Geopolitics

Disambiguation of OBOR in Sino-Indian Relations: Is It a Strategic Checkmate – Part-3
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Issue Net Edition | Date : 16 Jun , 2017

Therefore, global approach to a nation’s security is perhaps the basis of the application of naval power in the Indo-Pacific. For Britain, the presence of Japanese Naval forces in Indian Ocean with the occupation of Port Blair (Andaman and Nicobar – 23rd March 1942) set forth a re-orientation in its naval command structure during the Second World War. The East Indies Command based at Red Sea and Persian Gulf including ships from Royal Indian Navy (Delhi) was responsible for the entire Indian Ocean prior to 1942 (Fall of Singapore) when it was abolished to create Eastern Fleet[29]. The Eastern Fleet (East Indies Fleet since November 1944) comprising of elements from Royal Australian Navy along with US and French naval ships included a massive input of the Royal Indian Navy with its escort vessels and undertook the following tasks;

a)The battle fleet with its carriers, battleships and supporting warships to tackle any Japanese heavy ships and strike at shore targets
b)The submarine force to deny Japan the use the sea routes between Singapore and Rangoon (Myanmar)
c) A substantial escort force to guard the convoys between Suez and India, and between the Cape and India.

From October 1943, the fleet was the maritime component of South East Asia Command, but had responsibilities outside of the SEAC area as well. In November 1944 Britain’s Pacific Fleet was created in support of US Seventh Fleet to deal Japanese militarism in Western Pacific Theater.

A significant aspect of the British naval strategy during Second World War was the sudden influx of arms transfer to the Royal Indian Navy (RIN)[30]. While ships from the Royal Indian Navy prosecuted naval engagements during Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily (July, 1943), until the Second World War Britain’s Indian Naval arm was limited to patrolling, mine – sweeping and ferrying combatants. History of RIN (established on 02 October, 1934) since 1612 when it was East India Companies Marine underwent multiple reorganization exemplifying Indian sub-continents (Indo-Pacific) role across a large time-frame until 1950. However, none such change paralleled the change since the fall of Singapore (1942).

R.I.N. Personnel

1939

1945

Officers

198 3,031

Men

1,475

28,800

Sloops(05)

A.A. Frigates(06)

Ships

Patrol Vessel(01)

A.S. Frigates(07)

Survey Vessel(01)

Corvette(01)

Fleet Minesweepers(16)

Survey Ship(01)

Naval Review (November, 1952)

The recent upsurge in Indo-US defense relationship albeit occurring in a radically changed strategic environment of this century shares a continuing resemblance with such a phenomenon.The sudden influx in arms transfer to India since the fall of Singapore resonated the strategic beliefs associated with the defense of Britain, which rested on the guiding principle that – if Britain can ensure an open and free trading system at high seas and project naval power to discourage the interruption of free- flow of inter-colonial trade and combat troops across the vast expanse of the oceans, it could remain militarily invincible. Japan’s naval presence in Indian Ocean disrupted the global command of the seas which was a prerequisite for Britain’s survival.

Command of the Sea: A Case for Continuity

British Command of the Sea from a global perspective was secured after the naval campaign of 1805 – Trafalgar with the defeat of combined Franco-Spanish fleet lasting until incompletely challenged by German fleet at the battle of Jutland in 1916 and the fall of Singapore in 1942. Britain’s command of high seas continued despite the rise of Russia, France, Germany and US in late 19th and early 20th century and resulting relative decline of Britain’s economy. For Britain, maintaining its naval operations to secure the Mediterranean and Western Pacific from Indian Ocean secured its naval superiority until it officially declared the seizure of naval presence East-of-Aden[31] (East-of-Suez) a quarter century beyond World War II (1968). However, given its strategic culture, a need for naval presence in East-of-Suez manifested throughout the second half of 20th century (Hong Kong, 1997) and into the 21st century (Bahrain). In December 2014, Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond signed an agreement with Bahrain to develop the Mina Salman Port as a permanent base for its Type 45 destroyers and two yet to be commissioned (2021) Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. Britain’s need for permanent presence along with French in Abu Dhabi (2009) was rationalized by Britain’s Foreign Secretary as a measure to cope with US naval pivot towards Asia-Pacific[32] which requires the European allies to share the burden of stability and security in Gulf, Near East, and Africa[33].

