Geopolitics

Disambiguation of OBOR in Sino-Indian Relations: Is It a Strategic Checkmate – Part-3
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Issue Net Edition | Date : 16 Jun , 2017

It’s the “Sea”, and not the “Land”

OBOR includes a land-sea component (Silk Road Economic Belt (Land) and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road [Sea]). The following sections elaborates why it’s the sea, and not the land component of OBOR which may or may not produce negative strategic consequences for India. If OBOR where to produce negative strategic consequences for India at sea, then India is not alone in responding to such challenges. Major powers such as Japan, United States, Australia, France and Britain will step (already have) in to reverse any adverse gains made by China in the Indo-Pacific. Such a strategic posture has already begun to take shape, and India has had a pivotal role in shaping such a strategic discourse in both capability and geographical terms.

Naval power provides the security for the nations conduct from and at sea – commerce and navigation[1]. Security of Indo-Pacific through which the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road passes is essentially a strategic narrative of application of naval power in the Indo-Pacific from a global perspective. The following analysis attempts to understand this phenomenon from a military-historical perspective built around the global context of India’s naval power in the 20th century and its defence relation with major powers such as Japan and United States in the 21st century. The prime hypothesis being – India’s traditional role in the security of Indo-Pacific has continued in a recognizable pattern if observed within a global strategic context and its strategic role is shaped by both endogenous and exogenous variables. For China’s OBOR, India’s strategic appraisal of 21st century Maritime Silk Road and its security will require it to factor in the overall health of Sino-Indian relations.

The idea of a New World Order (NWO)[2] primarily resides at Indo-Pacific with majority of global “commerce” and “navigation”[3] traffic relocating to Indian Ocean Region. It first came into the global strategic calculus at the turn of the last century with the discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf[4]. Following theIslamic revolution in Iran and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Persian Gulf witnessed an influx in militarization of Indian Ocean. In January, 1980 President Jimmy Carter articulated the US foreign policy as “…. any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America….and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force”[5]. However, the presence of extra-regional power shaping events in Indo-Pacific has prior historical precedence where the present foundations of the New World Order are enshrined.

Since the gradual relocation of economic and military power at sea, control and domination of sea lanes of communication has been the prime concern for anyone attempting to be a global power (hegemon). The 20th century hegemon (Britain), and 21st century hegemon (United States) are primarily maritime powers who have matured capability at projecting military power from sea to shape events at land and sea. This stands in variance to the approach adopted by continental powers who predominantly employ land to shape events at sea. Both Russia and China are predominantly continental powers constrained by their geography and strategic culture. A maritime power believes in controlling the sea (sea-control) where as a continental power attempts to deny such a sea control to others. This is evident in Russia and China’s behaviour in Black Sea and South China Sea respectively. Given this backdrop, OBOR as this analysis argues is China’s continental solution to a maritime problem. Constrained by its philosophy of peaceful rise/development China intends to achieve the following strategic objectives through the successful implementation of OBOR;

  • Relocate the reliance of sea based communications and establish reliable trade routes from Pacific to Mediterranean via land.
  • Challenge and secure for itself sea based communications which has been dominated by western industrialised nations – (Anglo-Saxon) without directly posing as threat to the established world order based on sea based communications.

Sea and its strategic understanding thus remains central to decoding the Chinese initiative of OBOR. The idea of OBOR has come about the same time of the articulation of the concept Indo-Pacific by Japan and India. Furthermore, western powers have begun strategic rethink on maintaining their supremacy in shaping and maintaining the present world order within a maritime framework.

The Idea of Indo-Pacific

“Indo-Pacific” as a geo-strategic resonance, has found acceptance with multiple nations since it was first officially articulated by Japanese leadership on their visit to the Indian Parliament (2007)[6]. In a speech titled “Confluence’s of Two Seas” the then Prime Minister of Japan articulated the importance of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean for Japan’s national security in terms of the geographical “strategic vulnerability”. The idea was perhaps the outcome of strategic dialogues between Indian and Japanese officials, military leaders, and scholars preceding its official articulation that year[7]. According to Japan’s Défense Ministry, China too has similar geographical strategic vulnerability associated with the concept of Indo-Pacific[8].The term Indo-Pacific in geographical term resembles the operational area of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and includes Pacific and Indian Ocean as a combined theatre of naval operation[9]. However, Indo-Pacific as a strategic concept is more potent in being operational as strategic reasoning from a global perspective rather than as a limited geographical imagination. As a strategic concept, it has been invoked by leaders, diplomats and scholars alike to decode their understanding and explanation of security architecture that includes both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

The concept of “Indo-Pacific” further stands extended to interpret the developments in the field of defense relations and diplomacy amongst major powers that subscribe to this analytical framework of “Indo-Pacific” other than India and Japan such as Australia, United States, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, UAE and China. While it is the geographical vulnerability that concerns Japan and China, for others varying causes and reasons produce the dynamics that shape their foreign and military policy choices with respect to Indo-Pacific. For example, for the US it is the Freedom of Navigation (FoN) and perseverance of “global” neo-liberal economic (trading) system which necessitates uninterrupted access to global common such as the high seas, for Japan it is its survival as an island nation that’s dependent on external trade, and for China like Russia it is the battle for access to high seas[10]. In this regard, it is worth to recollect that Soviet Union’s foothold in Afghanistan (1979) was met with US covert resistance to discourage a Soviet access to warm deep-water port in Indian Ocean via land (Pakistan). Interpretation of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC – April 2015) falls along the same line of strategic reasoning albeit different strategic context where China’s flag-ship project (CPEC) under the new “One Belt One Road” initiative optimizes the deep-water port at Gwadar, Pakistan (Arabian Sea – Indian Ocean). The recent US-Japan defense relations and U.S. and Japan’s defense relations with India also confirm to the same strategic reasoning as this analysis sets out to clarify.

