Indian Defence Review

In the night of 4/5 December, the BOPs at Joginder and Raja Mahatam were vacated by the BSF troops manning them after being heavily shelled. Orders to reoccupy these posts were issued, and that at Joginder was reoccupied on 5 December as Pakistan showed no interest in retaining it. Raja Mahatam post was attacked and recaptured by Wadhawa, a police officer, with the support of regular army elements, particularly artillery. He was killed in action and was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra posthu- mously, thus becoming the first police officer to get it.

Pakistan held the post with no more than a section, and left only two dead and one wounded against one killed and ten wounded of the BSF. Bakhshi was wounded by a mine blast on visiting the post on its recapture. He was evacuated to the rear area and took no part in the battle thereafter. The command of 14 Infantry Division passed to Maj Gen Onkar Singh Kalkat, who enjoyed the reputation of being a bold and resolute leader.

On the fall of the Hussainiwala enclave, the command and control aspect in the sector was redressed, and 35 Infantry Brigade accordingly reverted to the command of 14 Infantry Division. Having been relieved from the defence of Ferozepur, 15 Dogra was detailed to capture the Pakistani BOPs at Basti Anoks and New Kasoke, and this was accomplished by first light on 7 December. This secured the area north of Ferozepur right up to the Sutlej.

It was then decided to eliminate the Pakistani enclave south of the river opposite Mamdot so as to deny the Pakistanis a lodgment area for developing a thrust towards Ferozepur. 15 Dogra attacked the first BOP at Rangewala in the enclave, adopting conventional tactics, and suffered heavy casualities. It was a frontal attack with the forming up place too near the objective. No sooner had the attackers crossed the start line when they were subjected to heavy automatic and artillery fire. This was so devastating that the assault line fell into disarray.

But the situation was saved by the officers moving well forward, regaining control of their men and leading the assault on the objective. The Pakistanis left two dead and some arms and ammunition, while 15 Dogra suffered two officers and 20 other ranks killed and one officer, two JCOs and 53 other ranks wounded. The momentum of eliminating the BOPs in the enc- lave slowed down till the night of 14/15 December, when the battalion captured those at Jaluke Dhuan and Amrud Wali.

The attacks on these positions came from an unexpected direction after a clever manoeuvre. Fearful of being surrounded, the Pakistani troops abandoned the posts in a hurry. The tempo of operations was now building up fast, and 13 Punjab captured the post at Dona Beta without resistance. As the battalion was poised for the next attack, the Pakistanis fled from the remaining two posts of Pira Kana and Jaloke Hittar in confusion. On the night of 17/18 December they infiltrated a strong platoon, later identified as from 9 Baluch, with five MMGs to secure a foothold on the eastern bank of the Sutlej. The whole platoon was ambushed and captured by 13 Punjab.

116 Infantry Brigade was deployed to hold the bridgehead across the Bikaner Gang Canal on the Ferozepur-Guru Harsahai and Muktsar-Jalalabad roads in considerable depth from the Sutlej. Aware that Pakistan had not made any move in the sector, Kalkat pushed forward elements of the brigade units and captured the BOPs at Peepoke, Kali Sahu, Gatti Bhapola, Ghurka and Amin Bhaini in quick succession from 13 to 17 December. All the attacks were well planned and boldly conducted.

After containing the BOPs frontally with a small force, stops were established on the likely routes of withdrawal. This was followed by attacks from the rear following the maintenance routes of the posts. As a result, the attackers suffered very light casualties. In capturing five BOPs, the Indians suffered one NCO killed and one officer, two JCOs and 13 other ranks wounded against Pakistan’s 29 killed and 17 taken prisoner. The brigade captured 15 MMGs, two LMGs and 17 rifles.

After the ceasefire, Pakistan attacked Kali Sahu with approximately one company strength after last light on 3 January 1972. The attack was beaten back and the enemy withdrew into a nearby growth of sarkanda. They were hotly pursued, and a search yielded 12 prisoners from 31 AK Battalion besides 24 dead. More arms and ammunition fell into Indian hands.

14 Infantry Division captured 13 Pakistan outposts in all and recaptured Raja Mahatam. These posts were lightly held and did not seem to form part of any Pakistani defensive or offensive design. Their elimination made no significant contribution to the national strategic aims. Nonetheless, in the otherwise essentially defence-oriented XI Corps actions they raised the spirits of the people, especially after the debacles at Fazilka, Hussainiwala and Chhina Bidhi Chand.

All these minor attacks were planned in detail and well conducted. India suffered negligible casualties in them except at Rangewala post. Kalkat, out to make his mark, pushed his troops hard, and setting a personal note of resolute leadership completely dominated the area beyond Ferozepur and Fazilka right up to the Sutlej. The formation commanders and the entire leadership down the line displayed much zeal and determination in carrying out their tasks and achieved commendable results.

