Indian Defence Review

Politically, Yahya Khan still relied upon Tikka Khan to finish the counter-insurgency operations launched to suppress the revolt and the subsequent guerilla movement. “Give me a few days,” Tikka Khan was reported to have said, but Yahya Khan saw those days stretch into weeks and months and last deep into May that year. By the time some semblance of control could be assured, June had arrived and the impending monsoon was very much in sight. The heavy rains for the next three months hampered military operations in the eastern wing. The riverine nature of the terrain and low-lying paddy land turned the countryside into a swamp of mud, immobilising armour and other vehicular traffic. No serious campaigning could therefore proceed at a meaningful pace.

Similarly, in the western wing, where decisions were envisaged through mobile warfare employing a predominance of armour, the armour would bog down in the rainsoaked plains of Punjab. There was no alternative for Pakistan but to wait till October, when the earth would harden after the rains, to enable military means to be employed in both wings. This gave India a much-needed respite for preparations to redress the strategic imbalance and to make up the critical shortages in arms and ammunition. India woefully lacked the requisite infrastructure in the eastern theatre to build up a sizable force for either defence of its own territory or for launching an offensive. This was particularly so in Meghalaya, Assam and Tripura, opposite the Mymensingh, Sylhet, Comilla and Chittagong line. Creation of this infrastructure meant developing roads, communications and administrative dumps to sustain a war, and these needed a considerable lead period to develop.

In addition, the buildup of troops in the eastern as well as the western theatres had to be completed to meet a likely preemptive attack. Troops for the eastern theatre had to be found from formations engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland and Mizoram, those facing the Chinese on the northern borders, and also what could be garnered from formations earmarked for the western theatre. Troop movements involving long distances from the hinterland and from the western to the eastern theatre needed from six to eight weeks to complete. The welcome monsoon would cover the time required to execute this buildup.

The next possibility was for war after the monsoon—from the middle of October onward. This would have suited India if the deadline could be pushed beyond the first week of December, as it was visualised that the Himalayan passes would then close for about five months. It would reduce the potentiality of Chinese collusion and would enable India to take greater risks against the Chinese by thinning out its holding force in the Hmalayas to create the required buildup of troops against Pakistan, particularly in the eastern theatre. It would also enable India to tilt international opinion in favour of Bangladesh, with a view to seeking help in meeting the crushing economic burden of looking after millions of refugees as well as a political solution with Yahya Khan which would create stability in the subcontinent.[13]

The next question which confronted the Indian military planners was whether the Chinese would act in collaboration with Pakistan, and if so in what strength? By the middle of April some indications were available from the statements of Chinese and Pakistani leaders. On 13 April, Prime Minister Chou En-lai promised all help to Yahya Khan in maintaining the “territorial integrity of Pakistan” against all “external interference,” which included the “handful of people” waging guerilla war in Bangladesh.

On 30 April, Bhutto, the most ardent pro-Chinese politician in Pakistan, declared that China would intervene in the event of an India-Pakistan conflict over Bangladesh. This statement was soon followed by the Pakistani Ambassador in Peking, who hailed the ready Chinese support in Pakistan’s difficulties with India. On 19 July, Yahya Khan commented in an interview with a foreign correspondent: “Pakistan will not be alone if India forces a war on it.” Such loud claims continued to be repeated by different voices till he actually forced war on India. So far as Yahya Khan’s and Bhutto’s professions indicated, Chinese support was likely to be of a meaningful degree for Pakistan if war broke out.

At the beginning of November, Yahya Khan told Newsweek magazine that war with India was imminent and the Chinese could be counted on to come to Pakistan’s aid with supplies of arms and ammunition. He went a step further the following week in an interview with Columbia Broadcasting System when he asserted that China would intervene if India attacked Pakistan.[14] About the same time, Bhutto rushed to Peking, presumably for last-minute arrangements for intervention. At a banquet in Bhutto’s honour, the acting Foreign Minister of China promised that “should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese Government and people will, as always, resolutely support the Pakistan Government and people.” On his return to Islamabad, Bhutto triumphantly claimed: “We have achieved concrete results.[15]

China watchers in India however read differently between the lines of the Chinese and Pakistani statements. Firstly, the promise of Chinese support did not mean military intervention. This could mean only diplomatic support abroad and economic aid at home and supply of arms to equip additional formations being raised in Pakistan. Secondly, such intervention was conditional on “foreign aggression” against Pakistan. Since India had no intention of starting a war with Pakistan, the only question that would arise was that of Pakistani aggression against India.