Application of naval power from a global perspective challenges any maritime power from simultaneous capability to project power in Indian Ocean and the Pacific via sea. It requires;

  • Alliances, Partners and Friends.
  • Land based facilities (Ports/Repair yards/Refuelling) across Indo-Pacific region.
  • Ability to remain at high-seas for longer durations.
  • Unhindered access via choke points and land obstructions.
  • Right to innocent passage via territorial waters.

An enhanced focus on Middle East by US Navy calls for a reconsidered policy of “pivot to Asia” as it depletes its ability to project power in western Pacific. This strategic problem is less about the actors and their respective behaviours, but sea as a predominant factor from where power is to be projected.Inability to achieve sea control under modern war conditions has led some to profess the decline of US hegemony in the 21st century[11].While sea power is likely to remain bedrock for the conduct of international relations, undergoing transformation (control and domination) over space will determine the conduct of international affairs during the latter part of 21st century[12].

The present international security structure stands re-located to a sea based logistics system were modern maritime powers occupy predominant position within the international system and is being transformed by regional powers in the Indo-Pacific region in the 21st century[13]. China having displayed aversion to carrier based strike force similar to Russia is now contemplating to commission two carrier strike force to operate in the Pacific and Indian Ocean which necessitates building six aircraft carriers in total. India on the hand has approved strength of three aircraft carriers, where as Russia will design and build the largest aircraft carrier in the world. Traditional maritime powers – US, UK, and Japan – haven’t lost their lust for carrier based Navy despite economic challenges and retain the capacity for cutting edge technology such as the US EMALT system.

Since the element of in-vogue “global” context emerges from sea power such that of Britain since 1805 (Battle of Trafalgar) or US after Second World War, in hypothesis Britain’s relationship with the Indo-Pacific within the context of British Empire from a military perspective establishes the global context of Indo-US defense relation relations for the 21st century and maritime component of China’s OBOR.

Historical Reasoning: Past and Present

Though the Chinese had established storehouse (Chinacota – Fortress of the Chins) at Calicut (India) eighty years before Portuguese navigating from the east, it was the Portuguese discovery of sea routes in 1499 from Western hemisphere that laid the foundation of the in-vogue NWO[14]. The naval domination of the sea-lanes of trade and commerce became increasingly vital during the Anglo-French rivalry of the 18th century when Western European powers were accustomed to a sea based international trading system having compromised the land routes with the end of Byzantine Empire (East Roman Empire) beginning on 06 April, 1453 when the Ottomans laid a 53-day siege to Constantinople (Istanbul, Turkey)[15]. The discovery of sea routes by western Christian empires broke the Ottoman’s (Islam) lock on the eastern Mediterranean[16]. Strategic reinforcement of such a maritime Christian order at the cost of continental Islamic order and the tensions arising therefore continues to persist since. Furthermore, this led to intrusion into pre-existing economic systems in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia and established a new kind of militarised commerce under Portuguese, Dutch. British, and French traders. Companies, and state actors[17].

The traditional Land-Sea based network of trade and commerce established by continental powers in Asia began to wither away since paving way for a global Sea-Land based network jointly shaped with West. The transition from an old order to new order was predominantly shaped by extra-regional maritime powers-Britain (19th century) and US (20th century) – wherein projection of naval power upon land – to shape events at both land and sea – from sea was central to the security architecture in contrast to the previous land-based solution to sea-based problem in Asia. But one Asian naval power staged major disruption to this order in mid-20th century – Japan; however, she herself employed a land based military solution to a sea-based military problem[18]. Japan’s southern advance (nanshin) driven by naval expansion beginning with the Japanese Navy’s administrative independence (1872) from a north oriented Army found a strong military alliance within this security architecture first with Britain and then US.[19] Role of extra-regional maritime power in Indo-Pacific has thus been a constant factor since in shaping the evolution of NWO.

To lose control of the Oceans could provide the death knell for colonies as the French discovered in Canada and India during the Seven Years War (1754-1763) and Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802), and as the British found in the 13 colonies during the American War of Independence (1775-1783). In the 19th century it is no accident that the British invested so heavily in the Royal Navy as it tried to professionalize the service and place it at the cutting edge of scientific research and warfare. It industrialized the production of ships and mobilized huge financial resources to the benefit of the service. Time and again, the Royal Navy was able to blockade French or Spanish colonies whilst being able to supply her own and move British troops around the Oceans of the world with relative ease.

The defeat of the French in Canada and in India (Battle of Plassey- 1757) was also due to the fact that French could not guarantee the arrival of their own reinforcements or supplies. A new generation of Royal Naval officers showed just how valuable the investment in skills, ships and technology was worth with two important victories against their foes; a Spanish fleet was decisively defeated at Cape St. Vincent* whilst a French fleet was devastated at Aboukir Bay*. These did not secure Britain by any means, but they illustrated the power of the Royal Navy and the importance of control of the seas. Once again, Britain could start the process of hoovering up French and Spanish possessions whilst forcing Napoleon to scurry back to Continental Europe and concentrate on building a Continental Empire rather than a Global one. Britain still had a significant Empire along with Royal Navy which allowed it to continue trade with most of the rest of the world, at least outside of Europe. The Royal Navy could also be brought to bear to blockade Europe and prevent goods and raw materials getting to France and her allies. This combination of control of the seas and access to markets was crucial in providing Britain with the ability to continue fighting a long, drawn-out war for over two decades during early 19th century.

