Homeland Security

How Pakistan's Proxy War Began - VII
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By B Raman

“Most terrorists continued to rely on conventional tactics, such as bombing, shooting, and kidnapping, but some terrorists – such as Osama bin Laden and his associates -continued to seek CBRN capabilities.

“Popular literature and the public dialogue focused on the vulnerability of civilian targets to CBRN attacks. Such attacks could cause lasting disruption and generate significant psychological impact on a population and its infrastructure.

“A few groups, notably those driven by distorted religious and cultural ideologies, showed signs that they were willing to cause large numbers of casualties. Other potentially dangerous but less predictable groups had emerged, and those groups may not abide by traditional targetting constraints that would prohibit using indiscriminate violence or CBRN weapons.

“Some CBRN materials, technology, and especially information continued to be widely available, particularly from commercial sources and the Internet.”

Terrorist use of Information Technology

“Terrorists have seized upon the worldwide practice of using information technology (IT) in daily life. They embrace IT for several reasons: it improves communication and aids organisation, allows members to coordinate quickly with large numbers of followers, and provides a platform for propaganda. The Internet also allows terrorists to reach a wide audience of potential donors and recruits who may be located over a large geographic area.

It referred to the role of Pakistan vis-à-vis the Taliban, the ““ Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in much greater detail than any past reports of the previous US Administrations. Though it did not declare Pakistan a State-sponsor of international terrorism”¦

“In addition, terrorists are taking note of the proliferation of hacking and the use of the computer as a weapon. Extremists routinely post messages to widely accessible web sites that call for defacing Western Internet sites and disrupting online service, for example. The widespread availability of hacking software and its anonymous and increasingly automated design make it likely that terrorists will use them.”

This report for 2000 was initially drafted by the officials of the outgoing Clinton Administration, but revised and finalised by the officials of the Bush Administration and hence was the first important indicator of the Bush Administration’s counter-terrorism policy.

It referred to the role of Pakistan vis-à-vis the Taliban, the – Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in much greater detail than any past reports of the previous US Administrations. Though it did not declare Pakistan a State-sponsor of international terrorism, it discussed the role of Pakistan not only in the chapter on terrorism in South Asia, as was done in the past reports, but also in the chapter on State-sponsored terrorism.

Previous US Administrations had considered only premeditated attacks on civilians as acts of terrorism, but not attacks on security forces. The latest report explained the circumstances under which the US would consider even attacks on security forces as terrorism.

It specified that the HUM is a member of Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front For Jehad Against the US and Israel and had signed his fatwa of February, 1998, calling for attacks against US and Israeli nationals/interests. Such a specific finding was not there in past reports.

While the UK has had no problem in banning the LET and the JEM under the new Terrorism Act of 2000, the US has not so far done”¦

The report had two Annexures – one on terrorist organisations, which have already been declared as international (foreign) terrorist organisations by the US and the other on terrorist organisations, which were active in 2000, but against which evidence was not adequate to warrant such a declaration. The HUM figured in the first list and the JEM and the LET in the second.

The Counter-Terrorism Division of the State Department submits two reports to the Congress every year – one in October on organisations, which need to be declared international terrorist organisations and the other in April on States, which need to be declared State-sponsors of international terrorism.

Though there is nothing to prevent the State Department from declaring an organisation as an international terrorist organisation even in April, generally this is not done. But, much to the disappointment of India, while the Bush Administration ordered the freezing of the accounts of the HUM and the JEM after the terrorist strikes in the US on September 11, 2001, it did not designate the LET and the JEM as international (foreign) terrorist organisations in its review of October, 2001.

While the UK has had no problem in banning the LET and the JEM under the new Terrorism Act of 2000, the US has not so far done so due to the following reasons:

US law-makers declare only those terrorist organisations, which are active in the territory or against the nationals/ interests of more than one country, as international terrorist organisations. Other organisations are treated as domestic terrorist organisations, which do not attract the penal provisions of the US law.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

B Raman

Former, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai & Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat. He is the author of The Kaoboys of R&AW, A Terrorist State as a Frontline Ally,  INTELLIGENCE, PAST, PRESENT & FUTUREMumbai 26/11: A Day of Infamy and Terrorism: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow.

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