, regionally as well as bilaterally. Soon after India and Pakistan stepped on to the nuclear path, they also mutually agreed to respect the deterrent value of their nuclear prowess. Nuclear diplomacy maintained by India and Pakistan, though largely sidelined, even ignored globally, can from no angle be overlooked, especially with regard to their having stayed away from waging any war against each other. Ironically, there is a striking parallel between India and Pakistan staying away from the battlefield and the menacing role assumed by terrorism with an increasing alacrity during the same period. Yet, despite terrorism leading to diplomatic tension between India and Pakistan, it has had limited impact on bilateral relations promoted through people-to-people interaction. The latter has received a major boost through various organisations, including the ones linked with SAARC. Neither of these developments can be delinked from the role played by the communication revolution at several levels, from films, cultural exchanges (dramas, ghazals, mushairas) and cricket, among others.
There was a phase when cricket matches between India and Pakistan excited certain sections in India to express their anger against the same by damaging property where they were being held, shouting anti-Pak slogans and so forth. Now, with cricket being exploited commercially in a major way, Pakistani players are seen playing for companies controlled by Indians. In this respect, the commercial boom linked with cricket bears its own importance in having led to an apparent end to the Indo-Pak animosity being reflected on the cricket field. This does not, however, imply that Indo-Pak relations may be viewed as having reached the stage of being as diplomatically smooth as they can ideally expected to be. The answer is no. While they are off the battlefield, the two neighbours have not ceased from hurling verbal missiles and indulging in a blame game against each other.
The anti-Pak and anti-India approach held in both countries revolved around their being either at war or not.
Besides, while business lobbies are well aware of the potential that Indo-Pak economic ties have, they have yet to be exploited fully. Indo-Pak tension is also held responsible for the regional organisation SAARC remaining confined to playing the role of routine diplomacy marked by the gathering of member countries. It has yet to develop as other regional organisations, such as NATO, have.
It would not be possible to elaborate on each of these aspects in this paper. An attempt shall be made to first focus on the nuclear turn in Indo-Pak ties and then analyse other developments.
Nuclear Diplomacy
With each country moving ahead on its nuclear path and also taking steps to enhance cooperation even across the controversial LoC by opening travel routes between India-occupied and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Indo-Pak nuclear diplomacy cannot be ignored. Undeniably, their nuclear diplomacy stands symbolic of the ideal use to which nuclear prowess can and should be put diplomatically. Had either or both countries exploited nuclear prowess to initiate conflicts, engage in war/warlike games or issue threats, their nuclear diplomacy would then have been labelled a dismal failure. Diplomacy, whether nuclear or nonnuclear, can only be held as having failed when war or warlike measures are taken by one or more powers against any nation.
| Editor’s Pick |
There is no denying that before they stepped onto the nuclear path, compared to the present period, India and Pakistan gave little importance to solving their differences through diplomatic measures. The anti-Pak and anti-India approach held in both countries revolved around their being either at war or not. Undoubtedly, India and Pakistan have not been engaged in any major conflict since their progress along the nuclear path. In fact, the two countries appear to have reached a mutual and tacit understanding about not being engaged in an open conflict. They have accepted the hard fact that differences over various issues may time and again bring a chill, tension and/or even a break in their interaction at the official level. What is pertinent is that even when Indo-Pak cordiality has given the impression of having reached a dismal low, diplomacy has been lived up to significantly enough with their not opting for a full-fledged war.
The 1999 Kargil crisis, while it lasted, did raise apprehensions about India and Pakistan heading for a major conflict.1 An impression was created of their having reached a near-war stage. It was the first Indo-Pak bilateral crisis after they assumed the status of nuclear powers. In other words, in addition to spreading tension among both countries and international observers about India and Pakistan heading towards a conflict, it was also a major test of their nuclear diplomacy.
The Kargil crisis brought India and Pakistan to a near-war stage but not to an actual and full-fledged war. It was definitely a setback to the Lahore Declaration, a bilateral agreement signed on 21 February 1991 by the then prime minister of India, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif. The Lahore Declaration was viewed as a major breakthrough in their relations, particularly as it was inked following nuclear tests carried out by both the countries in May 1998. But the optimism raised about an improvement in Indo-Pak relations lost its momentum because of the Kargil crisis, a point that shall be looked at from another angle later. With respect to their nuclear diplomacy, it is important to note that they kept away from an open conflict during the Kargil crisis.
