An unsuccessful attempt was made in April-May 1948 to relieve Skardu. A battalion of the Jammu and Kashmir Infantry was sent from Srinagar together with a small party of regular troops. Due to the size of the staging camps and the narrowness of the tracks, the force had to be sent piecemeal. In the beginning of May, while the battalion was strung between Dras and Parkutta, the enemy decided to leave the garrison at Skardu alone for the time being and attacked the staging camps. The small detachments at these camps were surprised by the sudden appearance of the enemy and were either destroyed or driven out. The relief column for Skardu, staging in these posts, was also taken in the sweep, a small number escaping to Leh. The enemy on reaching Kargil along the Indus and moving a column along the Shyok was now in a position to threaten Leh as well as Srinagar from the direction of Zoji La. The Kashmir Valley was now ringed from the West, North and East.
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Thapa and his gallant men stood firm at Skardu but they did not have the means to bar the route to the South. The enemy left just enough men there to continue the siege while making for Kargil. The small garrison there was ordered to withdraw to Leh. With Dras and Kargil gone, Indian land communications with Leh were firmly cut: only one tortuous route remained, the mountain track from Manali to Leh.
The enemy left just enough men there to continue the siege while making for Kargil. The small garrison there was ordered to withdraw to Leh.
When Sher Jang Thapa left Leh to save Skardu, he left behind just 33 men of the state forces. A few days after Skardu came under attack, Sen despatched a party of three officers and 70 men to Leh to raise and train a local militia for its defence. Strict secrecy was maintained about the despatch of this force. Called ‘Lehdet’, it was commanded by Major Prithi Chand of 2 Dogra and consisted entirely of volunteers. The 415-kilometre trek in the midst of winter was a dangerous venture. A number of Lahaulis from his own battalion formed part of Prithi Chand’s detachment. Zoji La was under nine metres of snow at the time and Prithi Chand prepared it for the crossing in an ingenious manner. Drums were beaten in the stillness of the night to create avalanches and the process was repeated over three successive nights before the crossing was effected without a mishap. Lehdet reached its destination on 8 March.
Prithi Chand had taken a hundred spare rifles to train and arm the Leh militia. Towards the end of April, more arms and ammunition arrived. Among the first volunteers to join was the young Raja of Leh, a scion of the dynasty that had ruled over Ladakh for centuries. He enlisted as a jawan but was later given a commission in the Indian Army.
While the enemy was building up for an attack on Leh, a company of 2/4 Gorkha Rifles was flown in from Srinagar on 1 June. Thus reinforced, the garrison was able to undertake some aggressive patrolling.
The remnants of the Kargil garrison reached Leh on 17 May. The only troops now between Kargil and Leh were two platoons guarding the bridge at Khalatse (see Fig. 3.7). At this place, about 60 kilometres from Leh, the Kargil-Leh track crossed from the South bank of the Indus to the North bank. The enemy now converged upon Leh from the North, the West and the South.
In the winter months, the Leh garrison had built an improvised air-strip with the help of a Ladakhi engineer and on 24 May, Thimayya landed there. He had been flown in a Dakota by Group Captain (later Air Commodore) Mehar Singh over an uncharted region above 7,000 metres without using oxygen. The air route was opened none too soon for, two days earlier, the state forces platoons at Khalatse had been attacked and forced to withdraw. Fortunately, they blew up the bridge before falling back.
While the enemy was building up for an attack on Leh, a company of 2/4 Gorkha Rifles was flown in from Srinagar on 1 June. Thus reinforced, the garrison was able to undertake some aggressive patrolling. In an engagement with about 600 of the enemy on 26 June, near Gumkhar, the Gorkhas killed and wounded a good number. Meanwhile, 2/8 Gorkha Rifles had been despatched from Ferozepur by the old caravan route through Manali, in Himachal Pradesh.
By 18 September, the whole of 2/8 Gorkha Rifles had joined the garrison but it was not yet possible to mount a link-up operation as the line of communication from Srinagar had not been cleared of the enemy.
