In defence terms, the new ASEAN borders China and forms a sort of security link for India since the Sixties, in particular. That was perhaps the reason why India went out of its way in endorsing the Vietnamese approach to the Cambodian question during the 1980s even at the cost of damaging the then available prospects of joining ASEAN (old) as a dialogue partner. This was mistaken at that time as a manifestation of India’s pro-Soviet slant in its foreign policy. Peace and stability in the new ASEAN region has always been of considerable significance to India because instability and disorder there, as and when precipitated, has been exploited by China and other vested interests.
Indias defence public sector companies are also not apt in clinching sale deeds on a competitive basis, particularly in the conformity with the culture of the Southeast Asian defence purchases.
We have mentioned earlier that in some important way, the shift in India’s approach to the Myanmar military regime marked the beginning of India’s look-east policy. India has had defence cooperation with Vietnam for a long time. This has been strengthened during the 1990s and in the new millennium, covering not only training and defence supplies but also transfer of peaceful nuclear technology under international safeguards. 1995 also saw the beginning of defence cooperation with Laos under which India has been providing teaching support at the Lao Military Academy. India has also now agreed to establish a Lao Air Force Academy for training purposes.
In 1997, India also agreed to upgrade Laotian fighting aircrafts (MIG-21s, initially supplied by the former Soviet Union), but the Agreement could not be executed owing to financial difficulties at the Lao end. India’s Security cooperation with Laos operates at various levels. Both the countries are sharing intelligence and coordinating their border management activities to ensure that the insurgents on either side do not take undue advantage. In 1995, Myanmar and India conducted joint operations to curb the activities of India’s insurgents in the Northeast region. India is also coming forward to help Myanmar strengthen its naval capabilities and ports. India is now willing to supply military hardware to Myanmar. All this is done under a bilateral security dialogue instituted during the early Nineties. This dialogue has had more than 13 meetings so far.
Among the old ASEAN countries, India is gradually stepping up its defence cooperation with Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. All these countries, in particular Singapore, has played a very critical role in facilitating India’s integration with the ASEAN regional institutions. Strategic compatibility developed with Singapore by India is strongest in the region where India has offered critical training space and facilities to Singapore security forces (particularly air force). India has also started conducting anti-submarine warfare exercises with Singapore since March 2004. India’s experience in defence cooperation with Malaysia has not been free of disappointments to the either side.
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India could not complete its obligations to repair and upgrade Malaysian fighter aircrafts (MIG-21) due to both, the financial arrangements and technological snags. Thailand has been seeking a military supply relationship with India which could not take shape due to various reasons including the shadow of the financial crisis in the ASEAN region during 1997-2000. It is, however, hoped that new momentum seen in Indo-Thai relationship will overcome many of the past hurdles.
Indias strategic engagement with the emerging Asia is on the right track and it is expected to gain momentum as India streamlines its economic and security capabilities.
In 2001, Thailand and India instituted an annual security dialogue to deal with the issues of their mutual concern in regional and bilateral security. India’s defence cooperation that existed at a modest level with Indonesia during the fifties and the sixties may hopefully be revived.
One of the problems in India pursuing its defence cooperation with the ASEAN region is its inaptitude and structural constraints in dealing with defence ties. India’s defence production, being in the public sector all these years, has not been geared to meet export obligations. India’s defence public sector companies are also not apt in clinching sale deeds on a competitive basis, particularly in the conformity with the culture of the Southeast Asian defence purchases.
In this respect, India may also learn to workout barter arrangements in payments for defence supplies and services. The Indian defence establishments are increasingly getting sensitized to their constraints and the region’s market demands and it is hoped that necessary lessons are learnt to harness the considerable potential of building defence cooperation in coming years. For instance, India’s defence sales to the ASEAN countries registered an increase of nearly 9% by 2003. India should, however, continue to be careful in avoiding entanglement, if any, with bilateral disharmonies and strategic divergences among its eastern neighbours resulting from its increasing bilateral defence cooperation.
On the whole, India’s strategic engagement with the emerging Asia is on the right track and it is expected to gain momentum as India streamlines its economic and security capabilities.
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