The present international security structure stands re-located to a sea based logistics system were modern maritime powers occupy predominant position within the international system and is being transformed by regional powers in the Indo-Pacific region in the 21st century[13]. China having displayed aversion to carrier based strike force similar to Russia is now contemplating to commission two carrier strike force to operate in the Pacific and Indian Ocean which necessitates building six aircraft carriers in total. India on the hand has approved strength of three aircraft carriers, where as Russia will design and build the largest aircraft carrier in the world. Traditional maritime powers – US, UK, and Japan – haven’t lost their lust for carrier based Navy despite economic challenges and retain the capacity for cutting edge technology such as the US EMALT system.
Since the element of in-vogue “global” context emerges from sea power such that of Britain since 1805 (Battle of Trafalgar) or US after Second World War, in hypothesis Britain’s relationship with the Indo-Pacific within the context of British Empire from a military perspective establishes the global context of Indo-US defense relation relations for the 21st century and maritime component of China’s OBOR.
Historical Reasoning: Past and Present
Though the Chinese had established storehouse (Chinacota – Fortress of the Chins) at Calicut (India) eighty years before Portuguese navigating from the east, it was the Portuguese discovery of sea routes in 1499 from Western hemisphere that laid the foundation of the in-vogue NWO[14]. The naval domination of the sea-lanes of trade and commerce became increasingly vital during the Anglo-French rivalry of the 18th century when Western European powers were accustomed to a sea based international trading system having compromised the land routes with the end of Byzantine Empire (East Roman Empire) beginning on 06 April, 1453 when the Ottomans laid a 53-day siege to Constantinople (Istanbul, Turkey)[15]. The discovery of sea routes by western Christian empires broke the Ottoman’s (Islam) lock on the eastern Mediterranean[16]. Strategic reinforcement of such a maritime Christian order at the cost of continental Islamic order and the tensions arising therefore continues to persist since. Furthermore, this led to intrusion into pre-existing economic systems in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia and established a new kind of militarised commerce under Portuguese, Dutch. British, and French traders. Companies, and state actors[17].
The traditional Land-Sea based network of trade and commerce established by continental powers in Asia began to wither away since paving way for a global Sea-Land based network jointly shaped with West. The transition from an old order to new order was predominantly shaped by extra-regional maritime powers-Britain (19th century) and US (20th century) – wherein projection of naval power upon land – to shape events at both land and sea – from sea was central to the security architecture in contrast to the previous land-based solution to sea-based problem in Asia. But one Asian naval power staged major disruption to this order in mid-20th century – Japan; however, she herself employed a land based military solution to a sea-based military problem[18]. Japan’s southern advance (nanshin) driven by naval expansion beginning with the Japanese Navy’s administrative independence (1872) from a north oriented Army found a strong military alliance within this security architecture first with Britain and then US.[19] Role of extra-regional maritime power in Indo-Pacific has thus been a constant factor since in shaping the evolution of NWO.
To lose control of the Oceans could provide the death knell for colonies as the French discovered in Canada and India during the Seven Years War (1754-1763) and Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802), and as the British found in the 13 colonies during the American War of Independence (1775-1783). In the 19th century it is no accident that the British invested so heavily in the Royal Navy as it tried to professionalize the service and place it at the cutting edge of scientific research and warfare. It industrialized the production of ships and mobilized huge financial resources to the benefit of the service. Time and again, the Royal Navy was able to blockade French or Spanish colonies whilst being able to supply her own and move British troops around the Oceans of the world with relative ease.
The defeat of the French in Canada and in India (Battle of Plassey- 1757) was also due to the fact that French could not guarantee the arrival of their own reinforcements or supplies. A new generation of Royal Naval officers showed just how valuable the investment in skills, ships and technology was worth with two important victories against their foes; a Spanish fleet was decisively defeated at Cape St. Vincent* whilst a French fleet was devastated at Aboukir Bay*. These did not secure Britain by any means, but they illustrated the power of the Royal Navy and the importance of control of the seas. Once again, Britain could start the process of hoovering up French and Spanish possessions whilst forcing Napoleon to scurry back to Continental Europe and concentrate on building a Continental Empire rather than a Global one. Britain still had a significant Empire along with Royal Navy which allowed it to continue trade with most of the rest of the world, at least outside of Europe. The Royal Navy could also be brought to bear to blockade Europe and prevent goods and raw materials getting to France and her allies. This combination of control of the seas and access to markets was crucial in providing Britain with the ability to continue fighting a long, drawn-out war for over two decades during early 19th century.
