A Case of Sleep-walk?
Recently, the ‘Ajay Vikram Singh Committee (AVSC) Report Part II’ was implemented in the armed forces amidst much satisfaction among the military hierarchy. Thus a large number of higher posts were created to ease the stiff pyramidal structure that permitted only a very few to rise. Some years back, Part I of this Report had been implemented that led to proliferation of middle level ranks in fighting units and quickened the pace of promotions – and consequently, a long over-due case of appropriate compensation for the hard life of the soldiery was addressed. Actually, the idea of ‘upgrade of rank structure’ was first mooted in early 1980’s when many appointments in military units, headquarters and training institutions were rendered tenable by one step higher ranks. That may have been appropriate then when seen in light of higher responsibilities and accountability under the prevailing dispensation, but it is obvious that this innocuous idea set in motion which came to be referred to as the AVSC Report, graciously named after its prime mover, the then Defence Secretary.
The sense of satisfaction in the military establishment was expected. It brought much needed economic succor to the deprived soldiery who were ordained to perform extraordinary exactions in return of ludicrously low pay and stagnation in each rank. Thus, confronted with a sense of moral responsibility, the government of the day sought to address the injustice in the only manner it was familiar with – mass upgrade of ranks, and inter alia, pay scales – regardless of its propriety or fallouts. If there could be ‘table-top’ hierarchy in civil services – even if the majority might hibernate on mundane assignments – why should not the same balm be applied on the military edifice, the policy makers may have wondered.
Indian policy makers have to understand that even as it takes many generations to build an army, it does not need more than a few years to undermine it and that the imperatives of war preparedness cannot be addressed with civil- specific norms, nor can the role of the Army be mixed with societal obligations of the state.
In any case, the more appropriate recourse to raising emoluments at various ranks and lateral transfer of middle level soldiery to other organisations to decongest higher military ranks was in no w ay acceptable to the civil servants, as it would, according to their zealously guarded sense of authority, upset the existing ‘equation’ of civil-military hierarchy, howsoever irrelevant it might be when seen in light of the completely distinct and mutually exclusive service conditions among the two services. Military leaders on their part, finding no way out on the horizon, took to the expediency of acquiescence, and went all out in implementing the scheme with much chest thumping. Thus each service succeeded in guarding its turf. Consequently, the Army is now burdened with a top heavy organisation that in no way helps in its mandate of war-fighting. This self-inflicted damage is further exacerbated when the upgrade of appointments, instead of fostering better military vision and competence, leads to the higher ranks downgrading their skills and usurping the role of their subordinates – a Havildar is just about as efficient as a Naik of yesteryears and Generals have started thinking and acting just as Colonels did in the past.
In continuum with the enhancement of age-profile – that has led to emergence of numerous domestic, administrative, fitness and psychological problems – another misconceived step to de-fang nation’s military strength had been taken. Consequently, provision of married accommodation, running schools, enhanced medicare and improvement of ‘quality of life’ competes for fiscal allocation with training facilities and modernisation of weaponry and equipment. Policy makers, bureaucrats, and sadly, even the military leadership, all have been party to this mutually convenient arrangement. There may not be a more representative case of collective sleep-walking.
Military Management in Democracy
Democracy functions on a basic principle that expects each section of the empowered people to seek better and better dispensation for itself and to act as pressure groups or ‘vote banks’ to achieve its goals. The system functions best when strength of such pulls and pressures causes the most appropriate course to emerge. Annual budgeting, policies on ‘reservation’ and languages, are some examples of such dispensation.
Besides, there are administrative decisions which may not be palatable to the powerful but shortsighted vested interests and yet are necessary to adopt in long term interests of the nation. To accommodate such decisions, the Government sheds some of its powers for the autonomous bodies to regulate somewhat free form political influences. Arbitration and regulatory commissions are some examples of such recourse where control over the contentious issues is exercised by logic rather than body count. Good governance, therefore, is possible only if all institutions of the state perform according to their charter; even if one of them does not, there would be imbalance.
“¦the simplistic idea that terrorism is a direct result of social ills and poverty, and can therefore be comprehensively addressed by socio-economic uplift alone, if that was so, then Ireland, Kosovo, Nagaland, Kashmir and Punjab would not have happened.
The armed forces is an unique institution created by the polity to guard its vital interests through constitutional application of force when all other measures fail. Yet, with ‘brand-India’ democracy having seeped into the national polity, it is only to be expected that demands from other institutions to seek application of their yardsticks over management of military affairs would manifest, and so would be the vocal calls for ‘reform’ from a vast citizenry that is closely related to the million strong Indian Army, many of whom perceive military practices as archaic. This situation is particularly applicable in India, with most of her society remaining just about superficially aware of the deeper nuances of military matters. Unless therefore, professionals of the armed forces engage in the systemic dispensation to protect the distinct and extraordinary characteristics of the military establishment, which is .imperative to their ability to fulfill the nation’s exacting mandate that is ordained upon them, there would be adverse fallouts.
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