Military & Aerospace

Defending Indian Skies against the Chinese Air Force
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Issue Vol. 27.1 -Mar 2012 | Date : 08 Nov , 2012

The PLAAF Challenge

According to the latest reports (IISS Military Balance 2011), the PLAAF has some 1,687 combat capable aircraft up from 1,653 the previous year. The Chinese aviation industry now has the capacity to manufacture 40-50 modern fighters every year. Such is the pace of progress that reliance on Russian technological support has now reduced to a great extant.

Neither China nor India is likely to seek to engage in an all-out, copy-book and set-piece conventional war.

The PLAAF, however, has almost no combat experience nor has it participated in exercises with air forces other than the one with a few aircraft in Turkey last year. Yet if the type and variety of weapons, especially cruise missiles, UAV and UCAV and the focus on space-based systems such as the GPS/GLONASS, reconnaissance satellites are any indication, the PLAAF is by no means lagging behind other air forces in grasping the essentials of modern air power employment. A majority of the 1,687 combat aircraft, however, are of II/III generation. Barring some 144 J-10, a few Super-10, 243 Su-27/30 and 72 JH-7A, the rest comprise J-7 and J-8 of the older generation.

In addition, the PLA Navy’s aviation wing has some 311 combat capable aircraft with 24 Su-30 Flanker and 84 JH-7 fighter bombers with the remaining being J-7 and J-8 variants. Some 15 J-15, a locally manufactured version of the carrier-borne Su-33 are to join the PLA Navy’s new aircraft carrier, the Varyag.

In spite of the PLAAF and PLAN possessing a fairly large number of third generation or even slightly more advanced fighters, it is not clear if these would be used in their traditional roles. Given the strong influence of Sun Tzu’s philosophy of “winning wars without actually fighting”, the hangover of the People’s War dogma, PLA Army’s domination and relatively limited combat experience of the PLAAF, there is a possibility that the Chinese leadership might place a higher-than-normal reliance on the country’s missile force especially on the conventional short range ballistic missiles of the M-9 and M-11 variety. These weapons, available in large numbers, could well be used in the opening phases of a border conflict to convey Chinese political resolve and to keep attrition low. The terrain, large distances to airfields in Sichuan and Yunnan provinces (1,600km – 1,800km from Arunachal Pradesh to Chengdu and Kunming) and the limitations imposed by high altitude on fighter operations from Tibetan airfields could also force the Chinese to bank on conventional missiles. It is also debatable if on their way to targets in India, the Chinese aircraft would be allowed to fly over Myanmar and Bangladesh. As the crow flies, Mandalay is 805km from Kolkata, 821km from Tawang and 1,913km from Chennai. The Great Coco Island, that has only a 1,300-metre long runway, is just 284km from Port Blair.

Capabilities of the Indian Air Force (IAF)

Does it imply that the IAF cannot defend the Indian skies against this seemingly very formidable opponent? The answer is a definitive ‘NO’. As mentioned before, the actual offensive capability of the PLAAF is quite limited given the very large distances to their launch bases in mainland China and the severe payload limitations of fighter operations from the high altitude airfields in Tibet.

Geography will continue to play a very critical and possibly, positive role in any future conflict.

The PLAAF has a few Il-78 and ten H-6 converted into Tu-160 Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA). Their efficiency, state of training and employability however, remain somewhat uncertain. In the event of a face-off between the Chinese and Indian navies, the IAF may be called into action. Given the range, the IAF would have to undertake combat operations with the Su-30 fleet duly supported by FRAs.

