Geopolitics

Disambiguation of OBOR in Sino-Indian Relations: Is It a Strategic Checkmate – Part-3
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Issue Net Edition | Date : 16 Jun , 2017

Indo-Pacific: Security Structure

The naval security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region is associated with the beginnings of industrial revolution which has been the cradle for global trade and modern naval power. A continuing paradigm from a global perspective begins to start taking shape with early East-West interaction around Indo-Pacific coinciding with the 17th century period of European encounter with enlightenment. The initial order for the present multi-lateral institutions based approach to maritime security in Indo-pacific was a bloody affair. Of all the west European powers the violent display of use of force by Portugal dwarfed Britain, Germany, France in commencing the beginnings of present era strategic security architecture in Indo-Pacific.

The need for order culminated from the hostile relationship maintained among European powers during the initial phase of order creation. An important aspect of this order was its reliance on naval power born out of the history of naval rivalry in the European context. The revolution in military affairs (RMA) in the European context was led by British who placed by far the heaviest guns onboard its fleet and used it decisively in first neutralizing the source of global naval rivalry from European mainland. Since Second World War, the world order under US leadership continued to rely upon military power, open seas, and free trade in preserving the security structure of Indo-Pacific[37].

1950’s President Dwight Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy. (Robust nuclear arsenal and associated delivery system).
1970’s Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s “Offset Strategy”. (Digital microelectronics and information technology to smart weapons, sensors, targeting and control networks).
2014 Secretary Hegel and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work’s new “game-changing off-set” strategysince 2014.

Indo-Pacific naval security architecture rests on the geo-political and geo-strategic understanding of Asia[38]. Its scope and importance can be summarized by Admiral Alfred T Mahan’s view that Asia cannot be dominated militarily by land and therefore it was imperative for US Navy to combine its two fleets in the Pacific and Atlantic through the opening of Panama Canal originally a French Plan[39]. With geography remaining the constant aspect of this architecture, the structure has adapted to political developments across time while retaining its maritime essence. The maritime political relationships in Indo-Pacific exist in dependence to the geographical constraints which are constantly adapting to the changes offered by developments in naval technology since the era of trade at high seas under canon fire[40].

Although the Asia-Pacific has continued to lead the way in terms of their expanding maritime influence, it is arguable that the waters of the Indian Ocean, Africa and the Middle East rival them so far as operational naval activity is concerned. In terms of security architecture, the Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity[41]. In Indian Ocean, China, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore are amongst many other Asian countries that have added their warships to the longer-established European and American regional presence[42]. In addition to the growing naval power among the countries in western Pacific, China’s rise as a regional power remains most compelling in articulating the present maritime security architecture in Asia-Pacific. The ongoing advancement in the capability and proficiency of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), inevitably continues to drive the pace and development of the Navies in Indo-Pacific region (US, Japan and India). To the extent that the present theater level naval operational doctrines (Air-Sea Battle) considered by the United States (U.S.) Navy are directed to counter China’s naval modernization in the western Pacific measured by the capacity todeny an operational area and access (A2/AD).[43]

The naval power structure in Indo-Pacific has settled around United States (US) Navy as the predominant security provider after World War II when Great Britain lost its naval supremacy at the hands of Japanese militarism in mid-20th century. While having dislocated Great Britain from its strategic naval base in South East Asia (Singapore), Japan could not sustain a regional-global reach to initiate a creation of an alternate or sustain world order as that existed under the Anglo-Saxon Empire. Japan having been forced to back out of a hegemonic role in Asia-Pacific, the mantle relocated to United States after the World War II. What the British Empire controlled as colonies on its imperial periphery was maintained within an alliance structure by US during the second half of the 20th century. In the 21st century the terms “friends” and “partners” have been added by US and NATO to categorize their defense relations with others such as India and Singapore. In September, 2015, the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) has been sought by Japan and US to upgrade Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF)-US Forces (USF) cooperation[44] in lieu of the security environment of the present era (Middle East).

