Indian Defence Review

Al-Shabaab

The Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahedeen, commonly known as Al-Shabaab, is a militant group based in Somalia fighting for the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic State in Somalia. Al-Shabaab means ‘The Youth’ in Arabic and emerged as the radical youth wing of Somalia’s now-defunct Union of Islamic Courts in 2006 (UIC), as it fought Ethiopian forces who had entered Somalia to oust the ICU from power and back the weak interim government. The campaign carried out by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has significantly weakened the militant group in the last couple of years, yet Al-Shabaab remains a massive threat to the stability of the country. Due to significant support from local clans, Al-Shabaab still remains in control of most of southern and central Somalia. The group’s terrorist activities have mainly focused on targets within Somalia, but it has also proven an ability to carry out deadly strikes in neighbouring countries, as was shown by the attack on Westgate mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013.

Typically terrorist attacks conducted by al- Shabaab target Somali government officials, AMISOM forces, perceived allies of the Federal Government of Somalia, humanitarian aid organizations and other international workers. Most of its fighters are said to be predominantly interested in the nationalistic battle against the Federal Government of Somalia and are not supportive of global jihad. However, al-Shabaab repositioned itself as a militant Islamist group in recent years, as the formal allegiance with al-Qaeda, declared in 2012 emphasizes. Al- Shabaab advocates the Saudi-inspired Wahhabi version of Islam, while most Somalis are Sufis. Al- Shabaab has destroyed a large number of Sufi shrines, causing its popularity to further plummet. It is also assumed that Al-Shabaab has strong links with pirates operating in the Indian Ocean. This expands the source of their funding and enlarges their popular support through redistribution of the loot.

The southern port city of Kismayo with its vibrant economy (trade of charcoal) was taken over by Al-Shabaab in 2008 and, building up an extensive racketeering operation there, served as a crucial asset for the militant group. Experts consider the liberation of the Kismayo port by Kenyan forces in October 2012 to be a huge strategic setback for Al- Shabaab and a great success for the AMISOM mission. In a regional context, there seems to be a great interconnectedness between Al- Shabaab and other militant organizations operating in Africa, as Al-Shabaab militants were reported to have fought alongside the forces of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Northern Mali conflict starting in 2012. The group supposedly also has ties to Boko Haram.

Boko Haram

Nigeria’s militant Islamist group Boko Haram – which has caused havoc in Africa’s most populous country Nigeria through a wave of bombings – is fighting to overthrow the government and create an Islamic state including the implementation of sharia courts. Its followers are said to be influenced by the Quranic phrase which says: “Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors”. Boko Haram promotes a version of Islam which makes it “haram”, or forbidden, for Muslims to take part in any political or social activity associated with Western society. Western education is considered a sin. This includes voting in elections, wearing shirts and trousers or receiving a secular education.

Boko Haram regarded the Nigerian state as being run by non-believers, even when the country had a Muslim president. Mohammad Yusuf, a radical Islamist cleric, created Boko Haram in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the north-eastern state of Borno. Yusuf criticized northern Muslims for participating in what he saw as an illegitimate, non-Islamic state and preached a doctrine of withdrawal. But violence between Christians and Muslims and harsh government treatment, including pervasive police brutality, encouraged the group’s radicalization. Human Rights Watch researcher Eric Guttschuss told news service IRIN that Yusuf gained supporters “by speaking out against police and political corruption.” Boko Haram followers, called Yusuffiya, consist largely of hundreds of impoverished Islamic students and clerics as well as university students and professionals, many of whom are unemployed. Some followers are also members of Nigeria’s elite.

Until 2009, the group did not aim to violently overthrow the government. That however changed, when in July 2009, Boko Haram members refused to follow a motor-bike helmet law, leading to heavy-handed police tactics that set off an armed uprising in the northern state of Bauchi and spread into the states of Borno, Yobe, and Kano. The incident was suppressed by the army and left more than eight hundred dead. It also led to the televised execution of Yusuf, as well as the deaths of his father in-law and other sect- members, which human rights advocates considered to be extra-judicial killings. In the aftermath of the 2009 unrest an Islamist insurrection under a splintered leadership emerged. Boko Haram began to carry out a number of suicide bombings and assassinations from Maiduguri to Abuja, and staged an ambitious prison-break in Bauchi, freeing more than seven hundred inmates in 2010.