Britain’s true supremacy at sea was achieved when Nelson’s fleet thrashed the combined Franco-Spanish fleet at the battle of Trafalgar in 1805 lasting until incompletely challenged by German fleet at the battle of Jutland in 1916[20]. During this period, it really could cherry pick the best harbours and bases around the world. From Cape Town in South Africa to Heligoland in the North Sea to Mauritius in the Indian Ocean and many, many more French, Dutch or Spanish colonies dotted all over the world were captured by the Royal Navy. There was no naval power that could resist the Royal Navy and in a state of war it was free to attack and claim whenever and wherever it liked[21]. The true decline of British supremacy at sea which remained the foundations of the global maritime security architecture began in 1941 when island nation (Japan) of the Pacific unleashed unprecedented firepower in 1941-42 during the Second World War. While Britain slipped in its supremacy, the maritime security architecture that it had put in place continued to persist with the introduction of variety of means including international law which compensated for the use of force in the post-colonial period (1945-present). Pax Britannica was a space to conduct business using British financial and legal systems and with the Royal Navy holding the lanes of trade open that still persists albeit under different strategic context[22].

Britain’s naval strategy cannot be decoupled from its national interest and global interest. British naval strategistsclaim defending Malta (Mediterranean) and Singapore (Pacific) to be more central to British naval strategy than the territory of Britain itself. After the Opium wars, an assessment by Qing emperor on the threats to China from sea did not include Hong Kong, but Singapore and Calcutta. For Royal Navy to project naval power upon China’s coast required control over land, it was this naval necessity that Japan chose to successfully challenge during the second world war. Despite having secured the coastal perimeter of Singapore, Britain displayed lack of acumen in defending its northern frontier along the Malay peninsula. After the multi-national force comprising British, Australian, and Indian soldiers unconditionally surrendered to General Yamashita, Prime Minister Churchill called the shameful fall of Singapore to the Japanese the “worst disaster” and “largest capitulation” in British military history.[23]After Singapore, in March 1944, the Japanese launched the “U Go” offensive against the British that led to the Battles of Imphal and Kohima with the strategic intention to further deplete British command of sea in Indian Ocean[24]. It is this logic of naval power that allows China to reconsider its erstwhile doctrine of not possessing naval bases on foreign soil. Furthermore, this doctrine is undergoing transformation in China’s strategic rationale along with its rhetoric of a non-interventionist foreign policy[25].

Loss of Singapore to global British naval operations shares resemblance to constantly sought military outcome in the past by Britain’s adversaries such as France (19th century) and Germany (20th century). Triumph of British forces in their battle for survival in Europe primarily rests on its naval fleet and the idea of defense of Britain[26]. Until Britain controlled its overseas naval bases and international trade based on them by observing open seas, it was a military problem for its adversaries in mainland Europe to attack the island nation across the English Channel. Given this strategic logic, Britain diverted its better qualified armaments to overseas military theaters such as Mediterranean, India, and Far East than for homeland defense during the Battle for Britain and German Operation Sea Lion[27].Britain’s strategic instinct for open seas and its relationship with Britain’s survival lingers into the 20th century with British efforts to secure the Falklands (1982) by dispatch of naval task force and expansion of port facilities at Bahrain (2014) where it intends to station its latest Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. British naval solution for defense of Britain rests on the control and domination (COMMAND) of high seas along with the denial of same to its adversaries while in crisis. The German High Sea Fleet (Hochseeflotte) was organized with the sole intention of tackling Britain’s naval supremacy at sea based on the German strategic appraisal since 1907[28]. For Britain, Securing Gibraltar (Atlantic), Malta (Mediterranean), Ceylon (Indian Ocean) or Singapore (Pacific) was vital to securing Britain itself. Upon French defeat on 28 June, 1940 Britain created the Mediterranean fleet under direct Admiralty to conduct operations in western Mediterranean and the Atlantic with a strategic objective of guarding the supply convoys to Malta. The Mediterranean fleet secured the Red Sea which was the responsibility of the East Indies Command securing Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Britain’s national insecurities as approached by its naval strategist becomes the key variable shaping the global context of the Asian security architecture.

Therefore, global approach to a nation’s security is perhaps the basis of the application of naval power in the Indo-Pacific. For Britain, the presence of Japanese Naval forces in Indian Ocean with the occupation of Port Blair (Andaman and Nicobar – 23rd March 1942) set forth a re-orientation in its naval command structure during the Second World War. The East Indies Command based at Red Sea and Persian Gulf including ships from Royal Indian Navy (Delhi) was responsible for the entire Indian Ocean prior to 1942 (Fall of Singapore) when it was abolished to create Eastern Fleet[29]. The Eastern Fleet (East Indies Fleet since November 1944) comprising of elements from Royal Australian Navy along with US and French naval ships included a massive input of the Royal Indian Navy with its escort vessels and undertook the following tasks;

a)The battle fleet with its carriers, battleships and supporting warships to tackle any Japanese heavy ships and strike at shore targets
b)The submarine force to deny Japan the use the sea routes between Singapore and Rangoon (Myanmar)
c) A substantial escort force to guard the convoys between Suez and India, and between the Cape and India.

From October 1943, the fleet was the maritime component of South East Asia Command, but had responsibilities outside of the SEAC area as well. In November 1944 Britain’s Pacific Fleet was created in support of US Seventh Fleet to deal Japanese militarism in Western Pacific Theater.

A significant aspect of the British naval strategy during Second World War was the sudden influx of arms transfer to the Royal Indian Navy (RIN)[30]. While ships from the Royal Indian Navy prosecuted naval engagements during Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily (July, 1943), until the Second World War Britain’s Indian Naval arm was limited to patrolling, mine – sweeping and ferrying combatants. History of RIN (established on 02 October, 1934) since 1612 when it was East India Companies Marine underwent multiple reorganization exemplifying Indian sub-continents (Indo-Pacific) role across a large time-frame until 1950. However, none such change paralleled the change since the fall of Singapore (1942).