The fleet of FRA with the PLAAF is neither large enough nor sufficiently trained to compensate for these limitations of operating from airfields at high altitude. Besides, the airfields in Tibet can be easily targeted by the IAF and hence would remain vulnerable. The IAF today has a fairly large number of combat aircraft and a small number of conventional missiles of the Prithvi class. The Su-30 MKI fleet in the East is being progressively enhanced and together with Mirage-2000 and MiG-29, would be able to counter any offensive by the elements of the PLAAF in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. The situation would definitely improve once the Su-30 MKI fleet is built up to full strength and the 126 MMRCA and 40 Tejas Light Combat Aircraft are inducted into the IAF in the next decade. By 2020, hopefully the Indo-Russian Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft would also be available to the IAF.

In the past, India has shown some reluctance to employ offensive air power in right measure. The combat elements of the IAF were simply not used for fear of escalation during the 1962 Sino-Indian War and India lost. Thirty-seven years later, in the 1999 Kargil conflict, the use of air power was delayed and then severely restricted to the Indian side of the Line of Control again for fear of escalation. It is therefore, essential that the country’s military and political leadership is prepared to demonstrate India’s resolve, without which all the expensive hardware would be utterly useless.

IAF resources would undoubtedly be stretched in the event of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) also mounting an offensive in collusion with the PLAAF. But even in such a situation it would not be easy for them to prevail. Simultaneous and well-coordinated offensive operations by China and Pakistan are a remote possibility but one for which the country must be ever prepared. For a variety of reasons, at this point in time, neither China nor India is likely to seek to engage in an all-out, copy-book and set-piece conventional war. Firstly, India has consistently avoided using force even in the face of serious provocation by Pakistan. Secondly, for China, Taiwan and South China Sea disputes are of far greater strategic importance given the recently re-affirmed American interest in the region. This is not to suggest that Tibet and the so-called separatist forces in Xinxiang do not pose a serious challenge/threat to China’s national unity and territorial integrity. Thirdly, China is no longer the isolated country of the early Cold War era. Today, China is an important economic power with trading interests the world over and can hardly afford to sully her image as a responsible player. Fourthly, China’s dependence on maritime routes for exports and energy imports especially through the Strait of Malacca would also constrain her strategic options.

China’s dependence on maritime routes for exports and energy imports especially through the Strait of Malacca would also constrain her strategic options.

The possibility of a local border skirmish arising from a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the situation viz the un-demarcated LAC cannot be ruled out. India would be well advised to sharply restrict the scope, both in time and space, of such a skirmish by resorting to carefully calibrated military/diplomatic responses without delay. In the meantime, the IAF must assiduously build up the capability for swift and effective response to any threat or proactive step by the PLAAF.

Conclusion

In August 2009, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, the then-Chief of Naval Staff had stated that India was not in a position to match China “force for force” and had advised a more technological solution to cope with the threat and not confront a rising China. In July 2011, Air Chief Marshal PV Naik, the then-Chief of the Air Staff had said that the PLAAF was three times the size of the IAF. While these statements are not very different from the suggestions by General Thimayya and Lieutenant General Thorat in 1960-1961, they may also be termed as ‘defeatist’.

…although China and India are neighbours, fortunately their forces are neither in conflict nor in competition.

Today, both India and China are very different. While China has no doubt shown a propensity to resort to aggressive language or even bullying, the actual use of force is another matter. Although slow in implementing steps in her defence preparedness, India is no push-over.

The IAF is well on its way to establish a network of light transportable radars, improved airfield infrastructure and the induction of new fighters, UAV/UCAV and a whole host of force multipliers such as the AWACS and FRA. Unfortunately, all of these are from foreign sources. China’s strategic defence industry has made spectacular progress leading her to be soon counted amongst the leading arms producing and exporting countries. Although the Indian economy too is on a growth trajectory, the power differential with China has been growing. Finally, although China and India are neighbours, fortunately their forces are neither in conflict nor in competition. Geography will continue to play a very critical and possibly, positive role in any future conflict, however, localised it might b

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Air Commodore Ramesh Phadke

Former Senior Fellow and Research Advisor at the IDSA, Visiting Fellow at CISAC Stanford University and Research Fellow at the USI. He has authored a book, “China’s Power Projection”.

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