Indian Defence Review

In his article on ‘Special Operations Forces: Understanding the Dynamics of Change’ (refer IDR Jan-Mar ’14 Vol. 29.1) Brigadier Deepak Sinha (Retd.) makes an excellent case for setting up a uniformed Special Operations Command (SOCOM). While this is an idea whose time has come, Brigadier Sinha’s article suffers from two major factual inaccuracies that lead to wrong conclusions. It is perhaps necessary to address those inaccuracies and also correct a few misconceptions that have a great bearing on the future and efficacy of Special Forces (SF) in India.

In his article Brigadier Sinha argues that the SF of various Western democracies such as the US and the UK are deployed, “with the tacit approval of the state” they are operating in. This is, in fact, incorrect. It is only partly true the US and British SF have operated in some countries on a range of missions with the ‘tacit approval’ of the target countries. But there is a large body of Special Operations conducted by the SFs of not only the US, but also of countries such as Israel and South Korea which are done without the tacit approval of the targeted/host country.

In the raid carried out by the Israeli SF, the Sayeret Matkal on July 04, 1976, was not with any tacit approval of Uganda, the target nation which had housed Jewish hostages after a hijacked Air France fight was diverted there. Similarly, the aftermath of the massacre of Israeli Olympic participants in the Summer Olympics held in Munich, Germany in 1972 led to a series of covert raids by Israeli SF in Lebanon as reprisal attacks. Brigadier Sinha’s incorrect assumption also misses out on the role of SF at sea, which is also governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and poses a separate set of legal and jurisdictional challenges. However, several nations such as South Korea, the US and the UK have launched Special Operations from sea without seeking any tacit approval from the target nations.

Interestingly, Brigadier Sinha also argues that a distinction needs to be drawn between Special Operations and covert missions. According to him, “covert missions that require credible deniability and total non-attributability (sic) have been undertaken; the responsibility for their conduct has rested with the national intelligence agencies.” This again is an inaccurate assessment, as the available literature on Special Forces and Special Operations clearly establishes. During the Cold War, British SAS troops would be regularly inserted into East Germany for covert missions. These would be cleared by the Director, Special Forces and they would primarily be inserted into East Germany for surveillance and reconnaissance missions that were primarily aimed at gathering intelligence or conducting extraction missions of high value defectors. This would be just some of the broad range of missions conducted by the SF and would remain deniable, if detected. In fact, it is interesting to note that an essential part of the SAS training is to conduct evade and escape training capsules for their troops to ensure that their missions remain deniable even if they are captured.

The role that the US SF played in the Second Gulf War is also of great importance. They conducted key missions to hunt for Scud missiles long before the war commenced. Under the command of General Stanley McChrystal, the US SF also undertook several covert missions as he sought to amalgamate the intelligence and Special Forces elements into a single, dedicated task force. This was the hallmark of the initial days of Operation Enduring Freedom when US SF went into Afghanistan to establish partnerships with the Northern Alliance and set up air strikes. Once again, these were covert operations and completely deniable till hostilities began formally. Similarly, Israel has carried out a series of covert missions in its neighbourhood that were aimed to be deniable and were only known once the success of the missions became apparent.

Therefore, to merely use the deniability factor of a covert mission to draw a distinction between Special Forces and other troops working under the command of national intelligence agencies, is not only a fallacious argument, the conclusions drawn therefore, are also patently wrong. It is also to be noted that when covert operations require military intervention, or intervention by military personnel, then it will always be SF that are called upon to do so albeit under a different command structure. The key to such missions is capability and efficacy, rather than the nature of the role or the command structure.

The third argument that Brigadier Sinha puts forth is to add the conventional airborne troops to the proposed Special Operations Command. If this were to happen, then India would be the first to make such a folly. Not only would this be a mistake, it would also be a deliberate attempt to erase India’s recent military history. The author rightly argues that airborne troops are meant primarily for Out Of Area Contingencies (OOAC). But the OOAC needs conventional structures to achieve their missions. When India intervened in the Maldives in Operation Cactus, all conventional units were pressed into service. These included large elements of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indian Navy (IN).

It is critical to understand the nature of OOAC operations. Troops need to be mobile and easily deployable but are also required to be overwhelming in their response. This is a crucial factor to achieve the aims of OOAC objectives. Imagine a scenario where a dedicated SOCOM is burdened with managing such large operations when their charter is to exactly the opposite. Perhaps a part of the demand to include OOAC troops into a SOCOM stems from a historical blunder that has dominated India’s SF. In 1967, when the first para-commando units were being formed, parachuting was considered a key skill for these troops. Naturally, with scarce resources at hand, the para-commandos were made a part of the Parachute Regiment, which housed the facilities required to impart these skills en masse. However, the nature of warfare has undergone a dramatic change. As warfare becomes more network-centric along with Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the emergence of state-sponsored terrorism, the need for dedicated SF has emerged as a key and decisive factor in a nation’s Comprehensive National Power (CNP) strategy.

In 1987, the Brigadier Nico Bahri Committee with Colonel Sukhi Mann (later Brigadier) and Colonel R.K Nanavatty (later Lt. General and Northern Army Commander) did the first comprehensive study of India’s SF and its capabilities. A key recommendation that emerged out of the Committee was to establish a separate Special Forces Regiment, recognising the history of the US SOCOM and the British SF.

Here, it is important to note the final key factual error that the author bases his faulty assumptions on. He states that parachute and airborne elements work in support of the SF during operations. This may be partially true but such situations are extremely rare and go against the nature of Special Operations. Intrinsically, the SF undertakes missions that are covert and perhaps, remain deniable. To introduce conventional troops like paratroopers in aid of SF would, therefore, defeat the very need for covert capabilities, secrecy and deniability.

Second, it is important to note that by their very nature, parachute regiments are conventional troops with a different means of delivery. In short, they are no different from the mechanised troops who use Armoured Personnel Carriers for mobility and tactics but are essentially infantry. This is a key element that needs to be recognised dispassionately and keeping in view how militaries have developed across the world. An attempt to re-invent the wheel in India, due to reasons other than strategic, would be foolhardy and would defeat the very purpose of having a SF capability.

It would also be factually incorrect to equate the Rangers, who are a part of SOCOM, with India’s parachute battalions. The Rangers do not necessarily have parachuting skills and operate as normal infantry in support of SF when required for a particular mission. On the whole, they are also known to conduct their operations, depending on the requirements of the military commanders on ground. Finally, the British SAS has always maintained its separate identity as a Regiment and its role has been separate from the British airborne forces. No airborne forces report to the Director, Special Forces, UK and in the US, the airborne troops do not report into SOCOM.

It is high time that India’s Special Forces get the place that they deserve, not only because they need that, but more so because India’s strategic aspirations and immediate needs require it. Delaying this any further will imperil India’s capability to deal with a rapidly changing and challenging environment.