Nevertheless, Chinese intervention could not be discounted altogether. But the indications available until then did not suggest such an eventuality. For instance, no joint statement was issued at the end of Bhutto’s visit to Peking. The foreign press in Islamabad accordingly concluded that Bhutto had returned without any specific commitments or assurances. He remarked in a press interview that “the question whether China would take any diversionary action in the north was a superficial matter.” In fact, militarily nothing was more pertinent than the correct answer to this question at the time.

Indian strategists had however to rely on their own political and military appreciation. Politically, with China’s isolation having decreased as a result of detente with the US, it was at the moment seeking an ideality and rightful role in international politics through the United Nations. It was therefore improbable that the Chinese would jeopardise their national interests by a military engagement in aid of Pakistan at this critical juncture of entry into the UN, including the Security Council.[8] Moreover, there had been no anti-Indian propaganda in the Chinese mass media to indicate a psychlogical buildup for intervention although Pakistan projected such a possibility even up to the time of the Indian unilateral ceasefire.

The latest intelligence reports from Tibet assessed the Chinese strength there at approximately 150,000 troops. This was estimated to be composed of about eight divisions and communication zone troops for administrative backing. Of these eight divisions, five to six were employed in a holding role along the India-Tibet border while the remainder were stationed in the hinterland for internal security duties.[16] In 1970, the law and order situation was generally reported to be fairly stable in Tibet and the Chinese could muster two or three divisions to develop a thrust at a chosen point.

Lateral communications on the Tibetan plateau enabled the Chinese to concentrate speedily in any one of the four main sectors: Ladakh; UP-Tibet; Sikkim and western Bhutan; and eastern Bhutan, NEFA. In addition, they had a good network of roads leading to the Indo-Tibetan border from bases in the rear. On the Indian side however, the countryside is furrowed by high mountainous ridges forming deep and narrow valleys. These valleys canalise ingress. Thus, it is possible for China to develop several parallel thrust lines, but for India, because of intervening heights and lack of lateral communications, these cannot mutually support each other. Offensive deployment can therefore be plugged by moving troops in a given time frame according to the signs of a Chinese buildup across the passes. Road development since the Chinese invasion of India in 1962 ensures this capability in good measure.

One thing was certain: China was so conscious of its international prestige as a military power of consequence that it would not make an overt move, however small, unless assured of sufficient superiority in arms to guarantee success. China would take no action which, if escalated, would land it in difficulties. No Chinese build-up along the Himalayan border had thus far been noticed by Indian intelligence, but our planners, having been bitten once in 1962, could not rely implicitly on intelligence agencies alone. They would have placed more reliance on closure of the Himalayan passes to discourage China from a military venture.

But history was in India’s favour. It was a fact that in 1962 the unilateral Chinese ceasefire and hasty withdrawal after the triump. hant march into NEFA against weak and panicstricken Indiantroops was less inspired by political magnanimity than by impending snowfall in the Tibetan passes. Cut off from their administrative bases, the Chinese troops could not have sustained further military operations against superior Indian strength hurriedly mustered in the plains of Assam to meet the incursion.

In 1965 however it was a different story. The Chinese coalition with Pakistan did not go beyond bellicose verbal threats on the f l imsy excuse of alleged abduction of goats and graziers on the part of India.[17] Without firing a single shot in support of its friend Pakistan, China managed to keep India on tenterhooks[3] to the extent that we were not able to move a substantial number of our troops facing China in the north to reinforce the western front till well after the conflict was over. Later analyses revealed that the Chinese had not built up their logistics as much as Indian intelligence had assessed. But then India could not afford to take chances with China.

Snowfall could start as early as November or as late as December. Except for the two eastern passes at Khinzemane and Diphu, the snows are usually so heavy that no sizable trans-border movement is possible, at least not large enough to sustain major operations. In addition, there was an approach along the old Ledo Road through northern Burma. But an incursion through a third country, especially when Peking was trying to establish an international image, was ruled out.

The Ledo Road was in such a state of disrepair that it would have taken months of Chinese roadmending effort to make it serviceable for the heavy traffic required for a major thrust. Within that time the Burmese would certainly have noticed the unusual Chinese activity, even in that sparsely populated area, and raised serious objections. It was unthinkable that the Burmese Government would connive tacitly at the roadbuilding activities and subsequent invasion of India on account of the friendly relations between New Delhi and Rangoon. At the same time, minor border incursions would not work, for India had travelled far on the road of military preparedness since 1962 and could look after hit-and-run raids with the prevailing level of holding forces facing the Chinese.