R.I.N. Personnel

1939

1945

Officers

198 3,031

Men

1,475

28,800

Sloops(05)

A.A. Frigates(06)

Ships

Patrol Vessel(01)

A.S. Frigates(07)

Survey Vessel(01)

Corvette(01)

Fleet Minesweepers(16)

Survey Ship(01)

Naval Review (November, 1952)

The recent upsurge in Indo-US defense relationship albeit occurring in a radically changed strategic environment of this century shares a continuing resemblance with such a phenomenon.The sudden influx in arms transfer to India since the fall of Singapore resonated the strategic beliefs associated with the defense of Britain, which rested on the guiding principle that – if Britain can ensure an open and free trading system at high seas and project naval power to discourage the interruption of free- flow of inter-colonial trade and combat troops across the vast expanse of the oceans, it could remain militarily invincible. Japan’s naval presence in Indian Ocean disrupted the global command of the seas which was a prerequisite for Britain’s survival.

Command of the Sea: A Case for Continuity

British Command of the Sea from a global perspective was secured after the naval campaign of 1805 – Trafalgar with the defeat of combined Franco-Spanish fleet lasting until incompletely challenged by German fleet at the battle of Jutland in 1916 and the fall of Singapore in 1942. Britain’s command of high seas continued despite the rise of Russia, France, Germany and US in late 19th and early 20th century and resulting relative decline of Britain’s economy. For Britain, maintaining its naval operations to secure the Mediterranean and Western Pacific from Indian Ocean secured its naval superiority until it officially declared the seizure of naval presence East-of-Aden[31] (East-of-Suez) a quarter century beyond World War II (1968). However, given its strategic culture, a need for naval presence in East-of-Suez manifested throughout the second half of 20th century (Hong Kong, 1997) and into the 21st century (Bahrain). In December 2014, Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond signed an agreement with Bahrain to develop the Mina Salman Port as a permanent base for its Type 45 destroyers and two yet to be commissioned (2021) Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. Britain’s need for permanent presence along with French in Abu Dhabi (2009) was rationalized by Britain’s Foreign Secretary as a measure to cope with US naval pivot towards Asia-Pacific[32] which requires the European allies to share the burden of stability and security in Gulf, Near East, and Africa[33].

During the Second World War, RIN warships commissioned after the break out of Second World War supported RN operations stretching from near Seychelles to Bombay Reef near Paracel islands off Hainan (China)[34]. Supplementing naval operations in Mediterranean and Far East, RIN established the geo-strategic significance of the Indian subcontinent in the Indian Ocean as Pivotal. The global context of RIN rationalized the continued British naval arms transfer to India after Indian Independence in 1947 which included an aircraft carrier in 1961. Of the total naval arms transfer, sale, and lend-lease agreements during Second World War, RIN remained a top recipient amongst Egypt, Canada, US, Dominican Republic, South Africa, Portugal, Free French Navy, and Denmark. Defense of India remained central to British defense planning and strategic thinking not up until India’sindependence and further but the Fall of Singapore (1942). Singapore in western-Pacific for British Empire held a particular naval strategic significance as did Calcutta or Colombo. This logic remained unaltered in time; the Qing dynasty for example did not consider the British possession of Honk Kong as direct military threats to China, as Singapore or Calcutta did[35]. Without such a forward presence, British Navy was impotent at projecting power in Far East culminating as a national threat to China under Qing dynasty. During Second World War Japan had no reason to attack US (Pacific) or British (Atlantic) mainland, it was sufficient to do so to their colonial possession in Western Pacific (Philippines and Singapore) and therefore both Japan (20th century) and China (19th century) adopted a continental solution (land based) to maritime challenge (sea based). However, this methodology has been in-vogue in distant past as well, when Alexander the Great sought to destroy the Persian naval fleet at Persian ports by employing his land based forces or when the French after the 1805 – Battle of Trafalgar decided to conquer sea by land.[36]

Interpretation of the Pacific War in terms of strategic thought defines the continuing politico-military challenge in Indo-Pacific. A Primary MilitarySolution-Challenge Matrix based on Japan and British strategic behavior during the first half of 20th century defined in terms of grand military objective is as following;

Pacific War

Status(Power Disposition) Primary Miliatry Challenge (Domain) Primary Military Solution (Domain)

 Britain

 Naval Power Continental (NEAR) Maritime (FAR)
 Japan

 Naval Power

 Maritime (FAR)

Continental (NEAR)

Primary Military Solution-Challenge Matrix

Both Britain and Japan display similar if not same approach in managing their challenge-solution matrix. This similarity in approach is signification of British requirement for defense of India plan and Japan’s joint invasion of India from East (Burma) alongside Indian Prisoners of War (POW) at Singapore. Japan’s prime objective was the limiting British naval capability in power projection in the Pacific and in order to achieve this it employed a land-based strategy incontrast to Britain’s sea-based strategy. For example, Japan attacked Singapore from Malay Peninsula (north) while British defended Singapore from sea (West-East-South) leaving the North less defended.

Japan’s successful invasion of India upon successful termination of Burma Campaign in Japan’s favour would have restricted British naval power projection capacity to Mediterranean along with exponential increase in threats to continue to do so. Further Loss of command over Mediterranean would have threatened Britain’s mainland directly from mainland Europe. Similarly, Fall of Midway (June, 1942) in Japanese hand in the Pacific would have threatened US mainland having neutralized US Navy in the Pacific theater. Fortunately for Britain its colonies (India) and dominions (Canada and Australia) spread across the vast expanse of ocean helped mount expeditionary operations from sea to effect military outcome on land in Indo-Pacific and an unexpected breakthrough in predicting Japan’s attack on Midway in case of US set the future course of world history while retaining its erstwhile modern security architecture under US leadership and its NATO allies after the war.

