Conclusion:
Hence the quest for the command of the sea continues to remain the center of gravity of the global security architecture. The military-historical narrative of the evolution of command of sea and sea power provides clarity to India’s apprehensions with China’s OBOR that seeks an Indian Ocean presence along with other extra-regional powers. While China frames its flag ship project of CPEC as part Belt (land) of the Belt and Road initiative, its strategic association with 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (Sea) falls within this military historical narrative. What the west denied to Soviet Union during cold war, has now been secured by China without any major resistance adjusted for the changes that are associated with naval power. The linkage is so stark that India’s partition upon its independence has associations with Britain’s naval strategy. It was upon denial of a naval base in North-Western India by Congress and its acceptance by the Muslim League that Britain engineered a religion based partition by creating Pakistan. Its strategic values were to remain a military post for Britain in case of military contingency against Soviet Union[55]. Within Britain’s maritime security architecture, the creation of Pakistan represents the strategic value of the Indian Ocean and the association of Maritime powers quest to command and control sea. Pakistan may have a similar strategic role for US and China albeit for different reasons. For China,a military post at Gwadar (Baluchistan) is a continental solution to a maritime problem which haunts it with the memories associated with 100 years of humiliation possible due to sea power. For India, such a development occurs within a historical context where it has to deal with the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean and its national security. China’s presence in Indian Ocean for its own national interest, adds an additional dimension that’s shaped by major extra-regional maritime powers US, France, Britain, Japan, Australia and India.
China’s OBOR reflects a continental approach informed by its strategic culture which has multiple points of difference with maritime powers who value mobility, the ability to concentrate resources and military technology adapted to a particular situation. The period before the arrival of Europeans in the Indian Ocean and China Sea was the great era of “free trade” within the region[56].Militarization of Indian Ocean and India’s national security provides the framework of interpreting China’s OBOR. Intensification of Indo-US and Indo-Japan defense relations and the flag ship project of CPEC have direct and proportional relationship. From a traditional naval strategic perspective, China and Japan’s naval presence in Indian Ocean also brings along with it China-Japan and US rivalry not similar to the European rivalry that shaped the evolution of maritime nature of Asian security architecture. India’s traditional role within this security structure remains pivotal in modern context and will shape India’s strategic situation.
With respect to Sino-Indian relations, role of extra-regional powers and their relation with India, China and Pakistan will be an Asian affair given the re-rise of China and India which have begun their respective quest for sea power in the 21st century. Naval security architecture based on India’s partition with the creation of Pakistan and recent Pakistan-China naval relations framed within the context of OBOR provides the Sino-Indian relations a pivotal position for the overall success of OBOR itself. Having successfully employed its strategic value Pakistan has had the honor of being a non-NATO ally and member at Shanghai Cooperation Organization along with Russia and China. However, it is less understood if Pakistan will reflect upon China as maritime or continental power. China’s approach towards Pakistan as a maritime power would be the first of its kind within the Anglo-Saxon Asian security architecture – by design. While the causes for Japan’s behavior in mid-20thcentury beabsenting in the present context, the strategic reasoning continues.
. China’s continental strategic culture makes China a reluctant maritime power. Maritime powers and continental powers quest for sea power marks the differentials adopted in their respective strategies. The Sino-US naval relationship in the Pacific is yet to play out in the Indian Ocean. China’s strategic culture is likely to use the belt (land) to meet the challenges met along road (sea). For both India and China, the evolution of the cannon based militarized maritime order has been an eventful chapter in their respective history. Re-emergence of an Asian maritime power with in the global security architecture is unprecedented given that Japan’s identity as an Asian country is subject to debate. China as an Asian extra-regional power in Indian Ocean is less likely to be behave like western extra-regional powers or India as a regional power. Western architects of the present security architecture based on their maritime empire which were the result of long-distance commerce based on the strategic logic to neutralize local strategic content by extending its own, do not fundamentally align with both India and China’s strategic cultural approach. Intra-trade within Asia itself was sufficient to ascertain a prominent place within the global geo-political economic structure. However, the present strategic context allows and necessitates India and China to be an extra-regional power themselves.