India’s normal allocation of forces against East Pakistan was about a division plus against some eight or nine divisions for the north against the Chinese. The impending operations in Bangladesh needed a force level of some six to seven divisions to deal with Pakistan’s three to four divisions then operating in the eastern wing. Since the western theatre could not be denuded of manpower without jeopardising the offensive defence capability, additional formations had to be found from the holding force against the Chinese. This inevitable thinning out had however to be achieved without upsetting the security of the region to any appreciable degree, as politically China remained as inscrutable as ever. In any case, China could not be taken for granted.

Against the Chinese, the Indian planners leaned heavily on the snows. They proposed to maintain a maximum presence in sensitive sectors right up to the time the passes closed and denude the remainder of the northern front to the minimum desirable level so as to create the force required for the Bangladesh operations. But what would happen if Pakistan did not obligingly wait for the snows and China came to its aid much earlier? They believed that the magnitude of conflict China could generate within the force level obtaining in Tibet could be contained by the Indian resources available in the region—by accepting an initial loss of territory if necessary. What would happen if China attacked in a big way? In that case India would have to seek refuge behind more powerful protection, which we did through the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 1971.

The Indian planners decided to hold these sensitive sectors against the Chinese with sufficient strength to prevent a walkover and employ the withdrawn forces in such access of time and space that they could swiftly reinforce the threatened sectors from other deployment areas. This implied that the withdrawal from more sensitive areas had to be held up till the last moment, and the deployment of these forces in the Bangladesh operation had to be such that they could be withdrawn at short notice without jeopardising the vitals of the operational plan as such. This called for the closest coordination between the intelligence agencies and the operational planners, something hitherto unpractised in India.

There could be some miscalculation because of failure of intelligence or faulty weather forecasting, resulting in a premature pullout of reserve formations. But this miscalculation could be offset by making the holding formations sufficiently strong to withstand a Chinese attack till the reserve formations could be switched back if required. The mountainous terrain near the passes and the years of effort in developing our defence potential had endowed India with the capability to hold such an attack for a week or so. Any marginal loss of territory, if enforced by Chinese superiority, was acceptable temporarily.

This much risk had to be taken if India was to muster sufficient forces for the envisaged Bangladesh operations. But the operational plan for intervention had to be so contrived that its objectives would be secured with such speed that the borrowed formations from the north could revert in time to meet the likely Chinese re-action. This fitted well with the overall concept of a short war the Indian planners envisaged in view of the fear of international pressures. Even the overt intervention of the US in one form or other was not discounted. It was better to finish the war in Bangladesh before extraneous pressures came into play.

Although it would have paid India to keep the war localised to Bangladesh so that all effort could be concentrated there, unlike in 1965 when Pakistan wanted to confine the coflict to Kashmir, Yahya Khan now preferred to escalate it into a fullfledged confict on two fronts. In addition, he would spare no effort to persuade China to open a third front—if only to create more difficulties for India. He also had an eye on the naval and air might of the US to bail him out of his difficulties in Bangladesh if the evacuation of Pakistani troops from the region became necessary. In that event, the US Marines were expected to hold a beach head to permit the US Navy to do so.

It seemed very unlikely that Pakistan would allow the surrender of the four divisions in the east. As most of the Pakistani soldiery came from West Pakistan, their being taken captive could create such a political furore in the western wing that the military regime might topple. Yahya Khan was expected to ask for help to save his men only if things become operationally hopeless and withdrawal was absolutely imperative. This was expected to happen when the war in Bangladesh reached its final decisive stages.

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This implied that India had perforce to keep adequate forces on the West Pakistan border, in Jammu and Kashmir, and also against China along the northern border, to maintain a proper strategic balance,[18] and then to contrive such a concentration of strength in the east as to liberate Bangladesh swiftly and allow the Indian formations to be redeployed on other fronts. The order of priorities for India appeared to be Bangladesh, then West Pakistan, and finally China, if it chose to intervene overtly to aid Pakistan.

The only way to cope with the problem of US intervention was to finish the job in East Pakistan before President Nixon was in a position to react. The nearest US naval presence which could be used to evacuate the Pakistani garrison was in the Pacific, and this would take some time to reach its destination in East Pakistan. Although the Indo-Soviet treaty would theoretically look after such US action,[19] it was very unlikely that the two superpowers would come into open conflict on this issue, especially when detente was drawning in international politics. This was a pertinent matter, and the Indian planners were fully aware that in the end India must be prepared to fight alone.