Indian Defence Review

After a couple of days’ rest, 77 (Para) Brigade resumed its advance and, one by one, enemy pockets on the way to Kargil were eliminated. The 5th Gorkhas now played a leading role. On the night of 22/23 November,while one of their companies dealt with the enemy lurking across the Shingo River, another company climbed a 4,267-metre mountain and marched all night to strike Kargil before dawn. Later during the day (23 November), a column that had advanced from Leh reached Kargil. The news of the link-up was received with great joy in India: Ladakh had been saved.

The cost of this operation in the shape of casualties was 40 killed and 86 wounded, besides about 350 cases of frostbite. The enemy was estimated to have 318 killed.

While Thimayya’s attention was focused on Zoji La, the enemy had stepped up its activities around Tithwal. The Pakistanis thought it was a good opportunity to retake Tithwal. From the second week of August, they frequently shelled and mortared Indian positions South of the town. When pressure in this sector increased, Thimayya switched 3 Jat from Zoji La to 163 Brigade. Harbakhsh Singh ordered the Jats to clear enemy pockets East of the Kishanganga (Neelam River to the Pakistanis) and destroy all bridges on the river up to the suspension bridge. The Jats thereafter conducted a series of operations in this sector.

“¦knew that the enemy was on the offensive in every sector and it would be suicidal not to take a practical view of things.

It was, however, the Sikhs, in the Richmar Gali area who bore the brunt of Pakisani attacks. A brigade attack was launched against 1 Sikh’s forward position on 13/14 October after a massive artillery bombardment. It was a fierce attempt and at some places the enemy got as near as 10 metres to the Sikhs’ positions. But the Sikhs held firm. The intensity of the fighting can be judged from the fact that the enemy put in eight attacks against one of the battalion’s outposts. The man in charge of the post – Lance Naik Karam Singh of Malian village in Ludhiana district – made history by repelling each one of them.

Outnumbered ten to one, he kept his ground and beat off every attack. . . his ammunition running out and with no hope of help owing to the heavy enemy fire, [he] crawled from bunker to bunker encouraging those who were still unhurt to carry out the fight. Himself wounded, Lance Naik Karam Singh kept up the fight, dominating the scene throughout.

The PVC that the Government later conferred on this brave man was richly deserved.38

Before proceeding further, it would be well to touch upon an organizational change that had taken place in the beginning of September. The need was felt for a co-ordinating Headquarters within the theatre. As a result, Lieutenant General S.M. Shrinagesh was placed in overall command of troops in Jammu & Kashmir. His Headquarters at Jammu was initially known as V Corps; the designation was later changed to 15 Corps. With Cariappa and Thimayya already on the scene, the arrival of Shrinagesh brought together in Jammu & Kashmir three senior Indian officers who would in due course rise to the highest position in the Army. The operations were in good hands.

Cariappa was not in favour of a defensive posture.

The presence of the UN Commission in India put her military command in an awkward situation. The Indian Government had accepted the Commission’s appeal to refrain from offensive action, and had issued a directive to Cariappa through Army Headquarters to the effect that no major operation was to be undertaken without their approval and that he should concentrate on stabilizing the existing positions. However, Cariappa was not in favour of a defensive posture. He knew that the enemy was on the offensive in every sector and it would be suicidal not to take a practical view of things. We have seen how the enemy had struck in the North. It had retaken Pandu, forced Skardu to capitulate and had almost reached Leh. In the Jammu and Punch districts, enemy moves had been even more menacing. The nearness of its bases here made it easy for the enemy to bring up artillery and men against vulnerable spots.

The enemy had not reconciled itself to the loss of Jhangar. In April, it had made a determined attempt to retake it. Thrown back, it built up for a bigger attempt. By the first week of May, the enemy had a mixed force of about six battalions (Azad Kashmir, tribals and one regular unit) against 50 (Para) Brigade.

The attack came in the early hours of 10 May with wave after wave of the enemy throwing itself against the defences of Jhangar. However, these were in good hands, and the attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. In the middle of June, the enemy brought up 25-pounders to positions South of Jhangar. The gun positions were strafed by the Indian Air Force. The enemy brought them into action again on 3 July and shelled Jhangar. Brigadier Usman was killed by a shell-burst near a bunker he was about to enter. His inspiring leadership and courage were recognized with a posthumous award of the MVC.

To be continued…