Britain’s true supremacy at sea was achieved when Nelson’s fleet thrashed the combined Franco-Spanish fleet at the battle of Trafalgar in 1805 lasting until incompletely challenged by German fleet at the battle of Jutland in 1916[20]. During this period, it really could cherry pick the best harbours and bases around the world. From Cape Town in South Africa to Heligoland in the North Sea to Mauritius in the Indian Ocean and many, many more French, Dutch or Spanish colonies dotted all over the world were captured by the Royal Navy. There was no naval power that could resist the Royal Navy and in a state of war it was free to attack and claim whenever and wherever it liked[21]. The true decline of British supremacy at sea which remained the foundations of the global maritime security architecture began in 1941 when island nation (Japan) of the Pacific unleashed unprecedented firepower in 1941-42 during the Second World War. While Britain slipped in its supremacy, the maritime security architecture that it had put in place continued to persist with the introduction of variety of means including international law which compensated for the use of force in the post-colonial period (1945-present). Pax Britannica was a space to conduct business using British financial and legal systems and with the Royal Navy holding the lanes of trade open that still persists albeit under different strategic context[22].
Britain’s naval strategy cannot be decoupled from its national interest and global interest. British naval strategistsclaim defending Malta (Mediterranean) and Singapore (Pacific) to be more central to British naval strategy than the territory of Britain itself. After the Opium wars, an assessment by Qing emperor on the threats to China from sea did not include Hong Kong, but Singapore and Calcutta. For Royal Navy to project naval power upon China’s coast required control over land, it was this naval necessity that Japan chose to successfully challenge during the second world war. Despite having secured the coastal perimeter of Singapore, Britain displayed lack of acumen in defending its northern frontier along the Malay peninsula. After the multi-national force comprising British, Australian, and Indian soldiers unconditionally surrendered to General Yamashita, Prime Minister Churchill called the shameful fall of Singapore to the Japanese the “worst disaster” and “largest capitulation” in British military history.[23]After Singapore, in March 1944, the Japanese launched the “U Go” offensive against the British that led to the Battles of Imphal and Kohima with the strategic intention to further deplete British command of sea in Indian Ocean[24]. It is this logic of naval power that allows China to reconsider its erstwhile doctrine of not possessing naval bases on foreign soil. Furthermore, this doctrine is undergoing transformation in China’s strategic rationale along with its rhetoric of a non-interventionist foreign policy[25].
Loss of Singapore to global British naval operations shares resemblance to constantly sought military outcome in the past by Britain’s adversaries such as France (19th century) and Germany (20th century). Triumph of British forces in their battle for survival in Europe primarily rests on its naval fleet and the idea of defense of Britain[26]. Until Britain controlled its overseas naval bases and international trade based on them by observing open seas, it was a military problem for its adversaries in mainland Europe to attack the island nation across the English Channel. Given this strategic logic, Britain diverted its better qualified armaments to overseas military theaters such as Mediterranean, India, and Far East than for homeland defense during the Battle for Britain and German Operation Sea Lion[27].Britain’s strategic instinct for open seas and its relationship with Britain’s survival lingers into the 20th century with British efforts to secure the Falklands (1982) by dispatch of naval task force and expansion of port facilities at Bahrain (2014) where it intends to station its latest Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. British naval solution for defense of Britain rests on the control and domination (COMMAND) of high seas along with the denial of same to its adversaries while in crisis. The German High Sea Fleet (Hochseeflotte) was organized with the sole intention of tackling Britain’s naval supremacy at sea based on the German strategic appraisal since 1907[28]. For Britain, Securing Gibraltar (Atlantic), Malta (Mediterranean), Ceylon (Indian Ocean) or Singapore (Pacific) was vital to securing Britain itself. Upon French defeat on 28 June, 1940 Britain created the Mediterranean fleet under direct Admiralty to conduct operations in western Mediterranean and the Atlantic with a strategic objective of guarding the supply convoys to Malta. The Mediterranean fleet secured the Red Sea which was the responsibility of the East Indies Command securing Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Britain’s national insecurities as approached by its naval strategist becomes the key variable shaping the global context of the Asian security architecture.
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