No troops had used this difficult 325-kilometre track in recent times and the first company reached Leh on 5 July, 38 days after the battalion had left Ferozepur. Bad weather prevented the fly-in of reinforcements from Srinagar till 15 August, when some troops, stores and ammunition began to arrive. Meanwhile, the enemy had been pressing its advantage in numbers, and one of its groups managed to come within 6 kilometres of Leh. By 18 September, the whole of 2/8 Gorkha Rifles had joined the garrison36 but it was not yet possible to mount a link-up operation as the line of communication from Srinagar had not been cleared of the enemy.
Skardu fell on 14 August. While the rest of the country was preparing to celebrate the first anniversary of Independence, this garrison, without ammunition and hardly any rations, had to hoist the white flag. The jubilant enemy commander is said to have reported his victory thus: “All Sikhs shot, all women raped”.37
To save Leh from the fate of Skardu, Thimayya now turned his attention to Dras and Kargil. He had earlier planned to take Gurais which was captured by 1 Grenadiers in the early hours of 29 June. However, before an advance towards the Burzil Pass could commence, Skardu fell. There being little point now in going in that direction, Thimayya decided to move 77 (Para) Brigade to Baltal for a thrust against Kargil through Zoji La. The formation was now commanded by Brigadier K.L. Atal and it had left its old battalions in the Uri sector. It now comprised 3 Jat, 1/5 (Royal) Gorkha Rifles, 5 Maratha LI, J&K Mountain Battery, Engineers, a platoon of Mahar machine-gunners, and the usual ancillaries.
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During its summer offensive, the enemy had debouched into the Sonamarg Valley through Zoji La. The task of chasing him back had been entrusted to 1 Patiala. The battalion drove the enemy back to Zoji La and thereafter established picquets around Baltal, at heights of over 4,800 metres. After the arrival of 77 (Para) Brigade, 1 Patiala came under its command. The latter carried out its mission with superb elan.
Baltal is at the foot of Zoji La, about a hundred kilometres North-East of Srinagar. The pass was a three-kilometre defile, with high peaks dominating it on either side. The enemy held both shoulders of the pass (Mukand Ridge and Chabutra Ridge) and a position further back (Machine-Gun Ridge) with a battalion, which had mountain guns, three-inch mortars and machine guns in support. It had built bunkers into the mountainside. To storm these positions, Indian troops would have to climb from the foot of Zoji La under fire.
On the night of 13 September, Atal made another attempt. It was an all-out effort to storm the pass frontally, but the enemy was again able to hold out.
Atal made an elaborate plan for Operation ‘Duck’, the code name given to the mission. Two of his battalions were to carry out a wide hook from the left, while the rest of the brigade made a frontal assault on the pass. At the same time, a small diversionary force was to be despatched from Khanabal. South of Srinagar, towards Kargil, by way of Suru. The plan was put into effect on 3 September, but the operation fizzled out. The frontal attack received adequate support from field and mountain artillery and for two days before the assault, Tempests bombed and strafed enemy positions. But all this plastering had little effect on enemy bunkers, and the infantry were forced back after some initial gains. The column on the left encountered frozen tracks and had to be recalled. On the night of 13 September, Atal made another attempt. It was an all-out effort to storm the pass frontally, but the enemy was again able to hold out.
Indian casualties in the two attacks had been heavy and Thimayya now realized that the bunkers in the mountainside would have to be cleared like the Japanese bunkers in Burma, i.e. busting by direct fire. But getting tanks to these heights was not easy. No tanks had operated at such altitudes before and bringing them up would be something never attempted before. Also, the move would have to be kept secret as the enemy could easily bring up a few anti-tank guns or mines and ruin the whole effort. But once it was decided that tanks would be used, everyone concerned with the operation set to work. At the back of their mind was the single thought of saving Leh before it was too late.