Indo-Pacific: Security Structure

The naval security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region is associated with the beginnings of industrial revolution which has been the cradle for global trade and modern naval power. A continuing paradigm from a global perspective begins to start taking shape with early East-West interaction around Indo-Pacific coinciding with the 17th century period of European encounter with enlightenment. The initial order for the present multi-lateral institutions based approach to maritime security in Indo-pacific was a bloody affair. Of all the west European powers the violent display of use of force by Portugal dwarfed Britain, Germany, France in commencing the beginnings of present era strategic security architecture in Indo-Pacific.

The need for order culminated from the hostile relationship maintained among European powers during the initial phase of order creation. An important aspect of this order was its reliance on naval power born out of the history of naval rivalry in the European context. The revolution in military affairs (RMA) in the European context was led by British who placed by far the heaviest guns onboard its fleet and used it decisively in first neutralizing the source of global naval rivalry from European mainland. Since Second World War, the world order under US leadership continued to rely upon military power, open seas, and free trade in preserving the security structure of Indo-Pacific[37].

1950’s President Dwight Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy. (Robust nuclear arsenal and associated delivery system).
1970’s Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s “Offset Strategy”. (Digital microelectronics and information technology to smart weapons, sensors, targeting and control networks).
2014 Secretary Hegel and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work’s new “game-changing off-set” strategysince 2014.

Indo-Pacific naval security architecture rests on the geo-political and geo-strategic understanding of Asia[38]. Its scope and importance can be summarized by Admiral Alfred T Mahan’s view that Asia cannot be dominated militarily by land and therefore it was imperative for US Navy to combine its two fleets in the Pacific and Atlantic through the opening of Panama Canal originally a French Plan[39]. With geography remaining the constant aspect of this architecture, the structure has adapted to political developments across time while retaining its maritime essence. The maritime political relationships in Indo-Pacific exist in dependence to the geographical constraints which are constantly adapting to the changes offered by developments in naval technology since the era of trade at high seas under canon fire[40].

Although the Asia-Pacific has continued to lead the way in terms of their expanding maritime influence, it is arguable that the waters of the Indian Ocean, Africa and the Middle East rival them so far as operational naval activity is concerned. In terms of security architecture, the Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity[41]. In Indian Ocean, China, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore are amongst many other Asian countries that have added their warships to the longer-established European and American regional presence[42]. In addition to the growing naval power among the countries in western Pacific, China’s rise as a regional power remains most compelling in articulating the present maritime security architecture in Asia-Pacific. The ongoing advancement in the capability and proficiency of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), inevitably continues to drive the pace and development of the Navies in Indo-Pacific region (US, Japan and India). To the extent that the present theater level naval operational doctrines (Air-Sea Battle) considered by the United States (U.S.) Navy are directed to counter China’s naval modernization in the western Pacific measured by the capacity todeny an operational area and access (A2/AD).[43]

The naval power structure in Indo-Pacific has settled around United States (US) Navy as the predominant security provider after World War II when Great Britain lost its naval supremacy at the hands of Japanese militarism in mid-20th century. While having dislocated Great Britain from its strategic naval base in South East Asia (Singapore), Japan could not sustain a regional-global reach to initiate a creation of an alternate or sustain world order as that existed under the Anglo-Saxon Empire. Japan having been forced to back out of a hegemonic role in Asia-Pacific, the mantle relocated to United States after the World War II. What the British Empire controlled as colonies on its imperial periphery was maintained within an alliance structure by US during the second half of the 20th century. In the 21st century the terms “friends” and “partners” have been added by US and NATO to categorize their defense relations with others such as India and Singapore. In September, 2015, the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) has been sought by Japan and US to upgrade Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF)-US Forces (USF) cooperation[44] in lieu of the security environment of the present era (Middle East).

However, the inherent strategic logic remained unaltered with respect to naval power within this structure. Naval power banked on naval bases in order to enable the predominant power to shape events both at sea and land from sea[45]. This necessity has remained unaltered despite technology reducing the principal requirement for naval bases by providing technical solutions to a strategic problem. The United States has engaged in aggressive military action in at least thirteen countries in the Greater Middle East since 1980 and spent $10 trillion protecting Persian Gulf oil supplies over the past four decades[46]. However, such an over bearing military posture requires key dependence on US military bases in the region which ensures power projection and facilitates expeditionary operations. In its 21st century avatar the US requires formal military alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand, and has formed or is forming security partnerships with Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Burma and India, despite a technical competency in projecting power by way of nuclear powered aircraft carrier and submarines, and global strike assets such as strategic bomber fleet and long-range stand-off weaponry. The wrinkle being LOGISTICS!

The recent Indo-Japan defense cooperation occurs within the guidance of “India and Japan Vision 2025” set forth on 12 December 2015[47]. This vision statement underlines the rising importance of the Indo-Pacific region as the key driver for the prosperity of the world and inherits India’s “Act East” policy and Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”[48]. Under formal requests from Government of India through Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Japan will invest in $744 million road building project in the northeastern Indian border regions of Mizoram, Assam, and Meghalaya. India’s defense relations with United States have matured since the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal (2005) that failed to achieve the expected potential of its defense relations with U. S[49]. India’s military relations with Russia, India’s reluctance to participate in U.S. led initiatives on what India considered it to be selective disarmament measures such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and foreign policy preoccupation of non-alignment resulted in India’s dependence on Russian military industrial complex. However, the then lack of bonhomie in the Indo-US defense relations has matured to the level of “partner”, if not alliance[50]. India is today a signatory of the Missile Transfer Control Regime (MTCR) and contemplating design, development, and production of its third Aircraft Carrier (INS Vishal) with US EMALT launch system while India’s Aircraft Carrier INS Vikramaditya was commissioned in 2015 at St. Petersburg, Russia and in 2015 India became a member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) along with Russia and China. A reorientation in Indian and US foreign policy provides an unprecedented renewal of Indo-US defence relations. The US Navy signed a Master Ship Repair Agreement (MSRA) with Reliance Infrastructure (RInfra) – led Reliance Defense and Engineering (RDEL) to repair and alteration service US naval ships of the Seventh-Fleet operating in the Indian Ocean on 14 February. The Indian shipyard (Gujarat) based on the recent Logistics Excahnge Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA – 29 August, 2016) will substitute shipyards in Japan and Singapore for US Pacific Fleet. India now shares the FoundationalAgreements with US making it a formal partner, if not ally, for US forces in the Indo-Pacific[51]. The Indo-US defense relation will further strengthen with the Communications and Information Security Memorandum Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence (BECA). US Secretary of Defense General James Mattis believes it’s the India-US Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) that’s central to the unprecedented levels of cooperation Indo-US defence relations. National Defense Authorization Act of 2017 (NDAA 2017) by the US government in January mentions ‘Enhancing Defense and Security Cooperation with India’ institutionalized in the DTTI mechanism under Section 1292[52].