The Lahore Declaration was viewed as a major breakthrough in their relations, particularly as it was inked following nuclear tests carried out by both the countries in May 1998. But the optimism raised about an improvement in Indo-Pak relations lost its momentum because of the Kargil crisis”¦
Without doubt, the United States was acutely apprehensive of India and Pakistan taking to the MAD path by pursuing a nuclear proliferation drive. Certainly, the U.S. tried its best to prevent either from going for the nuclear bomb,2 but Washington failed to secure both India’s and Pakistan’s signature to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Had only India or only Pakistan pursued nuclear proliferation, the situation may have been different. It may be noted that Pakistan stayed away from being a signatory to NPT on the ground that India was not inking it. To this date, the policy of deterrence has held India and Pakistan from going towards the MAD path. India opposed the NPT as it was against “vertical proliferation”—that is nuclear drive being pursued by only a few powers. Their nuclear drive, as suggested by the following pattern, has had a revolutionary impact on their bilateral ties.
- During the seventies, the United States was strongly against Pakistan joining the nuclear club. Pakistan, however, remained insistent and moved ahead to pursue its nuclear drive. United States reacted strongly and imposed Symington and Glenn amendments, cancelling US aid to Pakistan during the late seventies. The two amendments prohibit US aid to any country “found trafficking in nuclear enrichment equipment or technology outside of international safeguards,” and/or any nuclear-weapon state (as defined by NPT) that, “among other things, detonates a nuclear explosive device.”
- During this period, Indo-Pak relations were at a very low ebb. The crucial role played by India in helping Pakistan’s eastern wing seek independence, leading to the formation of Bangladesh, in 1971, cannot be delinked from the fact that Indo-Pak ties were fairly dismal during this phase. The India factor, however, carried little importance in United States’ stand against Pakistan’s nuclear policy. The United States opposed India’s nuclear drive also. Interestingly, neither India nor Pakistan paid much attention then to U.S. sanctions’ threat and/or their imposition regarding their nuclear drive.
- Regional developments compelled the United States to give importance to the geostrategic worth of Pakistan from early eighties. The United States was forced to change its stand following the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Russian intervention in Afghanistan (1979). In 1981, a presidential waiver was given to Symington and Glenn Amendments, leading to the resumption of United States’ aid to Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan continued its nuclear pursuits, maintaining an attitude of diplomatic ambivalence. It was then apparently essential for such ambiguity to keep a façade of Pakistan’s nuclear designs before American officials. The façade was also needed to keep the U.S. image about the superpower not aiding a country engaged in nuclear proliferation.
- The phase from the eighties was suggestive of Indo-Pak relations having reached the stage of no conflict.
“¦despite Indo-Pak tension being severe over the Kargil war in 1999 and Mumbai terror strikes in November 2008), they did not reach the stage of any open conflict.
- Despite Pakistan clandestinely pursuing its nuclear drive, there was a marked change in United States’ approach towards the same. The U.S. had earlier imposed sanctions against Pakistan for continuing its nuclear drive. During the eighties, the U.S. chose not to be disturbed by the same.
- During the same period, India and Pakistan moved towards the stage of “cordiality,” described then as unimagined of in the past. Earlier, the Indo-Pak animosity had created the impression that both countries were engaged either in wars or in avoidance of the same. Now, ground for moving to better ties was laid at different levels, including negotiations for discussing elements of discord and move towards greater cooperation and cricket diplomacy.
The highlight of this period was the six-point accord reached between the then Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani president Zia-ul-Haq in December 1985, during the latter’s visit to Delhi. It was inked during the Indian prime minister’s visit to Islamabad in December 1988. The two countries agreed in principle not to attack each other’s nuclear installations. The agreement came into force on 27 January 1991. Under the agreement, the two countries, on 1 January every year, are to inform each other of nuclear Installations and facilities to be covered by the agreement. The first such exchange of lists took place on 1 January 1992.
A question mark is naturally placed over this aspect of their nuclear diplomacy when the Kargil crisis is taken note of. It would be perhaps pertinent to view Indo-Pak relations by focusing on the nature of their message and who it targets.