Working day and night, the Engineers built a track from Baltal to Zoji La within a month. A squadron of Stuarts of 7 Light Cavalry moved under Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Rajinder Singh (‘Sparrow’) from Akhnur, a distance of 445 kilometres. To ensure secrecy, the turrets of the tanks were removed and carried separately, while the armoured vehicles were camouflaged and moved at night. During the day, they were kept covered with shrouds in harbours and when they passed through Srinagar, a curfew was imposed. Many of the bridges on the way were too weak for the tanks and they had to be winched across, in case they collapsed with the crew inside.By 15 October, the squadron was in position at Baltal, and 20 October was fixed as D-day for the third assault on Zoji La. Additional artillery support had been arranged this time and the infantry element had somewhat changed. Now the brigade had 1/5 (Royal) Gorkha Rifles, 4 Rajput and 1 Patiala. For better luck, the name of the operation was also changed; it was now ‘Bison’ instead of ‘Duck’.
When all was ready, however, the weather gave out. It snowed for several days. After the operation had been postponed twice, Thimayya took a decision to go ahead on 1 November, regardless of the weather. It would have to be that day or next year. He also changed the plan of attack. According to the original plan, the Mukand and Chabutra features were to be attacked by infantry supported by tanks, after which the tanks were to pass on to the Gumri basin, on the other side of the pass. Now he decided on a bolder course: the tanks, followed by the 5th Gorkhas, would advance straight to the Gumri basin; thereafter, they would attack the enemy from the rear, while the Patialas and the Rajputs attacked it frontally.
The appearance of tanks came as a complete surprise to the enemy. They fled in panic when streams of bullets from their machine guns flattened on the sides of the tanks and fell away harmlessly.
As luck would have it, it began to snow heavily on 1 November, and the Air Force could not be used. But the attack began, as scheduled, at 1000 hours, after a heavy artillery concentration. Thimayya rode in the leading tank. The reduced visibility due to the snow-storm was a boon to the Gorkhas: they could advance without interference from the enemy, and by 1400 hours the column had got across to the Gumri basin. The appearance of tanks came as a complete surprise to the enemy. They fled in panic when streams of bullets from their machine guns flattened on the sides of the tanks and fell away harmlessly.
Thimayya exploited his success by ordering the Patialas to pass through the Gorkhas during the night and attack Machoi, on the far end of the pass. The battalion again did extremely well. Besides taking its objective, it captured an enemy howitzer, and a large quantity of ammunition. The whole of the Zoji La area was now clear of the enemy.
Indian troops fought at Zoji La under severe conditions. The terrain was difficult, the temperature was 20 degrees below zero, and they had no snow-clothing or special equipment. The men of 7 Light Cavalry showed great skill in manoeuvring their vehicles over the slushy, narrow track. Not a single tank got stuck in the snow. For the first time in history, tanks had participated in a battle at this height and the action received a good deal of attention in the world press.
While Thimayyas attention was focused on Zoji La, the enemy had stepped up its activities around Tithwal. The Pakistanis thought it was a good opportunity to retake Tithwal.
While congratulating everyone on the success at Zoji La, Cariappa ordered that the advance to Kargil go on at full speed. The enemy was to be given no rest till a link-up with Leh had been achieved. Atal and his team were already attuned to the task. Nothing spurs men to greater effort than a whacking success, and Zoji La had been one. By 4 November, the Rajputs had captured Matayan, 18 kilometres from Zoji La. When two strongly held features beyond Matayan barred further progress, tanks had to be brought up again. As at Zoji La, the enemy here was entrenched in caves, from where only tanks could blast them out.
It so happened that Guru Nanak’s birthday fell on 16 November that year. The Patialas, who were again in the lead, vowed they would celebrate the great day in Dras and kept their promise by entering the town a day earlier. General Thimayya was given a civic reception by the people of Dras.
After a couple of days’ rest, 77 (Para) Brigade resumed its advance and, one by one, enemy pockets on the way to Kargil were eliminated. The 5th Gorkhas now played a leading role. On the night of 22/23 November,while one of their companies dealt with the enemy lurking across the Shingo River, another company climbed a 4,267-metre mountain and marched all night to strike Kargil before dawn. Later during the day (23 November), a column that had advanced from Leh reached Kargil. The news of the link-up was received with great joy in India: Ladakh had been saved.