During the Second World War, RIN warships commissioned after the break out of Second World War supported RN operations stretching from near Seychelles to Bombay Reef near Paracel islands off Hainan (China)[34]. Supplementing naval operations in Mediterranean and Far East, RIN established the geo-strategic significance of the Indian subcontinent in the Indian Ocean as Pivotal. The global context of RIN rationalized the continued British naval arms transfer to India after Indian Independence in 1947 which included an aircraft carrier in 1961. Of the total naval arms transfer, sale, and lend-lease agreements during Second World War, RIN remained a top recipient amongst Egypt, Canada, US, Dominican Republic, South Africa, Portugal, Free French Navy, and Denmark. Defense of India remained central to British defense planning and strategic thinking not up until India’sindependence and further but the Fall of Singapore (1942). Singapore in western-Pacific for British Empire held a particular naval strategic significance as did Calcutta or Colombo. This logic remained unaltered in time; the Qing dynasty for example did not consider the British possession of Honk Kong as direct military threats to China, as Singapore or Calcutta did[35]. Without such a forward presence, British Navy was impotent at projecting power in Far East culminating as a national threat to China under Qing dynasty. During Second World War Japan had no reason to attack US (Pacific) or British (Atlantic) mainland, it was sufficient to do so to their colonial possession in Western Pacific (Philippines and Singapore) and therefore both Japan (20th century) and China (19th century) adopted a continental solution (land based) to maritime challenge (sea based). However, this methodology has been in-vogue in distant past as well, when Alexander the Great sought to destroy the Persian naval fleet at Persian ports by employing his land based forces or when the French after the 1805 – Battle of Trafalgar decided to conquer sea by land.[36]

Interpretation of the Pacific War in terms of strategic thought defines the continuing politico-military challenge in Indo-Pacific. A Primary MilitarySolution-Challenge Matrix based on Japan and British strategic behavior during the first half of 20th century defined in terms of grand military objective is as following;

Pacific War

Status(Power Disposition) Primary Miliatry Challenge (Domain) Primary Military Solution (Domain)

 Britain

 Naval Power Continental (NEAR) Maritime (FAR)
 Japan

 Naval Power

 Maritime (FAR)

Continental (NEAR)

Primary Military Solution-Challenge Matrix

Both Britain and Japan display similar if not same approach in managing their challenge-solution matrix. This similarity in approach is signification of British requirement for defense of India plan and Japan’s joint invasion of India from East (Burma) alongside Indian Prisoners of War (POW) at Singapore. Japan’s prime objective was the limiting British naval capability in power projection in the Pacific and in order to achieve this it employed a land-based strategy incontrast to Britain’s sea-based strategy. For example, Japan attacked Singapore from Malay Peninsula (north) while British defended Singapore from sea (West-East-South) leaving the North less defended.

Japan’s successful invasion of India upon successful termination of Burma Campaign in Japan’s favour would have restricted British naval power projection capacity to Mediterranean along with exponential increase in threats to continue to do so. Further Loss of command over Mediterranean would have threatened Britain’s mainland directly from mainland Europe. Similarly, Fall of Midway (June, 1942) in Japanese hand in the Pacific would have threatened US mainland having neutralized US Navy in the Pacific theater. Fortunately for Britain its colonies (India) and dominions (Canada and Australia) spread across the vast expanse of ocean helped mount expeditionary operations from sea to effect military outcome on land in Indo-Pacific and an unexpected breakthrough in predicting Japan’s attack on Midway in case of US set the future course of world history while retaining its erstwhile modern security architecture under US leadership and its NATO allies after the war.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Dr Rajasimman Sundaram

teaches history, politics, and culture and a member of the Institute of BRICS Studies and College of Multi-Languages at Sichuan International Studies University [四川外国语大学] (The People’s Republic of China)". 

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