The offensive action in the Ganganagar sector was confined to a few BOPs. After the ceasefire, the BSF post at Nagi reported on 26 December an exchange of fire between a BSF patrol and Pakistani troops in the sand dunes northwest of the post. It was later confirmed that about a platoon strength of Pakistanis had infiltrated about 54 to 243 kilometres beyond the ceasefire line. The location of the platoon was mined to a considerable depth and was supported by two defended localities across the border.

4 Para Battalion was ordered to throw back the Pakistani intruders. The battalion commander established contact with the platoon with one company and decided to assault the position front the northern flank after last light. The attack was to be supported by two field and two medium batteries and a squadron of tanks. The attack went as planned, but the outflanking company lost direction at night and could not contact the objective as scheduled. Unluckily, radio contact with the attacking troops was broken soon after their launching. Fearful of failure, their commander launched the reserve company from the easterly direction, traversing the shortest distance.

Soon after crossing the start line, the assaulting troops got entangled in the minefield and suffered heavy casualties, especially when assaulting in open line. Despite casualties, the attack was pressed home, and on reaching the objective our men came under fire of the outflanking company, which by then had also reached the objective after having suffered equally heavy losses. A clash was averted by the initiative of the officers on the spot, but by that time the Pakistani platoon had withdrawn to depth localities. Soon after its capture, the locality was subjected to heavy artillery fire from three heavy, one medium, four field and one light batteries, which caught the troops in the open as no elaborate field defences existed in the area and digging in soft sand was not possible without adequate revetment facilities.

Three prisoners were taken in the process, and they gave the information that this locality was built up over three to four nights under the very nose of the Nagi post. The total Indian casualties of some 80 killed and wounded included an officer. The casualties were due to the assault from the direction of the minefield in extended lines, offering the maximum exposure to the field’s lethality. An assault in ramrod fashion would have minimized the mine casualties.

The rest of the casualties were due to the clash between the two companies assaulting from different directions and heavy artillery fire. Perhaps an attack along the route of maintenance would have paid better dividends. Credit must however go to 4 Para Battalion for its resolute pursuit of its objective despite very heavy losses. Its officers and men fought extremly well.

What did this battle achieve? In terms of pluses and minuses, Rawlley claimed a gain of 199.15 square kilometres of territory against loss of 153.3 square kilometres to Pakistan, indicating a marginal gain of about 45.85 square kilometres of territory. But battle valuations are not such simple mathematical equations. Politically, it meant the evacuation of the Pulkanjri and Chhina Bidhi Chand group of villages in Amritsar district and all villages forward of the Sabuna distributary in the Fazilka area of Ferozepur district, and the attendant refugee problem inflicted on a population already tired of the periodical India-Pakistan conflicts and wanton destruction of property in their wake.

Added to this was the loss of the wheat and cotton crops in the period of waiting for political negotiations between the two countries, which stretched about a year. Another six months of rehabilitation was necessary before normalcy could be restored in the agricultural economy. The economic void could perhaps be filled with liberal grants, but none could restore the loss of faith in the Indian armed forces and their ability to safeguard the interests of the border population.

Rawlley was assigned the task of defending the Punjab and Ganganagar district of Rajasthan. The area of operational responsibility extended approximately 640 kilometres along the boundary. The defensive posture adopted and the concept of defence varied from sector to sector. The defences in the north were broadly organized on strongly held sectors defended by brigades in the general areas of the Dera Baba Nanak and Ajnala, south of the Ravi, with a limit of penetration allowed up to the line of the Saki nullah, about 16 to 24 kilometres deep in Indian territory.

Defences between the Ravi and the Sutlej were based on the line of ditch-cum-bund defences. Covering troop positions were however held in Khalra area based on the UBD Canal, and in the Mastgarh-Khemkaran area based on the newly constructed defence drain. The Bikaner Gang Canal was the line of penetration between Fazilka and Ferozepur. In the southern sector, the towns of Fazilka, Abohar and Ganganagar were held in the form of defence fortresses with limits of penetration up to the Rajasthan twin canal.

The very acceptance of the line of penetration in such considerable depth envisaged the Pakistani occupation of our territory ahead of these obstacles. So defensively oriented in fact was Rawlley’s concept that he had prepared about 160 bridges for demolition as deep as the twin canal, involving the use of some 250 tons of explosive.

Rawlley evacuated Kassowala and other Indian enclaves north of the Ravi without a fight. But for the elimination of the Pakistani enclaves of Dera Baba Nanak he awaited a Pakistani invasion across the Ravi which never came. In the remainder of the sector between the Ravi and the Sutlej it was a question of first abandoning the BOPs and other defensive positions ahead of the ditch-cum-defence line and later making efforts to retake them, some successfully and others without success.

