Geopolitics

India's Strategic Engagement of the East
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Issue Vol 20.4 Oct-Dec 2005 | Date : 14 Sep , 2011

All the member countries acknowledge India’s willingness and capabilities to undertake appropriate obligations to advance the cause of peace and security in the region. This is because India acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation during its second Summit with ASEAN (+1) in October 2003 at Bali, Indonesia. India also signed at Bali the joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism.

“¦a specific thrust in Indias approach to terrorism which may be useful for the overall ASEAN regional perspective. India does not over emphasise the Islamic extremist dimension of terrorism and the Indian experience shows that its own Muslim population has not joined the ranks of the Jihadi extremists.

At the Vientiane Summit in 2004, ASEAN – India Partnership of Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity was also concluded. After its 1998 nuclear explosions and declaration to have nuclear weapons, India has tried to alleviate concerns of the ASEAN members that its nuclear programme is aimed strictly to ensure India’s security interests and will not be used to advance any warlike or hegemonic objectives. In this respect, India also endorsed ASEAN’s proposal for regional Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. This is a revised version of the earlier concept of Zone of Freedom, Peace and Neutrality (ZOFPAN). Through all these Treaties and Agreements, India has tried to establish its credentials as a dependable partner in ensuring regional peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

It may be pertinent to mention here that the upgrading of India’s naval facilities in its Andman and Nicobar Islands is of vital importance in enabling India to play a useful role in ASEAN regional security. India’s naval capabilities on these Islands are a part of its overall maritime security concerns where it has to protect its own 2mn Kms. of Extended Economic Zone (EEZ). These Islands are 1300 Kms away from the mainland but hold a nodel geo-strategic location with regard to Malacca Strait through which approximately more than $300 bn worth of oil and gas transits along with 40 Super Tankers and 300 ships daily. China and Japan, the two major players in Southeast Asia depend heavily on the Malacca Strait for their trade of $100 bn and $260 bn respectively.

In the two critical areas of countering terrorism and ensuring maritime security, India’s contribution has been active and constructive, both in building mutual confidence and implementing preventive measures. India’s cooperation with the US in escorting their ships through Malacca Strait during 2002 (April-September) under “Operation Sagittarius” considerably enhanced its standing with regard to maritime security. India has been willing to enter into bilateral or multilateral arrangements with any of the ASEAN countries to ensure maritime security, within or outside the ARF framework. Apart from Search and Rescue, the areas covered for such security cooperation include curbing – terrorism, piracy and trafficking of drugs, small arms and humans.

Many of the Indian terrorism experts have contributed to seminars and conferences in ASEAN countries on the question of dealing with the post-9/11 phenomenon of terrorism.

The speed and efficiency with which India could reach out to Tsunami affected areas in the region in December 2004, have also been appreciated. On terrorism, India needs extensive cooperation with the ASEAN countries because many of its terrorist and insurgent groups depend upon arms shipments and financial transactions passing through the ASEAN countries. India is also actively cooperating in intelligence sharing with the eastern neighbours in this regard and other arrangements such as Container Security Initiative.

There is, however, a specific thrust in India’s approach to terrorism which may be useful for the overall ASEAN regional perspective. India does not over emphasise the Islamic extremist dimension of terrorism and the Indian experience shows that its own Muslim population has not joined the ranks of the Jihadi extremists. Religious tolerance and pluralism is India’s strength that has constructive lessons for ASEAN to emulate.

For instance, Singapore’s Defence Minister acknowledged this positive aspect of India’s national experience in his interaction with Indian policy think tanks during his official visit to India. It was also impressed upon him that many persisting insurgencies in South Asia are not rooted into Islamic extremism. Many of the Indian terrorism experts have contributed to seminars and conferences in ASEAN countries on the question of dealing with the post-9/11 phenomenon of terrorism. Thus, India is gradually emerging as a positive and stabilising force in the region.

Building Dependable Bilateral Ties

The substance of India’s strategic engagement with the ASEAN region would be shaped and defined by the content of its relationship with the individual members of the region. Over more than a decade, there has evolved a regional approach in India’s policy that would nurse these bilateral ties. The main instruments of this regional approach has been high level political exchange visits, as well as visits by professional and defence delegations, arrangements like Free Trade Agreements and security dialogues, visits of naval ships and joint military exercises and agreements for defence supplies and training. The nature and extent of the use of these instruments or mechanisms depend upon the quality and strength of relationship with a given country.

India is now willing to supply military hardware to Myanmar. All this is done under a bilateral security dialogue instituted during the early Nineties.

In India’s perception, there exists two clearly identifiable clusters of ASEAN when it comes to building strong and dependable bilateral ties in the region namely; the old ASEAN (of six initial member countries namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines and Brunei) and the new ASEAN (of four countries that were given membership during the 1990s; i.e. Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam). Both these clusters differ in their economic performances and strategic perspectives. India’s economic synergies with these two clusters also operate at two different levels. While India is capable and willing of offering support to the new ASEAN in the areas of human resource development, technical know-how and credit line on softer terms, it looks towards the old ASEAN for investments, trade and financial arrangements.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

SD Muni

SD Muni, Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

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