Simultaneously, India has grown in strategic importance to Japan with Japanese construction of power plant (15 megawatt) at Andaman and Nicobar Island (India) and potential assistance in building Indian Navy’s Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability along with possible export of ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious aircraft[53]. India has deployed Israeli-made aerial “Searcher” drones and two Boeing P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft, developed for anti-submarine warfare, to the Andaman and Nicobar chain[54]. In the present strategic situation where China’s grand strategy intends to relocate the traditional sea based trading system to quasi land-sea based system (OBOR), a strong Indian Navy along with Japan’s distribution of its ASW capability developed since the Imperial times is welcome to US, Britain and Australia’s strategic schema of Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion:

Hence the quest for the command of the sea continues to remain the center of gravity of the global security architecture. The military-historical narrative of the evolution of command of sea and sea power provides clarity to India’s apprehensions with China’s OBOR that seeks an Indian Ocean presence along with other extra-regional powers. While China frames its flag ship project of CPEC as part Belt (land) of the Belt and Road initiative, its strategic association with 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (Sea) falls within this military historical narrative. What the west denied to Soviet Union during cold war, has now been secured by China without any major resistance adjusted for the changes that are associated with naval power. The linkage is so stark that India’s partition upon its independence has associations with Britain’s naval strategy. It was upon denial of a naval base in North-Western India by Congress and its acceptance by the Muslim League that Britain engineered a religion based partition by creating Pakistan. Its strategic values were to remain a military post for Britain in case of military contingency against Soviet Union[55]. Within Britain’s maritime security architecture, the creation of Pakistan represents the strategic value of the Indian Ocean and the association of Maritime powers quest to command and control sea. Pakistan may have a similar strategic role for US and China albeit for different reasons. For China,a military post at Gwadar (Baluchistan) is a continental solution to a maritime problem which haunts it with the memories associated with 100 years of humiliation possible due to sea power. For India, such a development occurs within a historical context where it has to deal with the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean and its national security. China’s presence in Indian Ocean for its own national interest, adds an additional dimension that’s shaped by major extra-regional maritime powers US, France, Britain, Japan, Australia and India.

China’s OBOR reflects a continental approach informed by its strategic culture which has multiple points of difference with maritime powers who value mobility, the ability to concentrate resources and military technology adapted to a particular situation. The period before the arrival of Europeans in the Indian Ocean and China Sea was the great era of “free trade” within the region[56].Militarization of Indian Ocean and India’s national security provides the framework of interpreting China’s OBOR. Intensification of Indo-US and Indo-Japan defense relations and the flag ship project of CPEC have direct and proportional relationship. From a traditional naval strategic perspective, China and Japan’s naval presence in Indian Ocean also brings along with it China-Japan and US rivalry not similar to the European rivalry that shaped the evolution of maritime nature of Asian security architecture. India’s traditional role within this security structure remains pivotal in modern context and will shape India’s strategic situation.

With respect to Sino-Indian relations, role of extra-regional powers and their relation with India, China and Pakistan will be an Asian affair given the re-rise of China and India which have begun their respective quest for sea power in the 21st century. Naval security architecture based on India’s partition with the creation of Pakistan and recent Pakistan-China naval relations framed within the context of OBOR provides the Sino-Indian relations a pivotal position for the overall success of OBOR itself. Having successfully employed its strategic value Pakistan has had the honor of being a non-NATO ally and member at Shanghai Cooperation Organization along with Russia and China. However, it is less understood if Pakistan will reflect upon China as maritime or continental power. China’s approach towards Pakistan as a maritime power would be the first of its kind within the Anglo-Saxon Asian security architecture – by design. While the causes for Japan’s behavior in mid-20thcentury beabsenting in the present context, the strategic reasoning continues.

. China’s continental strategic culture makes China a reluctant maritime power. Maritime powers and continental powers quest for sea power marks the differentials adopted in their respective strategies. The Sino-US naval relationship in the Pacific is yet to play out in the Indian Ocean. China’s strategic culture is likely to use the belt (land) to meet the challenges met along road (sea). For both India and China, the evolution of the cannon based militarized maritime order has been an eventful chapter in their respective history. Re-emergence of an Asian maritime power with in the global security architecture is unprecedented given that Japan’s identity as an Asian country is subject to debate. China as an Asian extra-regional power in Indian Ocean is less likely to be behave like western extra-regional powers or India as a regional power. Western architects of the present security architecture based on their maritime empire which were the result of long-distance commerce based on the strategic logic to neutralize local strategic content by extending its own, do not fundamentally align with both India and China’s strategic cultural approach. Intra-trade within Asia itself was sufficient to ascertain a prominent place within the global geo-political economic structure. However, the present strategic context allows and necessitates India and China to be an extra-regional power themselves.

How land oriented rising powers in Asia come to terms with the maritime challenges organized by naval power will remain at the center of disambiguation of OBOR in Sino-Indian relations. A checkmate situation is unlikely from a traditional security perspective; however, such a checkmate can be avoided by careful study of military history and its influence upon the world order.