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The cost of this operation in the shape of casualties was 40 killed and 86 wounded, besides about 350 cases of frostbite. The enemy was estimated to have 318 killed.
While Thimayya’s attention was focused on Zoji La, the enemy had stepped up its activities around Tithwal. The Pakistanis thought it was a good opportunity to retake Tithwal. From the second week of August, they frequently shelled and mortared Indian positions South of the town. When pressure in this sector increased, Thimayya switched 3 Jat from Zoji La to 163 Brigade. Harbakhsh Singh ordered the Jats to clear enemy pockets East of the Kishanganga (Neelam River to the Pakistanis) and destroy all bridges on the river up to the suspension bridge. The Jats thereafter conducted a series of operations in this sector.
“¦knew that the enemy was on the offensive in every sector and it would be suicidal not to take a practical view of things.
It was, however, the Sikhs, in the Richmar Gali area who bore the brunt of Pakisani attacks. A brigade attack was launched against 1 Sikh’s forward position on 13/14 October after a massive artillery bombardment. It was a fierce attempt and at some places the enemy got as near as 10 metres to the Sikhs’ positions. But the Sikhs held firm. The intensity of the fighting can be judged from the fact that the enemy put in eight attacks against one of the battalion’s outposts. The man in charge of the post – Lance Naik Karam Singh of Malian village in Ludhiana district – made history by repelling each one of them.
Outnumbered ten to one, he kept his ground and beat off every attack. . . his ammunition running out and with no hope of help owing to the heavy enemy fire, [he] crawled from bunker to bunker encouraging those who were still unhurt to carry out the fight. Himself wounded, Lance Naik Karam Singh kept up the fight, dominating the scene throughout.
The PVC that the Government later conferred on this brave man was richly deserved.38
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Before proceeding further, it would be well to touch upon an organizational change that had taken place in the beginning of September. The need was felt for a co-ordinating Headquarters within the theatre. As a result, Lieutenant General S.M. Shrinagesh was placed in overall command of troops in Jammu & Kashmir. His Headquarters at Jammu was initially known as V Corps; the designation was later changed to 15 Corps. With Cariappa and Thimayya already on the scene, the arrival of Shrinagesh brought together in Jammu & Kashmir three senior Indian officers who would in due course rise to the highest position in the Army. The operations were in good hands.
Cariappa was not in favour of a defensive posture.
The presence of the UN Commission in India put her military command in an awkward situation. The Indian Government had accepted the Commission’s appeal to refrain from offensive action, and had issued a directive to Cariappa through Army Headquarters to the effect that no major operation was to be undertaken without their approval and that he should concentrate on stabilizing the existing positions. However, Cariappa was not in favour of a defensive posture. He knew that the enemy was on the offensive in every sector and it would be suicidal not to take a practical view of things. We have seen how the enemy had struck in the North. It had retaken Pandu, forced Skardu to capitulate and had almost reached Leh. In the Jammu and Punch districts, enemy moves had been even more menacing. The nearness of its bases here made it easy for the enemy to bring up artillery and men against vulnerable spots.
The enemy had not reconciled itself to the loss of Jhangar. In April, it had made a determined attempt to retake it. Thrown back, it built up for a bigger attempt. By the first week of May, the enemy had a mixed force of about six battalions (Azad Kashmir, tribals and one regular unit) against 50 (Para) Brigade.
The attack came in the early hours of 10 May with wave after wave of the enemy throwing itself against the defences of Jhangar. However, these were in good hands, and the attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. In the middle of June, the enemy brought up 25-pounders to positions South of Jhangar. The gun positions were strafed by the Indian Air Force. The enemy brought them into action again on 3 July and shelled Jhangar. Brigadier Usman was killed by a shell-burst near a bunker he was about to enter. His inspiring leadership and courage were recognized with a posthumous award of the MVC.
To be continued…
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