The loss of the Hussainiwala bridgehead, Rawlley argued later, was of no tactical significance or strategic importance. The loss should however be viewed in terms of the desecration of the Shahid Bhagat Singh memorial and the resultant humbling of Indian pride. It should also be measured in terms of the humiliation of 15 Punjab, the unit defending the enclave, with its proud history. This battalion, which took part in the Burma campaign as well as that against the Pakistani invasion of Jammu and Kashmir, lost the first battle in its history. This meant much to those who had helped to build up its traditions. The impact of the loss of the headworks was felt in the floods in 1972, when India had to approach Pakistan to open the sluice gates, then in its possession, to save Ferozepur town.

Besides, considerable sums of money had to be spent later on restoring the headworks after the return of the lost territory. The Bhagat Singh memorial had to be constructed afresh. In the Fazilka sector, apart from the suspension of agricultural activity and the refugee problem, the wanton destruction of about 23 bridges over the Sabuna distributary resulted in the disruption of traffic for normal activities in the agricultural belt across the distributary for many months even after the return of the territory on the implementation of the Simla Agreement.

In defensive operations, the earliest opportunity is sought to capture tactical ground which enhances the inherent defence potential and also to pre-empt enemy action to gain lodgment in our defences and develop further offensive thrusts deep in our territory. The timing of both these actions should be so synchronised as to nullify the adversary’s actions to gain a tactical advantage. Rawlley captured the Dera Baba Nanak enclave, but only after giving away the Kassowala enclave.

Again, he took Sehjra bulge after having lost the Hussainiwala bridgehead. And he captured the Mamdot bulge, but after having given away the advantage in the Fazilka sector. Thus, it would be seen that Rawlley’s offensive actions were disjointed, not coordinated with the overall pattern of the defensive battle. As a result, his gains did not nullify or seduce the magnitude of his losses.

From the interrogation of prisoners and through defections by East Bengal troops, it was later revealed that Pakistan intended to launch a major offensive somewhere in Ganganagar district with its 1 Armoured Division and one or two infantry division under Gen Tikka Khan. This offensive was originally scheduled for 7 December, but was later postponed to the 14th on further consideration, perhaps because 33 Infantry Division had to be moved to the Sind sector to forestall an Indian advance to Naya Chor and Rahim-Yar-Khan. The attack did not come off even on 14th December, ostensibly because of difficulty in concentrating the force across the Sutlej in time. The freeze Tikka order was finally given by Yahya Khan on acceptance of India’s ceasefire offer.

If Tikka Khan had chosen to strike, what was Rawlley’s reaction capability? On both 7 and 14 December, 14 Infantry Division less one brigade was employed on BOP operations between Ferozepur and Fazilka, far more dispersed on the 14th than on the 7th, and it would have taken a good 48 hours to get the formation together. The concentration area of 1 Armoured Division in and around Muktsar-Kotkapura enabled one armoured regiment to be effective in 24 hours and the remainder of the formation from 48 to 72 hours.

With the fortress defence concept of holding Ganganagar district, it would have been possible for Tikka Khan to advance up to the line of the Rajasthan twin canal without serious opposition, and beyond with some fight. As on or about 14 December there was no more than a squadron of armour between the infantry-oriented fortresses of Abohar and Ganganagar, they could be easily bypassed although made into well-fortified anti-tank localities, and routes of maintenance open beyond the intervention of these fortresses. The troops in the fortresses would have been helpless spectators of the armour manoeuvres outside their reach. Mercifully, Tikka Khan’s offensive did not come off.

As for command decision, it should be noted that Rawlley stayed away till the Hussainiwala bridgehead was lost. Although he did not approve withdrawal from the enclave, he did not countermand the order when Freemantle unfolded his withdrawal plan. Similarly, he let Ram Singh carry on with his succession of abortive attacks on the Pakistani lodgement in the Beriwala bridge area of Fazilka sector without any effort to influence the battle.

On the other hand, he was quick to visit and claim his share wherever there was a success, as at Dera Baba Nanak, the Sehjra bulge and the battle of BOPs between Ferozepur and Fazilka. He was ever ready to apportion the blame for failure and quick to grab the kudos for success, but in no way did he influence the battle. He was content to sit back and watch his formation commanders fight their little battles according to their own individual light.

But this has a background. When the Chinese invaded India in 1962, Rawlley commanded 11 Infantry Brigade in the Walong sector of the Northeast Frontier Agency. On contact with the enemy, he retreated hastily, blaming the ineptness of his unit commanders in battle. For this, he was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. In the 1965 conflict, he commanded 11 Infantry Division in the Rajasthan sector, where he lost considerable territory to Hur and Razakar irregulars, and into the bargain he sacked two brigadiers for inefficiency in battle. For this, he was awarded the Param Vashisht Sewa Medal.

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In 1971, he commanded XI Corps (once again the same number) and he compounded the loss of Kassowala and other enclaves, the Hussainiwala bridgehead, the Fazilka cotton tract, and the wanton destruction of Hussainiwala bridge and part of the headworks and the bridges over the Sabuna distributary and the Chand Bhan drain. Although he was quick to blame others because of the Chief’s earlier enunciated policy nobody, including himself, got sacked. He was perhaps the only corps commanderin the west who was not decorated in this war.