Boko Haram’s capabilities have also markedly increased since its beginnings. Attacks attributed to the group increased from 21 in 2010 to 186 in 2011, and soared to 526 in 2012. In June 2011, the organization conducted the first suicide bombing ever in Nigeria. A few months later, a car full of explosives rammed into a United Nations’ building in Abuja. Boko Haram has also conducted highly coordinated assaults, displaying enough manpower and weaponry to temporarily threaten entire cities. In this sense, while Boko Haram has demonstrated the capability to engage in large-scale terrorist violence, the organization conducts smaller- scale attacks throughout northern Nigeria on an almost daily basis. The advance in capabilities has occurred in concert with an expansion in area of operations. Though they started out launching attacks in the northeast corner of Nigeria, Boko Haram has moved on to initiate attacks as far west as Sokoto state and as far south as Kogi state, while increasing its presence in the central regions (Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, and Plateau). Targeting has also expanded from an initial focus on Nigerian security forces and government institutions, to include churches, bars, telecommunication infrastructure, schools, traditional leaders, and even the media.

Influence of AQIM can be seen in the attacks of the groups since the beginning of 2013, according to experts. In the escalation of conflicts between the group’s fighters and the military, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the northern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe in May 2013 that is to be continued until May 2014. In April, the Nigerian government tried to broker a cease-fire with the sect but failed. The sweeping offensive against Boko Haram has been going on for almost a year, and the military has described the group as being in disarray and no longer capable of attacking major population centres. But the success of the operation remains unclear. The attack in Damaturu, apparently carried out by a significant number of insurgents in a heavily fortified city, as well as ongoing attacks on civilian as well as military targets, has cast further doubt on the effectiveness of the military offensive.

Boko Haram cannot be considered as one group with one objective, instead it has many splinter groups that aim to achieve different targets. At least two splinters, one focusing on local grievances and one focusing in regional expansion, can be identified. The groups has been able to acquire better weapons and recruite more fighters than the regional state police troops have. Thus, some Nigerian politicians believe the groups cannot be (militarily) defeated.

Important Issues Regarding the Topic

Case Studies

Mali

Malian returnees from Libya in 2011, who were heavily armed with weapons acquired during the crisis in Libya, exacerbated tensions in northern Mali, and Tuareg ethnic militias started a rebellion in January 2012. The issue of returnees from the Libyan civil war causing unrest in Mali emphasizes the problem of militant groups being able to operate freely in the mainly unpopulated desert-areas of the Sahel and the Sahara. Malian combatants, who fought as mercenaries hired by Muammar al-Gaddafi in his attempt to stay in power, fled back to Mali with weapons supporting the Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA). The Western powers have arguably underestimated that getting rid of Gaddafi would have severe repercussions in the Sahel region. In mid-January 2012, the MNLA, along with Islamic armed groups including Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO), initiated a series of attacks against Government forces in the north of the country.

On 22 March 2012, President Toure was overthrown by low- and mid-level soldiers, who were frustrated with the poor handling of the rebellion by the President. Intensive mediation efforts led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) returned power to a civilian administration in April with the appointment of interim President Dioncounda Traore. The post-coup chaos led to rebels expelling the Malian military from the three northern regions of the country and allowed Islamic militants to set up strongholds. The militant group Ansar Dine, closely associated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), seeking to impose shariah law consolidated its hold over three key cities in Mali’s restive north, after ousting Tuareg rebels that earlier helped it seize control of the region.

In the course of the conflict, hundreds of thousands of northern Malians fled from the violence to southern Mali and neighbouring countries, exacerbating regional food insecurity in host communities. Authorized by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085, a United Nations mission was deployed in Mali in order to contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces and support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of militant groups. As a result of the French and African military operations alongside the Malian army in northern areas, the security situation in Mali significantly improved.

By the end of January, State control had been restored in most major northern towns, such as Diabaly, Douentza, Gao, Konna and Timbuktu. Most terrorist and associated forces withdrew northwards into the mountains while others, mainly local Malians, reportedly blended into local communities. One of the greatest challenges of Mali will be resolving the simmering secular separatist rebellion in the northern region of Kidal. Ethnic Tuaregs there have sought sovereignty ever since Mali’s independence from France in 1960 and their latest rebellion gained momentum in the power vacuum after the coup. While they were temporarily sidelined during the rule of the radical jihadists, the Tuareg separatists are now largely back in control of Kidal and the return of the Malian military remains deeply unpopular.

The Tuareg claim that the central government has been ignoring and oppressing them for decades and thus the establishment of the independent Tuareg state Azawad is the ultimate goal of the Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA). In the meantime, the MNLA has backed away from declarations of independence made by some of its members earlier. In the temporary ceasefire agreement signed on June 18th 2013, the group recognized Mali’s territorial integrity and borders. On July 1st 2013, the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) transferred its authority to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100 from April 2013.

The mission is mandated to support the political process and carry out a number of security- related stabilization tasks, “with a focus on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections”. In a democratic presidential election conducted in July and August of 2013, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was elected president. The international community has showed its determination in tackling the threats that jeopardize Mali.

However, the conflict is far from being solved. Serious security challenges still remain, including continued terrorist activities and military operations in some areas. The need to restore the integrity of Mali’s territory and ensure the physical security of communities in the north continues to be a central priority.