Reference:

[1]Till, Geoffrey (2013), Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, Routledge: London.

[2]However, the term “New World Order” in US scheme of imagination means much more than the logistics of global trade and has been invoked by US Presidents time and again to guide its foreign policy across time. It further carries a darker meaning implying covert conspiracies (Discussion with Professor Jeffrey Kaplan (2017) School of International and Public Affairs, Jilin University (People’s Republic of China) April, 2017.

[3]Commerce and Navigation are the two main ingredients of “Sea Power”. A country may possess either of the two or both in pursuit of seapower.

[4] “Indian Maritime Document”, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy) (18 August, 2009)

[5]US President Jimmy Carter (1980) Speech to Joint Session of Congress cited in Michael T. Klare, “Hormuz Mania: Why Closure of the Strait of Hormuz Could Ignite a War and a Global Depression”

[6]“Confluence of the Two Seas” – Speech by H.E.Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, 22 August, 2007. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/pmv0708/speech-2.html

[7] Gurpreet S Khurana (2007), “Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Relations” Strategic Analysis, Vol: 31; Issue: 1, Institute for Defence Study and Analysis, New Delhi. January 2007.

[8] Mr. Masanori Nishi (2016) – Former Vice-Minister for Defense (Japan) speech to National Security College at Australian National University.

[9] The term ‘Indo-Pacific’ combines the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Western Pacific Region (WP) – inclusive of the contiguous seas off East Asia and Southeast Asia – into a singular regional construct. Gurpreet S. Khurana (2017), “The ‘Indo-Pacific Concept: Retrospect and Prospect” National Maritime Foundation, 02 February, 2017. Available at http://www.maritimeindia.org/View%20Profile/636215922419657386.pdf

[10] Toshi Yoshihara (2006), ‘Japanese Maritime Thought: If Not Mahan, Who?’ Naval War College Review, Vol: 59; Issue: 3 (2006), pp. 23-51. Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes (2007), Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan,London: Routledge. Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan (2017), “South China Sea Imbroglio: Through the Prism of PLAs Grand Strategy of Unrestricted Warfare” in (Ed) Lt Gen JS Bajwa (2017), China: Threat or Challenge? Lancer Publications: New Delhi, pp.240-242. The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition, Published by the Office of Naval Intelligence, United States (December, 2015).

[11]S. Rajasimman (2015), “Beginning of the End of American Empire”Indian Defence Review, (Net Edition) 31 October, 2015.

[12]S. Rajasimman (2011), “Nuclear Doctrine and Deterrence: A Chinese Perspective” Journal for Air Power and Space Studies, Vol:06; No: 04, Winter 2011 (October-December).

[13]S. Rajasimman (2017), “Militarisation of South China Sea: The Offence – Defence Paradigm” in Lt Gen J S Bajwa (Ed), China Threat or Challenge, Lancer Publication: New Delhi.

[14]K. S. Mathew (1986), “Trade in the Indian Ocean and the Portuguese system of Cartazes,” in Malyn Newitt (Ed) The First Portuguese Colonial Empire, Exeter: New York p. 72 and Jorge Graqa (1977), “The Portuguese Porcelain Trade with China,” Arts in Asia, Vol: 7; p.45 cited in Robert Finlay (1992), “Portuguese and Chinese Maritime Imperialism: Camoes’s Lusiads and Luo Maodeng’s Voyage of the San Bao Eunuch” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Apr., 1992), pp. 225-241.

[15]Edward N. Luttwak (2009), The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge. p.12.

[16]Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper (2010), Empires in World History: Power and The Politics of Difference, Princeton University Press: Princeton. p.149

[17]Ibid; p.149

[18]Japan first gobbled land in Manchuria and then employed a southern strategy all the way up to Pacific Islands which destroyed Britain’s ability to shape events in Pacific during the second world war.

[19] J. Charles Schencking (1999), “The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Constructed Consciousness of a South Seas Destiny, 1872-1921” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Oct., 1999), p.772.

[20]Jeremy Black (2009), Naval Power, Palgrave Macmillan: New York.

[21]Ibid; p.85

[22]David Vine (2015), Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World (American Empire Project), Metropolitan Books: New York.

[23]Fred Glueckstein (2015), “Churchill and the fall of Singapore” Finest Hour 169, summer 2015; The International Churchill Society. Pg.32. Available at http://www.winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour/finest-hour-169/churchill-and-the-fall-of-singapore

[24]Shefali K Chandan (2017), “When Indian Soldiers Helped Turn the Tide in Favour of The Allies in world War II” Indian Defence Review (Courtesy:www.swarajyamaj.com) 06 June, 2017. Available at https://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/when-indian-soldiers-helped-turn-the-tide-in-favour-of-the-allies-in-world-war-ii/ [Accessed on 06 June, 2017].

[25]Zhongqi Pan and Paing Du (2015), “The Logic of Contingency in China’s Insistence on the Non-Interference Principle” Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, December 2015 Vol.8, No.4.

[26]A. Lambert (1995), ‘The Shield of Empire, 1815-1895’ in The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy, ed., J.R. Hill, Oxford, 1995, pp. 180ff

[27]“German Plans for the Invasion of England, 1940 Operation “SEALION”” Central Intelligence Agency, Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/GERMAN%20PLANS%20FOR%20INVASION%20OF%20ENGLAND,%201940_0001.pdf[Accessed on 10 June, 2017].

[28]P. Overlack (1999), ‘Asia in German Naval Planning Before the First World War: The Strategic Imperative’, War and Society, Vol: 17, No: 1, May 1999.