How land oriented rising powers in Asia come to terms with the maritime challenges organized by naval power will remain at the center of disambiguation of OBOR in Sino-Indian relations. A checkmate situation is unlikely from a traditional security perspective; however, such a checkmate can be avoided by careful study of military history and its influence upon the world order.
Reference:
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[2]However, the term “New World Order” in US scheme of imagination means much more than the logistics of global trade and has been invoked by US Presidents time and again to guide its foreign policy across time. It further carries a darker meaning implying covert conspiracies (Discussion with Professor Jeffrey Kaplan (2017) School of International and Public Affairs, Jilin University (People’s Republic of China) April, 2017.
[3]Commerce and Navigation are the two main ingredients of “Sea Power”. A country may possess either of the two or both in pursuit of seapower.
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[17]Ibid; p.149
[18]Japan first gobbled land in Manchuria and then employed a southern strategy all the way up to Pacific Islands which destroyed Britain’s ability to shape events in Pacific during the second world war.
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[21]Ibid; p.85
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[29]The East Indies Command included the 4th Cruiser Squadron [3 Town class], 2 sloops in the Red Sea, and 3 sloops in the Persian Gulf. When Italy entered the conflict in June 1940, responsibility for the Red Seas was transferred to the Mediterranean Fleet, and did not revert back until 1942. Dr. Graham Watson, “World War 2 at Sea ORGANISATION OF THE ROYAL NAVY 1939-194” Naval History, Available at http://www.naval-history.net/xGW-RNOrganisation1939-45.htm#33
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[31]The phrase was popularized by Rudyard Kipling in his 1890 poem Mandalay. In usage, the term meant British interests outside the European theater. The then Defense Secretary Dennis Healey announced in 1968 that British troops would be withdrawn from all major military bases “East of Aden”.
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[35]Summer Palace Library, Beijing
[36]S. Rajasimman (2017), “Militarization of South China Sea: The Offence-Defense Paradigm” in Lt Gen JS Bajwa, China: Threat or Challenge; Lancer Publishers: New Delhi. The war of the French Revolution and Empire the percentage of our trade lost by capture has been computed to have been only 3.5per cent, hence French methodology to attack commerce with no luck at sinking British naval fleet was relocated to solution based on land.See, Part I: “The Influence Oversea Trade on British Naval Strategy in the Past and at Present” The Naval Review (The Naval Society), Vol: III; No: 1, February, 1915. p.129.
[37]Robert Martinage (2014), “Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting Long-Term Advantages to Restore US Global Power Projection Capability” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington.
[38] (Rogers; 2011)
[39] (Rajasimman; 2009)
[40] (Kaplan; 2013)
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[42] (Waters, 2012)
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[44]Yoji Koda (2015), “Significance of The Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation and Japan’s Defense Legislation in 2015” The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies (AJISS), No:218.; 09 September, 2015.
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[53]The plane fitted with Rolls Royce engine can land on rough seas with a wave height of around 3 metres. The US-2 can cruise at extremely low speeds of approximately 90 km/hr. The US-2 has an approximate operational range of 4,500 km and a cruise speed of 480 km/hr. India is likely to commission 10 such aircrafts. Smriti Jain (2016), “US-2i: India’s plan to buy these Japanese planes that can land on water sends a message to China” Financial Express, 07 November, 2016. Available at http://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/us-2i-amphibian-plane-japan-india-defence-deal-indian-navy-indian-ocean-region-china/440128/
[54] Ellen Barry (2016), “As India collaborates With Japan on Islands, It Looks to Check China” New York Times 11 March, 2016. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/world/asia/india-japan-china-andaman-nicobar-islands.html?_r=0
[55] Tarek Fatah (2017) Rubin Report
[56]Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper (2010), Empires in World History: Power and The Politics of Difference, Princeton University Press: Princeton.
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