However, the inherent strategic logic remained unaltered with respect to naval power within this structure. Naval power banked on naval bases in order to enable the predominant power to shape events both at sea and land from sea[45]. This necessity has remained unaltered despite technology reducing the principal requirement for naval bases by providing technical solutions to a strategic problem. The United States has engaged in aggressive military action in at least thirteen countries in the Greater Middle East since 1980 and spent $10 trillion protecting Persian Gulf oil supplies over the past four decades[46]. However, such an over bearing military posture requires key dependence on US military bases in the region which ensures power projection and facilitates expeditionary operations. In its 21st century avatar the US requires formal military alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand, and has formed or is forming security partnerships with Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Burma and India, despite a technical competency in projecting power by way of nuclear powered aircraft carrier and submarines, and global strike assets such as strategic bomber fleet and long-range stand-off weaponry. The wrinkle being LOGISTICS!

The recent Indo-Japan defense cooperation occurs within the guidance of “India and Japan Vision 2025” set forth on 12 December 2015[47]. This vision statement underlines the rising importance of the Indo-Pacific region as the key driver for the prosperity of the world and inherits India’s “Act East” policy and Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”[48]. Under formal requests from Government of India through Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Japan will invest in $744 million road building project in the northeastern Indian border regions of Mizoram, Assam, and Meghalaya. India’s defense relations with United States have matured since the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal (2005) that failed to achieve the expected potential of its defense relations with U. S[49]. India’s military relations with Russia, India’s reluctance to participate in U.S. led initiatives on what India considered it to be selective disarmament measures such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and foreign policy preoccupation of non-alignment resulted in India’s dependence on Russian military industrial complex. However, the then lack of bonhomie in the Indo-US defense relations has matured to the level of “partner”, if not alliance[50]. India is today a signatory of the Missile Transfer Control Regime (MTCR) and contemplating design, development, and production of its third Aircraft Carrier (INS Vishal) with US EMALT launch system while India’s Aircraft Carrier INS Vikramaditya was commissioned in 2015 at St. Petersburg, Russia and in 2015 India became a member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) along with Russia and China. A reorientation in Indian and US foreign policy provides an unprecedented renewal of Indo-US defence relations. The US Navy signed a Master Ship Repair Agreement (MSRA) with Reliance Infrastructure (RInfra) – led Reliance Defense and Engineering (RDEL) to repair and alteration service US naval ships of the Seventh-Fleet operating in the Indian Ocean on 14 February. The Indian shipyard (Gujarat) based on the recent Logistics Excahnge Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA – 29 August, 2016) will substitute shipyards in Japan and Singapore for US Pacific Fleet. India now shares the FoundationalAgreements with US making it a formal partner, if not ally, for US forces in the Indo-Pacific[51]. The Indo-US defense relation will further strengthen with the Communications and Information Security Memorandum Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence (BECA). US Secretary of Defense General James Mattis believes it’s the India-US Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) that’s central to the unprecedented levels of cooperation Indo-US defence relations. National Defense Authorization Act of 2017 (NDAA 2017) by the US government in January mentions ‘Enhancing Defense and Security Cooperation with India’ institutionalized in the DTTI mechanism under Section 1292[52].

Simultaneously, India has grown in strategic importance to Japan with Japanese construction of power plant (15 megawatt) at Andaman and Nicobar Island (India) and potential assistance in building Indian Navy’s Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability along with possible export of ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious aircraft[53]. India has deployed Israeli-made aerial “Searcher” drones and two Boeing P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft, developed for anti-submarine warfare, to the Andaman and Nicobar chain[54]. In the present strategic situation where China’s grand strategy intends to relocate the traditional sea based trading system to quasi land-sea based system (OBOR), a strong Indian Navy along with Japan’s distribution of its ASW capability developed since the Imperial times is welcome to US, Britain and Australia’s strategic schema of Indo-Pacific.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Dr Rajasimman Sundaram

teaches history, politics, and culture and a member of the Institute of BRICS Studies and College of Multi-Languages at Sichuan International Studies University [四川外国语大学] (The People’s Republic of China)". 

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