[29]The East Indies Command included the 4th Cruiser Squadron [3 Town class], 2 sloops in the Red Sea, and 3 sloops in the Persian Gulf. When Italy entered the conflict in June 1940, responsibility for the Red Seas was transferred to the Mediterranean Fleet, and did not revert back until 1942. Dr. Graham Watson, “World War 2 at Sea ORGANISATION OF THE ROYAL NAVY 1939-194” Naval History, Available at http://www.naval-history.net/xGW-RNOrganisation1939-45.htm#33

[30]V.A.K. “The Indian Navy” The Naval Review, November 1953. Available at http://www.naval-review.com/issues/1950s/1953-4.pdf

[31]The phrase was popularized by Rudyard Kipling in his 1890 poem Mandalay. In usage, the term meant British interests outside the European theater. The then Defense Secretary Dennis Healey announced in 1968 that British troops would be withdrawn from all major military bases “East of Aden”.

[32]Jermyn Chow (2016), “US Navy’s Pivot to Asia ‘On Track’” Straits Times, 16 February, 2016. Available at http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/us-navys-pivot-to-asia-on-track

[33]Richard Spencer (2014), “Britain returns ‘East of Suez’ with permanent Royal Navy base in Gulf” The Telegraph; 06 December, 2014. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11277194/Britain-returns-East-of-Suez-with-permanent-Royal-Navy-base-in-Gulf.html

[34]Lecture by Vice-Admiral A. E. I. Bedford, C.B., C.S.I., to The Royal Central Asian Society (1937) reproduced as a chapter “The Royal Indian Navy” in The Naval Review, Vol. XXVI. No.2. May, 1938.

[35]Summer Palace Library, Beijing

[36]S. Rajasimman (2017), “Militarization of South China Sea: The Offence-Defense Paradigm” in Lt Gen JS Bajwa, China: Threat or Challenge; Lancer Publishers: New Delhi. The war of the French Revolution and Empire the percentage of our trade lost by capture has been computed to have been only 3.5per cent, hence French methodology to attack commerce with no luck at sinking British naval fleet was relocated to solution based on land.See, Part I: “The Influence Oversea Trade on British Naval Strategy in the Past and at Present” The Naval Review (The Naval Society), Vol: III; No: 1, February, 1915. p.129.

[37]Robert Martinage (2014), “Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting Long-Term Advantages to Restore US Global Power Projection Capability” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington.

[38] (Rogers; 2011)

[39] (Rajasimman; 2009)

[40] (Kaplan; 2013)

[41]“Confluence of the Two Seas” Speech by H.E.Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, 22 August, 2007. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/pmv0708/speech-2.html

[42] (Waters, 2012)

[43]S. Rajasimman (2016), “Militarization of South China Sea: Offence-Defence Paradigm” Indian Defence Review Vol.31, No.1 (January-March 2016).

[44]Yoji Koda (2015), “Significance of The Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation and Japan’s Defense Legislation in 2015” The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies (AJISS), No:218.; 09 September, 2015.

[45]David Vine (2015), Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World (American Empire Project), Metropolitan Books: New York.

[46] Mark Thompson (2011), “A Question for the Obama Administration: Has the US Wasted $8 Trillion Defending the Flow of Oil from the Persian Gulf?” Time, 24 April, 2011. Available at http://nation.time.com/2011/04/24/a-question-for-the-obama-administration/

[47]Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World (December 12, 2015). Available at http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26176/Joint_Statement_on_India_and_Japan_Vision_2025_Special_Strategic_and_Global_Partnership_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperity_of_the_IndoPacific_R

[48] “India-Japan Joint Statement during the visit of Prime Minister to Japan”, Press Information Bureau (PMO, Government of India) 11 November, 2016. Available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=153534

[49] Sanjaya Baru (2016), “An Agreement That was called A Deal” The Hindu, 02 September, 2016. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/indiausa-stand-in-nuclear-deal/article7444348.ece.

[50] Shivshankaran Menon (Former National Security Advisor) in a interview to The Wire on 27 December, 2016. Shivshankaran Menon (Former National Security Advisor) in a interview to News Laundry on 19 December, 2016.

[51] Charles Tiefer (2016), “China and Pakistan Should Note — This Week, India and US Sign the LEMOA Pact” Forbes, 28 August, 2016. Available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlestiefer/2016/08/28/china-and-pakistan-beware-this-week-india-and-us-sign-major-war-pact/#305cf4743778. “India and the United States Sign the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) Press Trust of India , 30 August, 2017. Available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/mbErel.aspx?relid=149322

[52] Sushant Singh (2017), “DTTI: First signs good but India to wait and watch on defense ties with US” Indian Express, 27 January, 2017. Available at http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/dtti-first-signs-good-but-india-to-wait-and-watch-on-defence-ties-with-us-obama-modi-trump-4493368/

[53]The plane fitted with Rolls Royce engine can land on rough seas with a wave height of around 3 metres. The US-2 can cruise at extremely low speeds of approximately 90 km/hr. The US-2 has an approximate operational range of 4,500 km and a cruise speed of 480 km/hr. India is likely to commission 10 such aircrafts. Smriti Jain (2016), “US-2i: India’s plan to buy these Japanese planes that can land on water sends a message to China” Financial Express, 07 November, 2016. Available at http://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/us-2i-amphibian-plane-japan-india-defence-deal-indian-navy-indian-ocean-region-china/440128/

[54] Ellen Barry (2016), “As India collaborates With Japan on Islands, It Looks to Check China” New York Times 11 March, 2016. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/world/asia/india-japan-china-andaman-nicobar-islands.html?_r=0

[55] Tarek Fatah (2017) Rubin Report

[56]Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper (2010), Empires in World History: Power and The Politics of Difference, Princeton University Press: Princeton.

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About the Author

Dr Rajasimman Sundaram

teaches history, politics, and culture and a member of the Institute of BRICS Studies and College of Multi-Languages at Sichuan International Studies University [四川外国语大学] (The People’s Republic of China)". 

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