Should it be assumed that Indo-Pak relations moved from the stage of conflict/no-conflict to that of improving their ties because of their nuclear proliferation? In this context, Indo-Pak relations undeniably fit into the theory of “classic deterrence.” The crucial impact of their nuclear policy has been twofold—one, the prevention of Indo-Pak confrontation and two, improvement in Indo-Pak ties. Had nuclear deterrence not laid the foundation, prospects of India and Pakistan moving towards better relations may not have prevailed. It may be noted, despite Indo-Pak tension being severe over the Kargil war in 1999 and Mumbai terror strikes in November 2008), they did not reach the stage of any open conflict. The two countries continued exchanging the nuclear list on the first of each calendar year. They exchanged lists of their nuclear installations for the nineteenth consecutive time this year too, on 1 January, through diplomatic channels simultaneously at New Delhi and Islamabad. Amid this backdrop, Indo-Pak nuclear diplomacy, resting on their bilateral understanding of nuclear deterrence, defies fears raised earlier about their nuclear-status leading to MAD in South Asia.
To a considerable extent, nuclear diplomacy’s role in the cessation of Indo-Pak open conflicts has contributed to opening avenues for increasing cordiality as well as reducing tension at other levels. Even though the track record of India and Pakistan cannot be hailed as positive in implementing confidence-building measures (CBMs), at least they have not abandoned the path.3 Undeniably, there have been phases when there has been a pause in their holding bilateral talks on CBMs.4 Nevertheless, despite being marked by tension, there is no denying that around two decades of pursuing CBMs has brought Indo-Pak ties to a level that seemed like a mirage earlier. The words “confidence-building measures” are in themselves suggestive of India and Pakistan having agreed that not war but dialogue was the appropriate diplomatic option for improving their relations at various levels.
| Editor’s Pick |
Compare this with the period when at multilateral gatherings, leaders of the two countries seemed reluctant even to greet each other. In the present period, they take out time to exchange warm smiles, shake hands and meet on the sidelines of multilateral gatherings. Even though these meetings may be viewed as nothing else but a show of cosmetic diplomacy, their significance cannot be ignored. They are at least suggestive of their trying to convince the world that India and Pakistan are holding talks and, thus, there should be no fear that they are moving towards any war. In this context, the Lahore Declaration inked shortly after India and Pakistan went nuclear bears greater relevance in light of their attempts to dismiss fears and apprehensions voiced about the negative aftermath of their respective nuclear policies. The ironic alacrity with which Indian and Pakistani leaders displayed “warmth” towards each other soon after going nuclear was their diplomatic message to the rest of the world. It aimed at dispelling noise made then about Indo-Pak nuclear policies leading the region towards a nuclear war or MAD.
The Indo-Pak nuclear diplomacy was again put to test when the Indian Parliament was attacked by terrorists in December 2001. India held Pakistani terrorists as responsible for the attack.
A question mark is naturally placed over this aspect of their nuclear diplomacy when the Kargil crisis is taken note of. It would be perhaps pertinent to view Indo-Pak relations by focusing on the nature of their message and who it targets.
The Lahore Declaration and CBMs should not be viewed simply as major strides taken by India and Pakistan in their bilateral relations. They should more significantly be regarded as diplomatic necessity of the moment to convince the world that the two “nuclear” powers were moving towards normalising their relations. Where the Kargil crisis is concerned, it may be noted that India and Pakistan continue to be engaged in minor skirmishes now and then over the violation of LoC norms they are expected to respect. The Kargil crisis was a violation on a larger level of what seems to be a routine irritant in their bilateral relations. From this angle, it isn’t surprising that the Kargil crisis remained a limited conflict.
The Indo-Pak nuclear diplomacy was again put to test when the Indian Parliament was attacked by terrorists in December 2001. India held Pakistani terrorists as responsible for the attack. The two countries reached a near-war stage once again, with around a million troops assembled along the LoC. Tension clouded their ties once again when terror-strikes hit Mumbai in November 2008. Against the backdrop of the heights reached by communication revolution during the same period, it is imperative to give some importance to its role in spreading “tension” in Indo-Pak ties as well as “news” about “progress” in their moving towards “normalcy.”
Please wait...
